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Abstract 
To establish whether social property villages (“núcleos agrarios”) in indigenous, well-
watered parts of  Mexico are maintaining the same degree of village-scale control of water 
sources that they practiced before the neoliberal land tenure reforms of the 1990s, three sources 
of data were investigated in two regions: the Huasteca of San Luis Potosí state (home to 
indigenous Teenek, Nahua, and Pame residents, as well as non-indigenous people), and the 
Sierra Norte of Oaxaca state (home to indigenous Zapotec and Chinantec residents, and a smaller 
number of non-indigenous people). The three data sources were: 1. Archival documents at state 
offices of the National Agrarian Registry (Registro Agrario Nacional, or RAN); 2. Participatory 
research mapping (PRM) data acquired in fifteen villages, with the author as sole academic 
researcher in one of these (the Zapotec núcleo of Talea de Castro); 3. GIS (geodata) analysis of 
water sources (springs) and land tenure zones in both regions, encompassing about 460 social 
property núcleos as well as private and public lands. 
Neither spatially-defined ownership of land where water resources are located, nor 
conceptual rights and obligations (enacted through local practices), were found to have 
undergone extraordinary changes in the two decades since the neoliberal reforms were initiated. 
However, these reforms were found to have played a key role in the gradual shift in legal and 
practical emphasis away from a fusion of village and individual attachments to water sources 
(regardless of legal or locally-defined land tenure), and toward a simplified, spatially 
unambiguous distinction between village and individual land units, linked to a nationwide 
program of water rights concessions which favor the individual and the state over the village. 
This shift in emphasis is being successfully resisted in many villages, particularly in indigenous 
ones. This resistance often takes the form of creative engagement with state initiatives such as 
the 1993-2006 land surveying and certification program PROCEDE and its successor FANAR. 
Nevertheless, village orientation toward water partly depends on de facto, orally transmitted 
local practices which will vanish in some villages during the next several decades. 
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Resumen 
Para establecer si los pueblos de propiedad social (“núcleos agrarios”) en las regiones 
indígenas con agua abundante mantienen el mismo nivel de control de parte de los pueblos sobre 
los recursos acuáticos que practicaban antes de las reformas neoliberales de tenencia de tierra en 
los años 90, se investigó con tres fuentes de datos en dos zonas: la región Huasteca del estado de 
San Luis Potosí (donde viven los indígenas teenek, nahua, y pame, y también gente mestiza), y 
parte de la Sierra Norte de Oaxaca (donde viven los indígenas zapoteco y chinanteco, además 
gente mestiza). Las fuentes de datos eran: 1. Documentos históricos en las oficinas estatales del 
Registro Agrario Nacional (RAN); 2. Datos obtenidos a través de la investigación cartográfica 
participativa (ICP) en quince pueblos, con el autor como el único investigador académico en uno 
de ellos (el núcleo zapoteco Talea de Castro); 3. Análisis SIG (geodatos) de las fuentes acuáticas 
(manantiales) y las zonas de tenencia de tierra en ambas áreas de estudio, incluyendo 
aproximadamente 460 núcleos de propiedad social tanto como tierras privadas y públicas. 
Se determinó que ni el dueñazgo de tierra donde se encuentran los recursos acuáticos en 
términos espaciales, ni los derechos y las obligaciones (realizados a través de las prácticas 
locales), han cambiado en el extremo en las últimas dos décadas desde el comienzo de las 
reformas neoliberales. Lo que sí ha cambiado es el movimiento gradual en el énfasis legal y 
práctico desde una fusión de vínculos entre el pueblo, los individuos, y las fuentes acuáticas 
(independiente de la tenencia de legal o práctico de tierra), hacía una distinción simplificada y 
espacialmente inequívoca entre las unidades terrestres del pueblo y de los individuos, ligada a un 
programa nacional de concesiones de derechos hídricos que favorecen el individuo y el estado 
sobre el pueblo. Muchos pueblos rurales están resistiendo exitosamente este cambio de énfasis, 
especialmente en las zonas indígenas. En varios casos la resistencia corresponde a métodos 
creativos de entablar con las iniciativas gubernamentales como el PROCEDE (un programa de 
levantamiento y certificación de tierras entre 1993 y 2006) y su programa sucesor FANAR. No 
obstante, la posición comunal hacía el agua parcialmente depende de las prácticas de hecho, 
oralmente transmitidas, las cuales desvanecerán en algunos pueblos en las próximas décadas. 
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Preface 
My curiosity about indigenous Mexico began in 1992, when I mapped the forest, village, 
and golf course around the Maya archaeological site of Dzibilchaltún, Yucatán in a naïve but 
enthustiastic effort to document changes in the cultural landscape over the past two millennia. 
For much of the time between 1996 and 2004, I was fortunate to enjoy many opportunities to 
collaborate with local rural residents and experts in many fields related to conservation and 
development, often in and around the Calakmul Biosphere Reserve of Mexico’s Campeche state. 
One task assigned to me was to assist the ejidatarios of El Refugio in the surveying and 
demarcation of their de facto individual parcels and community forest reserve; I was only dimly 
aware at the time that PROCEDE had just months before surveyed their núcleo perimeter. 
From 2005 to 2008, I was honored to be a member of the multinational México Indígena 
research team, the proptotype for the American Geographical Society Bowman Expeditions. 
During the final months of the project, I traveled to the Rincón Bajo region of Oaxaca with 
Ángel Santos Santiago, and there began to consider the possible links between land and water in 
the evolving practices within indigenous villages.  
Well before I discovered that it had been the longtime research focus of Ralph Nader’s 
sister Laura, I was intrigued by the Zapotec village of Talea de Castro: an upland, water-rich, 
proudly indigenous comunidad which, unlike most of its Sierra Norte neighbors, had undergone 
PROCEDE surveying of individual parcels. Did Talea offer a glimpse of the future in rural 
indigenous Mexico? Luckily, the authorities and residents of the village were kind enough to let 
me try and find out. 
During research for this study, I was guided by many scholars, through their published 
works and conference presentations. Here I will just mention one work: Wageningen University 
(Netherlands) sociologist Monique Nuijten and Roskilde University (Denmark) then-doctoral 
student David Lorenzo’s chapter on Andean local property practices, published in Sikor and 
Lund’s 2009 edited volume The Politics of Possession: Property, Authority, and Access to 
Natural Resources. I was inspired by their articulation of the concept of a “practice force field 
approach” in contrast to a “system of property rules,” of property as “not a relationship between 
people and things but between people about things.” Drawing from Pierre Bordieu and Loïc 
vi 
 
Wacquant’s (1992) approach of seeing “the field as the locus of relations of force and not of 
rule,” Nuijten and Lorenzo “give a central place, however, to ‘rule talk’, the ways in which 
people claim rights to land, frame their explanations of property relations in normative terms, 
and express themselves about categories of villagers with different privileges and obligations” 
(Nuijten and Lorenzo 2009, 79-80). 
In text passages with content derived from fieldwork in villages, human subjects who held 
public office during my visit (e.g., presidente del comisariado ejidal or presidente de bienes 
comunales), or who gave permission to be included in map legends for published community 
maps developed through participatory research mapping (PRM, a technique described on pages 
73-74), are quoted or mentioned using their real names. Other village residents are given 
pseudonyms, and identified in the References section with a dagger symbol (†). After fieldwork 
had been completed and their PRM community maps delivered, two of the México Indígena 
PRM communities, Tiltepec and Yagila, requested that their maps be withdrawn from public 
access and that any personal data developed during their production be destroyed. The México 
Indígena team immediately complied with these requests. The water source and de facto land 
tenure information for these two comunidades that I draw from in this study was developed 
independently of the México Indígena community map work, and was collected with the 
permission of the individuals and communities involved. 
All translations of Spanish texts are mine. 
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Glossary   
CDI     Mexico’s federal commission for indigenous affairs. 
civic parcel     A parcel surveyed by PROCEDE in a núcleo’s area of individual parcels, but 
assigned to the núcleo itself. It is not an official term. 
comisariado     The “mayor” of a núcleo agrario. Technically, the term also includes the 
mayor’s secretary and treasurer.   
common use area     Land determined by a núcleo assembly to be neither a human settlement 
nor an area of individual parcels, but which exists to benefit all núcleo members. In 
practice, often a rugged, wooded area with poor soils. 
comunero/a     Official member (usually, a descendant of an original head of household) of a 
comunidad agraria. The assembly of comuneros is the highest village-level authority. 
comunidad     Short for comunidad agraria. A núcleo formed when the federal government 
recognized its residents as having “presumably held possession of the lands, forests, and 
waters since time immemorial, with communal customs and practices.” 
CONAGUA     Mexico’s federal water commission. 
consejo de vigilancia     Three-member “security council” of a núcleo agrario, mainly 
responsible for ensuring the three-member comisariado fulfills its duties. 
DAAC      Predecessor of the SRA (federal agriculture ministry). 
de facto     “As practiced in real life.” In this study, this usually refers to land tenure designations 
recognized within a village community, but not part of the state-sanctioned legal system. 
Von Benda-Beckmann, von Benda-Beckmann, and Wiber (2006, 13) call these expressions 
of “concretized property relations.”  
de jure     “According to law.” In this study, this usually refers to land tenure designations as 
recognized by the state, according to the most recent “agrarian action” (official ruling 
which follows a government land survey). Von Benda-Beckmann, von Benda-Beckmann, 
and Wiber (2006, 13) call these expressions of “categorical property relations.” 
dominio pleno     Fully privatized title to a property, akin to “fee simple” in common law. 
GAIA     A public GIS web portal maintained by INEGI which has sometimes included spatial 
data layers depicting all núcleos, grandes areas, and parcels surveyed by PROCEDE until 
its closure in 2006, and some territories subsequently surveyed by FANAR. 
gran area (pl. grandes areas)     PROCEDE-surveyed land tenure zones within a núcleo. The 
potential categories are “human settlement area,” “parceled area,” and “common use area.” 
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ejidatario/a     Official member (usually, a descendant of an original head of household) of an 
ejido. The assembly of ejidatarios is the highest village-level authority. 
ejido     A núcleo formed when the federal government granted an eligible group of farmers a 
territory that, in most cases, had been formed by the government’s having condemned one 
or more (or part of a) private property found to exceed the limits set by the land reform 
mechanisms established after the Mexican Revolution of 1910-1920. 
FANAR     Successor to PROCEDE, without that program’s guarantee of no cost to the núcleo 
for its surveying and certifying services.  
human settlement area     A legal term for the part or parts of a núcleo where most or all of the 
permanent houses are clustered. A population center that has been surveyed by PROCEDE. 
Synonymous with “urban zone.” 
localidad     1. An INEGI rural census tract, geospatially regarded as a point. 2. In PROCEDE 
maps, a population center in a region dominated by social property which lacks official 
status as a núcleo.   
INEGI     Mexico’s federal bureau of the census, of statistics, and of publicly available 
geographical and cartographical products. 
manantial     A common Spanish word for “spring,” in the sense of “water source.” 
mestizo     The common Mexican term for someone who is not regarded as indigenous, or does 
not regard themselves as such. In some countries the equivalent term is “ladino.” 
México Indígena     A 2005-2008 research project which used participatory research mapping 
(PRM) and other methods to illuminate cultural geographic issues in indigenous Mexico. 
The team brought together professors, students, and local residents from Canada, the 
United States, and Mexico, with guidance mainly from scholars at the University of 
Kansas, the Universidad Autónoma de San Luis Potosí, and the Foreign Military Studies 
Office of Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 
municipio     In Mexico, a county-level administrative unit. 
núcleo     Short for núcleo agrario, an official term used by the Mexican social property 
bureaucracy but rare in the “real world,” where terms like agencia municipal, pueblo, and 
comunidad are more common. An ejido or comunidad agraria; in essence, the territory 
legally associated with a village-scale assembly of ejidatarios or comuneros. 
PES     “Payment(s) for Environmental Services.” A program, usually operated by a government 
agency, which directs funds from natural resource beneficiaries (e.g., urban or industrial 
water users) to landowners who may incur opportunity costs by engaging in practices 
which protect the abundance or quality of that resource. 
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PHINA     An online, publicly accessible database of basic facts and legal histories of Mexico’s 
núcleos agrarios. 
pozo     Literally a “well,” but used  by some villagers to also refer to a spring or other water 
uptake point which has been only partly modified by humans. Also used by CONAGUA to 
mean a “motorized pump well” (in contrast with a noria, a well lacking a motorized pump). 
PRM     “Participatory research mapping”: the application of “participatory methodology to 
make standard maps and descriptive information […] combining cartography and 
ethnography” (Herlihy and Knapp 2003, 307). 
PROCEDE     The massive Mexican federal program, enabled by the 1992 land tenure law 
reforms, which officially surveyed and certified the vast majority of núcleos, as well as (in 
most cases) their grandes areas, their individual parcels, and their individual solares. The 
program ran from 1993 to 2006, after which its functions were transferred to a smaller 
program called FANAR. 
RAN     The Registro Agrario Nacional, the federal agency within the SRA responsible for 
recording land rights to social property núcleos.   
Resolución Presidencial     A document in which the federal government “recognizes and 
assigns to a núcleo all the assets which form it, whether they be agrarian lands or resources 
such as waters, forests, mines, tourist or fishing resources, etcetera.”     
RTBC    Reconocimiento y Titulación de Bienes Comunales. A mid- to late-20th-century effort 
by the SRA to more or less accurately survey, and officially recognize the existence of, 
comunidades agrarias.     
social property     The type of land tenure which comprises, in Mexico, ejidos and comunidades. 
solar     (pl. solares)     A single lot within the human settlement area of a núcleo; it usually 
contains a house or other building. Unlike with an parcel, its owner is granted full title 
(dominio pleno) as soon as PROCEDE work is completed. The space in a solar adjacent to 
the house is sometimes called a “home garden,” “kitchen garden,” or “dooryard garden” 
(Altieri 1995, 125). 
special area     In PROCEDE parlance, a public right of way in a núcleo agrario.  
SRA     The Secretaria de la Reforma Agraria, a federal ministry established in 1974 and 
expanded in 1992 which handles matters of social property and national lands. 
tequio     The Mexican Spanish word for obligatory community work practices by members of a 
núcleo agrario. A more general Spanish term is faena, although this word is also used for 
the feudal forced labor practice called “corvée” in French and English. 
toma     A place where water is taken from a stream or water body for transport to a water use 
location.  
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1.  Introduction  
This study seeks to augment the body of scholarship focused on the evolving and spatially 
varied relationships among individuals in village-scale communities, particularly as this 
individual-community nexus is mediated or directed by the state, particularly by national 
governments. Mexico is an ideal place to explore these developments. Throughout its Pre-
Columbian and colonial history, and as its national character was essentially forged through its 
early 20th century revolution, the interplay among individuals, village-sized communities, and 
the state has played a crucial role. This theme has taken on renewed importance in recent 
decades, as Mexico’s democratic institutions rapidly modernize, and as its ties to the global 
economy and culture are ever strengthened.  
The interplay among individuals, village-scale communities, and the state is continuously 
and eternally evolving. However, distinct, concentrated episodes do periodically occur when the 
evolution is especially rapid and profound. One such episode took place in Mexico, and in many 
other countries, during the 1990s and early 2000s: the neoliberal state ideology which produced 
legal reforms in land tenure, natural resource management, and the protection of domestic 
products in the global marketplace. The most conspicuous reaction to these reforms was the 
indigenous-dominated Zapatista Rebellion in Chiapas state in 1993. This study compares certain 
geographical aspects of village culture as they were practiced before and after the neoliberal 
reforms. 
Land tenure practices and their relationships to place-specific natural resources are 
geographic subject matters which are especially sensitive to these individual-village-state 
interactions, both materially and symbolically. For this study, I chose to focus on the natural 
resource of water, particularly the water source – any place, representable on a map as a point, 
where humans have invested in infrastructure to divert water from its natural path for their own 
use.  
Most scholarship has concentrated on village-scale, regional, and national water rights 
structures and practices in water-poor areas, where irrigation – the artificial transport of water for 
agricultural use – is common (e.g., Worster 1985; Yetman 2000; Boelens and Gelles 2005; 
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Wilder and Whiteford 2006). I chose instead to focus on water-rich areas, where well-developed 
rights structures are less likely to already be in place. These communities may thus be more 
vulnerable to legal and cultural difficulties, as changing water rights and land tenure practices 
collide with an increasing regional demand for water – a demand augmented by population 
movements, climate changes, and a shift from subsistence farming to commercial (especially 
export) agriculture. 
Two caveats must be acknowledged. First, except in a few places in the world, it is 
unlikely that water will ever be a “resource curse” to the degree that, for example, petroleum has 
been in Nigeria. In general, long-distance water transport is rarely feasible or economically 
necessary, and when it does occur tends to only affect a few villages directly.1 Second, water is 
in some ways a poor choice to study in connection with land tenure. In physical terms, water of 
its own accord often transports itself from one property to the next. In legal terms, the Mexican 
Constitution (Article 27, paragraph 5) states that water is fundamentally owned by the nation as a 
whole. 
At the very least, the symbolic power of water can be enormous, and this symbolism can 
have real political and social consequences. This can be especially conequential in indigenous 
areas where, almost by definition, important aspects of territorial claims predate the state and 
thus stand partly in opposition to it.2 Furthermore, just through the process of investigating the 
water source ownership and management practices, one can learn important facts about land 
tenure in general, and about the relationships among the village, the individual, and the state. The 
findings arising from such research are more likely to be accurate and valuable when much of the 
data is collected through methods such as participatory research mapping (PRM) and a close 
reading of previously untranslated documents stored in public archives not accessible through the 
Internet (the PRM technique is described in subsection 3.2, on pages 73 and 74). 
 
                                                        
1 In section 1.3 I review examples of long-distance and medium-distance water transport systems in Mexico. 
2 For example, in their 2003 proposed changes to the Peruvian Constitution, a coalition of indigenous groups 
stated that “indigenous or ancestral peoples predate the state and have their own social, economic, cultural, and 
political institutions, their territory and they identify themselves as such” (Parellada 2003, 135). 
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1.1   Hypothesis and main concepts 
My hypothesis is that indigenous, water-rich communities in Mexico are maintaining the 
same degree of village-scale control (meaning, management and locally-defined “ownership”) of 
water sources that they practiced before the neoliberal land tenure reforms of the 1990s. 
1.1.1 Land tenure, neoliberalism, and social property 
As the 1991 breakup of the Soviet Union seemed to signal the triumph of free-market 
capitalism over state-planned economies, global finance organizations such as the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund increased their pressure on states in the developing world to 
lead the charge in a “neoliberal turn,” toward state mechanisms which support “strong individual 
property rights, the rule of law, and the institutions of freely functioning markets and free trade” 
(Harvey 2005, 64). Mexico’s federal government enthusiastically embraced this shift in 1992 
when the Harvard-trained president Carlos Salinas de Gortari, encouraged by the World Bank, 
saw an opportunity to renew the vigor and esteem of his Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) 
through constitutional and statutory reforms (Loewe and Taylor 2008, 7). The PRI had controlled 
the country for seventy years but was starting to lose the confidence of the Mexican public, 
particularly since a 1982 debt crisis driven by overdependence on volatile oil exports (Collier 
2005, 88). 
A caricature of the neoliberal ideal of property, common since Friedrich von Hayek 
popularized neoliberal economics in his 1944 book The Road to Serfdom, is one of pure, 
individual ownership, unfettered by any communal or government interest or intrusion. In 
actuality, even the most ardent pro-market, pro-privatization advocates recognize that any piece 
of land has a complex bundle of rights and obligations through which human beings (as 
individuals, groups, and states) choose to link it to other human beings (Powelson 1988, ix; 
Demarest 2011, 264). According to economist and social theorist Thomas Sowell (1980, 213), 
“every economic activity under every conceivable form of society has been planned. What 
differs are the decision making units that do the planning.” 
7 
 
  
Likewise, left-leaning social scientists and other advocates for indigenous rights and 
cultural survival have been caricatured as promoting a romantic ideal of purely communal land 
tenure. This ideal is well expressed by, for example, independent anthropologist Jaime Martínez 
Luna, resident of a village within this dissertation’s study areas (Martínez Luna 2003, 22). Any 
scholar, no matter how sympathetic to village-based and indigenous cultures, understands that all 
social situations include both individual and communitarian elements (Rendón Monzón 2003). 
Political scientist Todd Eisenstadt (2011, 71) recently observed that: 
The macro-historical processes underlying group solidarity in Chiapas and 
individualism in Oaxaca underscore the micro-institutional differences in each state’s 
land tenure structure. Rural dwellers in Chiapas made the transition from corporatist 
subjects to democratic (or quasi-democratic) citizens as a result of solidarity, 
collective action, and the formation of region-wide social networks surrounding the 
Zapatista movement. This contrasts markedly with political developments in Oaxaca, 
where colonial legal deeds to entire villages gave citizens control and a sense of 
political autonomy that allowed for individually-based property rights and community 
relations. 
 
In sum, neither a purely private property regime, nor a purely social one, has ever existed 
in practice. Any system will be a negotiation, a contested set of practices at village, multi-village, 
and pan-ethnic scales, with experiments and hybrid solutions as responses to internal and 
external events and pressures: 
Eric Wolf and other anthropologists reformulated the concept of closed Indian 
communities. Instead of being the remnants of Mesoamerican civilization, the tightly 
knit villages in Oaxaca and elsewhere in southeastern Mexico were seen as the 
product of a Spanish colonization strategy that sought to isolate and divide Indian 
peoples. Indian villagers themselves took advantage of these ‘closed, corporate 
communities’ to isolate and defend themselves against the incursion of outsiders. 
(Barry 1995, 180, paraphrasing Wolf 1986) 
What is especially worrisome is that the discourse of consensus [in indigenous 
Chiapas] has been transformed into a demagogic instrument to justify to outsiders all 
sorts of excluding, authoritarian, and anti-democratic practices, under cover of a 
supreme right to distinctiveness and a defense of ‘traditional’ culture.  
(Sonnleitner 2001, 125)  
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The renewed emphasis on individual land ownership is just one element of the neoliberal 
turn. Other elements include increased commercialization and monetization of human practices; 
increased mobility of goods, information, money, and people (which, in rural Mexico, often 
translates into ever-increasing roles for emigration and remittances); and, a call for (supposedly) 
universally shared individual rights to prevail over certain local cultural norms, even at the cost 
of loss of autonomy and distinctiveness among indigenous groups and ethnic minorities. Even 
within the specific realm of land tenure reform, the neoliberal emphasis is not just on the private 
individual, but also on the more general task of bringing the state’s de jure records (i.e., 
expanded cadastre) into alignment with the de facto reality of land tenure practices. Ironically, by 
requiring the state to impose its standards on local property systems, this effort runs counter to 
the overall neoliberal goal of reducing the state’s presence. Historian Raymond Craib (2004) tells 
how the Mexican state enacted a similar property surveying effort during the late 19th-century 
Porfiriato period to which the Mexican Revolution was a violent reaction – roughly 
simultaneously with the Dawes Act (1887) and Curtis Act (1908), through which Indian tribes in 
the United States were forcibly assimilated through the privatized individualization of their land 
tenure (McDonnell 1991, 15). 
In this study, the term “social property” refers to all lands where the post-Revolution 
Mexican federal government gave legal recognition to a village-scale group of persons as de jure 
owners of a defined territory. By the 1980s, about fifty percent of Mexico’s land area was social 
property (INEGI 2001a). A social property village in Mexico is either an ejido, its land granted 
by the state following the expropriation of a large private property, or it is a comunidad agraria 
(often called simply a “comunidad”), its land identified as having been in possession of the 
villagers “since time immemorial” (INEGI 2007). About 91 percent of social property villages 
are ejidos (de Gortari 1997, 16). In legal documents, ejidos and comunidades – i.e., all social 
property villages – are collectively called núcleos agrarios, or just núcleos. 
It must be stressed from the outset is that “social property” and “indigenous” are not 
equivalent terms. Unlike in some other countries, in Mexico “indigenous” as a legal designation 
attaches neither to individuals nor to territories (Roldán Ortega 2004, 12), although the concept is 
applied for government planning purposes and does appear in various local, state, and 
nationwide statutes. Within social property, nearly all residents of comunidades (known as 
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comuneros) are indigenous in some sense, but only about half of the ejido residents (known as 
ejidatarios) are indigenous. Almost one third of Mexico’s comunidades are in the state of 
Oaxaca (de Gortari 1997, 19), which is also the state with the highest diversity of indigenous 
languages (de Ávila Blomberg 2004, 483). 
1.1.2 The village and the núcleo  
A núcleo is a legally-defined territory in the social property areas of Mexico smaller than 
a municipio (county) (INEGI 2007). Each núcleo is simultaneously a piece of property and a 
jurisdictional unit (administrative area). As a property, it is or was collectively owned by a well-
defined group of people who are a subset (usually a majority, occasionally all) of the heads of 
household who live within the núcleo. If the núcleo is an ejido, these members are called 
ejidatarios; if it is a comunidad, they are called comuneros. As a jurisdictional unit, the núcleo’s 
population is larger than this membership list: it includes spouses, children, non-member heads 
of household (sometimes called pobladores or avecindados), and, increasingly (though still 
uncommonly), ex-members who have chosen to fully title their individual agricultural parcels 
through dominio pleno (fee simple), a process enabled by the 1992 agrarian reforms. I use 
“villagers” or “village residents” to refer to all the people living in a núcleo, and “ejidatarios” or 
“comuneros” to refer to just the núcleo members. 
In most respects, a núcleo is a village. If you ask someone where they live, they will 
usually give you the name of their núcleo, though they will probably think of it as a pueblo, 
comunidad, or ejido, because the term “núcleo” is a recent legal invention of the Mexican 
government. Most decisions associated with village life are made by the assembly of núcleo 
members, and whatever village rituals and collective activities still exist mainly operate at the 
núcleo scale. Among Mexican indigenous groups, the awareness or recognition of larger ethnic 
territories is generally understated or inactive when compared to most indigenous groups in, for 
example, Central America. Even the Huichols, a Mexican indigenous group noted for its 
unusually high degree of regional-scale territorial actualization, acquire formal landowning 
power only at the núcleo scale (Liffman 2011, 18). 
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Why do I use the word “village” at all in this study? Why do I not simply always use 
núcleo? I do this because the word “village” is more broadly applicable. It has a particular 
(though not always precisely defined) geographic meaning which allows comparison with 
situations in countries beyond Mexico. Even just within my geodata analysis areas, “village” can 
refer to congregations of households that are not núcleos, because they are not social property. In 
some cases, such villages were clearly never associated with social property practices, and 
function much like villages or townships in the United States. In a few cases, some social 
property ethos did (and probably still does) exist in the village, but a federal judge has decided 
that not enough exists to bestow official recognition as a núcleo. 
When I discuss village-scale practices and culture in contrast to other scales (e.g., the 
individual scale), I generally use the word “village.” For example, in chapter 6, I contrast village-
scale water items (e.g., potable water supply for homes) with sub-village-group-scale items (e.g., 
a shared irrigation system) and individual-scale items (e.g., a 50-m length of hose carrying water 
from a stream to an individual’s coffee processing place). I use “practice” to mean a human 
action which is repeated by many people, usually over a span of time. An “item” is a material 
cultural artifact which embodies a practice. A set of practices may together suggest an 
“orientation”; in this study, I focus on “village-scale orientation” and “individual-scale 
orientation.” For brevity, I will often omit the word “scale.” In place of “orientation,” I might 
have used “inclination” or “ethos.” “Worldview” is another near-synonym, one which I avoided 
due to the essentialist connotations some ascribe to it (Beine 2010, 2). 
Why do I use the word núcleo at all? Why not always use “village” instead? I do this 
because it is the more precise, unambiguous term for the units associated with most of the data in 
this study. For example, I researched hundreds of documents in various National Agrarian 
Registry (RAN) archives; these papers are separated into a separate folder for each núcleo. 
Similarly, my participatory research mapping was conducted as essentially separate projects in 
each of 13 núcleos. Only my geodata analysis areas are defined not by núcleos, but rather by 
1:50,000-scale government-produced topographic maps; but even the geodata findings depend 
partly on núcleo-scale land tenure information. 
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If I were to use “village” when referring to data pertaining to an entire núcleo territory, 
one ambiguity which could arise is that “village” is also used colloquially to refer to a compact 
population center, in contrast to the fields and forests around it. I use three terms for such a 
congregation of houses and buildings. The general term is “population center.” When discussing 
núcleos which have had government land survey work done since the 1992 reforms, I use a more 
specific phrase: “human settlement area” (asentamiento humano). This is a legal term used by 
RAN (along with with “urban zone”) for a population center which has been formally surveyed 
as such (INEGI 2007). Since the 1992 reforms, nearly all núcleos whose agricultural areas have 
been certified as individual parcels have also had their human settlement areas fully titled – not 
just certified – as individual house lots (solares). Because certification is merely a step toward 
titling, the distinction is important. 
Sometimes a núcleo includes several human settlement areas within its territory. Usually, 
one of these is clearly a “village” while the others are better characterized as “hamlets,” and the 
inhabitants of the hamlets consider themselves residents of the entire núcleo. In a few cases, 
however, two or more village-sized settlements have been included within a single legally 
defined núcleo territory. In such cases the residents generally identify most strongly with their 
particular village, and see the fact that they share a núcleo with another village as a mere 
technicality, and sometimes also as a point of conflict.  
A third term for a population center is “localidad,” a technical term with two distinct 
meanings. The federal census and cartography agency INEGI uses the word to refer to a rural 
census tract, conceived as a point on the earth’s surface representing a collection of homes 
ranging in scale from a farmstead to a small town. RAN uses “localidad” to refer to a village-
scale entity which lies within a municipio that is mainly social property, but is not itself a núcleo 
nor part of any núcleo territory, although its residents can be members of a neighboring núcleo 
(INEGI 2002b). 
Talea, the núcleo in the state of Oaxaca where I conducted the most thorough participatory 
research mapping for this study, is an odd case whose peculiarity illustrates the importance of 
using these terms properly. It appears to be a normal núcleo, with a bustling population center, a 
secondary hamlet, fields, orchards, and forests. However, during the PROCEDE process, the 
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núcleo members chose to separate their territory into two entities. The núcleo proper includes the 
fields, the orchards, the forests, and the secondary hamlet. The second entity, the population 
center where most of the núcleo members (and other residents) live, is a separate unit whose 
boundaries were technically never surveyed by PROCEDE, though in effect they were, since the 
inner boundary of the núcleo “donut” is identical to the outer boundary of the population center 
“hole.” This population center is a localidad in the sense used by RAN, and its affairs are 
administered by the municipio (county) of which Talea is the seat (cabecera). The two entities 
have distinct legal names: the núcleo is “San Miguel Talea de Castro,” while the localidad is 
“Villa Talea de Castro.” For most purposes, however, it would be ridiculous to think of both 
entities as anything but a single village, one which local people refer to as “Talea” when 
speaking Spanish, or “Raleha” when speaking Zapotec. 
1.1.3 The PROCEDE process 
In this study, “PROCEDE” is used to refer to the project of neoliberal land tenure reform 
in Mexico. PROCEDE is an acronym for Programa de Certificación de Derechos Ejidales y 
Titulación de Solares Urbanos (Program for Certification of Ejido Rights and Titling of Urban 
Lots), the massive surveying, certifying, and titling effort which the Mexican federal government 
undertook from January 1993 to December 2006, after changes to the federal Constitution in 
January 1992 allowed for the individual ownership and eventual privatization of social property 
parcels. The program represented a temporary collaboration among three federal agencies: the 
Procuraduría Agraria, a legal bureau which communicated with and assessed núcleo members; 
the RAN, which registered and distributed certificates and titles; and INEGI, which supervised 
the actual surveying work and its cartographic products (Zepeda Lecuona 1998, 6). In each 
núcleo, work proceeded in seven stages: coordination and agreement; raising of awareness 
among all [núcleo] residents; informational meeting; meeting for the report of the Auxiliary 
Commission [núcleo leaders in their role as assistants to the surveying process]; surveying and 
production of maps; the Asamblea de Delimitación, Destino, y Asignación de Tierras (meeting to 
ratify the delimitation, purpose, and assigned ownership of lands); and the distributing of legal 
documents (Zepeda Lecuona 1998, 7). 
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Before PROCEDE, formal, legal descriptions of individual parcels were unstandardized, 
haphazardly archived by government entities at various scales, and of limited utility beyond the 
núcleo itself. In the comunidad of Cuatlamayán, the México Indígena team was “shown an 
example of a legally binding, yet non-PROCEDE, hand-drawn parcel map, produced locally with 
assistance from the federal indigenous institute” (Herlihy et al. 2008, 67). With or without such 
written documentation, parcel transactions did occur in nearly all núcleos, as well attested in the 
literature and in the present study (chapter 5). These transactions varied in their degrees of 
formality and legality, from entirely legal inheritance by an owner’s child, to quasi-legal 
transactions among residents of a núcleo, to illegal transactions with outsiders. 
By the end of the PROCEDE program in 2006, 91.2 percent of the country’s officially 
recognized ejidos and comunidades had had at least their territorial perimeters surveyed, and the 
great majority of these also had individual parcels surveyed and certified (INEGI 2008). The 
“holdouts” to individual parcel surveying were mainly concentrated in certain indigenous, 
rugged areas of the southern states of Oaxaca and Chiapas, as well as other pockets of resistance 
such as the 1980s-settled ejidos in the Calakmul forest of Campeche. Many of these núcleos 
rejected the program explicitly, while others were not allowed to undergo PROCEDE work until 
certain boundary conflicts with neighboring villages or landowners were resolved. Since 2006, 
the government has extended the lifespan of PROCEDE (although without PROCEDE’s no-cost 
guarantee) through a successor program called FANAR (Fondo de Apoyo para Núcleos Agrarios 
sin Regularizar, “Assistance Fund for Unregularized Agrarian Núcleos”) in the expectation that 
many de facto individual parcels in remaining non-PROCEDE-parceled núcleos will eventually 
achieve de jure status through certification.   
In this study I compare individual and village orientation before and after the 1992 
reforms. For those study núcleos which underwent PROCEDE or FANAR surveying, the actual 
work occurred at various times during the first 15 years (1993 to 2008) of reform 
implementation. 
In their standard template for PROCEDE and FANAR work (Figure 1.1), the government 
envisioned that most núcleo assemblies would chose to have their de facto tenure areas legally 
divided into areas among three tenure types, collectively called grandes areas (“big areas”). The  
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Figure 1.1. Standard template for PROCEDE surveying and certification, as depicted in 
publicly distributed PROCEDE reports as a map of an unnamed or fictitious núcleo. 
(Source: INEGI 2006b, 3). 
 
 
three tenure types are common use areas, parceled areas, and human settlement areas. (Figure 5.3 
on page 211 shows part of a PROCEDE parcel area map, while Figure 6.7 on page 261 shows 
the pattern of individual PROCEDE-surveyed parcels in another núcleo.) 
Each land tenure type is linked to individual persons via a distinct legal document. If there 
are one or more PROCEDE-surveyed common use areas, each ejidatario or comunero receives a 
certificate stating that they share in their ownership of the entire area, even though in some cases 
de facto individual parcels (often temporary ones) do exist within them (Smith et al. 2009, 182). 
If there are PROCEDE-surveyed parceled areas, each ejidatario or comunero receives an 
individually customized certificate (Figure 1.2), including a legal description of neighboring 
properties, a GIS-drawn map of boundary segments and vertices, and a list which gives both 
relative azimuths and distances of boundary segments and absolute vertex coordinates, often in 
UTM, with centimeter precision. If an ejidatario or comunero owns several parcels, as is typical, 
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he or she receives a separate certificate for each one. While a parcel certificate confers to an 
individual an unprecedented degree of direct legal ownership over a well-defined plot of land, it 
is not a full title (dominio pleno); I will discuss dominio pleno in the next sub-section. 
If there are one or more human settlement areas, each ejidatario or comunero receives full 
title (domino pleno) for their solar (house lot) without the need for further steps. Evidently, the 
neoliberal reformers in the Mexican government deemed that the post-Revolution social property 
promise was, at most, directed toward agricultural lands and other relatively large plots, despite 
the fact that much food production and biodiversity management does in fact take place on 
solares (Ayalón-Gamboa and Gurri-García 2008; Aguilar-Støen, Moe, and Camargo Ricalde 
2009).  
Figure 1.2. Front (left) and back (right) of a parcel certificate delivered to an individual 
ejidatario after PROCEDE surveying. “C. Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León” was the 
president of Mexico when the parcels and common use areas of this Huasteca study núcleo 
were surveyed. Personal information is redacted. (Source: México Indígena database). 
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Different núcleo assemblies chose to allow distinct types of PROCEDE work to take place 
in their territories. In other words, only a subset of núcleos conformed to the standard 
government template depicted in Figure 1.1. In contrast some of those núcleos which did not do 
PROCEDE work at all, all núcleos which did “partial” PROCEDE work did so entirely on their 
own accord, never because existing conflicts or other issues caused the government to disallow 
participation. The spatial pattern such resistance and partial accommodation to PROCEDE is 
highly clustered, as a brief look at Figure 7.1 (page 300) and Figure 7.2 (page 305) reveals. In 27 
percent of the PROCEDE-parceled núcleos, the “resistance” took the form of not including any 
common use area (INEGI 2008); that is, in at least one sense, the villagers chose to apportion 
their territories in a less “village-oriented” manner than envisioned in the template. This was 
sometimes because no de facto common use area existed previously, and other times because a 
highly individual-oriented núcleo took the opportunity to divide up a common use area among its 
members (Hernández Cendejas 2008). 
Among my 33 RAN document study núcleos, PROCEDE was more commonly resisted 
and accommodated instead by having some surveying work done, but stopping short of creating 
any areas with de jure individual parcels. Figures 5.1.1 through 5.1.9 (pages 195 to 203) depict in 
map form the types of PROCEDE surveying and certification work performed in all 33 núcleos, 
and are arranged in order from “least PROCEDE work” to “most PROCEDE work.” Lighter 
colors represent more village-oriented de jure land tenure areas, while darker colors show more 
individual-oriented ones. The most basic PROCEDE survey is simply of the núcleo territorial 
boundary, a step often taken to prevent future inter-village boundary disputes (Figures 5.1.3 to 
5.1.5). Some núcleos (Figure 5.1.5) took the step of having PROCEDE certify a few individual 
parcels for civic purposes, while leaving the actual parceled areas in legal common use, thus 
inverting the intentions of the program. Figure 5.1.6 depicts comunidades which conformed most 
closely to the standard template by having individual parcels certified, while Figure 5.1.7 and 
5.1.9 show ejidos which did this; but even in these núcleos, there were interesting variations 
which I will discuss in other sections. 
In addition to the three grandes areas (land tenure types), in maps and documents 
PROCEDE would usually dedicate a small portion of a núcleo’s land to a fourth type sometimes 
called “special areas,” and other times “infrastructure and other.” These are essentially rights-of-
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way or easements, for purposes beneficial to the public beyond the núcleo such as highways and 
waterways. This tenure type was rarely explained clearly in the same brochures which described 
the grandes areas (the narrow, hockey-stick-shaped polygon near the southern edge of the 
parceled area in Figure 1.1 represents one, albeit unlabeled). Its status in the official documents 
is also confusing: it is apparently not owned by the núcleo itself (though it is under its 
jurisdiction), nor by any of its individual members, but its area is nevertheless included in some 
lists of gran area totals. I will explain in sub-section 1.1.6 how these “special areas” relate to 
Mexican constitutional concepts of water, and consider specific examples in sub-section 6.1.2. 
1.1.4 Defining “privatization” in the context of PROCEDE 
The 1992 neoliberal-influenced land reforms in Mexico were realized through changes to 
both the Constitution (Cámara de Diputados 2004), and to the Agrarian Law which regulates and 
directs actual policy (Congreso de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos 1992). “The changes aim at 
giving legal tenure security while promoting capitalization, protection, and strengthening of 
agricultural communities through ejidal and communal property” (Herlihy et al. 2008, 10). 
Once a núcleo has had its individual parcels surveyed, several more steps must be taken 
before any parcels are fully privatized (dominio pleno). If it is a comunidad,3 it must decide to 
convert itself into an ejido; “In a twist that may exaggerate the difference between comunidades 
and ejidos, the 1992 reforms […] specifically spelled out that only ejidos would be allowed to 
gain full, private rights and land titles” (Perramond 2010, 52). I am aware of just two 
comunidad-to-ejido conversions within my geodata analysis areas, the núcleos of La Palma and 
Ixtlapalaco in the Huasteca (Ledesma Barragán 2009).  
If it is an ejido, first the village assembly must approve the possibility of full title, by a 
two-thirds majority (Brown 2004, 20). Then, finally, any individual ejidatario can obtain this 
title, by taking the following steps which appeared in posters at each state RAN office: “1. Pay 
180 pesos; 2. Go to RAN with elector card and original parcel certifícate, and fill out form 
                                                        
3 Legally speaking, in a comunidad, the núcleo is the owner (dueño), while the individual is the worker 
(trabajador), authorized by that owner to work its land – exactly as a private, individual owner of an ejido 
parcel could authorize anyone to work their land (Ledesma Barragán 2009). 
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Solicitud de la Expedición de Títulos de Propiedad para la Adopción de Dominio Pleno sobre 
Parcelas; 3. Wait 90 days; 4. Go to RAN to pick up title.” From that point on, the document will 
be filed in the county’s cadastral office, just like any other private lot – and, incidentally, the 
state can keep track of its ownership every time it changes hands, something it was unable to do 
during the full social property era.4 So far, this happens rarely; as of 2006, “only 0.94 percent of 
the social sector’s surface area and 0.43 percent of the ejidos have adopted full ownership; most 
of these are situated in peripherally urban areas, and thus are interested in selling their lands at a 
higher price” (de Ita 2006, 158). 
Some would argue that PROCEDE only equates with “privatization” for those few (so far) 
parcels which have attained full individual title in this way. Others, however, point out that there 
are two other changes in the laws which could be interpreted as a partial “privatization.” The first 
is that the certificate given to each comunero or ejidatario acknowledging their usufruct rights to 
the common use area (which, for núcleos with only the perimeter surveyed, means the entire 
núcleo) can now be transferred to someone else within the núcleo (Lonzano 2008). In practical 
terms, this means that an individual villager can collect (surely meaning “buy”) many common 
use certificates. By itself, this change is not extreme (Linck 1999, 132). 
The second change is that now, the núcleo can grant leases – “association agreements” – 
to third parties to use their common use land for a period of time (Lonzano 2008). This is also 
not a radical change in itself. Ejidos and comunidades have always granted concessions, to 
timber companies and other commercial concerns, for the extraction of natural resources from 
their land. The new law modernizes and standardizes this process, bringing it closer to the kind 
of business deal where the núcleo members, as “junior partners,” are a step further away from 
controlling their property. I suspect that it is the combination of the first and second changes 
which will bring some villagers closer to individualized land-based commercial enterprise, 
leaving other villagers out of the deal. The Mexican leftist scholar and political organizer Julio 
Moguel asserted (1998, 17): 
                                                        
4 The Mexican cadastral system is embedded in its statutory law, but its basic principles of an updated state 
registry (in place of a complex history of deeds for each property) were first enshrined in a common-law 
context, by South Australia’s premier Robert Torrens in 1858 (Linklater 2003, 210). 
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The new legislative frame also changes the legal condition of the indigenous 
community – which, we have seen, can move to privatization if it first converts to an 
ejido regime. But it can at the same time ‘associate itself’ and transmit the domain of 
common use areas to merchant and civil societies. This path to privatization was 
ratified and extended by the Forest Law approved in 1992, under a scheme similar to 
that put in place by the military junta in Chile in 1974, which based it in large pine 
and eucalyptus plantations. 
 
The words “private” and “property” share a Latin root meaning “one’s own, belonging to 
an individual, set apart from state or public ownership” (closely related words include “proper” – 
apt for a single purpose – and “property” in the sense of a characteristic of a single thing or 
person). In the context of Mexican rural land tenure, most legal scholars and real estate agents 
clearly equate it with full individual title (dominio pleno). Anyone who uses the word “private 
property” to refer to communities which only had their external boundary surveyed by 
PROCEDE, for example, risks being misunderstood by many.5 
A case can be made, however, that on a more philosophical level, aside from any practical 
effects it may or may not have, the mere existence of a program like PROCEDE can color the 
cultural atmosphere of an entire country with its neoliberal penumbra – that, in a sense, any 
núcleo which does any kind of PROCEDE work, or even is anywhere near a núcleo which does, 
is somehow “guilty by association” (see, e.g., Pous and Vilanueva 2005). I do not recommend 
calling this reflected aura “privatization,” but perhaps “virtual privatization” is an apt term: 
virtual in both the cyberspatial sense of “simulated,” and in the temporal sense of “approaching, 
but not yet arriving.” 
Karen Bakker (2010a, xv), referring to urban water provision, contends that when we use 
the word “privatize” to mean anything remotely commercial, or anything not entirely owned and 
controlled by the state, we are losing its power as a descriptive term: 
                                                        
5 Among some indigenous cultures, simply the surveying of territorial boundaries, even if it is to codify 
communal tenure, can be detrimental and antagonistic to local traditions and practices (Herlihy 2011; Unruh 
2006). As I will examine in chapter 5, this sometimes is a problem at the sub-village level in Mexico, but to 
my knowledge is not generally an issue for nucleos or larger territories, except in regards to unusual situations 
such as the Huichol ritual pilgrimages from their villages in the Sierra Madre Occidental to a semi-arid part of 
San Luis Potosí state (Schaefer and Furst 1997). 
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Some [reserve] the term privatization for the sale of assets to the private sector – in 
other words, the private ownership of water-related infrastructure. In this case, the 
terms private sector participation and public-private partnerships are used to refer to 
a range of contracts whereby private companies build, manage, and/or operate 
infrastructure on behalf of governments. These contracts include concessions, 
management and service contracts, consulting services, and public-private 
partnerships with NGOs.  
     Others (usually opponents) use the word privatization as an umbrella term, to 
include the entire range of activities just mentioned, [because they all involve the] 
redistribution of governance to nonstate actors and the application of market-based 
norms, values, and practices in management and regulation.  
 
With reservations, Bakker decided to use the word in the broader sense, though not in the 
very broadest. She does “not use the term to refer to broader trends of commercialization of 
water resources and services,” nor to “small-scale water entrepreneurs, nor to community groups, 
cooperatives, and other, usually not-for-profit NGOs that do water work – it is unhelpful to 
extend the term private to cover all non-state actors” (Bakker 2010a, xvi). 
1.1.5   Water ownership and management: General concepts 
To organize in my own mind the complexities of human water use in Mexico and similar 
countries, I drew a diagram (Figure 1.3) which synthesizes information from many sources to 
show terminology (in black type) as well as examples from my study areas or elsewhere in 
Mexico  (in gray type). 
There are three variables. The first is the type of use – agricultural or domestic/industrial – 
represented by two overlapping rectangles. 80 percent of the water used by humans in Mexico is 
for agriculture (Wilder and Whiteford 2006, 346). All domestic/industrial water must be 
transported to the user, while only some agricultural water must be transported. The agricultural 
water which isn’t transported is here labeled as “rainfed” (temporal in Spanish), and obviously 
only exists where there is enough rain, annually and/or seasonally, to sustain a particular crop. 
“Irrigation” is simply refers to water which is a). transported, and b). used for agriculture. 50 
percent of Mexico’s agricultural production, and 70 percent of its agricultural exports, is 
irrigated (Wilder and Whiteford 2006, 346). 
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Figure 1.3. Categories of human water use (schematic), with example locations (in gray) 
from this study. The three variables are “type of use” (agricultural in foreground vs. 
domestic or industrial in background); “origin of water” (surface in upper half vs. ground 
in lower half); and “scale of user(s)” serviced by the water transport infrastructure 
(increasing in scale from left to right). Diagram and categories by the author. 
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The second variable, origin, refers to any water which is transported. There are two major 
categories: surface water and groundwater. “Surface water” is that which falls to the ground, 
becomes a stream (through a combination of surface runoff, and infiltration which soon emerges 
at a spring or pond), eventually joins a river, and flows into an ocean. Somewhere along this 
trajectory, the water is taken for human use and transported. The general term in Spanish for the 
point of uptake is a toma. “Groundwater” is different in that its point of uptake requires 
extraction via some sort of well. The water itself is usually in the phreatic zone – that is, below 
the water table, and produced from the same infiltration which originated as precipitation and 
surface runoff – but sometimes, especially in arid zones, it is in a non-renewable aquifer of 
“fossil water.” The Spanish word pozo means “well,” but during my fieldwork, I found that it is 
also used to mean shallowly-dug, roughly stone-lined, simple constructions that are more 
modified natural springs than true wells. Development engineers consider water extracted 
directly from a spring to be “groundwater” as well, as long as the spring is covered by some sort 
of roof such as a “spring box,” because such water is less likely to be contaminated by surface 
pollutants and parasitic organisms, as long as nearby land uses are also regulated (Mihelcic et al. 
2009, 278).  
The third variable, for any transported water, is the scale of the infrastructure system used 
to capture, store, transport, and distribute the water. “Single user” usually means that the same 
person or household captures the water, transports it (usually over a short distance), and uses it, 
but – as I learned through my fieldwork – the landowner at the point of uptake may be a different 
person than the user. The right-hand half of “domestic or industrial use”– i.e., the 
domestic/industrial categories at the scale of a village or larger – represent potable water 
systems: running water piped to houses or businesses. These systems are often called 
“municipal,” but I avoid that word in this study to prevent confusion with the Mexican county-
level administrative unit of the municipio. They are also sometimes known as “public drinking 
water supplies,” but I have avoided this phrase as well, because some “public” systems have 
been “privatized” (see previous sub-section). Larger cities, especially in drier areas, tend to have 
larger systems with longer-distance transport infrastructure. The two urban potable water 
systems I discuss in discuss in section 1.2 appear in Figure 1.3: Axocopan-Atlixco (a village 
spring supplying a nearby, medium-sized city), and Cutzamala-Mexico City (several rural 
23 
 
  
reservoirs supplying a distant metropolis). In Figure 1.3 I also included the Lerma well-field, 
which provides most of the remaining Mexico City water supply; overall, 70 percent of Mexico’s 
urban water supply originates as groundwater (Wilder and Whiteford 2006, 346). 
I did not include water storage features in Figure 1.3. Either surface water or groundwater 
may be stored in a reservoir; i.e., an artificial lake, usually created by building a dam.6 For 
groundwater, a reservoir is usually only required if it is a large system with many users, whether 
agricultural or domestic/industrial. For surface water, reservoirs are also common even if the 
system has only one, or a few, users. This is because reservoirs can be constructed to both store 
and also to capture surface water, for later uptake. If the artificial pond is small, such 
constructions are often called “check dams.” For small-to-medium-sized systems of all types, 
another common option for water storage is some sort of tank. 
In Figure 1.3, the shift in water management responsibilities mandated by Mexico’s 1992 
Water Law from “irrigation districts” to smaller-scale “water use associations” (see sub-section 
4.5.4) is represented by an arrow.  
1.1.6   Water ownership and management: Mexican law 
Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution of 1917 deals with property. The first paragraph 
establishes that all lands and waters within the country’s boundaries “correspond originally to the 
Nation, which has had, and has, the right to transmit their ownership (dominio) to individuals 
(particulares), establishing (constituyendo) private property” (Cámara de Diputados 2004, 14); 
in other words, the state retains the right to set in motion the actions by which land and water 
eventually comes to be owned by individuals, corporations, or groups – and the right of 
expropriation in the public interest. Other countries have similar legal arrangements, whether 
their systems are based on Napoleonic-style codes (as Mexico’s is), or on common law and 
precedence (Nolan 2004, 15). 
                                                        
6 Reservoirs, especially large ones, can also have the separate function of providing the “head” – the short-
distance elevation change – necessary to generate hydro-electrical power. 
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Paragraphs two through six delineate the many pathways by which land, water, and other 
natural resources can pass from the state’s “original” ownership into other hands. The possible 
pathways for each item are restricted to varying degrees. Generally, land is the most open of 
these items to other forms of ownership (although it, too, is subject to restrictions, such as the 
prohibition of foreign land ownership within fifty kilometers of a coast or one hundred 
kilometers of a national boundary). There are fewer pathways to alternative ownership for 
critical natural resources; for example, the nation retains “direct ownership over minerals from 
which metals and metalloids are extracted for industrial use” (Cámara de Diputados 2004, 14). 
Water is similarly limited in its potential pathways to non-state ownership, though not as 
strictly as are ores or petroleum. The fifth paragraph of Article 27 explains these restrictions. The 
word used for “water,” aguas, has no perfect translation in English, and implies both the 
substance of water as well as the geographic feature (water body or course) containing it; I will 
translate it here as “waters.”  
“Waters” with the most restricted ownership are categorized as “property of the nation,” 
and include “those of rivers and their direct or indirect tributaries (afluentes), starting from the 
point in the watershed where the first permanent, intermittent, or occasional (torrencial) waters 
begin” (Cámara de Diputados 2004, 15). This would seem to embrace all streams except those 
within local, closed watersheds (a hydro-geological rarity); however, later sentences in the 
paragraph appear to imply that this was not the intention.7  
“Waters” with fewer restrictions on potential ownership, but still subject to strict 
regulation, are those which “are located in two or more parcels (predios); the use 
(aprovechamiento) of these waters will be considered as a public utility, and will be subject to 
the States’ disposition.” Finally, “waters” with the fewest restrictions are of two types: 
“underground waters may be freely brought to light (alumbradas) using artificial means and 
appropriated by the owner of the land (terreno),” and water bodies or courses completely 
contained within a single parcel are “considered an integral part of the property” (Cámara de 
Diputados 2004, 15).  
                                                        
7 In other words, “water is considered property of the nation; however, there is some definitional ambiguity 
regarding ‘state’ waters (surface sources that originate and are depleted within a state)” (Scott, Dall’erba, and 
Díaz Caravantes 2010, 3). 
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As a practical matter, government and private surveyors who have gradually developed 
the cadastral maps of properties in Mexico have had to make thousands of decisions about where 
an ownable land parcel ends and a non-ownable water body begins. This process is much the 
same whether the land parcel is social property or a private parcel. Indeed, the process is 
essentially the same for other rights of way, such as public roads and electrical utility lines. As I 
mentioned in sub-section 1.1.3, the PROCEDE and FANAR surveyors have generally handled 
what they perceived as public watercourses by including them in a category called “special 
areas,” within the territorial boundaries of a núcleo but not part of any gran área (i.e., common 
use, individually parceled, or human settlement area). 
Controversial water issues tend to revolve around two concepts, neither of which is 
directly related to ownership of water or land: “water rights,” and “water privatization.” 
 Water rights come into play when there is more demand for water than supply in a region. 
At the sub-national scale, this is primarily an issue in agricultural areas where rainfall is 
insufficient to support crops, so water must be either drawn from underground aquifers, or stored 
in reservoirs, and then either used at the site (if the well or reservoir is located on the user’s 
property), or transported to (and distributed among) the users. If an aquifer’s supply is being 
used as fast, or faster, than it can be recharged – or, if water, whatever its source, is transported 
and distributed among multiple users – the society will typically develop a system to allocate the 
water. At the inter-regional and national and international scales, other water allocation 
agreements are made when different administrative jurisdictions – provinces (states) or countries 
– share a single water supply, usually because an important water transport channel, whether 
engineered or natural, serves both jurisdictions. 
In drier regions of Mexico, various water rights allocation systems have developed 
locally, a few dating even from before the arrival of the Spanish. The better-documented local 
systems include those of Sonora state (Banister 2011; Doolittle 2003) and of the Tehuacan 
Valley in Puebla and Oaxaca states (Enge and Whiteford 1989). These and other local systems 
have gradually come under the purview of the Mexican federal government, and today they are 
standardized through a permit (concession) system administered by the Comisión Nacional de 
Agua (CONAGUA). Technically speaking, CONAGUA requires most water users to obtain 
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permits even in well-watered regions where demand does not exceed supply. As I will explore 
further in chapter 4, the Mexican government’s water management regime has also undergone a 
neoliberal-era transformation (Wilder and Romero Lankao 2006), chiefly through an attempt to 
decentralize decision-making, and to diminish (or privatize) the once-robust state-driven 
“irrigation districts” program. 
Water privatization, another general goal of most neoliberal economic reform packages 
Swyngedouw 2005, 2), is an often-misunderstood concept. Arguments over water “privatization” 
are usually, in fact, about how the construction and maintenance of infrastructure to transport 
water to users should be paid for (Bakker 2010a, 5), not arguments over the ownership of water 
per se, nor arguments over the ownership of the places where water happens to emerge from the 
earth. Most privatization disagreements arise over the transport infrastructure of water to urban 
users, especially domestic use among the urban poor. However, rural areas can be impacted by 
increasing commercialization of water provision to urban users, at least politically. 
Neither water rights nor water privatization currently pertain directly to the present study, 
since the study regions are neither water-poor nor urban. This study will touch on both concepts 
from time to time, because in the future parts of both study regions are likely to become more 
intertwined with the water rights and urban service systems of Mexico.     
1.1.7  Water sources, water conduits, and water storage 
This study focuses on “water sources” – places where water is taken by humans, to be 
used at that place or transported to a user some distance away. The kinds of water uptakes 
include locations along a stream, shallow wells (to access ordinary flowing groundwater), deep 
wells (to access aquifers), or intakes at natural lakes or dammed reservoirs. This study 
concentrates on one specific type of source: the “spring.”  Springs (manantiales in Spanish), 
including the short stretches of stream just below them, have practical and symbolic values not 
shared with other surface sources: their water is generally cleaner, and often more reliable in dry 
seasons (Cairncross and Feachem 1993, 65). 
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The focus on the spring-land nexus will include responsibility for the care of the spring, 
including the tree and large shrub vegetation in its immediate vicinity, often deemed to be an 
important component of keeping the spring’s water clean and plentiful.   
A secondary focus for this study is the “water conduit”; that is, the conveyance 
infrastructure – the pipe, tube, or channel by which water is transported from the source to the 
use point. This, too, can raise questions of individual and communal management and 
ownership: Who builds the conduit? Who maintains it? Who is the end user? What is the 
agreement between them and the owner(s) of the land where the source is located? 
Occasionally, a third physical feature will be considered: the water storage infrastructure. 
Some kind of storage, such as a reservoir or a tank, is necessary whenever water must be 
collected before it is distributed, either for engineering reasons (gravity, for example), or because 
it is to be used over a period of time (typically, during the dry season), or for both of these 
reasons, as is the case with most “municipal” (in the sense of “urban”) potable water systems. 
1.1.8   Indigenous peoples and the state 
The term “indigenous” can mean many things, but one of its more consistently recognized 
aspects is its reference to groups of people which consider themselves to have occupied a certain 
territory (not necessarily the territory where they now reside) before the establishment of the 
state in which they now find themselves. Thus they have a special relationship with their national 
government: they are simultaneously a part of that state, and yet apart from it – and, in some 
cases, antagonistic to it (Niezen 2003, 20; Engle 2010, 95; Maybury-Lewis 1997, 8). This special 
relationship is perhaps more of a marker of indigeneity than the often-evoked concept of 
communal property. While village-scale self-identity and decision-making is certainly an 
important part of indigenous culture in Mexico, it is equally a part of much rural non-indigenous 
culture; and, as this study will demonstrate, the supposed indigenous preference for the 
community over the individual was never as overwhelming as many have supposed. 
One way in which some indigenous people express their partial separation from the state 
is by linking natural resources (including water) to territory more firmly than the state does 
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(Kauffer Michel 2006, 226). Related to this is the deep attachment that some indigenous people 
have to the territories they most identify with (even if they do not currently occupy, or legally 
own, those territories). One must be careful to avoid implying that non-indigenous people cannot 
feel equally tied to a piece of land, or that indigenous individuals shouldn’t be free to live 
wherever they want to. However, it is logical that indigenous individuals and groups, sharing a 
sense of temporal priority over the state, would include deep territorial links within their 
evolving struggle to define their relationship to the state, even (perhaps especially) in countries 
like Mexico where the legal concept of indigenous territory does not exist (Bonfil Batalla 1987). 
I will explore these links further in chapter 4. 
1.2   Summary of study areas and methods 
This study uses data from 35 study areas in two regions of Mexico: the Huasteca Potosina 
region8 in the state of San Luis Potosí, and the Sierra Norte region (sometimes called the Sierra 
Juárez, for its most illustrious native son, the 19th-century indigenous president Benito Juárez) in 
the state of Oaxaca. Two of the study areas, one in each region, are large zones I call “geodata 
analysis areas.” The boundaries of these areas were determined by the extent of INEGI 1:50,000-
scale topographic sheets (four sheets in the Huasteca area, and seven in the more sparsely settled 
Oaxaca area), modified to exclude areas outside the states of San Luis Potosí and Oaxaca. While 
the spatial definitions of the “Huasteca Potosina region” and “Sierra Norte de Oaxaca region” 
vary in the literature, it can be said that each geodata analysis area encompasses about two-thirds 
of the region for which it is named.  
The other 33 study areas are smaller territories contained within the geodata analysis 
areas. Each of these smaller areas (“RAN document study núcleos”) consists of the entire 
territory of an ejido or comunidad that underwent archival research. 
In 15 of the 33 RAN document study núcleos, I engaged in more intensive field-based 
research, at varying levels of intensity. I call these “PRM study núcleos,” as full participatory 
                                                        
8 The Huasteca is a larger cognitive or vernacular region without precise boundaries which includes portions of 
the states of Veracruz, Hidalgo, Tamaulipas, and San Luis Potosí (Ochoa 1989, 5). The “Huasteca Potosina” is 
the part within the state of San Luis Potosí state. 
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research mapping was carried out in all of them except two (Totomoxtla and Buenavista, where I 
executed partially participatory work in 2003 and 2004 as part of a rural development and 
conservation team called CAPLAC).  In one of these 15 núcleos, Talea, I carried out PRM work 
in 2009 as the sole academic researcher, focusing on fieldwork specifically for this study. In the 
remaining 12 núcleos, I was an integral part of the México Indígena team’s PRM work from 
2005 to 2008. In two of these México Indígena PRM núcleos, Yagila and Tiltepec, I engaged in 
considerable fieldwork specifically for this study. 
Figure 1.4 is a schematic diagram showing how the study areas and study regions are 
related to each other. Figure 1.5, on page 36, is the first of five maps which show the locations of 
the of the two study regions within Mexico (the polygons are the geodata analysis areas). Figure 
2.1, on page 47, is the first of three maps which show the locations of the RAN document study 
núcleos in the Huasteca Potosina. Figure 2.4, on page 53, is the first of three maps which show 
the locations of the RAN document study núcleos in the Sierra Norte de Oaxaca. 
The main purpose of the RAN archival document research was to understand the balance 
between village-scale and individual orientations toward land and water in indigenous ejidos and 
comunidades as it has evolved since the Mexican Revolution, and how these orientations have 
been negotiated with the state. The purpose of the PRM work was to document these orientations 
in more detail as they are practiced in the second decade since the 1992 neoliberal reforms. In the 
geodata analysis areas, the principal task was to compare the densities of important springs 
located in various social and non-social land tenure types. This analysis had two goals: to find 
whether certain tenure types possess a higher-than-average “natural endowment” of springs, and 
to ascertain whether some PROCEDE-parceled núcleos appear to be making efforts to keep these 
springs under village-scale control. The main tool for organizing and analyzing the PRM and 
geodata information was ArcGIS (versions 9.3 and 10.0), a GIS software platform developed by 
ESRI (Environmental Systems Research Institute). 
In the next two sections I investigate the geographic extent of indigenous residents, social 
property, and high-rainfall zones beyond the study areas, to better determine where my 
observations might apply. 
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Figure 1.4. Study areas and principal methods (schematic diagram). 
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1.3   Constraints on the impact of long-distance water transport to cities  
To better understand how water might become a more coveted resource in parts of 
Mexico, including perhaps in well-watered, indigenous-dominated regions, I researched 
examples and trends in transport of water from villages, including from social property núcleos, 
to other land tenure entities. I found that there are generally three circumstances which warrant 
the expensive investments necessary to move water more than a few kilometers, and each of 
these circumstances operates at a different scale. I concluded that highly engineered long-
distance transport of water, important a subject as it may be, is unlikely to have much of a direct 
impact on my study areas, at least not in the foreseeable future. 
The largest scale of water transport occurs when a large city engineers a system of 
dammed reservoirs, pumps, and aqueducts or canals to supplement its potable water service. 
Such a system covers a large area overall, typically over 10,000 sq km, but its water extraction 
directly impacts a much smaller total area. The handful of extraction points can affect a  
scattered assortment of rural places whose water sources may be mildly compromised, as well as 
a few communities whose land area is reduced when reservoirs are created after land is 
condemned via eminent domain. Less directly, the extraction zone can include a larger number 
of communities in the watersheds where permitted land uses may be restricted by hydrological 
and environmental authorities. In some countries, the opportunity costs caused by such 
restrictions are partly compensated through government-organized payments for environmental 
services (Daily and Ellison 2002, 63). Mexico City is the one of three metropoles in Mexico with 
a large system of long-distance water transport: the Cutzamala.9 Intriguingly, its sources are in 
the Mazahua indigenous area. I will discuss their political and cultural protest movement against 
aspects of the Cutzamala system in subsection 1.3.1. 
Medium-scale water transport occurs when a large town or growing city receives water 
from a specific water source (e.g., a reliable spring), often from a village territory typically about 
10 km from the city’s center, to augment or provide its potable water supply. There are perhaps 
several dozen examples of this throughout Mexico (e.g., Seefoo 2002), and there will be new 
                                                        
9 The other two large-scale systems provide water to Guadalajara and Tijuana. Several additional cities have 
somewhat smaller systems which I categorize as “medium-scale transport” (Whiteford and Bernal 1996, 224).  
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ones in the future: “competition for water between rural and urban populations and governments 
has increased” (Whiteford and Bernal 1996, 224). Nonetheless, the potential locations for this 
sort of situation are limited. In subsection 1.3.2, I will focus on one example which has 
engendered village-scale tension, though in a non-indigenous-language area: the ejido of 
Axocopan, whose spring provides water to the city of Atlixco, in the state of Puebla. 
The third scale of water transport out of a village occurs when water-intensive agriculture, 
sometimes run by a company for national or export commercial markets, uses water derived 
from a nearby place that may be within a social property núcleo. The potential locations for this 
arrangement are more widespread than those for village-to-city medium-scale transport, but are 
nevertheless limited to certain circumstances. This is the most likely of the three scenarios to 
affect some ejidos and comunidades within the geodata analysis areas. 
The findings in this section draw from secondary sources, augmented by land tenure data I 
collected through the GAIA (INEGI 2011) and PHINA (RAN 2009-12) online datasets, and by 
indigenous language data in the INEGI census (INEGI 2010). I describe these sources in detail in 
chapter 3. For the localities described in this section, I also used GoogleEarth to help determine 
the location of major springs. 
1.2.1 Mazahuas and Mexico City’s Sistema Cutzamala 
The Cutzamala surface water catchment and transport system, whose first phase was 
completed in 1982, provides 18 percent of the water used in a “service area” encompassing all of 
Mexico’s Distrito Federal, including most of Mexico City, and part of the state of Mexico. This 
water volume represents two-thirds of the water imported into the service area. The rest of the 
metropolitan area’s transported water originates as groundwater drawn through wells in the Río 
Lerma valley (SEMARNAT and CONAGUA 2009). The water comes from seven different 
reservoirs and their catchment areas that are 90 to 140 km west of Mexico City, most of them 
originally built in the 1950s for hydroelectric power. Two of the reservoirs are in the Valle de 
Bravo area of Mexico state  near the Michoacán border, two others are in the high-altitude Río 
Tuzantla Valley in Michoacán, and three others (including the Presa Villa Victoria) are north of 
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Valle de Bravo in Mexico state. The first and second groups of reservoirs supply water to the 
third group by a series of pumps (Haddad 1991). 
The catchment areas around several of these reservoirs are inhabited by the Mazahua, an 
indigenous group whose language belongs to the same branch of the Oto-Manguean family as 
the Pame of the Huasteca Potosina. To better understand the land tenure geography of the area, I 
took a closer look at one village, the ejido of San Diego Suchitepec, which borders one of the 
reservoirs. 24 percent of Suchitepec’s residents speak Mazahua. The núcleo contains two large 
villages and 10 smaller ones. 750 ha had been expropriated by the federal electricity board in 
1947, during planning for the reservoir. The núcleo was surveyed and certified by PROCEDE in 
2006; of its 2,500 ha, 212 were assigned to common use, while the rest was divided into 
individual parcels (INEGI 2011; RAN 2009-12). Of the eight major springs, three are located 
within the common use areas, two are on individual parcels, and three are technically within the 
parceled area, but in fact within public “rights of way.” 
While the direct impact of the Cutzamala system on water and land in núcleos like 
Suchitepec is small, the symbolism of water originating in a relatively poor indigenous region to 
supply a partly wealthy metropolis 100 km away is real and strong. Environmental historian 
Donald Worster (1985, 5) described the socially alienating effect of large hydro-engineering 
projects thus: 
Quite simply, the modern canal, unlike a river, is not an ecosystem. It is simplified, 
abstracted Water, rigidly separated from the earth and firmly directed to raise food, 
fill pipes, and make money. 
 
In 2005, angry that the state and federal governments were investing a great deal of 
money in the Cutzamala system while failing to improve village-scale water access in the source 
region, a group of Mazahua women formed an armed movement, mainly using Revolution-era 
old guns with handmade stocks (Cevallos 2006). Because they tend to use water in their daily 
routines, and were attempting to develop new orchards and domestic-use vegetable gardens, the 
women felt that their initiative would have special impact. They were particularly incensed that 
“37 percent of the potable water” in the Cutzamala system was lost through leakage (Gómez 
Fuentes 2009). In 2010, the Mazahua Front blocked the main highway to Toluca and reportedly 
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closed a valve on a Cutzamala pipeline, demanding that then-governor (and current president) 
Enrique Peña Nieto fulfill his promise to have modern water systems installed in their villages 
(Agencia MVT 2010; Enciso 2010). In Mexico, where organization at the level of the specific 
indigenous ethnolinguistic group tends to be relatively weak (Yashar 1997, 9; Jung 2003, 19), it 
is interesting that the regional-scale Cutzamala water system did provoke an ethnia-scale 
political response (Kelly 2012, 296). 
1.3.2 Axocopan’s spring and the city of Atlixco 
The village territory of Axocopan comprises 1,420 ha of social property (the ejido of La 
Magdalena Axocopan, surveyed by PROCEDE in 1998) and 580 ha of private property, a “fondo 
legal,” purchased by local residents before the Revolution, and where the main town is located. 
Within the territory is an important three-part spring, two parts in the private property area and 
the third on one of the PROCEDE-surveyed parcels. It is located near headwaters of the great 
Río Balsas watershed (Wolf 1959, 9). Since 1939, the Axocopan spring has provided water to the 
residents of the city of Atlixco 4 km to its east, a city whose suburbs now include and surround 
parts of the town (Ramírez Júarez, Campos Cabral, and Campos Cabral 2006, 180). 
The shared water history of the two communities is one of complex deals, resentments, 
and recriminations. “Atlixco violated its share repeatedly, leading to an April 2004 direct action 
by the ejido, blocking the passage of water toward the city”  (Ramírez Júarez, Campos Cabral, 
and Campos Cabral 2006, 184). The two entities entered a new agreement by which 14.2 percent 
of the spring’s water remains in Axocopan, while 9.5 percent is transported to Atlixco; the rest is 
destined for nearby commercial enterprises. However, the ejido per se does not actually receive 
the Axocopan portion; instead, its rights belong to the fundo legal – all the “people” of 
Axocopan, but without the protections associated with social property (even after PROCEDE). 
Some of this water is apportioned to a sociedad of fruit growers consisting of a minority of 
ejidatarios (Ramírez Júarez, Campos Cabral, and Campos Cabral 2006, 189). 
While neither the land tenure nor the water rights pertaining to its spring are entirely 
village-oriented, nonetheless the residents of Axocopan have developed a sophisticated village- 
and sub-village-group-scale organizational mechanism for maintaining the spring and 
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distributing the village’s share of its water (Campos Cabral 2011, 29). Perhaps it is the struggle 
with the city of Atlixco which has promoted this village-scale unity in spite of the factors which 
run counter to it.  
1.4   This study’s applicability to other places  
This study encompasses areas within two regions in Mexico (Figure 1.5): the “Huasteca 
Potosina,” in the southeastern part of the state of San Luis Potosí, and the “Sierra Norte de 
Oaxaca,” in the northern part of the state of Oaxaca. In this section I will discuss to what extent 
the study’s findings may be generalized findings; in other words, how far beyond the boundaries 
of my study areas do the geographic characteristics vital to the hypothesis extend?  (Besides the 
commonalities described here, the Huasteca and Oaxaca study regions also present illuminating 
contrasts which will discuss in chapter 2). I stress that while the “water source” is the main 
subject of this study, in a broader sense this geographic feature is only intended to serve as an 
example of the evolving relations among indigenous individuals, villages, and the state. Some of 
the findings of this study may apply to other geographic features and natural resources other than 
water, and also to certain countries beyond Mexico. These findings may therefore be applied 
beyond the zone which I delimit in this section. 
1.4.1 Water-rich, indigenous, social-property-dominated regions of Mexico 
Being within the geographic research tradition of cultural ecology, this study involves the 
spatially local links between humans and water sources. More specifically, this study is 
concerned with social property, which in Mexico was a system developed overwhelmingly in 
rural areas (although the expansion of some metropolitan areas into ejidos has engendered issues 
not examined here). Therefore, the “first cut” in narrowing the area of applicability is to identify 
rural, but inhabited, places in Mexico (Figure 1.5), which I did by displaying all the localidades 
(rural census tract points) in the 2005 national census (INEGI 2005b). Each point represents a 
rural population center, as large as a town of 2,000 inhabitants or as small as an isolated 
farmhouse with two inhabitants. When displayed at this national scale, the dots appear as a gray 
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pattern, continuous in some places and disjunct or web-like in others. The true desert areas of 
Coahuila state, the Pinacate-Altar region of Sonora, and the Baja Peninsula are visibly less 
densely inhabited, as are the three remaining tropical forest frontiers (internal colonization 
fronts) of Chimalapas (the southern half of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec), the Lacandon region of 
Chiapas state, and the Calakmul region of Campeche state.  
Rainfall patterns in Mexico are complex at both regional and local scales (West and 
Augelli 1989, 38), but can be simplified to three major classes: “water-rich” areas (where the 
 
Figure 1.5. Mexico: Inhabited rural areas, and areas with relatively high year-round or 
seasonal rainfall (Sources: INEGI 2005b; Sheffield, Wood, and Munoz-Arriola 2010). 
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winter dry season is shorter than about four months, and/or rainstorms are relatively frequent 
even in the dry season); “seasonally water-rich” areas (where the contrast between the dry and 
rainy seasons is especially pronounced, corresponding to the approximate extent of Köppen 
potential vegetation type “Aw”); and “water-poor” areas, generally where subtropical high 
pressure dominates over trade wind patterns for most of the year, as well as a few orographic 
rain-shadow zones further south (Sauer and Brand 1932, 59). I based the distribution of the areas 
in Figure 1.5 on a map showing “a high resolution (~ 10km) dataset of evapotranspiration for 
Mexico for 1984-2006 based on remote sensing data” (Sheffield, J., E. F. Wood, and F. Munoz-
Arriola, 2010, 271). My water-rich areas correspond to an average evaporation rate of more than 
2.0 millimeters per day, while my water-poor areas correspond to a rate of less than 1.0 
millimeters per day. The familiar wet and dry areas of Mexico are well illustrated, from the most 
general pattern of “north=dry, south=wet,” to regional-scale patterns such as the orographic 
rainfall belt along the Sierra Madre Oriental (including its extension as the Sierra Norte of 
Oaxaca). The principal effect of these patterns on agricultural potential is that “water poor” 
places generally require irrigation for any crops other than subsistence milpa (the traditional 
corn-beans-squash complex), while some “seasonally water rich” places will also require 
irrigation for certain crops. 
To better define the areas where local formal systems of water allocation rights are 
probably uncommon, I produced a second map (Figure 1.6) which shows only southern Mexico. 
In this map, the three wetness classes – “water rich,”  “seasonally water rich,” and “water poor” 
– are repeated from the first map, except that now they are shown so that the areas which most 
closely resemble the study regions (that is, mainly “water rich,” and a few areas of “seasonally 
water rich”) are shown in white or light gray stipple. In this map, a new variable, irrigation, 
enhances our understanding. Areas with more than 10 percent of farmland “equipped for 
irrigation” around the year 2000 (though not necessarily irrigated), according to a map 
republished by the FAO (Siebert et al. 2007), are shown in gray. Most of these are within the 
“seasonally water rich” zones, including two areas near the Oaxaca geodata analysis area (part of 
the Central Valley to the southwest, and part of the Tehuacan Valley to the northwest), and one 
large area near the Huasteca geodata analysis area (the Gulf plain to the northeast, centered on 
where the states of Tamaulipas, Veracruz, and San Luis Potosí meet). If climate change causes a 
38 
 
  
local decrease in rainfall, and/or if economic incentives cause a local increase in highly irrigated 
export crops, places adjacent to these areas may be most likely to develop locally accepted water 
allocation systems where none traditionally existed. 
 
Figure 1.6. Southern Mexico: Inhabited rural areas with relatively high year-round or 
seasonal rainfall; and, areas with more than 10 percent farmland equipped for irrigation in 
2000 (Sources: Sheffield, Wood, and Munoz-Arriola 2010; Siebert et al. 2007). 
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The third and final map of the extent of the study’s most direct applicability introduces 
two new variables: social property and indigeneity (Figure 1.6). (The areas in Figure 1.6 which 
are either “water poor,” or “>10 percent agricultural area irrigated,” or both, are shown in black 
in Figure 1.7, as these areas do not pertain directly to this study).  
 
Figure 1.7. Southern Mexico: Municipios dominated by social property (ejidos and 
comunidades), and municipios dominated by speakers of indigenous languages (Sources: 
INEGI 2005b; INEGI 2006a; INEGI 2006b). 
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The full extent of social property in Mexico is surprisingly difficult to map. Figure 1.7 
presents a reasonable approximation of social property at the municipio scale. I produced this 
coverage in ArcGIS by first joining the table of total núcleos in each county who had completed 
some degree of PROCEDE survey work by 2006 (INEGI 2006b) to the 2005 INEGI county 
shapefile. I created a field for the count of localidades within each county, and a final field of the 
ratio of PROCEDE núcleos to this count. There are three potential sources of inaccuracy: 
localidades are not a perfect proxy for “núcleos and non-social-property villages”; the 
PROCEDE table does not include the approximately 7 percent of social property villages which 
had not done any PROCEDE surveying; and some municipios with large areas may be only 
partly dominated by social property. 
I mapped indigenous areas by municipio, using the proxy variable “population 5 years or 
older who speak an indigenous languages” (INEGI 2006a), by calculating the ratio of this 
variable to “total population 5 years or older.” 
To the extent that this study focuses specifically on indigenous water-rich areas of 
Mexico, the region of greatest applicability appears as both gray and stippled in Figure 1.6. The 
notable regions include the rest of the upland (western) Huasteca region extending southeast of 
the study region, into Hidalgo and Veracruz states; a few smaller parts of Oaxaca state, including 
part of the Mixe-speaking area; most of the Chiapas Highlands, especially in the northern half of 
that state; and an extensive area shared by the states of Yucatan and Quintana Roo. 
More broadly, the current study pertains to water-rich social properties of all ethnic types, 
indigenous and otherwise. As depicted in Figure 1.7, this enlarges the zone of applicability to 
include most of Veracruz state, significant parts of Guerrero state, and smaller areas within other 
states, including the “Zona Media” region of San Luis Potosí state, west of the Huasteca region. 
1.4.2 Current trends impacting the study areas as potentially important sources of water  
In section 1.3 I explained why only a restricted number of places in well-watered regions 
of Mexico currently serve as important sources of medium- and long-distance engineered water 
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transport. In this sub-section I consider the possibility that climate change or other factors could 
increase the number of such places. 
Three factors could increase the value of water in the study areas, especially in when 
combined: decreased rainfall in nearby areas, high population growth in nearby cities, and a 
steep increase in water-intensive export agriculture or rural industry (e.g., a commercial 
distillery) in a village or one near it. (A fourth possible factor, greater demand for commercial 
bottled water from clean mountain springs, would have only scattered and localized impacts.10) 
Figures 1.8 and 1.9 show how three recent, well-regarded studies predict that global 
climate change will affect the regional availability of water. “Projections for changes in 
precipitation patterns are extremely complex, involving a high degree of uncertainty and large 
heterogeneity” (IPCC 2007); furthermore, the SEMARNAT/CONAGUA water stress prediction 
takes into account expected change in human demand and consumption, not just climate change. 
These uncertainties are reflected in the maps: while IPCC and Arnell agree that southern Mexico 
(particularly Yucatan and northern Chiapas) will probably experience a sharp decrease in water 
availability, especially in summer months, there are also disagreements among the studies. IPCC 
specifies that the entire Sierra Madre Occidental and Mesa Central regions will suffer the 
greatest decrease in winter precipitation, while SEMARNAT/CONAGUA predict that the border 
states of northern Mexico will experience a greater increase in water stress than elsewhere. The 
overall impression is that much of relatively wet southern Mexico will see a steeper decline in 
rainfall, but that relatively dry northern Mexico will undergo greater water stress due to factors 
other than rainfall, such as dependence on aquifers, higher population growth, and more 
widespread export agriculture. According to this, the Huasteca Potosina and Sierra Norte de 
Oaxaca regions fall somewhere in the middle of these extremes. Some contend that, overall, 
social property farmers are more likely to suffer crop failures than private property farmers 
(Liverman 1990, 66).   
                                                        
10 Not considered here is a factor which essentially increases the value of naturally transported clean water: 
payments for environmental services (PESs) granted from the state to private or social property landowners for 
their willingness to conserve forest vegetation in watersheds where clean, abundant water downstream is 
regarded as important. I review this subject in chapter 4.  
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The growth of urban areas within or near the study areas is unlikely to be an important 
factor in regional water demand, but it could affect a few núcleos. Four cities are within 100 km 
of the geodata analysis areas, and downhill from part of them: Oaxaca city (10 km southeast of 
the Oaxaca area); Tuxtepec, Oaxaca (20 km north of it); Ciudad Valles (within the Huasteca 
area); and Tampico, Tamaulipas (100 km east of it). Oaxaca is the largest of these, with almost 
600,000 inhabitants in 2010; it is followed by Tampico, with about 300,000; then Ciudad Valles, 
 
Figure 1.8. Mexico: Projected relative changes in precipitation during period 2090-2099 
compared to 1980-1999, according to SRES (Special Report on Emissions Scenarios) 
scenario A1B (adapted from IPCC 2007). 
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with about 170,000; and Tuxtepec, with about 100,000. Between 2005 and 2010, Oaxaca and 
Ciudad Valles experienced high population growth (9.2 percent and 6.9 percent, respectively), 
while Tuxtepec’s growth rate was modest (1.3 percent), and Tampico’s population actually 
declined, by 2.1 percent (INEGI 2010). It is conceivable, then, that a handful of núcleos in the  
 
Figure 1.9. Mexico: Predicted change in water availability by CONAGUA administrative 
region, and according to IPCC scenario A1 (2050 as percentage of period 1961-1990). 
(Adapted from SEMARNAT 2007 and Arnell 2004).  
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northern extreme of the Huasteca geodata analysis area, and/or the southern extreme of the 
Oaxaca one,11 could face an urban demand for their water akin to what Axocopa experienced 
(section 1.2). 
The growth of water-intensive export agriculture in and around the study areas is not easy 
to predict, and in any case will never be as important a demand on local water supplies as it 
increasingly is in drier (and more U.S.-proximate) northern Mexico. It is potentially an important 
enough factor to merit some examination: observations on Mexican export agriculture trends in 
general, followed by an overview of water-intensive crops specific to the study areas. For the 
first ten years after the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1993, 
Mexican agricultural exports to the United States more than doubled, while yearly increases have 
been more modest since 2003 (Villareal 2010, 13; Wilder and Whiteford 2006, 353). Vegetables 
and fruits whose exports have increased the most are sweet peppers, cauliflower/broccoli, 
carrots/turnips, lemons/limes, and watermelons (Yuñez Naude and Taylor 2006, 174). Export 
agriculture has been most intense in irrigated zones of northern Mexico such as Torreon (in 
Coahuila state) and parts of Sinaloa state. Of the aforementioned crops, only lemons/limes 
require intense water use, and are thus more commonly grown in high-rainfall areas such as the 
Gulf Coastal Plain. 
The following account combines recent data from Mekonnen and Hoekstra (2010, 17-20) 
on water demand of different crops, Yuñez Naude and Taylor (2006, 178) on annual average 
production of Mexico’s major exported vegetable and fruits, and INAFED (2007) on the 
important agricultural products of study area municipios. 
Sugar cane, coffee, and rice are products which are medium-high to high water 
demanding, and grown in the study areas, but are not increasingly significant Mexican exports. 
                                                        
11 In the Central Valley around Oaxaca City, irrigation from Río Atoyac and Río Salado floodwaters – barriers 
built to curb overland flow – are supplemented by shallow wells and rain-fed farming. “The history of water 
use in the Central Valley is one of increasing abstraction [i.e., extraction] at the outer edge of the drainage 
network leading to a decrease in water availability downstream in the Atoyac itself. More and more water has 
been taken from the perennial tributaries at their points of entry into the valley. Water has been used upstream 
of Oaxaca City in the Etla Valley by increasing the use of the high water-table zone and extending and 
modernizing canal systems. Abstraction has been multiplied many times over by the increasing number of 
wells with mechanical pumps, to the point that groundwater reserves are threatened” (Clarke 2000, 94). 
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Avocados, oranges, and pineapples are products which are grown in the study areas, and are 
increasingly significant Mexican exports, but which have only low to moderate water demands. 
The only agricultural products which meet all three criteria – medium-high to high water 
demand, grown in significant quantities within or near the study areas, and increasingly 
significant as an export crop – are mangos and lemons/limes.12 In the Huasteca Potosina, the 
commercial mango crop centers on Coxcatlán, between Tancanhuitz and Axtla de Terrazas (in 
Figure 2.2, on page 49). In the lowlands bordering the Sierra Norte de Oaxaca, the lime crop is 
concentrated around Jacatepec, about 15 km northeast of Valle Nacional, and around Choapam 
(in Figure 2.5, on page 56), while mango is grown most intensively around Choapam, as well as 
around Jocotepec, just 5 km from the RAN document study núcleo of San Miguel Lachixola. 
These portions of the geodata analysis areas have the greatest potential as future importers of 
medium-scale water transport using sources located within certain núcleo territories considered 
in this study. 
  
  
                                                        
12 Just beyond the Oaxaca study area, the county of Valle Nacional was, during the Porfiriato era, notorious for 
the indentured servitude on its tobacco plantations (Turner 1909-1923). Tobacco is another high-water-demand 
crop, with moderate export growth potential; however, in the study areas, the quantity grown is a fraction of 
that of a century ago. 
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2.  Study areas  
2.1   Huasteca Potosina geodata analysis area 
2.1.1 Topography and hydrology 
The Huasteca Potosina study region (Figure 2.1) is located along the boundary where the 
flat to gently undulating Gulf Coastal Plain, which continues into Veracruz state to the Gulf of 
Mexico (100 km east of the geodata analysis area), meets the Sierra Madre Oriental, a series of 
linear late Cretaceous limestone ridges that rarely exceed 800 meters in elevation. To the 
southwest into Querétaro state, these ridges grade into more imposing mountains, including the 
2500-meter-elevation Sierra de Xilitla, which is composed mainly late Jurassic to early 
Cretaceous mudstone and shale. At the junction of the Gulf Coastal Plain and the Sierra Madre 
Oriental lie the Eocene sandstones of the Chincontepec formation. In some sections the 
sandstone is hidden or eroded, while in other sections it appears as jumbled low hills extending 
about 20 km eastward into the plain; the Sierra de Tancanhuitz is one of these hilly areas (Cossey 
2011, 270; Suter 1980, 20-23). 
The entire Huasteca Potosina geodata analysis area is within the super-watershed of the 
Río Pánuco,“the fourth largest river in Mexico by volume of runoff, and the sixth largest river 
basin in Mexico by area” (Arbingast 1975). This river is only called the Pánuco along its final 
approach to the Gulf, the site of Mexico’s first oil boom in 1911 (Brown 1993, 114). Further 
upstream, the river’s two principal tributaries are the Río Santa María-Tampaón and the Río 
Moctezuma. About two-thirds of the geodata analysis area is within the Santa María-Tampaón 
watershed, and the rest within the Moctezuma watershed. A tiny portion is in the watershed of 
the Tempoal, the third principal tributary of the Pánuco. Maps show the sources of these three 
major tributaries as far to the southwest, in the Mesa Central (high central plateau) of Mexico. 
The upper Río Moctezuma, for example, drains a northern portion of the Mexico City 
metropolitan area (Wolf 1959, 6). Due in part to the porous nature of limestone, several smaller 
but regionally important tributaries arise or re-emerge at the Sierra Madre/Gulf Coast boundary, 
including two within the study area: the Río Oxitipa-Coy and the Río Huichihuayán. 
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Figure 2.1. Huasteca Potosina study region: Watersheds, rivers, and topography. Numbers 
indicate RAN document study núcleos. Teenek, Nahuatl, and Pame language areas labeled 
in gray. (Topography adapted from INEGI 2000). 
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2.1.2 Vegetation and land use 
The original and potential vegetation of the Huasteca geodata analysis area (Figure 2.2) 
includes several tropical forest types near their northern extremes of their ranges in the 
Americas. Selva mediana subperrenifolia, medium-canopy humid tropical forest with some dry-
season deciduous trees, is found in much of the Gulf Coastal Plain and limestone ranges. Selva 
baja caducifolia, low-canopy tropical forest dominated by dry-season deciduous trees, is found  
in the northern and western extremes of the study area. Bosque mesófilo de montaña, cloud forest 
(a blend of tropical and temperate species, many endemic), is located in a small area where the 
Sierra Xilitla generates orographic rainfall.  
I developed Figure 2.2 by starting with a 1:1 million-scale national shapefile of 28 
vegetation classes created by the Mexican federal biodiversity research and policy organization 
(CONABIO 1999). From my fieldwork, I knew that this coverage understated anthropogenic 
disturbance, so I modified the coverage by georeferencing current GoogleEarth true-color 
(visible spectrum) air photography at 1:100,000 scale, and using it to identify patches which 
were discernible as agriculture. 
The map shows a high degree of human alteration, especially in the Gulf Coastal Plain, 
where agriculture – particularly cattle ranching, but also extensive sugarcane cultivation (Tucker 
2000, 28) – has eliminated most of the humid tropical forest. Large forest patches are now 
mainly restricted to the rocky soils and steeper slopes of the Sierra Madre Oriental. It should be 
noted that the distinction between “forest” and “anthropogenic land use” is often vague. For 
example, some continuous-canopy forested areas are better described as complex orchards, 
including the traditional te’lom system still practiced by some indigenous landowners (Alcorn 
1983), and others are secondary forest mosaics with isolated temporary agricultural plots.   
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Figure 2.2. Huasteca Potosina study region: Land use and land cover, 2010. Teenek, 
Nahuatl, and Pame language areas labeled in gray. Numbers indicate RAN document study 
núcleos. (Vegetation adapted from CONABIO 1999). 
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2.1.3 Indigenous and mestizo populations 
I created the map of indigenous and non-indigenous (mestizo) language speakers and of 
specific language areas (Figure 2.3) from 2005 census data using methods described in section 
3.5. I present the raw population totals in chapter 7.  
The map shows two indigenous core areas. The first is a large area of Teenek and 
Nahuatl speakers occupying the westernmost strip of the Gulf Coastal Plain, the low sandstone 
hills of the Chincontepec formation, and the first ranges of the Sierra Madre Oriental. Within this 
continuous zone, the spatial division between the Teenek area to the north and the Nahua13 area 
to the south is quite sharp, with only a few small areas of overlap. Considering how the two 
groups share most culture traits, and that the dividing line does not correspond to a major 
physical barrier but rather cuts across the low hills of the Sierra Tancanhuitz, the clarity of the 
spatial differentiation surprised me. 
The Teenek, sometimes known as the “Huasteco,” speak a geographically isolated 
language within the Maya family. Before the arrival of the Nahuas around 145814 and the later 
encroachment of the colonial Spanish, the Teenek probably occupied most or all of the 
vernacular “Huasteca region.” The Nahuas speak a descendant variant of the Uto-Aztecan 
language of their Mexica forebears. The Nahuatl-speaking region which begins within the study 
area continues southward and southeastward another 80 km, and is not contiguous with the 
largest Nahua area of “central dialects” in the states surrounding Mexico City (Lastra 1986). 
The second cohesive indigenous language zone in the geodata analysis area is occupied by 
Pame speakers deeper within the rugged Sierra. Pame is the northernmost of the Oto-Manguean 
languages, most of which are spoken in Oaxaca state, including Zapotec and Chinantec. Its 
closest linguistic relative is Otomí, spoken mainly in the state of Querétaro. The Pame-speaking 
zone once continued well into the mountains of Querétaro south of the Río Santa María, in an 
area known as the Sierra Gorda, but it is only spoken in a few villages there today (Gómez 
Rendón 2008, 231).    
                                                        
13 “Nahua” is the ethnic group’s demonym, and “Nahuatl” is their language. 
14 Additionally, the Toltec residents who settled in parts of the Huasteca in the 9th century may have spoken a 
variant of Nahuatl (Kaufman 1976, 115). 
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Figure 2.3. Huasteca Potosina study region: Indigenous, mixed, and mestizo population 
areas; and, specific indigenous language areas. Numbers indicate RAN document study 
núcleos. (Sources: INEGI 2005b; INEGI 2006a). 
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These indigenous language areas are surrounded by speakers only of Spanish, some of 
whom may self-identify as indigenous or practice indigenous culture traits besides language. The 
Within the geodata analysis area, these rural mestizos occupy the rest of the Gulf Coastal Plain, 
as well as much of the Sierra Madre Oriental beyond the Teenek, Nahua, and Pame cultural core 
areas. The one large city in the study area, Ciudad Valles, is majority mestizo, while the towns of 
Tamazunchale and Xilitla are about evenly mixed. The largest towns with a majority of 
indigenous speakers are Tancanhuitz and Aquismón.  
2.2   Sierra Norte de Oaxaca geodata analysis area 
2.2.1 Topography and hydrology 
The Sierra Norte de Oaxaca study region (Figure 2.4), 300-400 km southwest of the 
Huasteca Potosina, is crossed by the same boundary between the Gulf Coastal Plain and the 
mountains, which here are known as the Sierra Norte (or sometimes as the Sierra Juárez). In both 
regions, the state of Veracruz lies between the study area and the Gulf of Mexico. As in the 
Huasteca, the first low, linear ridges of the Sierra are late Cretaceous limestone, but these soon 
merge15 into more geologically complex and higher-elevation mountains toward the southwest – 
in Oaxaca, mainly Permian schists and, southwest of Ixtlán and Ayutla and into the Central 
Valley, Paleocene andesitic tuffs (SGM 2000). The Oaxaca geodata analysis area includes a 
much smaller section of the Gulf Coastal Plain than the Huasteca one, and a much larger expanse 
of mountains, which surpass 3000 meters in elevation in several places. The area also includes a 
small part of the Central Valley, an approximately 1600-meter-elevation, mostly flat, T-shaped 
plateau centered on the state capital city of Oaxaca. This valley was created during and after the 
Miocene era, when the horsts of the adjacent Sierra Norte were raised along a normal fault, as a 
response to the southerly movement of the Chortis terrane under the Pacific Ocean (Centeno-
García 2004, 37).   
                                                        
15 One Sierra Norte water-formed feature is of global importance for speleologists, but does not impinge on the 
present study: the second deepest cave complex in the world (Tabor 2010, 32). It is located under the areas 
labeled “Mazatec” and “Cuicatec” in Figure 2.6. 
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Figure 2.4. Sierra Norte de Oaxaca study region: Watersheds, rivers, and topography. 
Numbers indicate RAN document study núcleos. Zapotec, Chinantec, and Mixe language 
areas labeled in gray. (Topography adapted from INEGI 2000). 
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The vast majority of the Oaxaca geodata analysis area, like the entire Huasteca one, drains 
into the Gulf of Mexico. The exception is the southeast corner of the Oaxaca area, in the Central 
Valley, which drains into the Pacific via the Río Atoyac/Río Verde. Like the Huasteca area, the 
Oaxaca one lies within a nationally important super-watershed – in the case of Oaxaca, the 
Papaolapan River basin. This super-watershed was famous as the location of a vast federal 
hydroelectric, irrigation, flood control, and rural development project mostly active in the 1950s 
and 1960s, modeled after the Tennessee Valley Authority (Gerencia Operativa 2011). Of the five 
major watersheds within the Papaloapan basin, parts of four are included within the study area: 
the Grande (called the Santo Domingo further downstream, after joining the Salado River which 
drains southeastern Puebla state); the Cajonos (called the Playa Vicente and the Tesechoacán 
further downstream16); the Colorado (also called the San Juan); and the Valle Nacional. Every 
decade or so, torrential rains cause floods and landslides in the Sierra Norte, threatening life and 
property (Pérez García 1996a, 64). 
Twelve of the RAN document study núcleos are within the Río Cajonos watershed, 
including the PRM focus comunidad of Talea. In the style of Dan Gade’s study of the Vilcanota 
(Urubamba) Valley of Peru showing vertical zonations (Gade 1975), the following is a brief 
description of the four sections of the Cajonos watershed, from upstream (most southerly) down. 
Each section is typified by a particular combination of physiography, climate, and vegetation. 
Section 1: From the headwaters to Betaza, a village between Zoochila and Villa Alta in 
Figure 2.4, the valley is relatively broad. Rocks are mainly Tertiary andesitic tuffs, then Permian 
schists (SGM 2000). The river elevation averages about 1500 meters above sea level, and the 
surrounding mountaintops about 3000 meters. This is the “dry Sierra Norte”: a rain shadow, with 
scrubby vegetation and selva baja caducifolia, including oaks, Burseraceae species, and some 
cactuses; vegetation is mainly disturbed. 
Section 2: From Betaza to Tiltepec and Yagalaxi, the river cuts through a deeply incised 
landscape. Rocks are mainly Permian schists (SGM 2000). The river elevation averages about 
900 meters above sea level, and the surrounding mountaintops about 2500 meters. This is the 
                                                        
16 The river over its entire length is called the Tesechoacán in an 1885 hydrological map (García Cubas 1885). 
Some documents spell the river as “Cajones” (SEMARNAT and CONAGUA 2006), which means “boxes” or 
“crates.” 
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“wet Sierra Norte”: orographic rainfall during over half the year, with pine-oak forest, and some 
cloud forest above the river toward the end of the section. Vegetation well conserved in lower 
portion. Talea is in the upper part of this section. 
Section 3: From Tiltepec and Yagalaxi to San José Mano Márquez, a village 10 km north 
of Ayotzintepec in Figure 2.4. The river elevation averages about 200 meters above sea level, 
and the surrounding mountaintops about 1000 meters. Vernacular sub-regions here include the 
Rincón Bajo (Lower Corner) and Chinantla Baja (lower region of the Chinantec people). A 
somewhat incised landscape, rocks here are mainly Jurassic siltstones and sandstones, then 
Cretaceous limestones (SGM 2000). Humid tropical vegetation dominates, with some cloud 
forest above the river at beginning of section. The forests are well conserved in the upper part. 
Section 4: North of the study area, from San José Mano Márquez to the confluence with 
Papaloapan River 80 km north of Playa Vicente, the river approaches sea level, and the 
surrounding land rarely reaches 100 meters above it. Rocks are mainly Tertiary mudstones and 
sandstones under alluvium (SGM 2000). This is the “Gulf Coastal Plain,” with mostly disturbed 
tropical vegetation, originally selva mediana y alta perennifolia – evergreen medium and high-
canopy rain forest.  
2.2.2 Vegetation and land use 
The original and potential vegetation of the Oaxaca geodata analysis area includes 
variations of the same general types in the Huasteca one. As in the Huasteca, the few relatively 
undisturbed forest patches of the Gulf Coastal Plain are dominated by mid-canopy humid 
tropical forest, though in the wetter Oaxaca region they verge on high-canopy rain forest. 
Between about 900 and 3000 meters, much of the Gulf-side slope is covered in cloud forest 
(although note that a broad definition of the term “cloud forest” was used for Figure 2.5, 
somewhat exaggerating its extent). The spine of the Sierra Norte follows the boundary between 
cloud forest and humid pine-oak forest visible in Figure 2.5, and includes a few patches of 
ericaceous alpine scrub on the most exposed peaks. The Cajonos and other valleys cut deeply 
into the Sierra Norte, in places allowing some Gulf moisture to penetrate beyond this high ridge. 
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Figure 2.5. Sierra Norte de Oaxaca study region: Land use and land cover, 2010. Zapotec, 
Chinantec, and Mixe language areas labeled in gray. Numbers indicate RAN document 
study núcleos. (Vegetation adapted from CONABIO 1999). 
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The lower parts of the Rio Grande valley are progressively drier, with oaks dominating from 
about 1100 to 1500 meters, and low-canopy dry tropical forest and xerophytic vegetation below 
1100 meters. Southwest of Ixtlán another ridgeline traces the continental divide, as high as the 
aforementioned Sierra Norte spine and covered mainly in seasonally dry pine-oak forest. Finally, 
the Central Valley has long dry season, and was once covered in low-canopy dry tropical forest. 
The great variety of vegetation types in a relatively small area has resulted in high 
biodiversity and regional (sub-state-scale) endemism (Dávila et al. 1997). Furthermore, the 
Sierra Norte “represents the northern limit for many montane Mesoamerican taxons, and is an 
important region for pteridophytes [ferns and their allies] and genera such as Begonia, Quercus 
[oaks], Miconia [of the Melastomataceae], and Piper [black pepper]” (García-Mendoza 2004, 
315). 
As in the Huasteca, the map of current land use and land cover (Figure 2.5) depicts 
extensive areas of anthropogenic disturbance, especially in the Gulf Coastal, mainly from cattle 
ranching, as well as in the Central Valley, from mechanized agriculture and large towns. The 
wide-ranging pine-oak forests of the Sierra Norte contain numerous agricultural areas, most of 
them not visible at the scale of this map, around the many indigenous villages that tend to cluster 
between 1500 and 2000 meters above sea level. Due mainly to its lack of sunshine, soggy soils, 
and economically less valuable tree species, the cloud forest band is the area least disturbed by 
agriculture, logging, and human occupation. 
While there are many similarities in the material culture and lifeways among the villages 
in the study area, even in the several small-territory villages once dedicated to mining (e.g., 
Natividad, whose location is shown in Figure 2.5), a surprising degree of village-scale productive 
specialization exists. This spatial differentiation is rooted partly in the distribution of natural 
resources and climate, and partly in the chance events of history. Examples of village-scale 
specialization include Zoochila (mezcal), Talea (coffee), and the cluster of núcleos which 
including Ixtepeji and Ixtlán that are dedicated to community-based commercial forestry 
(Klooster 2003). These and other specializations are apparently surviving into the age of global 
commerce and telecommunications-enabled “national” culture. Indeed, several villages may be 
benefitting from increased export potential afforded by better transportation links.  
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2.2.3 Indigenous and mestizo populations 
The map of indigenous and non-indigenous (mestizo) language speakers and of specific 
language areas (Figure 2.6) shows that nearly all of the settled parts of the Sierra Norte are 
dominated by indigenous languages. An exception is the town of Ixtlán, where long-standing 
road access to the Central Valley has led to Spanish language dominance, although from my field 
experience I am certain that most of its residents consider themselves indigenous. Similarly, 
Ayotzintepec and Valle Nacional are large towns in lowland valleys with historic connections to 
the city of Tuxtepec and the state of Veracruz that have diminished indigenous-language 
populations. 
The two principal languages of the Sierra Norte de Oaxaca geodata analysis area are 
Zapotec and Chinantec, both of the Oto-Manguean family. Along with Mixtec, Zapotec is one of 
the two most widely-spoken indigenous languages in Oaxaca. The Zapotecs of the Sierra Norte 
are concentrated in and around the major market towns of Ixtlán, Talea, and Villa Alta. They live 
mainly in the temperate pine-oak forest zone, as well as in a few villages in a humid tropical area 
called the Rincón Bajo. These “Sierra Norte Zapotecs” comprise one of the four major branches 
of Zapotec speakers. The other branches are the “Valley Zapotecs” (concentrated near 
Tlacolula), the “Sierra Sur Zapotecs” (in the mountain range closer to the Pacific Ocean), and the 
“Isthmus Zapotecs” (within the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, southeast of the study region) (Álvarez 
2003, 307). 
The Chinantecs occupy the same high-altitude pine-oak forest zone as the Zapotecs, but 
farther to the northwest, clustered mainly in villages near the market town of Quiotepec. Unlike 
the Zapotecs, they also live in a broad swath of lowland, humid slopes along the edge of (and a 
few kilometers into) the Gulf Coastal Plain. Several lowland Chinantec villages were relocated 
when the Miguel Aleman and Miguel de la Madrid reservoirs was constructed in 1959 and 1988, 
three of them to the La Joya Resettlement Zone shown in Figure 2.6 (Comisión del Río 
Papaloapan 1972; Valis 2010). The boundary between the Zapotec and Chinantec zones does not 
follow any especially notable physical divide, but communication between the zones was 
difficult until the Oaxaca-Tuxtepec federal highway was finished in 1958, and fully paved by 
1982 (Álvarez 2003, 348). 
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Figure 2.6. Sierra Norte de Oaxaca study region: Indigenous, mixed, and mestizo 
population areas; and, specific indigenous language areas. Numbers indicate RAN 
document study núcleos. (Sources: INEGI 2005b; INEGI 2006a).  
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A third major indigenous population, the Mixe, live at the edge of the geodata analysis 
area. The Mixe language is closely related to Zoque, spoken in the Chimalapas region on the 
Isthmus of Tehuantepec at the Oaxaca-Chiapas border. Both languages are more distantly related 
to the Mayan family (Suárez 1983, 26). Like the Chinantec zone, the Mixe area includes both 
pine-oak highlands and wetter, lower slopes toward the Gulf Coastal Plain. 
The rate of emigration varies greatly from village to village. Destinations include the 
United States (primarily the Los Angeles area), Mexico City, and Oaxaca city (Hirabayashi 
1993, 76; López 2001). The 19 RAN document study núcleos have experienced low to moderate 
emigration in the past decade, and a few of them (e.g., Tiltepec) almost none at all. In contrast, 
between Quiotepec and Ixtlán are a handful of sizeable villages where most members of each 
resident family live elsewhere. In these ejidos and comunidades, remittances have sponsored the 
construction of fine homes and public installations, but only a few people, mainly elderly, live 
there to enjoy them. 
2.3   33 núcleos, the subjects of intensive research 
In this section, I briefly introduce the 33 núcleos which I researched in detail using RAN 
archival documents. (An additional three were researched, but found to have legally uncertain 
status as social property). In 15 of these, I also conducted participatory research mapping.  
It should be noted that most villages in Mexico have two names which are often used 
together, on maps and in official documents: a patron saint name, followed by a unique name 
related to place. The unique name may be an indigenous toponym (e.g., “Tazáquil” or 
“Yagavila”), a Spanish descriptive toponym (e.g., “Buenavista”), or – as with many more 
recently established ejidos – a state-approved name honoring a person or event in Mexican 
political history, or a pioneer sentiment (e.g., “La Esperanza,” meaning “Hope”). A further 
complication is that the unique name, even if it is of indigenous origin, is not always the name 
used by the indigenous language speakers of the village itself; this frequently occurs in regions 
where the Mexicas (Nahuatl-speaking Aztecs) had conquered (or had imposed extractive 
commercial ties with) the local indigenous group in the century before the arrival of the Spanish 
– e.g., “Dsioh Juøi Tien” is the Chinantec name for their village of Tepetotula (Merrifield and 
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Anderson 2007, 62). For clarity, in this study I generally use only the part of a núcleo’s name 
that is most commonly used by people in the region when they speak Spanish.  
Three additional villages (Tampate and Piaxtla in the Huasteca, and Yatzona in Oaxaca) 
were found to have unresolved, legally ambiguous status as social property núcleos. Therefore, 
they are not included in most of the analyses. I have included them in Figures 2.1 through 2.6 to 
provide concrete examples of this seldomly acknowledged land tenure category. Because its 
boundary was surveyed by the government in 1981, Yatzona is also included in Figure 5.1.2. 
2.3.1 15 núcleos in the Huasteca Potosina 
The average area of the 15 Huasteca núcleos is 15 sq km, and the average population is 
1,095. The largest núcleo in population is Tancuime, with 3,132 inhabitants; the smallest is El 
Chuchupe, with 143. The average percentage of indigenous language speakers in the 15 núcleos 
is 86 percent. Two núcleos have at least 99 percent indigenous language speakers (Santa Bárbara 
and Tancuime), while one (Las Armas) has only 39 percent. 11 of the núcleos are ejidos, and 
four are comunidades. 47 percent of the núcleos had individual-ownership parcels surveyed by 
PROCEDE; 40 percent had PROCEDE survey only the núcleo perimeter, or also a few civic 
parcels; and 13 percent were not surveyed by PROCEDE at all.  
The núcleos generally lie where the Gulf Coastal Plain meets the easternmost ridge of the 
Sierra Madre Oriental. Most of them include some relatively flat, deep-soil territory typical of 
the plain (more suited to permanent agriculture), as well as some hilly, thinner-soil land typical 
of the Sierra (more suited to forest and generally non-commercial forms of traditional 
agriculture). Tanchanaco and Las Armas are the two núcleos which are entirely within the plain, 
but even Las Armas includes a low, forested hill which serves as its non-commercially-
productive common use area. El Chuchupe’s territory was, until a recent legal decree granted it a 
small extension into the deep-soil Coastal Plain, almost entirely within the shallow-soil Sierra. 
Six núcleos lie partly or entirely on the low sandstone hills of the Sierra Tancanhuitz.  
Ten of the núcleos are within the Teenek-speaking area, and five are within the Nahuatl-
speaking area. Las Armas includes significant numbers of both Nahuatl and Teenek speakers.  
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2.3.2 18 núcleos in the Sierra Norte de Oaxaca 
The núcleo populations and other 2005 census figures were calculated by selecting INEGI 
localidades (rural census tract points) within the núcleo territories. In the unusual case of Talea, 
most of the population technically lives outside their núcleo, in a “donut hole” that is a populated 
place with a different legal name. Because this is the same group of people who own the territory 
of the legally-defined núcleo called Talea, for the purposes of this study they are considered the 
residents of that núcleo.17 Among the RAN document study núcleos, the other example of a 
village’s territory excluding the main settlement was Chicomezúchil. Unlike Talea, 
Chicomezúchil held this status until the 1992 reforms (until 1989, to be precise), not afterwards, 
a legacy of its history as a factory town later surrounded by agriculture (Pérez García 1996b, 
340; RAN 1989c). 
The average area of the 19 Oaxaca núcleos is 38 sq km, and the average population is 663. 
The largest núcleo in population is Talea, with 1,998 inhabitants; the smallest is Cuasimulco, 
with 103. The average percentage of indigenous language speakers in the 19 núcleos is 63 
percent. Four núcleos have at least 99 percent indigenous language speakers (Cacalotepec, 
Reagui, Lachixila, and Tiltepec18), while one (Chicomezúchil) has only 1 percent. Two of the 
núcleos are ejidos (Las Palmas and La Alicia), while 16 are comunidades.19 One of the 
comunidades, Chicomezúchil, was legally considered an ejido until 1978. 
26 percent of the núcleos had individual-ownership parcels surveyed by PROCEDE; 42 
percent had PROCEDE survey only the núcleo perimeter, or also a few civic parcels; and 32 
percent were not surveyed by PROCEDE at all. 
                                                        
17 There exists an entire class of nucleos, Nuevo Centro de Población Ejidal (New Ejido Population Center, or 
NCPE), which shares this trait of the members living outside their territory. However, the NCPEs resulted 
from a specific late-20th-century program to grant land to qualified groups living in nearby cities (Ángeles and 
Ruiz 2000), while the case of Talea was a local, isolated decision. 
18 100 percent of the residents of the village of Tiltepec speak Zapotec. Legally, their comunidad territory is 
shared with another village, La Luz, where 81 percent of the residents speak Zapotec. 
19 The preponderance of comunidades (rather than ejidos) in much of Oaxaca is due partly to the highly 
indigenous character of the state, but more to its principal colonial landholding pattern having been one of 
“small, unstable Spanish estates” rather than the “huge, semi-independent haciendas of the north” (Taylor 
1972, 200). 
63 
 
  
All núcleos except two lie well within the mountains of the Sierra Norte. Three of these 
Sierra núcleos are in the Chinantec-speaking area. Tepetotutla, on the windward side of the 
range, has cloud forest in its upper zone and humid tropical vegetation in its lower parts, while 
Buenavista and Totomoxtla, on the leeward side, have temperate pine-oak forest covering most 
of their upper zones, and oaks and dry tropical scrub further down. 
The Sierra Zapotec núcleos are clustered into two groups: a group of just two 
(Chicomezúchil and Guelatao) in the seasonally dry pine-oak zone of the upper Rio Grande 
valley; and the core group of eight núcleos in the mainly pine-oak forests of the steep slopes in 
the midsection of the Rio Cajonos watershed. Yagila, Teotlaxco, and Zoogochi belong to a 
vernacular subregion known as the “Rincón [Corner] de Ixtlán,” since they fall within the 
municipio of which Ixtlán is the seat (cabecera). None of the Sierra núcleos are quickly 
reachable by paved road from either side of the range, but the three most isolated ones are 
probably Buenavista, Reagui, and Cacalotepec, although the last of these became more 
accessible in 2009 with the completion of the Rincón de Ixtlán loop road. 
Besides Tepetotula, three other núcleos are on the lower slopes of the humid, Gulf-facing 
side of the Sierra Norte: tiny Cuasimulco, enormous Lachixila, and Lachixola. All three contain 
tropical rain forest, and the first two have some cloud forest on their upper slopes. Lachixila and 
Lachixola have, in recent decades, felt the effects of the advancing lowland cattle ranching front. 
Cuasimulco and Lachixola are in the Chinantla-speaking area, while Lachixila is in the partly 
Zapotec-speaking vernacular subregion called the “Rincón Bajo” (Lower Corner). All three 
villages are relatively isolated, especially Cuasimulco, which cannot be reached by standard 
motor vehicles. 
There are two núcleos mainly within a flat lowland extension of the Gulf Coastal Plain, 
separated from the main plain by only a low limestone ridge: Las Palmas and La Alicia. These 
were included in this study to augment the sample of núcleos which requested that PROCEDE 
survey and certify their individual parcels. Some Chinantec is still spoken in both communities.  
64 
 
  
2.4   The núcleo of Talea de Castro, Oaxaca 
The comunidad of San Miguel Talea de Castro (Figure 2.7), called “Raleha” in Zapotec, 
was one of only four núcleos in the Sierra Norte de Oaxaca study region which chose to have 
PROCEDE survey and certify its individual parcels. Of these four, it is the only one which has 
never been an ejido, and only one of two where the majority of residents (53 percent in 2005) 
speak an indigenous language. The other Oaxaca study region núcleo with individual PROCEDE 
parcels and a majority of indigenous-language speakers is the ejido of Las Palmas, at the edge of 
the Gulf Plain. I chose Talea as the focus of this study for PRM work, and not Las Palmas, 
because Talea is located among the forested highland headwaters of some of the Río Cajonos 
tributaries, and therefore its water sources are probably more potentially important at a regional 
scale. 
2.4.1  History and land tenure status 
A visitor may find that Talea appears to be a typical Sierra Zapotec market town, like the 
similar-sized settlements of Villa Alta and Ixtlán. Unlike the older indigenous settlements around 
it, however, Talea was founded during the early Spanish conquest period. In 1525, a friar, 
Bartolome de Olmedo, “came from Mexico City to baptize Rincon Zapotecs, at request of 
Zapotecs themselves […] Olmedo founded his new settlement precisely on the border between 
Yatoni and Juquila, the lands presumably having been bought in small lots” (Nader 1964, 208). 
Talea remained a small village without much land of its own until the mid-1800s, when the Santa 
Gertrudis gold mine in the valley below boomed, and Talea grew to service the mineworkers. 
In 1905, when the mine closed, “many of the miners, representing a variety of pueblos, 
came to settle in Talea where they began to farm for a living. Some of these miners were 
mestizos from the Sierra Juárez [Sierra Norte] who spoke Spanish and Sierra Zapotec, some of 
them from monolingual [Zapotec] Rincon villages such as Reagui and Cacalotepec”  (Nader 
1964, 208).  While the community’s territory did expand somewhat, mainly through purchases 
from neighbors, the need to extract more economic benefit from relatively less land led Taleans 
65 
 
  
Figure 2.7. Talea (in Zapotec, “Raleha”): Principal geographic features. Land use and 
vegetation cover in 2010 is shown for both the núcleo of San Miguel Talea de Castro (outer 
polygon) and the localidad of Villa Talea de Castro (inner polygon). (Sources include 
INEGI 2002b and author’s fieldwork.)  
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to be among the first Sierra Norte residents to embrace coffee as an important cash crop. By the 
1920s, Talea was more prestigious than neighboring villages, but also more dependent on them 
for food staples like maize, until the road to Oaxaca city was completed in 1961 (and paved in 
the 1990s) as part of a regional road-building effort to support the supply of Sierra pulpwood to 
the FAPATUX paper mill in Tuxtepec (Montes Ramírez 2010, 64). 
This atypical history has resulted in a hierarchy of administrative jurisdictions even more 
complex than the already complicated norm found throughout Oaxaca. The “Talea” which is the 
focus of this study is the comunidad territory formally called San Miguel Talea de Castro, owned 
collectively and individually by 993 comuneros. However, 90 percent of those comuneros do not 
live within that polygon. Except during occasional overnight stays in their ranch huts, usually 
during the coffee harvest, they live in a different legal entity, a localidad called “Villa Talea de 
Castro.” (Here, localidad is not used in the INEGI sense of a “rural census tract point,” but rather 
in the RAN sense of a “non-núcleo village in a predominantly social property area”). 
The 10 percent of Talea comuneros who do live permanently within the Talea núcleo 
territory are clustered in a hamlet called Santa Gertrudis, site of the late-19th-century mining 
operation. During PROCEDE work, this hamlet was surveyed as a human settlement area with 
about 20 solares. Like other Taleans, each of the hamlet’s residents owns one or more parcels 
within the núcleo territory, and have certain rights to the common use areas. Santa Gertrudis 
residents conduct their own assemblies, where they make decisions related just to their hamlet, as 
well as participate in most of the full núcleo assemblies.  
The idea of a single ejido or comunidad containing two or more population centers, a 
principal one where the general assemblies are held as well as one or more subsidiary ones with 
some measure of autonomy, is common in social property areas of Mexico. La Pila and 
Tancuime are two examples from the Huasteca Potosina. In some places, these subsidiaries are 
called “agencias,” referring essentially to their status as a police precinct; in other places, they 
may be called “ranchos,” although in Talea this word refers to a single hut on an agricultural 
parcel. 
What is unusual about Talea is that its principal “urban zone” (human settlement) is not 
part of the núcleo at all. This was a decision made at the beginning of the PROCEDE process  
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(interview with Miranda 2009), to better separate the functions and responsibilities of Talea as a 
county seat from its role as the place of residence of a group of farmers, even though the 
functionaries for both roles are drawn from the exact same group of people. The municipal 
authorities of Talea have two areas of jurisdiction and responsibility. First, they maintain 
services pertaining to the main population center, the localidad of Villa Talea de Castro, which 
includes a more recently developed neighborhood called Barrio Vírgen de los Pobres. Second, 
they handle certain matters pertaining to the county as a whole, which includes not only Talea 
but also Yatoni and Otatitlán to the north. INEGI maps insist that Las Delicias (a dispersed-
settlement village southwest of Talea) is also part of the Talea county, but I found that the 
Taleans, who of course actually perform the functions in question, consider Las Delicias to 
belong to the county of Juquila. 
The principal square in the main village of Talea is located at 17° 21’ 40” north, 96° 14’ 
50” west. In UTM coordinates (zone 14N), this corresponds to 0792470 east, 1921660 north.  
2.4.2  Physical geography and land use 
Talea’s 2,851 hectares encompass 1,600 vertical meters, from the Cajonos River (at 480 
meters above sea level) at the easternmost vertex, to the microwave tower near El Arenal (at 
2,071 meters) at the westernmost vertex. Between these extremes lies another high ridge, the 
Cerro de Tabaa (named for the neighboring comunidad of Tabaa) and its continuation to the 
1,696-meter hill El Picacho. The ridgeline between Cerro de Tabaa and El Picacho is known as 
“La Cumbre” (“The Summit”). Between this ridgeline and the higher one culminating in El 
Arenal lies the valley of the Río Santa Gertrudis. This river is also called, at various points, Río 
de la Cantera, Río de la Hacienda, and Río Rosario. This follows the Zapotec custom of giving 
different names to different stretches of river, each stretch conceived as unit bound with some 
land on either side, and this unit equivalent to a sub-village-scale place often called a paraje 
(Schmeider 1930, 14). This river arises on the flank of the 3,005-meter Cerro Siete Picachos, 
seven km southwest of the Talea boundary, and joins the Río Cajonos three km north of the 
Talea boundary. Within Talea, its flow averages 900 meters in elevation. The southern extreme 
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of the comunidad is on the flank of the 2,013-meter Cerro Mogote, along the same ridge as Cerro 
de Tabaa. 
The núcleo territory thus divides neatly into three slopes. From east to west, they are: 
1. The east-facing slope draining to the Cajonos River. This relatively small area is 
also the driest, and least accessible, of the three slopes; it is covered mainly in 
semiarid and secondary vegetation. 
2. The west-facing slope draining into the Santa Gertrudis River. This relatively long 
and narrow slope is moderately to very humid – it is wettest at the higher southern 
section toward Cerro Mogote. Most of it is intensely cultivated, mainly in coffee 
but also with some cattle pasture in the upper parts. The northern and southern 
extremes are forested: humid pine-oak at the higher southern end (“Yag Brubh” in 
Figure 6.7, on page 261), and the beginnings of a transition toward tropical forest 
at the lower northern end. 
3. The east-facing slope draining into the Santa Gertrudis River. This large area 
covers about half of the total territory. The main population center of Talea was 
built about halfway up this slope, at around 1,600 meters above sea level. The 
lowest portion, above the river downstream from the hamlet of Santa Gertrudis, is 
only moderately humid, and non-coffee agriculture is practiced here. The 
microclimate is progressively more humid further up. Much coffee is grown 
below, and up to, the town. Above the town is a thick forest of humid pine and 
oak; little agriculture is practiced here now, although more once was. Large deer 
are sometimes seen here. In the highest part, especially along streams, there are a 
few patches of forest with some components typical of cloud forests, such as 
diverse epiphytes, mosses, and tree ferns of the family Cyatheaceae (Rzedowski 
1978; Challenger 1998, 462). 
The areas and percentages of each land use/land cover type are given in Table 2.1. 
The paved road which ends at the Talea town center links it to the Central Valley of 
Oaxaca. Unpaved roads link Talea to Santa Gertrudis (this road was extended in 2008 up the far 
slope to La Cumbre), to Yatoni and Otatitlán, and to Las Delicias and El Porvenir. In 2005, this 
last road was extended around Cerro Mogote to shorten the travel time to the communities of 
Solaga, Tabaa, and Villa Alta. The old road to the district court town of Villa Alta featured 
prominently in anthropologist Laura Nader’s study of Talean justice in theory and in practice 
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(1990), but it was never passable by motor vehicle, and is now just another path traversing the 
Talea polygon. 
 
Table 2.1. Comunidad of Talea: Land use/land cover areas, 2010.  
 area (ha) 
% of 
total 
Humid forest 1,071 37.6 
Coffee or orchard 713 25.0 
Secondary vegetation 480 16.8 
Agriculture or pasture 368 12.9 
Semiarid natural vegetation 214 7.5 
Urban 5 0.2 
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3. Methods 
The three principal sources for this study were archival research, participatory research 
mapping (PRM), and geodata analysis. To supplement this work, additional activities included 
directed interviews with núcleo authorities and government agency representatives, acquisition 
of records and data from CONAGUA, and analysis of secondary published sources.  
3.1   Archival research: Social property documents (1923-2007) for 33 núcleos  
The National Agrarian Registry (Registro Agrario Nacional, or RAN) stores records of 
interactions with social property núcleos (ejidos and comunidades) in offices in each state 
capital. These documents recount a wide variety of actions and information, mainly regarding 
legal land tenure interactions between a núcleo’s authorities and the government, but many 
describe issues and disputes between individuals living in a núcleo, or between an individual and 
the núcleo’s authorities. The files for some ejidos and comunidades are more complete and 
detailed than those for other ones. Since the inception of the PROCEDE program in 1993, the 
Oaxaca and San Luis Potosí state offices maintain these documents in two separate locations for 
each state: a Historical Archive (Archivo Histórico) for the period before 1993, and a General 
Agrarian Archive (Archivo General Agrario) for the period since 1993, though some older 
documents are also found in the latter location.20  
These files are available for public viewing, one expediente (ejido or comunidad dossier) 
at a time. I inspected all documents for 36 núcleos (19 in the Sierra Norte region of Oaxaca and 
17 in the Huasteca region of San Luis Potosí, including three which were found to have lost or 
never secured legal social property status). The núcleos were chosen based on three criteria: first, 
that they include the twelve villages where I had already completed participatory research 
mapping work as part of the México Indígena team; second, that they embrace a variety of 
núcleo types, particularly regarding de jure land tenure status; and third, that together they form 
parts of two reasonably compact geographical zones. 
                                                        
20 All documents from the RAN archives are listed in the References section with RAN as the author. 
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For 17 of these núcleos, I also acquired official paper copies of property maps produced 
by PROCEDE and FANAR surveys, 11 of which had been obtained during the México Indígena 
project. Depending on the work done in a núcleo, these maps show núcleo perimeters, internal 
land tenure zones (parceled areas, common use areas, and human settlement areas), or individual 
parcels.21 Upon its being surveyed, each parcel is given a number which is related to an 
individual owner (including, in the case of “civic parcels,” the núcleo itself as owner) through 
booklets often called Asignación de Parcelas. Copies of these, too, were acquired and analyzed, 
for those ejidos and comunidades which underwent the PROCEDE process. Because they are 
found in the same dossiers as other archival RAN documents, they are listed in the References 
section with RAN as the author.  
Geographer Michael Roche (2000, 145) described archival research as “somewhat akin to 
confidently accepting the challenge of working on a jigsaw puzzle where you can be certain that 
pieces are missing and that the box cover with the picture of the completed puzzle will never be 
found.” Studying the RAN archival documents, I paid close attention to two kinds of items: first, 
anecdotes and facts which suggest individual or village-scale practices, traditions, or 
innovations; and second, anything which related to water. In this context, an “anecdote” is an 
event, description, situation, or opinion recounted by someone – usually an individual villager, a 
núcleo authority, a government agent, a judge, or a neighboring landowner – which provides 
evidence of a personal, interpersonal, or institutional practice. I encountered many examples of 
individual or village-scale practices, but mentions of water were relatively scarce. Taken together 
with the other sources of data, particularly my participatory mapping experiences, the historical 
examples illustrated by these anecdotes contributed enough information to produce what is 
essentially a thematically focused ethnohistory of the study regions. 
“Communal statutes” are núcleo-level documents that codify the assembly’s by-laws and 
certain regulatory practices. The only such documents normally stored in the RAN files are 
“boilerplate” versions; that is, standardized government texts adopted by a núcleo’s assembly 
                                                        
21 Because INEGI was the primary agency responsible for cartographic work for the land tenure surveys, the 
PROCEDE maps (“Planos Producidos para el Registro Agrario Nacional”) are listed in the References section 
with INEGI as the author.When the PROCEDE program ended in 2006, the responsibility for any new survey 
maps in nucleos shifted to FANAR. Because the RAN became directly resoponsible for cartography, it is listed 
as the author for the map produced through FANAR for the comunidad of Tiltepec. 
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with little or no modification, often as part of the PROCEDE process. The two such statutes I 
examined in detail were for the comunidades of Yagila (RAN 2001b), and Santa Bárbara (RAN 
1999f). 
To facilitate content analysis, I entered all the collected data and anecdotes  in an Excel 
spreadsheet, with each column representing a theme or question (e.g., “post-PROCEDE-
certification anecdotes suggesting individual water source ownership”) and each row a núcleo. 
From this I identified patterns and chose illustrative anecdotes (see chapter 5). 
I georeferenced the PROCEDE maps in ArcGIS, creating shapefiles for land tenure areas. 
I used these coverages to produce tenure maps of each núcleo (Figures 5.1.1 through 5.1.9) and 
combined them with INEGI topographic layers to qualitatively analyze relationships among land 
tenure, water sources, and other geographic features. For the núcleo boundaries and land tenure 
polygons, as for all geo-spatial data, I used whichever data source was most accurate for each 
núcleo. Several of the 33 núcleos were surveyed by PROCEDE, but I did not possess the paper 
PROCEDE-generated maps; their perimeters and tenure areas were located by digitizing 
polygons displayed in the Mexican government’s GAIA web-based GIS portal (INEGI 2011). 
The núcleos which were never surveyed by PROCEDE were more difficult to map 
accurately, but I was able to find ways to locate each one reasonably well. In the case of 
Yatzona, for example, the núcleo happens to be coterminous with a municipio of the same name, 
so I could substitute an INEGI municipio shapefile. For Guelatao, the perimeter had been located 
by participatory GPS fieldwork during the México Indígena project. For Cuasimulco, I had 
fortuitously acquired its boundary coordinates in 2003 while doing work for World Wildlife 
Fund-Oaxaca. The most challenging núcleo to map was Lachixila, in Oaxaca. It did not appear in 
the GAIA layer, because it had never been officially surveyed by PROCEDE, even though its 
PROCEDE-era (1995) perimeter survey was legally equivalent. I was able to piece together its 
perimeter by combining the “negative space” of neighboring núcleos which did appear in GAIA 
with the sketch I had made of the 1995 map in the RAN office, supplemented by referring to the 
part of the boundary representing a physical entity (the Río Cajonos), and finally with the 
addition of four GPS points I happened to have taken when visiting the núcleo in August 2007 as 
part of my brief reconnaissance of the “Rincón Bajo” area. 
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3.2   Participatory research mapping (author as team member) in 12 núcleos 
Participatory research mapping (PRM) is a social science approach, used alone or in 
combination with other methods by an increasing number of geographers and others, in which 
geographic data are defined, collected, displayed, and put to practical, creative use in great part 
by nonprofessional, often indigenous “local investigators.” In a general sense, PRM is part of the 
postcolonial thread of applied social science research (Crang 1992; Hall 1993), which asks that 
“geographers construct more ‘polyphonic’ geographies as a way of reconfiguring academic 
authority in relation to ‘research subjects’” (Jacobs 2003, 351), but its deeper roots include the 
1920s field techniques of Carl Sauer, whose “conversations with Mexican peasants were not 
about how much he, the professor, knew, but what they could tell him about their agricultural 
and material life” (Gade 2012, 341). 
In this section, I review the components and evolution of PRM, provide a basic 
description of how the method was implemented by the México Indígena research team, and give 
details about my own implementation of the method in the village of Talea. Fuller accounts of 
the México Indígena experience appear in Herlihy et al. 2008 and in Smith et al. 2009.  
3.2.1  Participatory research mapping: Techniques and history   
A fully participatory research mapping project would generally include the following 
steps, which I have partly adapted from the description by geographers Peter Herlihy and 
Gregory Knapp (2003, 307-308).22  
1. The academic researchers or NGO facilitators train local investigators, chosen by 
their own communities, in skills which are both relevant to the PRM project and useful 
afterwards. Today these include GPS use, and sometimes basic GIS database and 
cartographic production techniques.       
                                                        
22 Participatory mapping (PM) is a method with several tasks in common with PRM. Because academic 
findings are not a primary goal of PM, any academic researchers or NGO facilitators initiate a PM project 
without preconceived research objectives. 
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2. Through an unhurried, iterative process of collaborative fieldwork and group 
meetings, the local investigators and community residents, working with the researchers, 
convert “cognitive” mental maps to “consensual” maps. 
3. The team members anchor the PRM products (mainly maps) to a specific location 
and time, only including features whose nature, name, and coordinates have been locally 
verified. 
4. The PRM research team converts the “consensual” maps to “standardized”  maps; 
i.e., in a format legible to a wide range of potential audiences. Most of the actual 
computer-based work is usually performed by the academic researchers, but always in an 
iterative process of improvement and verification with the local investigators and 
communities. For example, the 1993 Darién (Panama) PRM project “focused on the 
systematic collection of toponyms to locate the resource use site[s] and define subsistence 
lands. […] The PRM methodology emphasizes the dialectic between the researchers and 
surveyors to transform the toponyms, sketch maps, air photos, and other information into 
standard maps and descriptive form” (Herlihy 2003, 325). Some, however, contend that 
PM and PRM in indigenous communities need not include the step of cartographic 
standardization (Vermeylen, Davies, and van der Horst 2012, 122). 
5. The communities then use the maps (or not) for whatever purposes suit them. 
Typical uses can include education of younger community residents, interactions with 
government officials or NGOs for specific purposes (e.g., building a road, or defining a 
boundary), or as part of a larger political action. Examples of “much needed proofs of 
evidence for adjudications of the prior rights of indigenous peoples” (Jacobs 2003, 350) 
have included PRM efforts by the Yanyuwa of Australia (Baker 1999); the Embéra, 
Wounaan, and Kuna of Panama (Herlihy 2003); and the Miskitu, Pech, and Tawahka of 
Honduras (Herlihy and Leake 1997; Herlihy 2011; Nuila Coto 2011). 
6. The academic researchers may “scale up” the PRM results and understanding of 
other data. These findings are often published in peer-reviewed journals, and sometimes 
serve as part of an effort to advance the geographic understanding among government 
policymakers.23  
It is important to note that beyond the tangible “products” of PRM (standard maps, GIS 
databases, academic articles, etc.), the very act of participatory mapping can have real 
                                                        
23 The American Geographical Society Bowman Expeditions, for which the México Indígena project served as 
the prototype, is a notable example of the latter purpose (Herlihy et al. 2008). 
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consequences. These may include a new geographic awareness in all who participate (including 
children), or a reinvigorated community focus as the “communicative action” of the PRM 
process is transmuted into an “instrumental action” (Silk 1999, 11). 
Mohamed Mohamed and Stephen Ventura (2000, 230) specified how PM or PRM was 
sometimes applied to the problem of indigenous territoriality and its relationships to standard 
tenure maps such as cadastres: 
Geo-coded participatory mapping activities start with conventional participatory 
mapping, where informants representing a family, community, or other relevant 
group draw a physical map of their areas(s) to clearly show the limits of ‘parcels’ or 
‘ownerships’ (however various usufruct rights are conceptualized). […] An 
increasingly common method for geocoding participatory maps is acquisition of 
positional data with GPS receivers. […] Collected positional information (e.g. 
boundaries, resources points) and associated descriptive characteristics can be 
analyzed in a GIS or used to generate ‘indigenous parcel maps.’ 
 
In the application of PM or PRM techniques to the more specific problem of water sources and 
indigenous land tenure, a recent pioneer has been John Yumbya, who assisted rural residents in 
Kenya with locating and mapping springs to improve their management and water productivity 
(ABCIC 2010). 
Several of the prototype projects for participatory research mapping as a method date from 
the early- to mid-1990s, when involvement of local communities proliferated in all types of 
research and development (Herlihy and Knapp 2003, 306). Besides the efforts in Darién and 
Honduran Moskitia, pioneering projects from this period included those in the Canadian Arctic 
(Rundstrom 1991) and in Nicaraguan Moskitia (Nietschmann 1995). In the late 1990s and early 
2000s, Latin America in particular evolved as a locus for further experimentation in PRM, often 
to “document indigenous occupancy and substantiate territorial claims” (Smith 2003, 334). 
Projects included those in Nicaraguan Moskitia (Dana 1998) and in eastern Panama (Smith 
2003). Peter Poole24 (1998) and Peter Herlihy (2002) have assessed several efforts from this 
period. 
                                                        
24 More recently, Poole has worked to advance techniques in local interpretation of remote sensing imagery in 
Belize (Indigenous Mapping Network 2011), and tenure mapping with the Dinka of Sudan (Poole 2009). 
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In the 2000s, PRM techniques were increasingly used, most directly by human 
geographers to “highlight spatial and temporal dimensions” of social issues, usually “where 
people’s relations with, and accounts of, space, place, and environment are of cultural interest” 
(Pain 2004, 653). Indigenous territoriality continued to be a common focus, as part of research in 
how certain cultural identities are tied to place (Kindon 2003). Two graduate students in 
geography used PRM for studies with parallels to my work as an individual researcher in Talea. 
The first was by Derek Smith (2002, 55), who “undertook participant observation, conducted 
interviews, carried out field mapping, and accompanied hunters during their activities” in the 
Buglé lands of Panama, while “training local investigators to conduct a census, facilitate 
community mapping sessions, and administer hunting activity questionnaires.” The second was 
by Nina Goschenhofer (2007, 88), who used PRM to explore territoriality in a Wixárika 
(Huichol) community in Jalisco state, Mexico. The cognitive, community, and standardized 
maps she and the villagers produced revealed the importance of water “deposits” (springs and 
reliable stream uptake points). These water sources were among the first things mapped, 
especially those at the forest/agricultural margins, where there have been conflicts with 
neighboring non-indigenous communities over water access. 
By the end of the 2000s, even an international, UN-affiliated NGO was offering 
guidelines for “best practices” in participatory mapping (IFAD 2009), although without an 
emphasis on creating standard-format products: “participatory mapping is not defined by the 
level of compliance with formal cartographic conventions” (IFAD 2009, 7). With the expansion 
in the use of PM and PRM, criticisms also arose. Some found that the method could perpetuate 
an essentializing of power, or a romanticizing of the poor (Pugh and Potter 2003). Three other 
contentious issues which accompanied the proliferation of PRM were overly optimistic claims, 
especially regarding GIS;  a confusing association with techniques employed by academics 
embedded in US military ground forces; and a lack of rigor in the method’s application by some 
well-intentioned rural planners, especially in Latin America.  
As some kinds of GIS software became somewhat less expensive and, especially via 
Internet applications such as GoogleEarth, more widely available, certain academic, NGO, and 
government proponents helped develop a loose collection of methods called “public participation 
GIS” (PPGIS) which partly overlap the methods and goals of participatory research mapping 
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(see, e.g., McCall and Minang 2005). While there are many examples of indigenous participation 
in GIS (e.g., Knight 2011; Palmer 2012; Pyne and Fraser Taylor 2012), the computer (and 
Internet) access, and the GIS software training, required for many projects renders many of the 
PPGIS claims to non-expert involvement as overly optimistic (Cochran 2009; Graham, Hale, and 
Stephens 2012). PPGIS has also been critiqued for not always fully addressing ethical issues 
such as “control and ownership of geographical information” and “representations of local and 
indigenous knowledge” (Dunn 2007, 616). By the end of the decade, yet another branch of 
activities was emerging from technologies related to PPGIS: “volunteered geographic 
information” (VGI), which typically refers to untrained (but well-equipped) citizens uploading 
geocoded text messages, images, and videos to GoogleEarth (Zook and Graham 2007; Boulton 
2010). While not usually part of an organized effort with well-defined products, VGI can share 
some goals with PRM. Though it does not create statistically valid samples, it can help raise 
awareness and challenge state power, as it did by producing alternative “crisis maps” after the 
Szechuan, China earthquake in 2008 (Lin 2011). 
In the aftermath of many horrific mistakes committed by the US Armed Forces in the wars 
in Afghanistan and Iraq, some in the Defense and State Departments looked to certain social 
science techniques, some of them resembling parts of the PRM method, to improve human 
geographic understanding in conflict and occupation zones. “Human Terrain Systems” (HTS), a 
small program which “embedded” social scientists in military units, was one effort whose 
techniques drew some inspiration from parts of the PRM approach. While the intent may in 
theory be admirable, the efforts have caused at least two serious problems. First, because military 
deployment is so far removed from the academic context, the complexities which PRM 
practitioners always face to conform to human subjects ethical guidelines are multiplied (Cahill 
2007, 360). Second, the controversial history of US military interventions across the globe 
understandably arouses suspicions regarding intent among potential PRM collaborators 
(including indigenous communities) – suspicions which have, sadly, been allowed to cast a pall 
over some mutually beneficial projects, and to create unnecessary divisions among academics. 
Despite these problems, the HTS approach did achieve some local, and ethically sound, success 
in Afghanistan (Griffin 2011). Perhaps the groundwork is gradually being laid for better 
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understanding by all parties, even if these initial attempts at a rapport have upset the assumptions 
of some observers. 
In parts of Latin America in the 1980s, Carl Sauer-influenced cultural ecology combined 
with an interest in landscape analysis studies to produce a rational, goal-oriented blend of human 
and physical academic geography (Urquijo and Bocco 2011). By the mid-1990s, NGOs and 
government agencies, particularly those seeking to promote a healthy balance between 
conservation and development, were employing parts of the participatory research mapping 
methodology to specific problems of community-scale rural land planning (Toledo 1995). Such a 
project is typically called an ordenamiento territorial (roughly, “territorial regulation 
framework”).The community consensus which ideally emerges is sometimes given a legal 
imprimatur, such as by the government’s equivalent of the Environmental Protection Agency, or 
through the local rules of the community itself (for recent examples in Mexico, see Instituto de 
Geografía et al. 2009; for an academic critique of examples in Colombia, see Kiran and Ojeda 
2009). While the proliferation of ordenamientos territoriales does indicate a growing acceptance 
of some tenets of PRM, only rarely are all the steps taken; in particular, the first step – avoiding 
narrowly-defined, preconceived research objectives – is unlikely to be followed by an NGO or 
government agency with a specific donor- or taxpayer-funded mandate. 
3.2.2  The México Indígena project   
The México Indígena project combined archival research, analysis of land tenure, census, 
spatial and other data obtained from government agencies, and fieldwork in 11 indigenous 
communities as part of the first ‘Bowman Expedition’ led by the American Geographical Society 
(Herlihy et al. 2008). The investigation began in 2005 as a collaboration between the University 
of Kansas and the Universidad Autónoma de San Luis Potosí (UASLP), funded in part by the 
Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) of the US Army. It was focused on, but not limited to, a 
new understanding of land tenure practices since the 1992 reforms. The research team included 
more than 20 people, among them experienced researchers, graduate and undergraduate students, 
and trained local indigenous investigators. 
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After extensive consultations with the Tenek, Nahua, and Zapotec communities which 
chose to participate, each community selected a representative to be trained as a local 
investigator. Workshops, interviews, the administration of questionnaires, and participatory 
mapping took place each summer through 2008. The two regions were chosen because of their 
strong communal traditions and indigenous self-identity, and for the contrasting rates of 
PROCEDE participation between the two regions. Additional information came from interviews 
with people working for government agencies who were directly involved in the PROCEDE 
program, ranging from members of survey crews, to people managing and reviewing cadastral 
data, to high-ranking administrators at state and national levels. All study communities received 
multiple digital and printed copies of their final community maps (Smith et al. 2009, 178-181).          
The results of México Indígena work used specifically for the present study include 106 
geolocated, verified hydrology point features, including 53 springs in three Sierra Norte de 
Oaxaca núcleos 45 springs in nine Huasteca Potosina núcleos. 
During the summer of 2008, when my preliminary dissertation fieldwork coincided with 
overall México Indígena work, I received exceptional assistance from local investigators Ramón 
Ramos Jerónimo and Rigoberto Cruz Hernández, and from UASLP student researcher Gerardo 
López Roque, in identifying specific links between water sources and land tenure in the núcleo 
of Yagila. Other contributors included Estrella García, Marco A. Martínez Galicia, Taylor 
Tappan, and four local residents who remain anonymous here. In the núcleo of Tiltepec, I 
received exceptional assistance from local investigators Emigdio Gregorio Hernández and 
Bonifacio Hernández Montaño, and from geographer Scott Brady. Other contributors included 
Aida Ramos Viera, Marco A. Martínez Costilla, Derek Smith, and Hylian Lobo Guerrero 
Serrano. In both núcleos, geographic information was exchanged both during walks to take GPS 
points as well as during interviews. I also made use of three sketch maps created by a subset of 
comuneros in Tiltepec in fall of 2008 under the supervision of Marco A. Martínez Costilla, 
entitled “Mapa de Zonificación de San Miguel Tiltepec,” “Mapa de Sona [sic] de Bio-hidroagro 
Forestal,” and “Zona de Reserva de Recurson Hidrológicos.” 
For the Huasteca study area, I found for the following sets of México Indígena products 
especially useful:   
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1. Community questionnaires for all nine núcleos, supervised during village assemblies by 
UASLP student researchers Carlos Bonilla Jiménez, Aida Ramos Viera, Gerardo López Roque, 
Martha Elena Ramírez Espinosa. 
2. 117 parcel/household questionnaires, in all nine núcleos, administered to a non-random 
but broadly representative sample of heads of household who own de facto or de jure parcels. 
Some questions related to one of their parcels (whose boundaries were geolocated with GPS), 
while others related to all their parcels, and still others to their house and household. These were 
administered mainly by the same four student researchers, joined by Jacinto Jiménez. 
3. Maps of five núcleos in the Huasteca, in which all (PROCEDE-certified) parcels were 
assigned “land use” and “de facto recent ownership transfer” values by small groups of key local 
informants, in meetings organized by Carlos Bonilla Jiménez, Gerardo López Roque, and Jacinto 
Jiménez. Besides providing me with informal transfer rates, this data set allowed me to discount 
parcels inherited through the owner’s death; these accounted for 77 percent of the total. 
4. Notes from directed group interviews about common use areas for two núcleos 
(Tancuime and Cuatlamayán), conducted by Gerardo López Roque and Jacinto Jiménez in July 
2006. 
5. The nine final PRM community maps delivered to the núcleos.25 Scales vary; generally 
the data is appropriate to a scale of about 1:10,000. I reiterate that “the final maps include 
information that they specifically requested, and we did not put anything on the maps that they 
did not want included” (Smith et al. 2012, 124). Two comunidades, Tiltepec and Yagila, 
subsequently requested that their maps be removed from circulation, and their association with 
the project be discontinued, after some members of each community expressed irritation that it 
has not been clear to them that the FMSO was a source of the project’s funding. 
Another data source acquired by the México Indígena team was a set of Historiales 
Agrarios (Agrarian Histories). After PROCEDE, any núcleo which had undergone certification 
of individual parcels could formalize any subsequent parcel transfer by registering it with the 
state Rural Cadastral Office. The Historiales Agrarios include updated lists of these de jure 
                                                        
25 In the References section, the author of these maps is “México Indígena Research Team.” The publisher is 
the American Geographical Society, lead organizing body for the project. 
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transfers, and are available to the public on request (RAN 2006c). In 2008, assisted by Aida 
Ramos Viera, I processed these documents for all five PROCEDE-parceled Huasteca núcleos 
where México Indígena did fieldwork. 
Miscellaneous hard-copy items acquired or processed during México Indígena fieldwork 
included the 1801 last will and testament of a Yagila resident; 1995 1:20,000-scale INEGI air 
photographs of Huasteca communities and their surroundings; and a 1969 map of the irrigation 
system and internal tenure of the núcleo of Guelatao.  
Parts of this study draw from a semi-participatory research mapping experience I had as 
part of a different team previous to the México Indígena project. For seven months in 2003 and 
2004, I served as GIS database manager, GPS training supervisor, cartographer, geographic 
analyst, and assistant meeting facilitator with CAPLAC (Capacitación y Planeación Comunitaria 
A.C.), a consulting service consisting of a Oaxaca-based couple (Beatriz Solís and Aaron 
Ramírez Lara) who hold agronomy and anthropology degrees. During the project, funded by 
World Wildlife Fund under the supervision of Javier Castañeda, four Sierra Norte indigenous 
communities, the Chinantec núcleos of Totomoxtla, Buenavista, and Nieves and the Cuicatec 
núcleo of Teponaxtla, collaborated with the three consultants to produce detailed maps and 
descriptive documents that strongly resemble some of the output of México Indígena. By 
coincidence, the núcleos are located only 20 km from the ones where México Indígena did work, 
allowing me to incorporate two of the CAPLAC núcleos into the present study. These two 
comunidades are Totomoxtla and Buenavista, where the CAPLAC fieldwork happened to have 
paid special attention to water sources and locally-defined de facto land tenure. The main 
distinction of CAPLAC as compared to México Indígena was the main goal of CAPLAC:  to 
help the communities generate ordenamientos territoriales which would strengthen conservation 
of flora and fauna while improving the local economies, especially via sustainable commercial 
forestry. 
3.3   Participatory research mapping (author as sole researcher) in núcleo of Talea 
In September 2008, after conferring with José Luis Cruz Piñeda, regional director of the 
CDI (Comisión Nacional para el Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indígenas), I first visited Talea, and 
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explained to the municipal authorities my idea of facilitating a participatory research mapping 
effort. They explained to me Talea’s unusual territorial division into a main population center 
administered by the municipio and a separate, PROCEDE-surveyed “agriculture and forest” 
comunidad. We agreed that my interests, and the needs of the community, would be better served 
by working with the comunidad, since that is where nearly all the water used by Taleans 
originates, and because PROCEDE had worked there but not in the main population center. 
I made initial contact with comisariado Jaime Andrés Rodríguez, the comunidad’s 
principal authority, known informally as “el comi.” Jaime was impressed work by México 
Indígena, and proposed that an accurate map featuring local toponyms would likely serve 
multiple uses. He suggested that we arrange a meeting with the other núcleo authorities when my 
own fieldwork began the following January, and that two local investigators be chosen at that 
point. We estimated that it would take us about three or four weeks, spread over two or three 
months, to complete the GPS fieldwork, toward the end of which we would call at least one 
larger meeting, attended by several “ancianos” (long-term residents with deep geographic and 
historical knowledge), to validate and discuss the development of the community map. 
At the meeting in late January 2009, I agreed in writing that I would pay each local 
investigator for the time they devoted to the work; that I would train them in the use of a 
handheld GPS device; that the community map would include whatever data the Taleans wished 
to include, but omit whatever they wished to omit; that I would donate the GPS device to the 
núcleo; that I would deliver three full-scale paper copies and two digital CD copies about three 
months after the fieldwork had ended; and, that I would offer my services to assist with a 
reasonably-sized geo-technical task of their choosing. In return, they agreed to answer questions 
related to my own research interests, specifically pertaining to GPS points taken as well as more 
generally in unstructured ad hoc interviews. 
To my delight, the comi and the selected principal investigators decided, without any 
prompting from me, that “water sources” were a feature they were especially interested in 
including in the map and as part of the overall work. The principal local investigators were 
presidente de vigilancia (security committee head) Ivan Pascual García and secretaria de 
vigilancia (security committee secretary) Maurilio Toro Yescas. On six occasions, I was 
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accompanied instead by either of two other local residents. When in Talea, I would reside at the 
Hotel San Carlos, a remarkably comfortable, little-used facility that had recently been built by a 
prosperous Talean. 
Between January 28 and March 19, 2009, the local investigators and I collected 196 points 
using a Garmin GPSMap 60 device. Notes on each point were written I notebooks, at first by me 
but later by the local investigators, along with point number, coordinates, and positional error (all 
fields except notes were stored in the device, but repeated in the notebooks to provide security 
through redundancy). We visited all parts of the núcleo territory, although we didn’t walk on 
every path or to go to every parcel. About half the GPS points were related to water, while the 
rest marked turns in major paths, changes in land use or land cover, named places, changes in 
land tenure, and other features. 
In the mornings and evenings, such as over a game of basketball or while enjoying a local 
meal, I talked with many Taleans. Four of these talks were lengthy enough to be considered 
unstructured interviews: a discussion with municipal water committee representative Isidro Pérez 
Cruz, and conversations with three other comuneros whose pseudonyms in this study are 
Belisario Miranda, Felicia Méndez, and María Ribero. A product of my talk with Isidro was his 
letter-sized schematic sketch map showing the potable water system (sources and main conduits) 
for Talea’s urban zone. A fifth comunero, an anciano (elderly person), assisted me by affixing 
toponyms to a letter-sized drawing I had made of the village landscape including approximately 
half of the núcleo’s territory. 
In March, a workshop took place to verify and correct all information, especially 
toponyms, which would appear on the community map. Besides the comi and the principal local 
investigators, there were present at the meeting three ancianos, a woman and two men. The main 
result of the meeting was a 50-by-90-cm sketch map of the núcleo (Figure 3.1), showing mainly 
toponyms (parajes), rivers and streams, and water sources. To make sure everyone was oriented 
in the same way, I had drawn on the page only three points (Cerro Mogote, El Arenal, and El 
Picacho). Accompanying the sketch map, the attendees prepared a list of all toponyms, using 
what several of them considered to be standardized Zapotec spelling conventions. They also 
cleared up several misconceptions I had; for example, they sometimes use the word “cerro” not 
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in its standard Spanish sense of a peak or mountain, but rather for a pass (i.e., a high point along 
a road or trail). 
Figure 3.1. Talea: Part of participatory sketch map drawn by the author and by a group of 
villagers in March 2009 (image shown here is reduced from original scale). 
 
 
In February, Jaime and Maurilio had stated that the most helpful small service I could 
provide would be to assist them in precisely locating seven key vertices along the boundary 
between the núcleo of San Miguel Talea de Castro and the localidad of Villa Talea de Castro 
(i.e., the “donut hole” of the núcleo). Having acquired the paper PROCEDE maps and coordinate 
tables from the RAN office, I converted all 150 of the vertices officially defining Talea’s 
boundary from “transverse modified ejidal” (TME) coordinates to UTM, using a software 
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converter provided by RAN. I then entered the UTM coordinates as waypoints in the GPS unit, 
and explained to Maurilio that they would be stored there for as long as the núcleo wished them 
to be. I then demonstrated to Maurilio how to locate a stored waypoint on the Earth’s surface, 
and together we located the seven vertices in question. 
Next, I began to process my data into GIS formats. The major steps were: 
1. Using ArcGIS software (versions 9.3 and 10.0), I converted all GPS points into a 
shapefile, including an attribute field (column) for point-specific field notes. 
2. In an “mxd” (GIS project file), I overlaid this with 1:50,000-scale INEGI topographic 
shapefiles. 
3. Using the GPS points, my field sketch maps, and the participatory sketch maps as 
guides, I began to modify these shapefiles, and to create new ones. 
4. I converted the PROCEDE coordinates table for the outer perimeter into to a shapefile 
of points, and joined these points into a polygon. 
5. I scanned the PROCEDE maps of common use areas and parcels, georeferenced the 
scanned images using the outer and inner perimeter shapefiles, and created land tenure polygon 
shapefiles by tracing the georeferenced images. 
6. I created the community map (Figures 3.2 and 3.3), with toponym labels, roads, 
landmarks, legends, and other cartographic elements, and delivered poster-sized copies of it to 
the núcleo authorities during my follow-up visit to Talea in July 2009. 
7. I finished the modification and creation of shapefiles based on GPS points, focusing 
now on information related specifically to the present study: water points, and water conduits. 
Attribute fields for water points included physical type (i.e., “partly modified small spring”), 
general purpose (“collection,” “storage,” or “use”), and user(s). I found it helpful to maintain an 
“mxd” file which displayed all my collected information, for my own analysis. 
After the Talea field data was fully processed into GIS and other digital formats, I 
repeated essentially the same steps for the other núcleo, Yagila, for which I possessed detailed, 
geolocated land tenure and water information; and then again for Tiltepec, for which I had  
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Figure 3.2. Talea: Final version of 2009 PRM community map. Actual map is 1:10,000 
scale, measures 120 by 90 cm, and is in color. 
 
 
comparable data. Although I had less data for these núcleos than for Talea, their processing 
required special effort, because the data came from various sources: my own fieldwork, and 
México Indígena results. In Talea, Yagila, and Tiltepec, only a representative sample of water 
conduits were geolocated, while the sample for water points – especially for important springs – 
was generally much more complete. Instead of precisely located de jure (PROCEDE-surveyed) 
internal land tenure areas, these núcleos contain incompletely known de facto tenure areas. The 
GPS locations used to generate the de facto land tenure areas appear in Figure 6.9 (on page 273), 
and in Figure 6.13 (on page 283). These “fuzzy” polygons were created with the Euclidean 
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Allocation tool in the ArcGIS Spatial Analyst extension, then displayed as polygons with a 
gradient fill symbol and multiple offset outlines. 
I then repeated several of the same steps once again, for those México Indígena núcleos 
which I revisited briefly in July 2009. I built shapefiles for water points and water conduits, and 
created “working map” mxd files, with detailed text labels, in order to analyze patterns. 
Eventually, all water points from all sources were joined into a single shapefile, to facilitate 
comparison with the INEGI-derived “springs” shapefile which served as the main source for the 
geodata analysis discussed below.  
 
Figure 3.3. Talea: Detail, at original 1:10,000 scale, of final version of 2009 participatory 
community map. Original is in color. 
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3.4   Geodata analysis 
The primary goal of the geodata analysis was to broaden the geographic scope of the study 
beyond the 33 núcleos subjected to RAN archival research (and, in 15 of them, to participatory 
research mapping as well). The study areas are shown in Figures 2.1 through 2.6 (pages 47 to 
59), labeled “limit of geodata analysis.” “Geodata,” in this study, refers to digital spatial data 
which is acquired mainly through trustworthy secondary sources, quantitatively assessed with the 
assistance of GIS software, and interpreted through the lens of knowledge gained by archival 
research and participatory fieldwork. 
I chose to focus on a single variable, “important springs,” using the manantiales (springs) 
digital data set as it appears on the 1:50,000-scale topographic maps produced by the Mexican 
federal agency INEGI. In this section, I describe how I developed a land tenure coverage and 
explored its relationship to the springs coverage. To characterize this relationship, I calculated 
how many springs would be found in each land use type if they were randomly distributed, and 
compared this to the observed quantities. (In sub-sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 below, I examine the 
degree to which both of these coverages are accurate and complete.) 
The acquisition and processing of the INEGI springs data was straightforward, while the 
creation of the land tenure coverage was complex. Fortunately, the land tenure coverage 
construction process served a second purpose. Besides being a required component of the INEGI 
springs analysis, the land tenure coverage represents an important research result in its own right.  
I based the springs density calculations on the total areas of each tenure class within the 
geodata analysis areas, rather than first aggregating to the intermediate unit of the núcleo. 
Núcleo-scale aggregation was unnecessary for my purposes, and would have been impossible to 
carry out completely in any case, as there is no well-defined equivalent to this unit in private 
property zones. I also excluded precise population data from the analysis, except to briefly 
characterize each area’s populations for descriptive purposes. Calculating populations within 
each land tenure type would be a simple exercise, but to compare them would be misleading, 
since they would simply reflect the arbitrary study area boundaries.  
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Table 4.1. Land tenure categories used for the geodata analysis. More specific categories 
are grouped into more general categories adjacent to them; for example, “common use 
areas” are subdivided into “only only núcleo perimeter surveyed,”  “common use areas in 
comunidades,” and “common use areas in ejidos.”   
social 
property 
 
de facto social property,  
status as núcleo unresolved   
núcleos without PROCEDE survey   
PROCEDE- 
surveyed 
núcleos 
 
only núcleo 
perimeter surveyed   
common 
use areas 
 
common use areas  
in comunidades   
common use areas  
in ejidos   
human settlement areas   
parceled 
areas 
 
parceled areas in 
comunidades   
parceled areas  
in ejidos   
non-social property   
 
 
In Table 4.1, “parceled” refers to núcleos, and areas within núcleos, with parcels surveyed 
and certified by PROCEDE, not to the de facto individual parcels found in nearly every núcleo in 
Mexico. The “common use areas” group category includes núcleos where PROCEDE surveyed 
only the perimeter, in which case the entire núcleo is de jure common use, as well as the 
common use areas that were specifically designated as such within núcleos that also contain 
PROCEDE-surveyed parcels (“common use areas in ejidos” and “common use areas in 
comunidades”). “Social property” refers to land within the boundaries of functioning ejidos and 
comunidades, ignoring the conceptual argument I discussed in chapter 1 that, in some ways, the 
very existence of social property terminated with the 1992 land reforms. 
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The gray portion of each table indicates non-social property. It extends partially into the 
“parceled areas in ejidos” cell, to represent the fact that individual parcels within some ejidos 
(but not comunidades) are gradually being transferred into dominio pleno (fully privatized 
properties). As of 2011, the total land area of privatized ejido parcels was not large enough to 
affect the quantitative results,26 and none of these parcels contained an INEGI-mapped spring.  
It is important to note that “civic parcels” – parcels surveyed by PROCEDE, but deeded to 
the núcleo, in some cases to keep a water source or storage facility in the functional equivalent of 
a common use area – are not differentiated from other individual parcels this analysis. Civic 
parcels can only be identified within “parceled areas” by soliciting from a RAN office, in person, 
the PROCEDE maps for each núcleo separately. It is possible that some of the INEGI-mapped 
springs located within PROCEDE-parceled areas are in fact within civic parcels. However, it is 
unlikely that more than a handful of them actually are so located. One reason I am confident of 
this is the fact that none of the water-related civic parcels positively identified among the 33 
RAN document study núcleos contains an INEGI-mapped spring.  
The main source used to develop the land tenure coverage for the two geodata analysis 
areas was a set of spatial data layers called Acervo (collection) de Informacíon Geográfica 
(INEGI 2011), offered as a web mapping service (WMS) through an INEGI-maintained web 
portal called GAIA (formerly Galileo). GAIA allows users to examine many coverages relating 
to Mexico’s human and physical geography as real-time updated links within a personal GIS 
work file (in ArcGIS, an “mxd”), or to simply use the web portal as a view screen. However, 
because the coverages cannot be download as shapefiles, in order to use any GIS functions which 
automate the relating of one coverage to another (e.g., “Select by Location”), or which calculate 
areas, the user must first laboriously recreate the original digital file. One method to accomplish 
this is to save a screen shot of one scene, georeference the raster image using some set of 
features common to a previously acquired shapefile, and build a new shapefile by tracing the 
georeferenced image, a process sometimes called “heads-up digitizing” to contrast with the now 
                                                        
26 By mid-2007, over 1.6 million ha had been converted from social property to dominio pleno in Mexico, 
mainly in states bordering the United States (Ventura Patiño 2008, 8). However, from my work analyzing 
PHINA data throughout the entire Huasteca Potosina region (RAN 2009-12), I know that this has so far only 
occurred there in a few small, scattered patches, most of them northeast of the Huasteca Potosina geodata 
analysis area.  
91 
 
  
little-used method of tracing from paper maps affixed to a digitizing tablet. The process must be 
repeated for each screenshot (tile). 
GAIA presently includes only PROCEDE-surveyed núcleos. The layers used for this 
study were “núcleos agrarios,” “parceled areas,” “common use areas,” “human settlement 
areas,” “parcels,” and “solares.” Based on my fieldwork and archival research, I knew that that 
the layers precisely display the RAN geodatabase of PROCEDE and FANAR data, although 
without the attribute data (e.g., parcel numbers) found on paper PROCEDE maps and 
documents. The service provides an excellent overview, at whatever scale the user prefers, of 
PROCEDE’s work in Mexico. I realized how well the system is kept updated when I noticed that 
one núcleo came appeared where none had existed the previous day. A query of PHINA (a 
database I explain below) confirmed that the núcleo had been surveyed and certified by FANAR 
only a few months previously. 
Because it was not necessary to distinguish individual núcleos, areas with contiguous 
núcleos of the same type (e.g., “perimeter-only” núcleos) could be traced as a single polygon. 
The second task was to assign land tenure values non-PROCEDE-surveyed areas. For this, 
I relied mainly on five sources, detailed below: 1. shapefiles of non-social property from the 
Mexican federal agency ASERCA; 2. a shapefile of Huasteca núcleos; 3. a non-spatial RAN 
online database on núcleo characteristics called PHINA (RAN 2009-12); 4. neighboring 
properties as shown on núcleo-specific RAN maps (including PROCEDE maps); and 5. for a few 
difficult cases, air photography. 
ASERCA (Apoyos y Servicios a la Comercialización Agropecuaria), a unit of the federal 
agriculture ministry SAGARPA, promotes the development of commerce in agricultural 
products. I obtained two of their shapefiles (ASERCA 2011) for the state of San Luis Potosí.27 
The first shapefile shows individual private properties; 1,123 are in the Huasteca geodata 
analysis area. The second shows “zonas federales,” 77 of which are partly or wholly within the 
area. Although they lack embedded metadata, the layers are presumed to be reasonably current 
and complete. After comparing it with neighboring properties as shown on PROCEDE maps I 
                                                        
27 I obtained the ASERCA shapefiles through my colleage Aida Ramos Viera. 
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acquired for certain núcleos, I found that the private property shapefile undercounted the likely 
number of private parcels by about 5 percent; I adjusted the area totals accordingly. 
The concept of a zona federal should not be confused with a terreno nacional. The latter 
concept is an umbrella term with a long and interesting history (Escobar 1999, 16-29), essentially 
referring to any land that is either considered “empty” (baldío) – i.e., not currently owned, 
occupied, or used by any people, neither by the federal government (zona federal), nor by private 
individuals or corporations (privada), nor by ejidos or communidades (social). Terrenos 
nacionales also include lands that have not yet been properly surveyed and/or adjudicated 
(Rojero Díaz 2008, 22), even if they are in fact occupied by residents. Most of the areas I classify 
as “de facto social property, status as núcleo unresolved” are legally terrenos nacionales, as are 
much of the lands within Mexico’s national parks and biosphere reserves. Additionally, some of 
the land whose tenure status remained unknown after I had exhausted all my sources is likely 
terreno nacional. The zonas federales shapefile includes an attribute field “nom_pred” (parcel 
name). Using these names, the polygons could be classified into the following categories: rivers 
and large streams; urban areas, including some “county seats” (cabeceras municipales) which 
are also social property núcleos; nationalized companies (e.g., railroads, the “Compania Agrícola 
de México,” or the “Ingenio Alianza Popular”); federal highways; a couple of universities; 
“fundos legales” (an old term for certain human settlement areas); and irrigation districts and 
“systems.” 
Because they relate to water, and because I was uncertain how they should be assigned my 
land tenure values, I researched the legal tenure status of the irrigation districts. One source 
(Gómez Morin Rivera 2007), describing the Mexican government’s recent efforts to better 
survey and catalog government-owned (including para-statal) properties, asserted that irrigation 
districts (or some of them) are directly owned by the federal government, in the same class as 
railroads, power-line rights-of-way, and “rivers under investigation.” Other sources, however, 
including Wilder and Whiteford (2006, 348) and Reyes Hernández and colleagues (2008, 382), 
led me to the conclusion that the actual land tenure of these districts was more complex and 
93 
 
  
varied.28 This was confirmed after I used a map in the latter article to create a georeferenced 
polygon of the Pujal-Coy Irrigation District and compared it to its counterpart in the ASERCA 
shapefile. It is apparent that irrigation districts are essentially a blend of “redevelopment zones” 
and “planning zones.” In redevelopment zones, private or social property is acquired by the 
government through eminent domain, and users, typically cattle-ranchers, become leaseholders 
as irrigation infrastructure is introduced. The land is gradually returned to these users, or to 
others, after spatial reorganization. In planning zones, government funds are preferentially 
invested, and lands might be purchased by the government as opportunities arise, but the pre-
existing land tenure, including social property, remains unchanged. Thus, the zonas federales 
“irrigation districts” polygons comprise two categories: undisputed social property núcleos, and 
“leftover” lands still owned directly by the government, but leased to, or informally used by, 
nearby private and social-property ranchers.29  
The second source used to refine and extend the land tenure coverage was a shapefile of 
social property núcleos in San Luis Potosí state from CONAFOR, the Mexican federal forestry 
agency.30 The layer resembles GAIA, but also includes núcleos not surveyed by PROCEDE. 
Comparison with GAIA and with the paper PROCEDE maps showed differences in the 
alignment of some núcleo boundaries, but did demonstrate its overall reliability. This layer 
showed the spatial extent of non-PROCEDE núcleos in the Huasteca study area, something I had 
to estimate for the Oaxaca study area. The shapefile contains 302 núcleos in the Huasteca (GAIA 
included two more which, for unknown reasons, were not in the shapefile.) With the assistance 
of colleagues Aida Ramos Viera, Andrew Hilburn, and Gerardo Hernández Cendejas, I had 
previously entered the PHINA area figures for each núcleo and (where applicable) PROCEDE-
surveyed gran área as attributes. Therefore, I used these more accurate counts for the geodata 
                                                        
28 Geographer Miguel Aguilar Robledo (1992, 65-66) found that government planners in the 1970s had 
expected that the final pattern of land tenure in the Pujal-Coy district would be 80 percent social property, but 
by 1986, as the project began to wind down, the actual social property portion was only 47 percent. 
29 According to Reyes Hernández et al.’s detailed research (2008), the Pujal-Coy Irrigation District boundaries 
include areas shown as “private properties” in the ASERCA shapefile, but the ASERCA “irrigation district” 
polygons omit these. This implies that the Mexican government still considers itself the “owner” of social 
property nucleos in redevelopment/planning zones such as irrigation districts, in ways that it does not consider 
itself to be owner of any private properties, nor of social properties outside such zones.   
30 This source was donated by an anonymous representative of CONAFOR. 
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analysis, rather than calculating the polygon areas in ArcGIS, or attempting to recreate the GAIA 
coverage for sub-núcleo tenure areas (grandes areas).  
The third additional data source was PHINA (Padrón e Historial de Núcleos Agrarios), a 
publicly accessible online archival database maintained by the RAN. Through it, the user may 
look up any núcleo and learn its basic de jure land tenure history and related facts: the dates of 
official resolutions establishing or significantly changing its extent (including PROCEDE), and 
the size of the land tenure categories so established. Areas given for pre-PROCEDE-era actions 
are generally somewhat inaccurate, due to the difficulties of premodern surveying in remote, 
mountainous terrain. A few núcleos appear in PHINA, but not in the other data sets; most of 
these are listed as having no terrain at all, and may be “paper núcleos,” i.e. failed attempts at 
establishing a social property village. 
For both study regions, I used PHINA to identify each núcleo as a comunidad or ejido. In 
Oaxaca, I also used this data source to find núcleos never surveyed by PROCEDE, via the 
following method. I displayed the shapefile of localidades (private-property and social-property 
rural populated places, including village centers and isolated ranchos) which serve as census 
tracts for the INEGI national censuses (Derek Smith and I had built this file from tabular data 
sets that included latitude and longitude coordinates). For each localidad with a population 
greater than 30 located in territory of uncertain tenure, I searched for its name in the PHINA 
database. For each such localidad found in PHINA, I used its PHINA area figure to construct a 
polygon of the correct size, using any nearby tenure boundaries derived from other sources, as 
well as municipio boundaries,31 as guides whenever possible. The resulting polygons represent 
an educated guess of núcleo extents. While certainly not usable for any núcleo-scale analysis, 
this was sufficient to produce the overall area totals of tenure categories, and probably did not 
lead to my assigning any of the INEGI springs to the wrong category. The exact spatial 
configuration of 14 of the approximately 313 núcleos in the Huasteca Potosina geodata analysis 
area (4.5 percent), and of 38 of the approximately 146 núcleos in the Sierra Norte de Oaxaca 
                                                        
31 It should be noted that there are numerous inconsistencies between the municipio boundaries as shown in the 
INEGI “marco geoestadístico” shapefile, and the PROCEDE-surveyed núcleo boundaries depicted in GAIA. 
In a few cases, the territorial size of an individual núcleo as stated in PHINA was much larger than its 
municipio in the INEGI shapefile. 
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geodata analysis area (26.0 percent) were accordingly estimated because they were never 
surveyed by PROCEDE or FANAR.  
To further improve the land tenure coverage, I examined a fourth additional data source: 
neighboring properties as indicated by name on any official núcleo-scale maps in my possession. 
The maps included 21 PROCEDE paper maps, three pre-PROCEDE maps acquired by México 
Indígena, and my sketched renditions of 12 pre-PROCEDE maps encountered during my RAN 
archival research. While only a minor portion of each study region could be investigated in this 
way, this task proved invaluable for understanding, through specific examples, the approximate 
extent and distribution of one category in particular: private properties in the Oaxaca study area. 
I am aware of the existence of a limited number of private properties in the Sierra Norte 
de Oaxaca study area. One in particular had been acquired by a sub-village group of comuneros 
in Teponaxtla, an ancestrally Cuicatec núcleo just west of the Oaxaca geodata analysis area (see 
Figure 7.1 on page 300, where the property is visible northeast of the label “Río Grande”). 
Referring to the same part of the Sierra, a scholar found that “private properties [la pequeña 
propiedad] that exists today in the Chinantla were formed during the Porfiriato, through 
adjudications realized via dispossession [despojos], invasions, and illegal occupations of 
communal lands” (de Teresa 1999, 4). 
A handful of private properties are former núcleos (comunidades or ejidos) which lost 
their social property status when a judge declared them to be lacking the required traits of a 
núcleo (in section 5.1, I will recount the example of Yatzona). One Oaxaca núcleo, Totontepec 
Villa de Morelos, was actually surveyed by PROCEDE in 2005, and then declared by a judge to 
be “insubsistente” (null and void) for PROCEDE certification, because its lands were already too 
privately and individually managed to warrant even the temporary and imperfect social property 
status which a PROCEDE survey confirms. It is interesting how certain judges, perhaps 
especially after the 1992 land tenure reforms, are reluctant to acknowledge núcleo status to any 
village where doubts have been raised regarding its eligibility, even if the village is located deep 
within a mountainous, predominantly indigenous region. I cannot know whether the village of 
Totontepec “deserved” this legal resolution. In any case, I considered its territory “private” for 
the purpose of the geodata analysis. I reserved the category “de facto núcleo, status unresolved” 
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only for any villages for which I found evidence that it was reasonably likely to eventually be 
declared a social property núcleo. 
While the sources referred to above were sufficient to compile an adequate estimate of the 
total surface area of each land tenure class, and to assign the proper class to most of the INEGI-
mapped springs, four of these springs required further investigation, usually because they were 
located so close to a tenure-class boundary that any spatial inaccuracies could affect their 
“assignment.” For these springs, I used a fifth additional source, air photography, to more 
accurately locate them in relation to land tenure areas. Eight air photos were acquired from 
INEGI, while others were accessed through GoogleEarth. Fortunately, the four springs in 
question were located in parts of the Huasteca Potosina where, based on my field experience, I 
knew the contrasting land use patterns to be a reasonable (though not definitive) guide to 
distinguishing private and social properties. (One of these four, the La Cuchilla spring, is 
discussed in sub-section 7.2.2.) The Chunutzen spring was especially important, for two reasons: 
it is shown by INEGI as providing water to two nearby núcleos (Chunutzen Uno and La 
Pimienta); and, it is one of the principal sources32 of the Huichihuayán River, which include 
K’aan Ja’ (“Precious Water”), a Teenek sacred site (Urquijo 2008, 27). The ASERCA shapefile 
assigned the place to private property, and I did notice an individual farmhouse nearby (with a 
driveway to the main highway, not linked to any núcleo) nearby; but it was difficult to ascertain 
from the air photograph whether the entire wooded patch containing the spring was part of this 
property. For methodological consistency, I decided to trust the ASERCA shapefile. 
For the INEGI springs coverage, I used shapefiles derived from eleven topographic sheets 
(INEGI 2000): four in the Huasteca, and seven in Oaxaca, where the geodata analysis area is 
larger because population density is lower and average núcleo territorial size is greater. The 
Oaxaca coverages were acquired as shapefiles, while the Huasteca coverages had to be converted 
from Autocad files. 
In addition to springs, I processed two other categories of INEGI-mapped water items: 
water storage tanks (“tanque de agua”), and water conduits (“acueducto superficial” or 
                                                        
32 The Huichihuayán River emerges from the base of the easternmost major limestone ridge of the Sierra 
Madre Oriental. Technically, its waters originate from much higher-elevation sources far to the west, and then 
pass underground through karst pockets. 
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“acueducto subterráneo”). Some of the depicted acueductos originate along streams; these are 
clearly “tomas de agua,” and are not given a point symbol in INEGI maps. Water conduits and 
storage tanks shown on 1:50,000-scale INEGI maps usually indicate village-scale (or larger) 
systems, mainly for potable (“municipal”) water distributed to homes and other buildings in 
village centers. In regions of Mexico more dependent on irrigation, some INEGI-mapped 
conduits and tanks are for agricultural use, and some of these are probably individually owned 
and operated. However, even in well-watered places like Talea, INEGI maps sometimes include 
water infrastructure operated not by villages, but rather by sub-village groups. The “Río del 
Rosario” agricultural sociedad, a group of Talea comuneros (see sub-section 6.1.4), built a pipe 
to collect water from a stream, and a tank to store the water before distribution to individual 
parcels. Both the pipe and the tank appear on the INEGI map. The map locates the tank 
accurately, but it places the toma – the other endpoint of the pipe – in the wrong part of the 
stream. My conjecture is that the tank was visible to INEGI cartographers on air photographs, 
but that the route of the pipe (which passes through a forested area) had to be estimated, perhaps 
based on incomplete information from the village itself, or from a CONAGUA permit 
application. 
The most commonly used basic nonparametric test for comparing observed values with a 
uniform33 distribution of values among categories is Pearson’s Chi-squared test. I chose not to 
attempt such a precise statistical test, because of the underlying deficiencies in the INEGI springs 
data set. These deficiencies (explored below, in sub-section 4.4.2) include a lack of 
independence from the land tenure data set (specifically, a bias toward agricultural areas and, 
especially, village centers), and a partial dependence on other factors (e.g., geology and 
hydrology) which can produce unwanted spatial autocorrelation (Slocum 2004, 123). 
In both geodata analysis areas combined there were 123 INEGI-mapped springs. Although 
this number was not high enough to calculate “densities” mathematically (e.g., via quadrat 
analysis), my quantitative analysis is in essence about “densities” conceptually. Given the 
number of INEGI-mapped springs, and given the total surface areas of each tenure type, I 
                                                        
33 Note that “uniform” is not the same as “random.” One sense of the latter term is “complete spatial 
randomness;” that is, “the points follow a homogenous Poisson process over the study area” (Baddeley 2006, 
37). 
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calculated by how many instances (i.e., springs) the expected distribution differed from the 
observed distribution. For each tenure type, this produced a number, either positive (a “surplus” 
of springs exists) or negative (a “deficit” of springs exists). Because these raw figures 
exaggerated the differences for any tenure types with small total areas, I normalized them to 
n=100. Thus, the tables in chapter 7 show the differences between observed and expected springs 
as a percentage of the total number of springs. 
While not a formal test of statistically significant deviances from expected values, these 
figures do suggest tentative interpretations when considered together with the other lines of 
evidence cited throughout this study. One exercise was specifically intended to improve the 
interpretation of the full-study-area, INEGI-mapped-springs geodata results. I subjected two 
different data sets representing the same concepts (springs, and land tenure areas) to the same 
quantitative approach, but at a more detailed scale and produced through different methods. 
These data sets are the springs and land tenure areas as collected through the participatory 
mapping work (PRM) in 15 núcleos. 
Following the main quantitative analyses comparing springs to land tenure types, I 
performed two briefer exercises, in the same geodata analysis areas, which introduce a third 
variable: indigeneity. I used the same basic analytical approach – expected surface areas (if 
evenly distributed), compared to observed surface areas – to relate indigeneity first to land 
tenure, and then to the INEGI-mapped springs. (I discuss the use of “indigenous language 
speakers” as a proxy variable for “indigeneity” below, in section 3.5.) 
3.4.1 Land tenure: Assessing the completeness and accuracy of the GAIA data set 
Other scholars have noted the impossibility of acquiring a complete and accurate geodata 
coverage of all social property in Mexico or one of its regions (Madrid et al. 2009, 182), 
especially one which includes the extent and location of village lands not officially recognized as 
núcleos agrarios (e.g., by a Resolución Presidencial) despite their de facto functioning as 
commonly-held territories by village-scale groups (Madrid et al. 2009, 184). To evaluate the 
GAIA land tenure coverage of PROCEDE-certified social property núcleos, I compared it to the 
other sources described in the preceding pages. 
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In comparing the GAIA data to the paper PROCEDE (and FANAR) maps which I had 
acquired or viewed for 25 individual núcleos, I found only one case where a recently 
government-surveyed polygon was never uploaded to the GAIA server: the Oaxaca núcleo of 
Tiltepec. In comparing the GAIA data to the PHINA non-spatial tenure histories, I found four 
other recently surveyed núcleos (Comaltepec, Tecocuilco, and Capulalpam in Oaxaca, and 
Coaquentla in the Huasteca) missing from GAIA (and still not included as of July 25, 2012). 
These five núcleos were surveyed in 2008-2010 by the PROCEDE follow-up program FANAR. 
Evidently, the GAIA publicly viewable coverage does not include some ejidos and comunidades 
surveyed after the end of PROCEDE, even though the legal consequences of FANAR work are 
identical to any equivalent PROCEDE work.  
In the Huasteca Potosina, a few other discrepancies were discovered between the GAIA 
and PHINA datasets. The ejido of El Saucillo was listed as having completed a PROCEDE 
survey in 2005 (including parcels), but has not appeared in GAIA. Two other núcleos appear in 
GAIA, even though they are listed in PHINA as not having done PROCEDE (or FANAR) work. 
Finally, two núcleos neither in PHINA nor in GAIA were included in the CONAFOR-derived 
shapefile. These were Tampate and Tamapatz, the two large, water-source-rich villages whose 
status as a núcleos is disputed and unresolved. 
To summarize, no one source is perfect, but omissions or errors in any one source are 
usually answered in another source. It is possible that a handful of núcleos are misattributed in 
the final land tenure coverage, but it is extremely unlikely that these add up to even as much as 
five percent of the total area. 
I reiterate that none of the land tenure sources capture the distinction between de facto 
common use and de facto individually parceled areas, only between their de jure, PROCEDE-
surveyed counterparts. For this geodata analysis, all land within núcleos either never surveyed by 
PROCEDE, or with only a perimeter was surveyed by PROCEDE, is counted as “common use.” 
For the de facto tenure distinctions within such communities, I collected reliable data in only 
four núcleos (Tancuime, Cuatlamayán, Tiltepec, and Yagila). Of these, this data was complete 
enough for quantitative analysis only in two núcleos (Tiltepec and Yagila). 
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3.4.2 Springs: Evaluating the criteria for inclusion in the INEGI data set 
To try to ascertain what the INEGI 1:50,000-scale “springs” coverage represents, I 
examined three sources: INEGI cartography user manuals; important springs mapped through 
participatory fieldwork; and air photography which I had interpreted to explore relationships 
between springs and forested areas. My conclusion is that some bias exists in the INEGI springs 
coverage toward areas with more direct and intense human use and occupation.  
I read three INEGI user manuals: a guide to their “potential land use” maps, which use the 
same “springs” layers as their topographic maps of the same scales (INEGI 1996, 67); a data 
dictionary” for their “subterranean waters” maps, which also use the same “springs” layer, 
though with added hydrological data for many of these springs (INEGI 1997a, 11-12); and a 
guide to “air photo interpretation,” to assist users in reading the same publicly obtainable 
1:10,000-scale air photographs which INEGI cartographers use to develop much of the 
information on their topographic maps (INEGI 2005a, 13). The last document stated directly that 
springs were located using air photographs, and that this was especially useful for two purposes: 
understanding geology, and locating suitable sites for cattle ranching. The first document 
considered a “spring” to be a “water supply feature,” which is a type of “public service.” 
Maps developed through participatory fieldwork, generally suited to about 1:10,000 scale, 
naturally include more springs than 1:50,000-scale topographic maps. In all the fourteen PRM 
núcleos34 (12 mapped with México Indígena, plus two with CAPLAC), only four springs appear 
on the INEGI maps. One is in the CAPLAC núcleo of Buenavista; another is within the 
perimeter of Tiltepec – although not in the part mapped participatively, but rather in the part 
occupied by the non-participating village of La Luz; a third is in Tancuime; and a fourth is in 
Chuchupe. In these same 14 PRM núcleos, 144 springs were mapped through participatory 
methods. According to these samples, the INEGI inclusion rate for springs deemed important by 
communities is 2.8 percent. 
This figure, while perhaps interesting, does not tell us anything about what kinds of 
springs INEGI tends to include. While maintaining caution due to the very small sample size, I 
                                                        
34 For this exercise, I did not include Talea, because my fieldwork there was directed specifically at springs, 
and thus includes a different level of detail than in the other PRM nucleos. 
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began to probe this matter by isolating just those three núcleos where I had already made forest 
cover maps from air photographs (Tancuime, Cuatlamayán, and Chimalaco). There was one 
INEGI-mapped spring within them, in Tancuime. 62 percent of the 52 PRM-mapped springs in 
these three núcleos were located in forests, yet the one INEGI-mapped spring was located in a 
non-forested patch. It seems that INEGI mainly maps springs that are visible in air photographs, 
perhaps supplemented by some information provided by municipal (county), state, or federal 
agencies. Whether by accident or by design, in a region with large and numerous forest patches, 
this results in a coverage with a bias toward open-field agricultural areas and certain village 
centers. In social property núcleos, such areas tend to be imperfectly correlated with parceled 
areas and human settlement areas, whether de facto or de jure.  
Because it exemplifies the same social construction of nature which pervades all aspects 
of the present study, this apparent bias toward water sources in high-human-activity areas is not 
worrisome. The only problem is that my INEGI-based analysis may have failed to include a 
representative sample of springs which are invisible in air photographs due to forest cover, yet 
which are nonetheless so important to humans (e.g., as sources for a village potable water 
supply). Again, this problem is potentially most relevant when considering common use areas in 
núcleos which also contain PROCEDE-surveyed parcels. I investigate the issue further in sub-
section 7.4.2. 
3.5   Supplementary work 
Three additional principal sources of information were: 1. interviews with officials or 
local residents in places other than Talea; 2. three digital files of CONAGUA water concessions 
in the Oaxaca geodata analysis area, and 3. miscellaneous mapping work. 
Interviews were unstructured discussions, focused on the specific questions at hand but 
often evolving to include unanticipated ideas and advice from the interviewee. The conversations 
with ejidatarios and comuneros were especially important for improving my understanding of de 
facto (i.e., non-PROCEDE-certified) land tenure practices.  
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In the state RAN offices, I talked with José Manuel Vásquez Córdova, Secretary for the 
Delegation (delegado) of RAN in Oaxaca, and José Ledezma Barragán, his counterpart in San 
Luis Potosí. At the CONAGUA Pacífico Sur Watershed office in Oaxaca, I met with Pedro 
Bernal Flores, chief of user services at the Dirección de Administración del Agua, and with his 
colleague Vicky Díaz Jiménez, who also provided me with copies of the federal water laws, 
regulations, and rights (CONAGUA 2008b; CONAGUA 2008c). At the CONAGUA Golfo 
Central Watershed office in Xalapa, Veracruz, I talked to Mario Guillermo Yáñez Morales. 
In núcleos in the Huasteca, I held discussions with Agustín Lázaro Reyes, Dario 
Hernández Reyes, †Daniel López, †Claudio Salazar (Presidente del Comisariado Ejidal of 
Chimalaco), and †Andrés Almendro. In núcleos in Oaxaca (besides Talea, described in section 
4.3), I talked with Raymundo Ramos Francisco (former Presidente del Comisariado de Bienes 
Comunales of Yagila) and Flavio Pérez (Presidente del Comisariado de Bienes Comunales of 
Totomoxtla).   
Nearly all of the Sierra Norte de Oaxaca geodata analysis area lies within the major 
watershed administered by CONAGUA through its office in Xalapa, Veracruz. There I was 
given two digital files (CONAGUA 2009) which list the water concession titles currently in 
force within the sub-watersheds which comprise most of the Oaxaca geodata analysis area, with 
attribute columns such as their locations in latitude and longitude, the name of the water source, 
the volumes of water conceded, and the type of user. I also obtained INEGI-produced shapefiles 
(described in INEGI 2009), for both Oaxaca and the Huasteca, which contain some water sources 
(and, for many of them, attribute data such as concentrations of anions or cations for various 
compounds) not included in the INEGI 1: 50,000-scale topographic maps. I used these data 
sources to create Figure 7.6 (page 337). 
In chapter 1 (Introduction) and chapter 2 (Study Areas), I provided some explanation for 
how I made the maps which appear in those chapters. I conclude this chapter with a more details 
on the process of making several of those maps.  
For maps which show indigenous language areas, I calculated “percentage of population 
age 5 or older who speak an indigenous language,” derived from the 2005 census and joined to 
an INEGI localidad shapefile. Kemper and Adkins (2004) found this method to be imperfect but 
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adequate. In late 2011, after I had completed this work, INEGI released its tables from the 2010 
census. For the first time, the census included questions about ethnic self-description (CESOP 
2011, 4). This contributed to a 75 percent increase in Mexico’s indigenous population between 
2000 and 2010. While it is likely that a few of the observations in the present study would be 
modified by including self-reported ethnicity figures, the overwhelming impact of the new 
census method has been in urban places, not in the rural areas which are its focus (CESOP 2011, 
7). 
I displayed the localidades points as three classes, based on natural breaks observed in the 
histogram (Kelly et al. 2010, 171). Localidades with greater than 62 percent indigenous language 
speakers were considered “indigenous,” those with fewer than 13 percent were considered “non-
indigenous,” and those in between were considered “mixed.” I then drew polygons around the 
populated areas, assigning to each polygon whichever class of localidades had a visual 
preponderance. Relatively large, contiguous areas more than about 4 km from villages (here 
defined as localidades with more than 100 inhabitants), or more than about 1 km from ranchos 
and other very low-population localidades, were designated as “no population.” (Note that “no 
population” does not imply “unoccupied,” nor “unused by any local resident,” nor “not owned by 
any person or núcleo,” but rather an absence or near-absence of permanent homes.) 
I then mapped specific languages by using municipio (county) level data from the 2005 
census. I displayed each language in turn as a percentage of total indigenous-language speakers, 
and drew boundaries (with a buffer of about 5 km) around municipios where the language was 
spoken by a plurality of them. I made adjustments for those parts of large municipios without 
significant indigenous speakers, as well as for “no population” areas. Because each language is 
assigned a separate attribute field in the shapefile, overlap zones are possible, such as the parts of 
the Huasteca (e.g., the México Indígena-researched ejido of Las Armas) where both Teenek and 
Nahuatl are widely spoken.   
Finally, air photographs were used at several points during the research: to locate forest 
cover in four núcleos; to better understand land use patterns in núcleos including Santa Cruz and 
La Pila; to improve the vegetation and land cover coverages for the maps in chapter 2; and to 
complete the land use and land cover map of Talea (Figure 2.7, on page 65).  
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I developed Figure 2.7 by combining INEGI topographic shapefiles, digitized PROCEDE 
maps, and PRM-derived features such as local toponyms. To this I added a land use/land cover 
(LULC) coverage, created via remote sensing interpretation in the following manner: 
1. I converted my 203 GPS field points into a shapefile, and assign to each of them a 
class from the following list: agriculture, pasture, orchard, coffee, secondary 
vegetation, humid pine-oak forest, logged clearing in forest, humid tropical forest, 
cloud forest, and natural dry-climate vegetation. 
2. I acquired high-resolution true-color air photography. Fortunately, GoogleEarth has 
just recently made this available without cost. However, the imagery did have 
about 25 percent cloud cover. For these areas, I substituted lower-resolution true-
color GoogleEarth satellite imagery. 
3. I created an LULC polygon shapefile by visually interpreting the imagery with 
reference to the field points. The most challenging class proved to be (shade-
grown) “coffee,” as it often resembles other classes (e.g., humid pine-oak forest, 
orchard, or secondary forest), but I found the final result to be satisfactory, based 
on my knowledge of the núcleo. 
Finally, I executed a modest, preliminary investigation of state-sanctioned “natural 
protected areas” in the geodata analysis areas using shapefiles acquired from CONANP, 
Mexico’s federal commission on protected areas (CONANP 2011). One shapefile comprises 778 
polygons representing approximately 200 federal natural protected areas, including marine 
reserves. The other, perhaps an incomplete data set, represents state-level natural protected areas 
in Mexico large enough to be represented as polygons on 1:250,000-scale maps.  
105 
 
  
4.  Related scholarship  
In this chapter I will present a deeper introduction to the main concepts involved in this 
study, especially as they apply to Mexico: land tenure, neoliberalism, water source 
proprietorship, and indigenous perspectives on these themes. This is not a comprehensive 
literature review of these concepts. Rather, it is a selective introduction to certain theoretical, 
empirical, and case-study sources surrounding these concepts, many of them specific to Mexico. 
As a whole, the body of cited works is suffused with reference to three kinds of actors (the 
individual, the village, and the state), two material geographic features (land and water), and two 
modes of normativity (de jure “law,” and de facto “practice”). Secondary sources related to the 
method of participatory research mapping (PRM) were reviewed in chapter 3. 
4.1   Land tenure and neoliberal reforms 
Land tenure has long been a favorite subject of many cultural geographers, as well as of 
some anthropologists, political scientists, sociologists, historians, philosophers, and legal 
scholars. Because it is a universally relevant and contentious concept which links the spatial 
geometry of the earth’s surface with the cognition and organization of human beings, Nicholas 
Blomley has called on geographers to focus more deeply on the subject of property, and to 
include concepts beyond the standard one of “territorialized, discrete space” owned by a private 
citizen and endorsed by the state (Blomley 2005, 126). “As has been mentioned by many authors 
but cannot be stressed too often, ‘property is not a relation between people and things, but 
between people with respect to things’” (Nuijten, Lorenzo, and de Vries 2006, 17). In geography, 
influential works about territoriality, ethnic communities, and sovereignty within jurisdictional or 
administrative areas include Sack (1986), Delaney (2005), and, among the early cultural 
ecologists, Brookfield (1964).  
Neoliberalism has been defined as “a theory of political economic practices that proposes 
that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms 
and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free 
markets, and free trade,” in which “the role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional 
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framework appropriate to such practices” (Harvey 2005, 3). Neoliberalist policies are 
simultaneously enacted through the existing system of state (national) governments – often in 
response to pressures imposed by a “consensus” within international financial institutions – and, 
in theory, with the goal of removing the state from many of its responsibilities. It is a central 
concept within current discussions regarding governance, whether narrowly defined as simply 
the legitimacy, competence, and real power exercised by national, provincial, or county-level 
government bureaucracies, or more broadly defined as “the emergence of actors who do not 
belong to the traditional governmental sphere, but still play a part in the control of public affairs 
and establish complex (antagonistic, complementary, or juxtapositional) relationships with the 
state” (Blundo and Le Meur 2009, 2).  
Many question whether neoliberalism is as encouraging of democracy as its advocates 
claim; indeed, geographer David Harvey has called it “profoundly anti-democratic” (Harvey 
2005, 71), because it has empirically been shown to accelerate the accumulation of wealth by an 
entrenched elite, and because it leaves many socially sustaining functions in the hands of less-
accountable corporations and NGOs. Other frequent topics of debate include the extent to which 
neoliberal policies favor the individual over the group, and to what degree it causes the 
commercial market to dominate over alternative spheres of reproduction and exchange. In the 
specific realm of land tenure, for example, many governments have enacted programs to 
standardize, modernize, and complete their cadastral information systems, often entailing a 
reform of land tenure laws and legal procedures (Powelson 1988). While this certainly can be 
one step in the information availability, commodity interchangeability, and legal security 
demanded by neoliberal advocates, such land tenure standardization need not inherently require 
the elimination of non-individual or non-commercial social structures, at least not directly or 
immediately, such as is the case in Peru.  
Arturo Warman (1937-2003) was an architect of the 1990s land tenure counter-reform in 
Mexico, a component of neoliberalism. Warman was an anthropologist who directed Mexican 
government’s National Indigenous Institute (INI, now CDI) early in the Salinas administration, 
and then the Agrarian Reform Ministry (which oversees the National Agrarian Registry, or RAN, 
in essence Mexico’s social property cadastre and legal forum) until 1999. While some find it 
ironic that an advocate for the indigenous would sow the seeds for the eventual dismantling of 
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the post-Revolution social property system, Warman did not find this to be a contradiction. In his 
mind, the corrupt, effectively one-party state was so entrenched in that system, that only the 
neoliberal promise (in theory) of a reduction in the role of the state could free rural individuals 
and communities, including indigenous ones, from fulfilling their potential – even if in practice 
this might necessitate deeper state involvement in the organization of some productive activities 
in indigenous regions (Hernández-Díaz 2001, 37). Warman did not believe this would require the 
elimination of the ejido as an institution, but he did recommend (1972, 101) that the village 
should no longer be sacrosanct as the locus of identity and local power, because villages so often 
fought with each other, and were themselves dominated by local corruption and false democracy: 
Thus, the peasant corporation which owns the land lives isolated in a hostile 
environment, surrounded by real or potential enemies with whom neither alliance nor 
cooperation is possible. Their fellow peasants constitute a permanent threat. The 
power or force of each isolated unit is small, ridiculously small if it is confronted with 
the potential might of the provincial city, acting as the seat of economic and political 
power. 
4.1.1 Land tenure law 
Many theorists do not see a fundamental difference between land and natural resources 
such as water or trees; land is a resource like any other. In this sense, considering land to be 
something which one owns outright, and other resources as things which one merely has rights 
to, is a misleading distinction. In all cases, “we don’t really own resources; rather, we own the 
property rights that we attach to those resources” (Sekar 2003, 269). The nature of the owners of 
these rights – individuals, village-sized groups, corporations, or the state – determines the kind of 
common or private property involved, rather than the nature of the thing we attach the rights to. 
All of the classes of property include restraints imposed by law and by society on these 
rights; even private property rights merely grant an “individual or family with the right to control 
access and to use resource in socially acceptable ways, and duty to avoid other uses.” Non-
private property can be of several different types, including “public lands with open access,” 
where “no one owns the resource”; “state (government) property,” where the “owner is all 
citizens (as represented in government bodies), with right to determine rules, and duty to 
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maintain social objectives,” and finally true “common property,” where the “owner is a well-
defined collective, with right to exclude non-users, and duty to maintain resource, partly by 
containing its rate of use” (Sekar 2003, 270). Only the first of these, open-access public lands, is 
necessarily susceptible to the famous “tragedy of the commons.” Even the term’s inventor 
Garrett Hardin “later admitted [that] the ‘tragedy of the commons’ is a misnomer. Common-pool 
resources are usually governed by rules and social relations that control access with the goal of 
limiting overuse. Where it occurs, Hardin’s tragedy is, rather, a tragedy of open access, in which 
no property-rights systems are in place” (Bakker 2010a, 172; see also Ashenafi and Leader-
Williams 2005, 549). 
Mexico’s social property system is (or at least was) an example of the last of these types, 
true “common property.” Much of the system’s economic, environmental, and cultural success 
requires that ownership, management, and access be maintained, to some practicable degree, at 
the same scale of human grouping – in this case, that of the village (Hanna and Munasinghe 
1996). However, the individual is still important:  
The essential element in the term CPR [common property regime] is the combination 
of collective ownership of the resource system (the productive stocks, the commons, 
the ecosystem that yields product) with individual ownership of rights to appropriate 
and often to sell that system’s annual harvest or flow, as attenuated by the regulations 
invented and enforced by the collectivity that owns rights to the productive system.  
(Sekar 2003, 271) 
In Mexico’s social property system, another layer of complexity arises from the 
jurisdictional spatial unit generally coinciding with the land area which is owned in common. 
That is, the núcleo assembly is both responsible for making and enforcing local laws within its 
territory – laws which also apply to women, children, non-landowning pobladores, and recently 
fully privatized ex-members – and for exercising collective ownership of that territory. In post-
1992 PROCEDE-parceled núcleos, this collective ownership is fully intact only within the 
remaining de jure common use areas.   
Whether considered in jurisdictional or in property ownership terms, the extent of a 
núcleo’s territory is not necessarily tied to its legal description in state-sanctioned documents. In 
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his study of two feuding núcleos in the Central Valley of Oaxaca, Phillip Dennis (1987, 163) 
found that: 
One of the most fascinating bits of evidence, to me, of the persistent nature of these 
[foundation] stories (and of village land claims) was the recital by informants of the 
boundary markers ‘as they should be’, not as they are legally recognized. I noted that 
there were at least two different cognitive maps of the lands – the one held by Zautla 
and the one held by Mazaltepec – in addition to the version marked by government 
authorities as official on both villagers’ paper maps. The ‘true’ cognitive map of the 
community lands is preserved long after the official map has changed, indicating the 
tenacity of village land claims. Given the moral basis of village land claims, 
definitive settlements and Presidential Resolutions do not change the conviction of 
ownership on the losing side. 
4.1.2 Neoliberalism 
There has been “an emphatic turn towards neoliberalism in political-economic practices 
and thinking since the 1970s” (Harvey 2005, 3). The implementation of neoliberal tenets at a 
national scale began with Chile, where economists who had studied under the University of 
Chicago’s Milton Friedman worked for Pinochet’s government with the assistance of the 
International Monetary Fund (Harvey 2005, 5), reversing the previous land reform which had 
established a system of asentamientos (cooperative groups) (Dorner 1992, 38). Global economic 
crises such as the 1973 Arab-nations oil embargo exacerbated tensions between the essentially 
Keynesian relationships among states and economies, and the need for more flexible flow within 
the integrating markets of labor, capital, and goods (Judt 2010). The neoliberalist response to this 
tension was advanced in successive stages, reaching Mexico first in the wake of the 1982 debt 
crisis, which had been caused by a combination of high global interest rates promoted by United 
States Federal Reserve chairman Paul Volcker to combat inflation, and a fall in the price of oil 
on which the Mexican government had recently become overdependent (Meyer, Sherman, and 
Deeds 2003, 719). The Reagan administration and the IMF insisted that privatization of state 
assets be a condition of any rescue package (Harvey 2005, 11):  
In 1984 the World Bank, for the first time in its history, granted a loan to a country in 
return for structural neoliberal reforms. [President] de la Madrid then opened Mexico 
to the global economy by joining GATT and implementing an austerity programme. 
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The effects were wrenching: from 1983 to 1988 Mexico’s per capita income fell at a 
rate of 5 percent per year; the value of workers’ real wages fell between 40 percent 
and 50 percent. 
 
The privatization process in Mexico came to fruition during the heyday of neoliberal 
reform, during the administration of Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994), as the demise of the 
Soviet Union signaled the apparent victory of unfettered capitalism over state control of 
resources. Emblematic of the winners of privatization was Carlos Slim, the Mexican 
telecommunications magnate who is today one of the world’s wealthiest persons – in the words 
of David Harvey, “neoliberalization has not been very effective in revitalizing global capital 
accumulation, but it has succeeded remarkably well in restoring, or in some instances (as in 
Russia and China) creating, the power of an economic elite” (Harvey 2005, 8). The Salinas 
administration made parallel commitments to free trade, including the elimination of subsidized 
foodstuffs, and to the modernizing – and, arguably, to the elimination – of the rural social 
property system. Although neoliberalists assured that democratic reforms were an inevitable part 
of their plan, one-party dominance persisted in Mexico, as it did even more rigidly in an ever-
more capitalistic China. The fierce reaction in Mexico against the state, led by the Zapatista 
rebellion of 1994, was directed against neoliberal policies and against the continued top-down 
paternalism of the PRI, Mexico’s ruling party at the federal level since the 1920s. Under the 
Ernesto Zedillo administration – the PRI’s last,35 until 2012 – the country suffered yet another 
debt crisis in 1995, while ex-President Salinas was suspected of massive corruption, for which 
his brother Raúl was indicted.  
While the PRI regime’s loss in the 2000 elections finally heralded a new (if incomplete) 
flowering of democracy in Mexico (Preston and Dillon 2005), the government’s policies and 
                                                        
35 A recent paper (de Janvry, Gonzalez-Navarro, and Sadoulet 2011) explains how benefactors of Mexico’s 
neoliberal land tenure reform failed to credit the PRI for the change in their favor. Another analyst describes 
how the the state-initiated neoliberal turn in Mexico coincided with accelerated movement toward fuller 
democracy, as well as a global reawakening of indigenous rights issues; all three trends were simultaneously 
aspects of, and reactions to, each other (Olvera 2010, 83). The interplay among these trends and partially 
opposing forces is complex. It includes the PRI’s (temporarily) unsuccessful attempt to try something new to 
hold onto the power that was finally slipping from its grasp, as well as the leftist reaction (sometimes in 
alliance with with some indigenous peoples) to NAFTA, PROCEDE, and the commercialized, “placeless” 
ethos they represent to many. 
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practices hardly changed. This was due in part to President Vicente Fox and his successor Felipe 
Calderón being of the center-right PAN party, leaving Mexico an exception among the “center-
left coalitions, openly critical of neoliberalization, [who] have taken over political power, and 
seem poised to deepen and extend their influence all over Latin America” (Harvey 2005, 64), 
Furthermore, rather than responding to leftist and indigenous dissatisfaction, Mexico since 2000 
has had to focus its attentions to the economic stagnation engendered by its deep ties to the ailing 
United States economy, as well as to the crisis of governance exposed by a US-encouraged 
attack on drug trafficking cartels (Longmire 2011). 
The 1990s neoliberalist-directed land reform in Mexico is in a narrowest sense simply a 
tool, the application of updated surveying and data storage technologies to the problem of a 
complex and confusing palimpsest of tenure regimes.36 However, as the great historian Fernand 
Braudel cautioned, “one must always take account of history, or perhaps one should say society, 
in the broad sense; technology is never the only factor in the discussion” (Braudel 1979, 335). As 
David Harvey reminds us, “neoliberalization has transformed the positionality of labor, of 
women, and of indigenous groups in the social order by emphasizing that labor is a commodity 
like any other” (2005, 59). To the extent that rural, village-based societies – especially, perhaps, 
indigenous ones – connect their practices (including labor) to the specifics of place, they may be 
especially affected by, and in turn they may be especially capable of transforming, the elements 
of neoliberalist practices by which the state promotes the increasing commodification of land and 
natural resources (see, e.g., Stocks 2005). Karl Polanyi (1944, 79) wrote that: 
To allow the market mechanism to be sole director of the fate of human beings37 and 
their natural environment, indeed, even of the amount and use of purchasing power, 
would result in the demolition of society. […] Robbed of the protective covering of 
cultural institutions, human beings would perish from the effects of social exposure; 
they would die as victims of acute social dislocation through vice, perversion, crime 
and starvation. Nature would be reduced to its elements, neighborhoods and 
landscapes defiled, rivers polluted, military safety jeopardized, the power to produce 
food and raw materials destroyed. 
                                                        
36 In their review of cadastral mapping as it developed in the service of European states, Roger Kain and 
Elizabeth Baigent (1992, 336) affirm that “the collecting of taxes and state revenues from land and resources 
drawn from that land, has been the overwhelming reason” for the growing practice. 
37 Mike Davis (2004, 54) criticizes Polanyi for reifying the “market” as some automaton, rather than something 
humans make. 
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Harvey (2005, 80) contends that “neoliberal concern for the individual trumps any social 
democratic concern for equality, democracy, and social solidarities.” While this may overstate 
the opposition of neoliberalism to democracy as it has actually been implemented, it is difficult 
to exaggerate the degree to which neoliberalism has failed to keep its promise of reducing the 
presence of the state in those realms where the powerful deem state intervention to be 
advantageous (Watts 1994, 380). “As [Béatrice] Hibou suggested (1999), rather than the decline 
of its structures, the apparent retreat of the state under the privatization policies may mean its 
redeployment in other forms. According to this hypothesis, the state would retain a certain level 
of control over society, relying on private intermediaries, as indirect colonial rule had done” 
(Blundo and Le Meur 2009, 17). Because many indigenous peoples define themselves partly by 
their resistance to the state, which was constructed mainly by others on territory their ancestors 
had already occupied (Metz 2006, 5; Cobo 1986, 4), indigenous societies play a unique role in 
shaping the evolution of land tenure practices and natural resource stewardship.   
4.1.3 Neoliberal land tenure reforms in countries other than Mexico 
Numerous studies document the effects of recent land reform programs in developing 
countries (e.g., Thiesenhausen 1995; Wolford 2003 and 2007; Bobrow-Strain 2004). In Mexico 
there is a clear distinction between the post-Revolution social property land redistribution and 
the post-1992 neoliberal-influenced counter-reform. The onset if the two eras are separated by 
about 70 years, so the redistribution program had time to deeply influence a huge portion of the 
country. In certain other countries, the two eras occurred much closer in time. For example, Peru 
enacted a reform in 1974 to allow community titling among indigenous peoples (Plant and 
Hvalkof 2001, 15), only about 20 years before the neoliberal reforms I review below. In other 
countries “socially progressive land redistribution or community-scale rights” and “neoliberal-
influenced land tenure reform” are enacted simultaneously, often under the banner of cadastre 
standardization. In Ecuador, for example, “in the 1990s the demarcation, registration, and titling 
of small rural landholdings were re-organized around the contradictory impulses of ethnic rights 
activism, neoliberalism, and the rise of geographic information systems” (Radcliffe 2009, 439).  
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In any country, unique historical circumstances shape the form and implementation of its 
state-driven land tenure plans. One common variant, e.g. in Guatemala and Colombia, is the 
resettlement of internally displaced civil war refugees, usually disproportionally represented by 
indigenous people; another variant is the state-encouraged settlement of a vast forest frontier, as 
in Amazonia, where Brazil is trying to systematize its cadastre, but deliberately keeping some 
aspects of it ambiguous while “condoning violence as a means to acquire and protect property 
rights” (Simmons et al. 2007, 578; Blomley 2003, 122).  
To represent the range of studies, I will mention just two: one from South Africa, the other 
from Peru. 
Wiebe Nauta (2009) related how it became necessary to address the imbalance of land 
ownership, as the apartheid system was terminated and the former “Bantustans” (nominally 
autonomous, crowded regions where blacks had been forcibly resettled) were re-incorporated 
into South Africa. The last white-dominated administration under DeKlerk ensured that land 
reform would favor private property rights, as “the rhetoric of the market also penetrated the 
Land Reform Programme that was drawn up after the first democratic elections” (243). While 
this was done mainly to protect the interests of white landowners, it also coincided with the 
widespread neoliberal ethos of policymakers in the early 1990s.   
The program which resulted also included a social property tool reminiscent of post-
Revolutionary Mexico: the “Communal Property Association” (CPA). In Mexico, ejidatarios 
were given land carved from expropriated haciendas outright. In South Africa, landless blacks 
were given cash grants to purchase properties at market value, which they often could only 
afford to do by organizing village-scale groups. Unfortunately, building a workable village-scale 
culture from the ground up often failed: “CPAs ultimately proved to be a problematic answer as 
group ownership and management created severe difficulties in ‘communities’” (Nauta 2009, 
244). Without a history of group cohesion, and in many cases lacking strong leadership, many 
individuals feared that they were contributing more than their fair share to farming tasks. In a 
small women’s cooperative, for example, Nauta (2009, 258) found that:  
There was an obvious tension between the private and the common domain that led to 
distrust and tensions. The number one priority for every household is to get its own 
garden ploughed and only then can people begin to think about common agricultural 
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goals. But even these goals are subordinate to private goals like sending children to 
school and clothing them. 
 
Monique Nuijten, David Lorenzo, and Pieter de Vries described the case of Peru, where a 
new 1993 Constitution, and a 1995 land law, “opened the way to the privatization of communal 
land rights” (Nuijten, Lorenzo, and de Vries 2006, 4). However, as in Colombia (Ng’weno 
2000), the neoliberal-hued land tenure program has also provided village-scale groups to codify 
their land tenure regimes, somewhat in the style 20th-century Mexican social property núcleos. In 
other words, Peru’s efforts have been directed primarily at standardizing a rational, complete 
national cadastre, but not necessarily, in many cases, about privileging the individual.38 Like 
their indigenous Mexican counterparts, many Andean peasant communities chose to only have 
their community perimeters surveyed and certified. 
Nuijten, Lorenzo, and de Vries stress that these village-oriented legal cadastral forms can 
be just as neglectful of complex local tenure practices as the privatizing of individual parcels 
would be. They see that the Peruvian government, and the NGOs which advise it, are beholden 
to a romanticized, simplified “culturalist notion of the Andean comunidad,” where 
straightforwardly communal land tenure practices are erroneously assumed to be “the original 
expression of deep Andean values.” Instead, “contrary to the popular image conveyed by 
government officials, academics and Usibambinos themselves, the comuneros do not have an 
exceptional inclination towards equality and communitarian ideology” (Nuijten, Lorenzo, and de 
Vries 2006, 17). The state’s essentializing of village society has at least two negative 
consequences. First, it colors any intra-village squabbling as a failure, rather than as the 
negotiated, evolving manner through which villagers have always engaged each other. Second, it 
can encourage the “exclusion of specific groups, [and] domination by others” (Nuijten, Lorenzo, 
and de Vries 2006, 4) by rigidly legalizing the property rights of “haves” (the Peruvian 
equivalents of ejidatarios and comuneros) and “have-nots” (other residents of the same 
communities). 
                                                        
38 In this respect, Mexico and, to an even greater degree Peru, arguably seem generally to be adhering to 
Article 17 of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), which “provides for the right to own 
collective property and not be arbitrarily deprived of that property” (Posey 1994, 228). 
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4.2   Water source control and land ownership 
Among geographers and other social scientists, relationships among people, land, and 
natural resources have been matters for analyses often grouped under the term “cultural ecology” 
(e.g., Vayda 1983), as well as the more recent variant “political ecology.” The latter approach 
includes geographer Erik Swyngedouw’s work on the “continuing centrality of the state and of 
‘governance’ in the regulation of the water sector, and the weakened position of the citizen vis-à-
vis these modes of water governance” (2003a, 10) and Tina Wallace and Ann Coles’ edited 
volume on water, gender, and development (2005). A related field is “environmental history,” 
where scholarship on land and water in Mexico includes works by Butzer and Butzer (1993), 
Melville (1994), and Endfield and O’Hara (1997). Environmental historian Ted Steinberg (1995, 
98-103) discussed the legal and practical difficulties of attaching water ownership to landed 
property.  
In the Mexican Constitution, water is considered as fundamentally belonging to the nation 
as a whole in certain ways that do not apply to the ownership of land. This distinction is a 
specific example of a general one between land and natural resources, one which takes different 
legal and practical forms in different countries. In many contexts it is more accurate to use words 
such as “proprietorship,” “management,” “custody,” “control,” “supervision,” or “caretaking” to 
describe the rights specific people or groups have with regard to specific water sources, water 
bodies, or volumes of water. 
David Harvey (2005, 3) asserted that a goal of neoliberalism is that “if markets do not 
exist (in areas such as land, water, education, health care, social security, or environmental 
pollution) then they must be created, by state action if necessary.” Karen Bakker, in Privatizing 
Water: Governance Failure and the World’s Urban Water Crisis (2010, 191-192), makes a more 
detailed and nuanced argument that acknowledges the complexities involved in the physical 
qualities of water, as well as in the varied forms of “privatization” and the specific, limited 
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situations (usually, engineered potable water systems in cities)39 in which it is accurate to speak 
of a water “market”: 
On one hand, we need to view water as a flow resource (including sanitation, which is 
strangely absent from much of this debate) – a part of the hydrological cycle. On the 
other hand, a relational approach suggests that water is articulated with other social 
relations such as property: land use and water use are inextricably interlinked, in both 
cities and rural areas [. . .] The link between people and urban property (e.g., via 
tenure) is central to explaining urban water-use practices. This implies that an 
explanation of the social construction of urban water-use practices must articulate the 
relationship between land and water, and between the social relations that govern 
these resources (such as land tenure and water rights). 
 
Bakker implies (2010a, 199-200) that geographers, being trained to integrate 
understanding at multiple spatial scales, are especially qualified to offer insight into issues of 
water rights and proprietorship: 
Water is a flow resource which transcends boundaries; its positive and negative 
effects are felt far downstream. Yet water is used locally: cheap to store but heavy 
and thus costly to transport, water is most often used close to the point of abstraction. 
As a result, water creates a tension between the local scale and higher scales of 
governance. [. . .] As a flow resource, water is, moreover, the supreme integrator; 
given water’s ability to dilute and transport pollutants (sometimes over long time 
scales), the nature of water use by one user on another is often difficult to 
discern. [. . .] This framing provides insight into potential solutions to a particularly 
intractable question within privatization debates: the issue of scale, so central to the 
tension between community and corporate systems. [. . .] Water is biophysically 
multiscalar, but it is used and disposed of locally.  
 
Water is neither an entirely private nor entirely public good (Myers 2010); “its status is 
irrevocably ambiguous” (Bakker 2010a, 207). Corporate control often dominates when the 
infrastructure for a water storage and conveyance system is massive, and this is where arguments 
about the role of the state are most germane. In contrast, relatively “artisanal” small-scale water 
systems “are more often directly controlled by communities; tend to be in rural or peri-urban 
areas; and in rural areas, often deal with multiple uses of water resources” (Bakker 2010a, 210). 
                                                        
39 About three percent of world’s population is “supplied via private operators,” but 20 percent of its urban 
population is (Bakker 2010a, 4). 
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Bakker recognizes (2010a, 211) that rural property regimes, including social ones, do remain 
“vitally important to water management; in querying property rights, the commons perspective 
invokes notions of justice as a social relation, invested with a moral dimension (rather than the 
modern view of justice as procedural)”: 
On social grounds, the case for decentralization (or delegation, as it is sometimes 
termed) might seem compelling; but on environmental grounds, it is not. [. . .] This 
conclusion does not imply that communities should play no role in water governance. 
On the contrary, the tension between the need for centralized oversight and 
community control (the “corporate-community” tension) is inherent in our 
relationship with water. 
 
The present study does not focus on the important question of ecological sustainability of 
various water proprietorship practices, but here I will briefly mention this matter in the context of  
critiques of neoliberalism. According to David Harvey (2005, 60), neoliberal economic systems 
tend to discourage sustainable management of natural resources, because their “preference for 
short-term contractual relations puts pressure on all producers to extract everything they can 
while the contract lasts.” In the case of water, this generalization is probably only directly 
applicable to situations where water is “mined”; that is, extracted from an aquifer more quickly 
than it can be naturally or artificially recharged. 
4.2.1 Water proprietorship 
There is a vast literature on water issues in the developing world (e.g., Gleick 2006; Postel 
2003; Singh 2008), sometimes alarmist, much of which focuses on the (so far) few places in the 
world where significant amounts of water are transferred between, or contested by, neighboring 
nations – occasionally mutually belligerent ones (see, e.g., Ehrenreich’s 2011 article on “Israel’s 
water war with Palestine,” in which he describes a spring contested between two neighboring 
villages). 
Proposals to reallocate water rights, or to create new systems to distribute them, often 
inspire angry reactions, especially when one of the parties has a commercial interest in the 
allotment. Karen Bakker (2010a, 4) posits that this is because: 
118 
 
  
Water fulfills multiple functions and is imbued with many meanings. Water is 
simultaneously an economic output, an aesthetic reference, a religious symbol, a 
public service a private good, a cornerstone of public health, and a biophysical 
necessity for humans and ecosystems alike. 
   Another reason for the fierceness of protests is the fact that water is, in some sense, 
a final frontier for capitalism. Essential for life and (at least in the case of drinking 
water) nonsubstitutible, water throws up challenging barriers—technical, ethical, and 
political–to private ownership and management. The water privatization debate is 
thus a microcosm of contemporary struggles over the roles of states and markets, and 
over the acceptability and efficacy of markets and private ownership as mechanisms 
for public services delivery and as solutions to the world’s putative environmental 
crisis. 
 
The present study focuses on springs because, in rural areas, these tend to be instilled with 
even more symbolic meaning than water in general. This is embodied by the English word 
“source,” now a general term for any original thing, work, or idea from which something else 
derives, but once simply a synonym for “spring” – as it still is in French. 
4.2.2 Water proprietorship and land issues in countries other than Mexico 
I will briefly present here examples from three countries – a Canadian legal study, an 
academic investigation of a state in southern India, and body of political ecology research in 
Bolivia – to characterize the literature examining the intersection of water, land tenure, and the 
state in rural and indigenous places. I will conclude the subsection with a brief review of water 
law in the United States. A common thread is that the neoliberal focus on the “human right to 
water” will “provide additional leverage for states intent on wresting control of water resources 
from local communities” (Bakker 2010a, 149). However, these same studies also highlight the 
agency of indigenous peoples and other rural communities in adjusting the implementation of 
these policies (e.g., Knight 2010, 111). 
In Canada, “water rights are an essential element of the settlement of land claims, and the 
establishment of comanagement regimes for natural resources” (Nowlan 2004, 5). “Co-
management” is the legal term for rights vested in a group, although Canadian lawmakers are 
careful not to assume that all “aboriginal” or “First Nations” (i.e., indigenous) communities 
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operate in the same way. Because most of Canada was effectively settled by Europeans from the 
British Isles, it is common law which laid the foundation for water rights practices, rather than 
the code-based legal systems which prevail in Mexico and, to a degree, in Quebec: 
Common law doctrine provided that flowing water could not be owned by an 
individual, except when the water was captured. [. . .] In 1895, a federal law was 
passed which declared that ‘the property in and the right to the use’ of all water was 
vested in the Crown [i.e., the state]. However, some First Nations believe that they 
have existing and superior rights to water. 
(Nowlan 2004, 12-13) 
In the Indian state of Tamil Nadu, the history and present system of rural land tenure has 
interesting parallels to Mexico’s. The village assembly, called panchayat, resembles a 
PROCEDE-surveyed ejido with a large, economically productive common use area as well as 
legally individualized parcels. Many of the panchayat duties involve water management: 
In Tamil Nadu, the village panchayat is a body corporate that has to maintain and 
manage the natural resources, particularly the common property resources. The 
village panchayats are vested with the responsibility of sinking and repairing wells; 
the excavation, repair, and maintenance of ponds or tanks [i.e., check dams]; 
maintenance and also utilization of unreserved forests and the like. It leases out the 
products from common sources such as fish, forest produce, water, and suchlike, to 
raise its revenue. 
(Annamali 2003, 250) 
The panchayat’s role has gradually declined in favor of state forestry and water agencies. 
Some see this shift in responsibilities as a contributing factor to the accelerating depletion of 
natural resources, because it encourages personal disassociation from the resource, removing the 
incentive for timely revenue collection, resulting in poor management by both local residents and 
state bureaucracies (Annamali 2003, 252).  
Bolivia has played a central role in popular and scholarly discussions of water rights, 
centered around two distinct but overlapping foci: Andean village-scale irrigation and land 
tenure practices, and the 2000 anti-neoliberal revolt in the eastern-Andean-foothills city of 
Cochabamba against corporate privatization of urban water provision. The first theme, of 
Andean rural water practices, is built upon academic cultural ecology research – e.g., geographer 
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Gregory Knapp’s adaptive dynamics work in Ecuador (1991) – and includes efforts by 
geographer Karl Zimmerer (2009) and social scientist Rutgerd Boelens40 (2009). The second 
theme, resistance to commercialized urban water services (e.g., Crespo Flores and Fernández 
2001), became a cause-célèbre among NGOs and journalists.  
In a book chapter which brings together land tenure, water sources, and hybrid indigeneity 
under neoliberal-influenced state programs, geographers Nina Laurie, Robert Andolina, and 
Sarah Radcliffe studied a collection of villages which applied for status as a Tierra Comunitaria 
de Orígen (TCO) equivalent to a Mexican comunidad. Most TCOs have been established not in 
the Andes, but in the eastern foothills and Amazonia, following the 1996 extension and 
clarification of Bolivia’s 1952 land reform law. They (2002, 255) explain: 
 In the highlands where existing land tenure is often contested, the state decided that 
new titling was needed in order to ensure that ownership was clarified so that land 
could be sold if so desired” and to “ensure that community land was not broken down 
into small plots. [. . .] Pressure from campesino and indigenous groups during the 
negotiations over the [national land reform] law meant that indigenous and original or 
ancestral communities (comunidades originarias) secured the possibility of asserting 
collective rights to legal land tenure. 
 
Negotiations among World Bank, local NGOs, and community leaders focused on the 
“development of a network of small lagoons [within the TCOs] where each lagoon would 
provide approximately five families with water during times of scarcity” (Laurie, Andolina, and 
Radcliffe 2002, 258). However, the residents were reluctant to put water sources in the hands of 
the newly formalized village-scale entity, because even that would be too restrictive and 
exclusive; as one villager said in an assembly, “historically water doesn’t belong to anyone,” not 
even to a village group, but rather it belongs “to God.” The compromise solution (Laurie, 
Andolina, and Radcliffe 2002, 261) was to pass actas relinquishing the village-scale collective 
rights to land and water in the vicinity of the lagoons: 
[This] example highlights a fundamental contradiction in the socially inclusive 
rhetoric of neoliberal land and water policies in Bolivia. The law indirectly opened up 
new opportunities for communal titles. [. . .] However, when land is discussed in 
                                                        
40 Boelens directs the Water Law and Indigenous Rights (WALIR) research consortium, based in Wageningen 
University, the Netherlands, and affiliated with the United Nations. 
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relation to the implementation of specific development projects the language of 
private ownership and commodification often prevails. [. . .] These discussions and 
the debate they generated point clearly to the types of problems that can arise with the 
introduction and implementation of new legislation that indirectly separates land and 
water issues. 
 
Zimmerer (2000 and 2009) stresses the continuous evolution of multi-scale irrigation 
practices among Andean peoples in their creative engagements with Pre-Columbian (Inca), 
colonial, and modern state structures, and with the political ecologies of “neoliberalism and 
beyond.”  
Rocio Bustamante and Daniel Vega (2003) analyzed the relationships among Bolivia’s 
legal land tenure forms and its local and regional water systems. They stressed that some 
indigenous concepts, e.g. the ayllu, have always proved troublesome for state-directed regimes, 
and that the neoliberal-tinged 1996 reform fails to recognize territories that are far from their 
controlling villages. The researchers found that each Andean community generally approaches 
the water-land nexus in one of two ways: either “water sources (lakes, reservoirs, springs, check 
dam ponds) are seen as belonging to the territory where they are found” – the “territory” being a 
village or a larger area with a unified irrigation system – or, the “water sources belong to the 
zone where they are used,” even if this is far away. Multi-village systems (mancomunados) – 
often entire watersheds – were becoming more common than before, influenced by the gradual 
incorporation of the region into the standardized national set of county-level municipios. They 
found that the well-watered Bolivian Amazon region had less pressure on both land and water, 
but that the widespread practice of rotative and temporary agriculture necessitated the securing 
of “rights to this vast common terrain” (Bustamante and Vega 2003, 20). 
The authors also examined communities which had been formed from former haciendas, 
in a way similar to how Mexican ejidos had formed, and found that the internal water 
distribution rules were defined more rigidly. In these villages, “water rights represent a certain 
durable individualization, a direct effect of the individual Agrarian Reform land grants that 
specifically include irrigation turnos [individual, strict water shares, rather than the older village-
oriented system], and of later investments of labor and money to build or improve the hydraulic 
infrastructure” (Bustamante and Vega 2003, 19). A similar trend was observed by Boelens and 
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Gelles in Peru (2005, 322), where the traditional Quechua dual water circuit (anasaya-urinsaya, 
two sets of field for each village) was declining in favor of state-directed, but locally resident, 
water controllers. 
The United States’ water laws differ from Mexico’s in several respects; most obviously, 
US laws vary more from state to state. Outright ownership of water by non-government actors 
(e.g., individual landowners) does exist in two states, Texas and Louisiana (Matthews 1984, 6). 
More important in terms of practical actions and litigation is the realm of water rights. Overall, 
the general trend has been one of gradual convergence with the state-managed concession permit 
system which dominates Mexico. 
However, this generalization overlooks much variation, rooted in the different histories of 
the US states (long-settled, village-oriented Eastern states vs. more recently settled, individually-
oriented Western states). For groundwater, most Eastern states use permits, while most Western 
ones use “appropriation” – i.e., “first come, first served.” True to its partial Spanish colonial 
origins, California has a mixed system of appropriation, but “with some notion of sharing 
between overlying landowners” (Matthews 1984, 7). For surface water, the Southeastern states 
use permits, and the Mountain and Desert West regions use appropriation. Eastern states, and to 
a degree several others in the Pacific West and on the Great Plains, include another legal layer: 
“riparian” rights. These give the landowner permission to use surface water flowing through or 
past his property, but also place on the owner the responsibility to “leave unimpaired the quantity 
and quality of the water flowing by his land” (Matthews 1984, 45).  Riparian rights stress the 
spatial proximity of a water source and a land parcel, while allocation demands that the owner 
continuously use the water (Matthews 1984, 46). 
In Canada, Bolivia, India, and in the United States, a common trend has been the gradual 
standardization of legally sanctioned practices at the intersection of land ownership and water 
rights. The differences among these countries, and among their sub-national regions, often 
pertain to whether and how spatial proximity is a determining factor in these practices. Rural 
residents (as individuals or as village-scale entities), urban and industrial users, and the public or 
private entities which build the infrastructure linking these stakeholders each have different 
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interests in the land-water nexus. The neoliberal project seeks to harmonize these interests in 
ways which can disrupt local practices. 
4.2.3 Water law and practices in Mexico before the 1992 land tenure reforms 
Four studies will serve to represent the body of scholarship on water management in the 
19th and 20th centuries.41 Two focus on the Porfiriato era (1876-1911): Raymond Craib’s 2004 
study of state-driven land tenure mapping work in Veracruz, and Patrick McNamara’s 2007 
examination of local and regional power dynamics in the Sierra Norte of Oaxaca. Two focus on 
the post-Revolution period: Philip Dennis’ 1987 story of two villages in central Oaxaca, and 
Scott Whiteford and Francisco Bernal’s 1996 study of Mexican water regimes before and after 
the 1992 land tenure reforms.  
During the Porfiriato era, when state-initiated systematized land surveys prefigured much 
of the PROCEDE program, the control of waterways – national or local – was an important 
issue, as recounted by Craib (2004, 193-194) in an example from Veracruz state: 
As the Porfirian administration attempted to bring waterways under federal dominion, 
confusions arose as to which rivers were under federal jurisdiction and which 
remained under local control. More accurately, confusions arose as to which river had 
which name. Federal agencies may have emphatically determined, for example, that 
the Minas River fell under federal jurisdiction, but in an area striped with waterways, 
which river was the Minas River? At points of confluence, which waterway denoted 
the continuance of the Minas and which its tributary? 
 
In his book Sons of the Sierra, McNamara asserts that contentious Porfiriato-era 
interactions between among indigenous villages, and between villages and the state (with 
parallels to the post-1992-reform era), did in fact often involve water, even in the relatively high-
rainfall areas which coincide with the present study’s focus regions. External parties with 
commercial intentions were a real factor, whereas in today’s neoliberal-influenced period, these 
are still mainly a hypothetical concern – or potential boon, depending on one’s position. 
                                                        
41 For Pre-Columbian water governance in Mexico, see Rojas Rabiela 2009. For Colonial era water 
governance, see Sánchez 2002. 
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McNamara (2007, 129-130) demonstrates that the Porfirian state was not as inimical to village-
oriented indigenous practices as many assume, nor were indigenous villagers as opposed to 
contractual remuneration for natural resources as many suppose: 
In addition to favorable treatment regarding tax increases, state officials granted 
Zapotec communities limited protection in preparing long-term contracts between 
native town councils and capitalist investors.  
     [. . .] Issues surrounding water rights have received far less attention in the 
historical literature than have land disputes, though in many cases conflicts over 
water mattered as much or more than those over land. In fact, after the turn of the 
century, when foreign investors sought even greater opportunities in rural areas, water 
rights became the most important source of cash revenue for Indian municipalities. 
     But because water was also so important for maintaining subsistence agricultural 
plots, leasing water rights to a mineral processing plant or a hydraulic-powered 
factory could undermine food supplies. [. . .] Consistent with the earlier era of 
consensus-based politics, Porfirian officials aggressively protected the interests of 
Zapotec communities in the face of unfair or potentially harmful water contracts. 
 
McNamara (2007, 131) recounts the story of an American mining investor, George S. 
Clark, whose water rights contract with three Zapotec villages prompted a state bureaucrat to 
help the villagers demand better terms: 
The demand for greater access to water increased during the mining boom of 1895 to 
1907, and many villages were being pressured to lease their rights to nearby rivers 
and streams. [. . .] If Zapotec villagers signed unfair contracts, unrest and 
dissatisfaction would surely build. In addition to relying on state bureaucrats, [. . .] 
Zapotec town councils often hired their own representatives to negotiate favorable 
contracts with foreign and Mexican businessmen. 
 
Only after the mining boom declined did villagers begin to lose support of the state in 
their efforts to maintain fair water contracts. One large water-dependent commercial enterprise 
persisted: the Xia textile factory, whose lands now belong to the núcleo of Chicomezúchil.42 
                                                        
42 Chicomezúchil, one of my RAN document study nucleos, is where the first shots of the Sierra Norte 
component of the Mexican Revolution were fired: “In 1912 an armed rebellion against district officials would 
begin at the factory, and many of the Ixtepeji soldiers would seek their revenge” (McNamara 2007, 134). 
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Dennis’ study of two villages in the Central Valley of Oaxaca during the 20th century 
includes two episodes related to water. In 1953, one of the villages, Zautla, built an underground 
canal from a reservoir whose catchment area is shared with another núcleo. Because it 
represented a village-scale investment in infrastructure, the second village, Mazaltepec, had to 
from then on pay the comisariado (village leader) to use the water (Dennis 1987, 86). The 
second eposide (Dennis 1987, 180) was specific to the villages’ location on the outskirts of the 
growing state capital city of Oaxaca: 
In the Etla valley, an organization called the Committee for the Defense of Natural 
Resources was formed. The committee is composed of municipal presidents and 
comisariados serving as representatives of the various communities, and thus it 
carries some weight with higher government officials. The issue here is water rights. 
The tremendous growth of the city of Oaxaca and the perforation of deep wells have 
meant that less water is available than formerly in this rich and productive part of the 
valley. The committee’s first action was to stop the well-drilling on village lands. 
 
Whiteford and Bernal outline water law in rural Mexico through the course of the social 
property era. While their description applies more directly to low-rainfall areas, it does provide a 
succinct historical background (1996, 223) to the legal framework now in place nationwide: 
The confiscation and divisions of the haciendas…were often accompanied by the 
transfer of water rights from the hacienda to the ejidos. But some of the most 
contested struggles in agrarian history were for water rights. In some cases the rights 
did not accompany the land converted into ejidos. Hacendados were often able to sell 
their water rights to local peasant leaders before their lands were confiscated. Some of 
the most bitter intercommunity conflicts today can be traced to battles over water. 
 
The overall impression of these and other accounts is that, while a simple history would 
divide Mexico into a proto-neoliberal Porfiriato period followed by a social-property-oriented 
post-Revolutionary period, the tone of negotiations among individuals, villages, and the state 
over water rights did not vary radically from one period to the next.   
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4.3   Village-scale orientation and the individual 
Scholarship on villages overlaps with the vast and varied literature about communities in 
general, including the more specific themes of indigenous autonomy and common property 
resources. Key texts about village-scale territories and their natural resources include Ostrom, 
Gardner, and Walker’s 1994 inquiry on the conditions of human cooperation, Sack’s 1986 work 
on territory as a “means for reifying power” with clear rules of group membership, and Dunbar’s 
1998 assertion that 150 is the approximate maximum population within which stable social  
relationships can be maintained. 
Perceived as a symbol of a pre-industrial past and a vanishing (or stubbornly persistent) 
remnant of that past, the village is both romanticized and demonized. Scholarly journalist 
Richard Critchfield (1981) praised the village as an institution which must be preserved in the 
developing world for practical agrarian reasons as well as cultural ones, while Christopher 
Hitchens  (2007, 183) countered that “Gandhi rhapsodized about the Indian village, where the 
millennial rhythms of animals and crops would determine how human life was lived. Millions of 
people would have mindlessly starved to death if his advice had been followed.” I will begin this 
section with reviews of several studies which stress the importance of village-scale practices, and 
follow this with a look at a few works which focus on the pervasive ways in which the village 
and the individual are inextricably bound. 
4.3.1 Focus on the village 
Scholarship which “favors” the village fits into two categories: first, empirical 
observations of how villages have dominated some region, during some time period, in some 
realms of power and practice; second, normative discourses which additionally claim that the 
village scale is superior for some stated reason, and so we must work to preserve it. Output of the 
second, normative type is allied with recent popular or semi-scholarly works which celebrate 
civic participation and face-to-face interactive communities in general, and bemoan their 
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supposed replacement by the Internet, cell phones, and social networking43 (e.g., Putnam 2000; 
Turkle 2011). 
I focus here on the first, observational type, which includes works which define common 
property resources (e.g., Stevenson 1991) and studies which detail the specific contexts in which 
villages have dominated sociopolitical structures (e.g., Ouweneel and Miller 1990). McNamara 
(2007), echoing Wolf (1957), explained how Mexico in the last several centuries has been 
dominated by village-scale loci of power, but that this is not an inherent characteristic of its 
peoples. He writes (2007, 6-7): 
If Zapotec families endured Spanish colonialism in similar ways, this common history 
did not lead to a sense of regional solidarity. As in other parts of indigenous Mexico, 
colonial administrators exacerbated tensions between communities and encouraged a 
deeper sense of belonging to a single town rather than a broader ethnic affiliation. 
Catholic missionaries bolstered this sort of localism. 
 
He continues (2007, 15): 
 To be from one village as opposed to another, to be from one particular state, to be 
Mexican, these held meaning only in relationship to other villages, other states, other 
nations. During the Porfiriato, people from the Sierra Zapoteca maintained these 
oppositional identities as a result of their participation in defensing national 
sovereignty. A further transformation took place after 1920, when Zapotec armies 
signed a peace accord with the Constitutionalist government in Mexico City. In fact, 
Oaxaca’s current relationship to the nation, its ‘place’ in Mexico’s political, cultural, 
and economic life in the early twenty-first century, comes from this later 
transformation of regional and national space and not from some Pre-Columbian 
preservation of an imagined indigenous world that refused to change. 
 
In the Chinantec indigenous region, within the area of the present study, José Manuel 
Escalante (1998, quoted in de Teresa 2000, 38) found that “the most complex communities are 
those where communitary consensus has broken down altogether and the struggle between 
                                                        
43 One might cite the influential Marxist scholar Rayomond Williams’ book The Country and the City as an 
early example of this genre. While Williams did celebrate the village-scale community, in his assessment of 
the “enclosure movement” of state-driven commons elimination in 15th- to 19th-century Britian he was careful 
to stress that the land tenure trend was only a metaphenomenon of the corrosive effects of capitalism, and that 
individual autonomy was not always a bad thing (Williams 1973, 98-103).  
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factions dominates. In this type of locality the structures of power are formal, that is they obey 
written laws.” Thus, the absence of written community statutes does not necessarily indicate a 
lack of unified village orientation, but may in fact signal the opposite. 
Researchers debate whether the village dominance in Mexico is a tool of state control, or a 
reaction against the state, or some combination of both. Dennis (1987, 2) contends that 
“intervillage conflict has been one mechanism through which central governments have both 
exploited and maintained control over their peasant constituents,” while Cohen (1999, 119) sees 
the decline of tequio (ejido or comunidad work obligatory for all members) in favor of 
cooperaciones (essentially, village taxes) as a positive response by villages to creatively supplant 
the state’s otherwise increasing role in formal tax collection. Cohen (1999, 122) prefers to 
emphasize the “sense that native and peasant populations understand their position vis-à-vis the 
state […They] are not blind to the machinations of the state.” 
Specifically referring to water management, Boelens and Bustamante (2005) critique the 
half-way measures of state-driven neoliberalism as it has been employed in indigenous 
communities. They concede that the Mexican government (and the Chilean one before it) has 
made decentralization a priority, but insist that it has not embraced true participation of village-
scale water user groups, except to co-opt existing local structures. Edith Kauffer Michel (2006, 
229) paraphrased their findings thus: 
Boelens and Bustamante particularly question the policies of water management 
decentralization – much in vogue in Mexico’s legal reforms – because they simply 
transfer the tasks but not the decision-making, and have had the effect of 
concentrating decisions and rights into the hands of the most powerful at the local or 
community scale. 
 
Similarly, David Mosse (1997, 470) showed how the British colonial government in late 
19th-century India found it convenient to perpetuate, even “invent,” a village-scale water 
management tradition for its own purposes. Just as Mexico’s social property system, albeit 
modified, is as useful as ever to the state, the state’s interest in community “customs and 
traditions” of resource management arose from an “awareness of financial implications arising 
from the state’s obligation to maintain highly decentralized resources such as tanks [i.e., check 
dams] over which it had recently extended its proprietorial rights.” That is, since water was 
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owned by everyone in the country as a whole, but the state had limited economic resources to 
manage it, it needed to incorporate, co-opt, or invent local management practices: 
 In the case of tank [i.e., check dam] irrigation in south India, the nineteenth century 
colonial government required the existence of autonomous traditions of tank 
maintenance for the administration of tens of thousands of irrigation tanks. When 
these traditions appeared to no longer exist they had to be re-invented, and where 
necessary (although futilely) upheld by the force of law. 
 
The British ryotwari tenure system, much like the contemporaneous Porfiriato-era surveys 
in Mexico (and like PROCEDE a century later), “brought government into direct relation with 
the individual ‘tenants’ (ryots) who paid land tax based on detailed field-level settlement 
surveys” (Mosse 1997, 478). As in Mexico, the state’s interest in a village/individual hybridity 
continues even today: “An ideology of autonomous village systems rooted in the exigencies of 
colonial administration continues to divert attention away from persisting links within tank 
systems” (Mosse 1997, 479). Also parallel to Mexico’s experience, the village-scale panchayat 
predated the proto-neoliberal ryotwari, survived the late-19th-century period of ryotwari 
implementation and thrived during the mid-20th century. Perhaps presaging the future of the 
ejido and the comunidad, the power and extent of the panchayat diminished considerably in 
recent decades (Mathew 1994, 3).  
Bakker (2007, 15) sees water as an especially appropriate theme with which to study how 
village-scale control interacts with other scales: “Essential for life, fresh water provides a 
powerful lens with which to examine these broader debates on the legitimate roles of 
governments, markets, and communities in environmental management and the provision of 
public services” Focusing on the provision of water services, especially to households, she 
proposes (2007, 28) placing the village along two theoretical axes, one representing the scale of 
control, and the other the sophistication of the infrastructure technology. The first axis ranges 
from “community control” (often, village-oriented) to “corporate control,” and the second axis 
from “artisanal” (more common to villages) to “industrial” Her main point is that a high degree 
of corporate (i.e., commercial) involvement in water provision does not always equate to highly 
engineered infrastructure, since the insufficiently-studied urban “water vendors” are both 
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corporate and artisanal. Most village-scale supply systems, in contrast, are beholden to neither 
corporations, nor to the state (Bakker 2007, 39): 
A central theme running through much of this work is the autarkic (in the sense of 
self-sufficient) nature of community-managed water systems. This is particularly the 
case with rural or peri-urban water supply, where irrigation uses are of primary 
importance, and in which multiple uses of water (for drinking, bathing, and other 
household purposes) coexist. Local in nature, using small-scale (or ‘appropriate’) 
technology, community systems mobilize local labor and community participation, 
and although they are articulated with formal structures of government, they almost 
invariably vest governance at the community level.   
 
Rutgerd Boelens (2009, 308), in his study of water management among Andean villages, 
stresses that this self-sufficiency is not maintained without effort: “Community struggles to 
defend water access are frequently framed as a defense of the legitimacy of community authority 
and community water rights as opposed to external actors (whether governmental or private).” 
While these scholars do occasionally champion the persistence of some village-scale 
practices, their studies of village practices and governance in the modern world are sober 
accounts which avoid romantic essentializing. They present cases where certain village-scale 
actions have practical and symbolic value emerging from the villagers themselves, as well as 
ways in which this symbolism has been exploited by the state.   
4.3.2 Focus on the interconnections between the village and the individual 
Today’s scholars (e.g., Appadurai 1996), steeped in critical theory and post-colonial 
approaches to structure and agency, tend to warn against romanticizing the village, preferring 
instead to analyze the interconnected, hybrid nature of village/individual relationships, and how 
both are linked to political systems and economy. This trend is related to efforts to recognize 
individual agency, including of “subaltern” individuals. To favor enforcement of universal 
human rights, even if they can run counter to certain indigenous (or other political and ethnic) 
practices which arguably strengthen the village-scale community, and to emphasize the fluid, 
contingent nature of human groupings (e.g., Sen 1999, 310). This dual emphasis is echoed in the 
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work of the influential sociobiologist E. O. Wilson stated (quoted in Lehrer 2012, 42), who 
recently that he sees human nature 
[. . .] as hung in the balance between these two extremes. If our behavior was driven 
entirely by group selection, then we’d be robotic cooperators, like ants. But, if 
individual-level selection were the only thing that mattered, then we’d be entirely 
selfish. What makes us human is that our history has been shaped by both forces. 
We’re stuck in between. 
 
The most famous early observations of village/individual dynamics in the Americas were 
those of Alexis de Tocqueville, who in the early 19th century celebrated the blend of laissez-faire 
individualism and village-scale decision-making, which he observed throughout the young 
United States. De Tocqueville was especially impressed by the townships of New England, 
where town “selectmen” had to consult an assembly of all landowners before making important 
decisions. He found the township size – two to three thousand inhabitants, like my study village 
of Talea – to be “not so extensive that all its inhabitants do not have nearly the same interests 
and, on the other hand, it is sufficiently populated so that one is always sure of finding within it 
the elements of a good administration” (de Tocqueville 2000, 58). He opined that “the 
institutions of a township are to freedom what primary schools are to science; they put it within 
reach of the people; they make them taste its peaceful employ and habituate them to making use 
of it” (de Tocqueville 2000, 57), and that: 
It is in the township, at the center of the ordinary relations of life, that desire for 
esteem, the need of real interests, the taste for power and for attention, come to be 
concentrated; these passions, which so often trouble society, change character when 
they can be expressed so near the domestic hearth and in a way in the bosom of the 
family. 
 
In a 2004 article, Chris Brown and Mark Purcell criticized cultural and political ecologists 
for too often paying lip service to multi-scale analyses, while in fact allowing their bias toward 
local (often, village-scale) practices and institutions to blind them to the inevitable, and 
sometimes even beneficial, interrelationships among all scales. They perceived this bias, for 
example, in the work of Erik Swyngedouw (1999), a “leading scale theorist and an insightful 
political ecologist working primarily on water provision.” They blamed the local bias primarily 
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on cultural ecology’s earlier inspirations from biological ecology, when in fact even biologists 
had since expanded well beyond their own emphasis on “outdated notions of closed, stable 
ecological systems” (Brown and Purcell 2004, 611):  
 Contemporary political ecologists often lament how the global economy dictates 
local cultural and ecological processes, assuming that more decision-making authority 
transferred to the local scale would allow the forces of culture and ecology to resist 
those of political economy. [. . .] This line of thinking misses the fundamental fact 
that political economy, culture, and ecology all exist and operate simultaneously at a 
range of scales. 
 
Gavin Smith observed that academic social scientists are especially prone to this bias when they 
document resistance to apparent injustice: “When peasants rebel, we are often tempted to slip 
back into stereotypical and de-contextualized notions of the peasant comunidad as one of 
tradition and homogenous solidarity” (Smith 1999, 56), while Tristán Platt’s work in the 
Bolivian Andes offered an early fusion of the individual and the village: “The function of a 
community is to collectively defend individual access to traditional economic resources, ensuring 
the reproduction of minimum conditions for agricultural production” (Platt 1982, 44). 
In the central valley núcleo of Santa Ana, Oaxaca, Mexico, Jeffrey Cohen found that 
village-scale cooperation exists, but within limits (see also Parnell 1978). “Individuals complain 
when it comes time to pay the guelaguetza [community festival] debt. Tequio [] crews are 
typically hard to organize…Cargos and committees are often difficult to fill, and village leaders 
sometimes find it necessary to push [villagers] forcefully into nombramientos (positions of 
service in village committees)” (Cohen 1999, 2). Recognizing that cooperative relationships can 
be “exploitative structures that obscure the exercise of power” (Bordieu and Wacquant 1992), 
Cohen approached them as the “outcomes of individual social actions and choices, made within 
the confines of communities” (Cohen 1999, 7). However, the village still has strong symbolic 
meaning: 
The discussion of local history notes the connections between Santañeros and the 
state, the nation, and the world through time, to show that the cooperative and 
reciprocal relationships that typify the community are neither isolated inventions of a 
recently formed closed corporate system, the outcomes of a mythic and timeless pre-
Hispanic past, nor a reflection of the shared psychological attitude of a population. 
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Structures of cooperation have evolved within the village and its population through 
time. As the needs of villagers have changed, so have their cooperative relationships 
and the meaning of reciprocity and communal action. 
 
Laura Nader’s treatise (1990, 237-238) on local and regional legal practices among the Sierra 
Norte Zapotecs of Talea further illuminates the village-individual interplay: 
 To understand the social meaning of property among the Talean Zapotec is to 
understand how they think about property in relation to the individual and how they 
relate to one another and their community. In a farming community land and water 
are central to survival, and other property such as poultry is central to networking. A 
position of power is crucial for access to agricultural resources, and the contest over 
power lies at the heart of disputes over scarce resources. [. . .] The relationships 
between these property rights of a subsistence nature and the social and cultural 
structure delineate a vision of the world that recognizes both individual and collective 
interests. 
 
In his recent research in a cattle ranching region of northern Mexico, geographer Eric 
Perramond presents fascinating comparisons between social property residents and fully private 
property owners. He is careful to avoid equating “social” with “good” and “private” with “bad,” 
while documenting that the distinction between “social” and “private” was never as clear-cut as 
many imagine it to be; for example, in most aspects, “ejido and community members [. . .] are 
more precisely smallholders, and few describe themselves as revolutionaries, much less as 
socialists.” He points out (2010, 22): 
The caricature of ranchers with ‘black hats’ in Mexico is a familiar one to social 
scientists who have so often used private landowners as the bad guys, literally, in 
narrative strategies. [. . .] Simply put, the plurality of conflicts and concessions and 
the continuum of land-tenure diversity cannot be simplistically reduced to binaries of 
‘either/or’ or ‘communal versus private’ owners. 
 
He continues (2010, 10): 
 Our conventional wisdom and scholarship thus poorly capture the processes and 
realities of landownership in Mexico. Few have written convincingly about 
ejidatarios becoming private landowners, much less private ranch owners, despite 
this being a common occurrence. Few have treated with any depth the practice of 
joint ownership (condueñazgo), or extended family owners, that begin to muddy the 
134 
 
  
dichotomous waters of ‘private’ versus ‘communal.’ [. . .] Indeed, as I hope to make 
clear, land tenure is a continuum, not the binary function of private versus communal 
so apparently enforced in our popular and even academic conceptions of 
landownership in Mexico. 
 
Perramond (2010, 34) found that large, modern ranches have some of the properties of pre-
Revolutionary haciendas, but that analogies across time and space can be misleading: 
The complexity of land tenure in Mexico is legendary and has never held firm 
footing, even in historiography. Terms for land tenure or practices, adopted or 
modified from their Iberian or indigenous contexts, have changed in almost every 
century. Even regional comparisons are difficult in Mexico, where terms in Sonora 
rarely mean the same as they do in Yucatan. 
 
Karen Bakker posits that the physical and practical qualities of water make it especially 
problematic for scale-dependent analyses: “Constraints imposed by biophysicality of resources 
such as water also complicate appeal to the local” (Bakker 2010a, 189). The “watershed” is often 
praised as a physical unit ideally scaled to water governance, most radically by “deep ecologists” 
who have proposed realigning the world’s political jurisdictions to watersheds (e.g., Sale 1985) – 
and, significantly for Mexico’s indigenous peoples, the watershed often approximates the scale 
of ethnic “territories” as the mere núcleo (village) cannot (see Oslender 2002, 94 and Offen 
2003, 55 for the example of Pacific Colombia). Bakker (2010a, 189), however, thinks that the 
watershed is not necessarily the ideal scale, as it “does not correspond with biomes, or even 
groundwater distribution through aquifers” – it is too large for individual users such as farmers, 
yet too small to incorporate longer-distance water use impacts. She advises that we “embrace the 
resulting ambiguity” of diverse governances constructively:  
Proponents of community control are correct in arguing that conventional models of 
public and private sector management do not exhaust the range of 
alternatives…although they are incorrect when they argue that commons and 
communities are antitheses to the market or governments. 
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4.4   Indigenous perspectives on these concepts 
Scholars of indigenous perspectives on land tenure, neoliberalism, villages and 
individuals, and water law must first grapple with the myriad definitions of “indigenous.” While 
Soren Larsen and Jay Johnson (2012, 4) wrote that “the emergence of Indigenous geography was 
both accompanied and partly inspired by parallel developments in poststructuralism and cultural 
anthropology, allowing for fruitful cross-fertilization of ideas,” others contend that “not only 
does the Anglophone word ‘indigenous’ fail to account for the myriad concepts of indigeneity, it 
also segments ‘Indigenous research’ into a discrete area of knowledge that is positioned in 
relation to Western scholarship” (Shaw, Herman, and Dobbs 2006, 3). 
Post-neoliberal debates over the state’s role in individual and collective control of land 
and natural resources interrelate with the “indigenous turn that has marked so much of Latin 
politics in recent years” (Lovell 2012, 173). The degree to which “indigenous” persons, 
communities, or territories should be treated as special legal categories is a matter of ongoing 
debate within states (countries) as well as within international organizations such as the United 
Nations, with “most states reluctant to accept legal obligations specifically based on this 
categorization” (Brownlie 1992, 60; see also Davis 1988). David Harvey warned that the 
increasing global focus on human rights, while well intentioned, can sometimes allow the 
individualizing tendencies of the neoliberal agenda to escape challenge (Harvey 2005, 62). Edith 
Kauffer Michel (2006, 231) advocates advocate greater recognition of simultaneous judicial 
structures. Extrapolating from her observations on water rights and social property, she wrote:   
 Legal pluralism recognizes more than one legal order in the same socio-political 
space: that is, parallel to the state judicial order coexist one or more others; for 
example, at the community scale. The different legal structures (ordenamientos) 
interact with each other, sometimes complementing each other, or may enter into 
conflict. From the perspective of legal pluralism, there is not a hierarchy among the 
different regulatory systems (ordenes jurídicos), unlike the positivistic state vision of 
the law, which when it recognizes other systems, places them in a lower rank. [. . .] 
This is an encouraging element, but in many cases it fails to go beyond a formal 
recognition, without achieving inclusion in water laws, in the definition of water 
rights, and, even less, in the implementation of water management policies and in 
projects developed at the local scale. For this reason, we recommend adding to the 
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analytical and judicial dimensions of legal pluralism, the socio-political perspective, 
without which the nascent promise (planteamiento) cannot be concretized. 
 
Kauffer Michel (2006, 232) cited the example of Ghana, where the “coexistence of two judicial 
orders opens water management to the role of community authorities (Opoku-Agyemang 2005, 
27-3). Nancy Peluso (2005) examined fluid and simultaneous land tenure regimes negotiated 
between local communities and the state in Indonesian Borneo. Denis Wood (2010, 238) 
discussed the 1920-1948 British cadastral survey of Mandate Palestine, where indigenous 
Ottoman Empire land tenure categories were replaced; e.g., the “Musha’ lands, which villagers 
held in common and so resisted division and titling by individuals, were cast in an especially 
disreputable light since they were also held to mitigate against individual initiative and so against 
the rationalization of agricultural practice. 
In Mexico, part of the discussion about individual and collective practices in indigenous 
communities stems from varying interpretations of Pre-Columbian evidence, whether  
archaeological, historical (from indigenous cultures with writing), or ethnographic (contact 
period). Here I can only touch on the large literature devoted to the subject. Much of the best 
scholarship is by authorities on cartography, e.g., Mundy (1996) and, for North American 
examples, Pearce (1998). The discussion is characterized by assertions such as that “in post-
classic Mixtec city-states, local commoner groups owned farmland collectively” (Terraciano 
2001, 205-206), while “the emphasis on territory and borders may have been a colonial period 
invention.” In this vein, anthropologist Michael Smith (2009, 93) contends that the concept of 
territory was important for Pre-Columbian Mexican cultures, but conceived in a different way 
than the Spanish idea. Mexican cultures emphasized a particular city (e.g. Aztec altepetl), 
founded and headed by a particular dynasty, with poorly defined borders.  
Some scholars (e.g., Scott 1998; Wainwright and Bryan 2009) contend that differences 
between indigenous peoples and 21st-century states regarding concepts of property and territory 
are always so deep that any indigenous engagement using state-defined legal tools must result in 
more harm than good. Others (e.g., Silvey 2010; Kelly et al. 2010) observe that interchanges 
between indigenous communities and the state are often nuanced, practical, and two-way. In 
their view, the state’s practices toward property are one toolset among many, one which is not 
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inherently harmful, although it can be harmful in particular situations. For example, 
anthropologist Paul Liffman (2011, 12) describes the Huichols of west-central Mexico as “by 
turns, exercis[ing] and represent[ing] their territoriality in terms of, independently of, and in 
opposition to the state’s notions.” He finds (2011, 80) that Huichols have long felt obligated to 
engage with the state's promotion of núcleo-scale identity and tenure, but they haven't allowed it 
take over their sense of a larger Huichol territory which they cognitively maintain through ritual 
practices, to a stronger degree than most other indigenous groups in Mexico. 
4.4.1 Indigenous communities and the state 
Some indigenous groups have responded to neoliberal-influenced state policies by 
organizing beyond their immediate communities (de la Peña 2006), for example in Guatemala 
(Fischer and McKenna Brown 1996). Partially counteracting this trend are the “progressive 
measures” within neoliberal policies, which have produced a “deepened state capacity to shape 
and neutralize political opposition” in Central America, resulting in a complex “neoliberal 
multiculturalism” (Hale 2005). In some cases, e.g. in the U.S. state of Alaska, indigenous 
peoples have found common cause with private landowners, and against state-driven 
conservation initiatives, in order to more fully exploit natural resources such as forests (Nelson 
2004). 
This mixed and sometimes contradictory interaction among indigenous communities and 
the state has been documented in the early 19th century Huasteca (Ducey 2004), among the Sierra 
Zapotecs during the Porfiriato era (McNamara 2007), and in the present time among the 
Huichols of western Mexico (Liffman 2011) and the valley Zapotecs (Cohen 1999). A theme 
running through these accounts is that these indigenous communities (defined broadly, not just as 
village-scale entities) do not simply react to the state, but rather that they actively assist in 
creating the state as it has evolved (Aguirre Beltrán 1991). This theme is especially pertinent in 
Mexico, where so much of the national identity is bound to a quasi-mythical concept of an 
inseparably fused “mestizaje” – a blending of indigenous and European which courses through 
every Mexican’s veins. McNamara (2007, 21) observed that: 
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Rather than a single community based on horizontal comradeship, Zapotecs during 
the Porfiriato imagined the nation as a confederation of multiple communities, each 
formed through vertical tensions around racial, class, gender, and generational 
identities [. . .] In effect, they had been willing to die [in the 1876 Tuxtepec Rebellion 
which brought Díaz to power with both Liberal and Conservative support] not 
because they imagined themselves as individuals within a ‘horizontal comradeship’ 
but because they imagined themselves as members of distinct communities allied in 
defense of local autonomy and national sovereignty. To borrow a phrase from the 
German historian Alon Confino, Zapotecs perceived the nation as a local metaphor. 
While the mestizo foundation myth underpinning the Mexican state has produced a federal 
legal system which does not, in any practical sense, distinguish indigenous persons or territories 
from non-indigenous ones,44 the recognition of indigenous community rights has recently begun 
to appear in the judicial code. This trend began in 1989 with a change to the state Constitution of 
Oaxaca to recognize “pluricultural” indigenous rights, which the national Constitution adopted in 
1990. In 1994 (modified in 1998), Oaxaca again led the way by decreeing that “communities 
with similar ethnic composition could join together and incorporate” as new or modified 
municipios; again, the national code followed suit in 2001. A third pioneering change to 
Oaxaca’s Constitution, in 1990, allowed the legal recognition of indigenous communities as legal 
entities (personas jurídicas, “legal persons” and thus potential parties to a lawsuit).  This 
advance has not been adopted nationally; instead, the federal government in 2001 opted to 
recognize indigenous coalitions as mere “public interest entities.” Furthermore, constitutional 
declarations mean little without state or local laws to apply them and money to enforce them 
(Sánchez Carreño 2008).  
                                                        
44 One realm where Mexico’s indigenous people have some distinction is in election laws. The concept of usos 
y costumbres allows comunidades (though not indigenous ejidos) to elect núcleo-level and municipio-level 
authorities according to their “traditional procedures.” This legal provision is strongest in Oaxaca, where it was 
part of the 1990 state constitutional reform (EDUCA 2005).  
    However, in Mexico there is no legal category of indigenous territory akin to a US reservation, nor to post-
neoliberal variants which exist in some countries (Tamburini 2007), nor is there a province-level 
administrative jurisdiction with codified indigenous authority, akin to the comarcas of Panama (Herlihy 1989). 
Instead, the indirectness of the legal links between indigeneity and land tenure in Mexico is comparable to that 
found in indigenous co-management of reserves created mainly for biodiversity conservation, e.g. in Honduras 
(Herlihy 2001) and in the southern Yucatán region of Mexico (Boege 2005). 
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A different Mexican law currently (as of May 2012) being considered by the federal 
legislative bodies, the Ley de Consulta a los Pueblos y Comunidades Indígenas, would create 
mechanisms by which indigenous individuals and communities (represented by village-scale 
bodies, or by larger coalitions) would have to be explicitly consulted for their advice on how to 
amend proposed federal laws (GPPAN 2012). While the law is intended to comply with the 
International Labor Organization’s Convention 169, some have criticized it as a means by which 
the state can “concretize the capitalist appropriation of indigenous territories” by obtaining an 
indigenous imprimatur without changing the practical effects of actual laws (González García 
2011, 10). 
The association of indigenous “communities” with village-scale land tenure or 
jurisdictional units is an important aspect of political organization for indigenous peoples in 
various parts of the world.45 Due to a combination of historical and geographical factors, 
Mexican rural societies, including indigenous ones, tend to be especially village-oriented, though 
some indigenous regions of Mexico are more village-oriented than others (van ‘t Hooft 2007, 
18). This is explained succinctly by Roberto González (2001, 64), who, like many researchers 
who have worked in Oaxaca, implicitly equates “community” and “village”: 
 What seems unequivocal is that in northern Oaxaca the strongest ethnic allegiances 
are those related to community. Regional alliances among the Zapotec of the 
Northern Sierra are often tenuous, and intercommunity conflicts flare up from time to 
time. The difference between the situation in the Sierra and other parts of southern 
Mexico are made dramatically clear in varying notions of indigenous peoples’ 
autonomy. In recent conferences and workshops, the Maya and Isthmus Zapotec 
expressed a preference for regional autonomous zones linking together many villages, 
while the Zapotec and the Mixe from the Northern Sierra argues that autonomy is 
likely only to work at the community level. 
 
Matthew Restall (2006, 208) sees this village-scale identity in Mexico as being 
fundamentally pro-indigenous, because all “outsiders” can be treated with the same degree of 
disdain. “Even the phrase ‘native defeat’ is meaningless from a community perspective that 
                                                        
45 Andrew Leake (2008, 114) described an interesting example of village-scale indigenous land rights actions 
among the Chaco peoples of Salta province, Argentina. Les Field (1996) recounted a comparable example 
among Otavalo communities in Ecuador. 
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views all outsiders more or less the same way, whether they be Spaniards, Mixtecs, Nahuas, or 
Zapotecs – or even people of the same language group who live in a separate town.” Others such 
as Alicia Barabas (2004, 107) contend that this strong village focus is a pernicious obstacle to 
regional-scale ethnically-based autonomy. If the Mexican village does decline significantly as an 
institution in coming decades, the effect on indigenous territoriality may be difficult to predict. 
4.4.2 Indigenous rights and the natural resource of water 
Most water-related cases of disagreement between indigenous communities and the state 
are fundamentally related to the more general question of “cultural pluralism” versus “universal 
human rights.” That is, “a potentially irreconcilable tension arises between the human right to 
water and traditional (communal) water rights – which are particularly important in places with 
indigenous populations” (Bakker 2010a, 12; see also Gálvez and Embriz Osorio 2008, 17). 
Natural resource rights are “often territorially based, local in nature,46 and of crucial importance 
to indigenous peoples” (Bakker 2010a, 149; see also Godoy et al. 2005). The literature suggests 
that this tension can play out in three distinct situations. First, a large, water-related public works 
project can disrupt the livelihoods of a group of people who may be indigenous. Second, the 
public’s right to water can conflict with a de facto or de jure right of certain indigenous 
communities to own water outright. Third, a government’s efforts to standardize local water 
management regimes can be ignored or protested against by local communities, often indigenous 
ones. 
In the first scenario, large public water infrastructure projects are initiated by the state, 
often benefitting private corporations as well as segments of the public. These can produce 
profound effects within a region (Bryant 1992, 15). As with any large public works, from 
airports to interstate highways, some communities suffer dislocation, loss of resources, or 
environmental problems. Although most countries have reasonably just procedures for 
                                                        
46 Similar debates surround the allocation of responsibilities for safeguarding the natural “resource” of 
biodiversity. Mexican biologists Jorge Soberón and José Sarukhan have stated that “almost every reference to 
biodiversity governance issues can, and should, be disaggregated to take into account the specificities of the 
different scales. […] The core of our argument is that shifting the scale almost always means changing the 
stakeholders” (Soberón and Sarukhan 2010, 2). 
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compensating those affected, evidence that indigenous peoples have suffered more than their fair 
share led in the 1990s to a groundswell of protests against the construction of massive dams (for 
hydropower, irrigation, or flood control). These protests persuaded the World Bank to scale back 
its indiscriminate offers of credit for such projects (Scudder 2005, 266). 
At the edge of my Sierra Norte de Oaxaca study region there is a good example of such a 
project: the two reservoirs, built in 1974 and 1989, which together displaced 30,000 indigenous 
people (10,000 Chinantecs and 20,000 Mazatecs) in about 70 villages. The Temascal (Miguel 
Alemán) and Cerro de Oro (Miguel de la Madrid) reservoirs were part of the Papaloapan project, 
Mexico’s answer to the Tennessee Valley Authority of the United States.47 The Chinantec 
villagers whose land was flooded by the Cerro de Oro reservoir were given four options of places 
to move to, three of them small in area but easily irrigated, and the fourth – the Chimalapas 
region – a vast, rugged forest at one of Mexico’s last internal colonization fronts. Political 
divisions led to different núcleos choosing to move to different locations, scattering what had 
previously been a spatially unified indigenous area (de Teresa 2000, 89-92). More recently, a 
conflict erupted between Mexico’s Federal Electricity Commission and a group of núcleos in the 
state of Guerrero over the loss of land occasioned by the impending construction of the La Parota 
Reservoir, intended in part to augment the city of Acapulco’s potable water system (Tovar 2009). 
The second scenario, where public water services to advance the individual’s right to 
water conflict with local water rights at the sources, tends to occur when a city depends on water 
originating in communities in its rural hinterland, but the rural communities object to the 
practical or symbolic interference with their local practices (Gentes 2003, 25). In section 1.2, I 
discussed the Mexican example of the village of Axocopa’s provision of water to a nearby city. 
A more famous example occurred in 2000 in Bolivia’s Cochabamba Valley. The same 
movement against the privatization of urban water provision also generated a disagreement 
(Bakker 2010a, 166) over the related issue of the state-corporate partnership seizing water rights 
from agricultural indigenous communities in the surrounding hills: 
                                                        
47 A map of the project’s accomplishments (Comisión del Río Papaloapan 1972) labels the states of Oaxaca, 
Veracruz, and Puebla beyond the watershed’s perimeter, as if to suggest that the project area was, in a way, its 
own “state.” Nevertheless, the visible impact on the already well-watered region as a whole was moderate. The 
map shows a large reservoir and a few smaller ones, resettlement zones, and five irrigation districts. Only one 
of the districts had significant infrastructure installed, for irrigating sugar cane (García Arenas 2007, 50). 
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The contract gave the company exclusive rights to all of the water in the Cochabamba 
Valley, including rainwater, and private wells in rural areas surrounding the city. This 
was an unprecedented move, and unusual given that in the intensively farmed Andean 
mountain valley in which Cochabamba is located, wells and streams are essential 
sources of drinking water and irrigation for indigenous campesinos, who managed 
local water sources largely independent of external control. […] The company also 
undertook to place water meters on private wells and the local irrigation and 
cooperative water supply systems that rural and peri-urban residents had 
independently built and financed. 
 
The protests, and the political trends which led to the election of Evo Morales in 2005, helped to 
forge a new national Water Law in 2004. The law gave villages much greater control over their 
internal water rights, approaching a degree of local water “ownership” greater than could 
possibly occur in Mexico without a radical change to its Constitution, where land can be locally 
owned (as social property núcleos) but water cannot. Karen Bakker, while sympathetic to 
indigenous practices, saw the 2004 Bolivian water law as a step too far in favor of village 
control, to the detriment of the greater public good (see also Paiement 2007, 14). She observed 
(2010a, 175-176) that village-scale water ownership shares some qualities with “privatization,” 
though the owner is a defined, closed group of people rather than an individual: 
First, the formalization of these rights amounts to their privatization, insofar as 
private rights are allocated to individual rights holders (communities in this case).  In 
other words, recognizing indigenous water rights, in this instance, implies removing 
water from the sphere of the ‘commons’ (belonging to all Bolivians) and allocating it 
to private (community) owners. I realize that my characterization of the creation of 
collective water rights as ‘privatization’ may seem objectionable to some. But it is 
technically correct: ownership passes from public (government) to private owners. 
     Consider, moreover, the fact that risk of exclusion is high for those who do not 
belong to an eligible community (for example, peri-urban residents, or rural residents 
who are not identified as ‘indigenous’). Second, the possibilities for the Bolivian state 
to plan or intervene in water resources management are potentially restricted.  Third, 
water rights create the possibility of creation of water markets – in which water rights 
owners are to be reimbursed for allowing ‘their’ water to be diverted to others. In 
other words, the danger here is that a system of water rights akin to private-property 
rights is being created, but although these rights may provide some communities with 
an opportunity to engage in market exchange (e.g., via the sale of water rights, or the 
use thereof), they may not necessarily enable the poor within or beyond these 
communities to reap the benefits that markets can putative provide; nor do they create 
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the context in which coherent, integrated management of water resources can 
effectively be conducted. 
 
The third scenario, the bureaucratic intervention of the state in local water management 
practices, is not as radical or conflictive as the first two scenarios, but it is potentially more 
widespread, because it is not restricted to specific geographic situations such as large dams or 
periurban hinterlands (Stevenson 2006). It can affect countries like Mexico where the outright 
ownership of water, as opposed to allocation of rights, is not an issue because it does not legally 
exist. In a sense, such intervention is the opposite situation of the one in Bolivia, because it 
signifies deep and permanent state penetration into local practices, rather than the state removing 
itself from such powers. 
In Mexico, this extension of the state has been realized through the standardization and 
expansion of the CONAGUA (federal water board) rights concession system, with parallels to 
the simultaneous land tenure standardization represented by the PROCEDE program. Kauffer 
Michel (2006, 220) described the effects on Tzotzil indigenous villages in the southern Mexico 
state of Chiapas. In the 1980s, Tzotzil villagers in several communities in the hills near the small 
city of San Cristóbal de las Casas began to develop a system using residual water (graywater and 
diluted, but untreated, wastewater) to irrigate their commercial flower gardens and nurseries. As 
is typical in well-watered communities, the irrigation system was not organized at the village 
level, but by individual families and sub-village groups. When CONAGUA became aware of the 
diversion of effluent occurring with neither a national-waters concession, nor a public health 
permit, they temporarily shut the village operations down, and a series of negotiations began 
between the state and the núcleos. According to Kauffer Michel (2006, 222), this episode “shows 
the incapacity of the National Water Law to incorporate existing management practices in 
indigenous communities, because these practices are carried out outside the law’s normative, 
technocratic framework, and in perfect ignorance of the law’s existence.” She continued: 
In most cases, the indigenous farmers who carry out these irrigation activities are 
characterized by an ignorance of the legal regulation […] but when they find out 
about its existence, they do not express any worry because they consider the law as 
something alien and imposed, and unlikely to be enforced. Moreover, among the 
population, there is an opinion that the government intends to act upon natural 
resources with the goal of commercial exploitation. There exists an indigenous 
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cosmovision in which the relationship with water does not obey a Western vision 
based on the hydrological cycle, but rather is related to cultural and spiritual aspects. 
In this sense, external intervention is doubly illegitimate. 
4.4.3 Land and water in the environs of Talea, a Zapotec village 
Anthropologists Laura Nader and Roberto González explored several of this study’s 
themes as they applied to the village of Talea during the 50 years before I conducted fieldwork 
there.  
Nader (1964, 212) reminds us that “each Zapotec village, no matter where in Oaxaca it is 
located, has its own ‘personality’[…] Each village has had separate and distinct experiences with 
the Mexican government and with Mexican national culture in general.” Today as well as in the 
past, Talea’s local culture demonstrates a careful balance in several related ways: between 
individual orientation and village orientation, between welcoming outside people, ideas, and 
practices while still retaining some of the suspicious reserve stereotypical of Sierra Oaxacans, 
and between appearing superficially mestizo while self-identifying as deeply indigenous. 
The internal individual orientation of Talea is expressed in part by its long-standing land 
tenure practices. Through the PROCEDE surveying and certification, these practices were 
recently sanctioned and registered by the state, while being only somewhat simplified. The 
following observations were made well before PROCEDE (in the case of Nader), and just as the 
PROCEDE officials were making their first contacts with the village (in the case of González). 
Nader (1990, 248) wrote: 
There are different types of ownership in Talea. An individual may be the single 
owner of a piece of property or a joint owner, as when two people share the 
ownership of a house. In addition, there is collective ownership, such as property 
purchased by a barrio or the village band collectively to ensure the continuity of their 
collectivity. Finally, there is communal ownership, whereby, for example, the village 
as an entity owns land that is legally recognized as communally held. 
 
while González (2001, 41) observed: 
One of the clearest divisions Talean campesinos make is that between forests and 
cultivated areas. Nearly all of the forest above the village is communal land, where 
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those who collect firewood may gather pine, oak, and other woods for burning in their 
homes. Cultivated areas are mostly held as private property, either with official land 
titles or as bienes ocultos (literally, ‘occult’ or ‘hidden’ lands, so called because no 
formal land title exists). Bienes ocultos were popular in the past as a way of evading 
government tax collectors, but among villagers they have been respected as private 
property.  
 
This internal individual orientation toward cultivated land contrasts, for example, with the 
neighboring núcleo of Juquila, where in 1961 a “communal coffee nursery [. . .] was voted upon, 
and carried through, not without some reservations on the part of many, but it was a group 
decision, unanimously agreed upon” (Nader 1964, 214). The government agronomist who helped 
Juquila establish its nursery had a different experience in Talea: 
He had relatively quick success Talea [. . .] Only months later, when the nurseries had 
already been started, did public opinion develop strongly against the idea, and at that 
time the nurseries were taken over by a group particularly interested in coffee 
production. The nurseries were abandoned as a town project and now they are under 
private auspices. 
 
This incident neatly demonstrates the relationship Talea typically has with state-directed 
initiatives: careful balance between working with the state and rejecting the state’s 
recommendations. While “traditionally, Taleans try to obtain all they can in the form of 
government aid” (Nader 1964, 214), they also rework government initiatives to their own ends, 
or sometimes reject them altogether after the government has been shown to be untrustworthy or 
incompetent, as I was told in 2009 regarding a recent CONAFOR (federal forestry agency) forest 
regeneration project. In other words, “the Taleans work together to create and maintain an 
effective local identity against the state” (Nader 1990, 3), resisting state hegemony by, for 
example, administering more local law than many villages do. González (2001, 69) noted, 
however, that “as Taleans […] become increasingly sensitized to political issues, local rule 
appears to be increasingly threatened.” 
The cultural position of Talea at a midpoint between insular and worldly is manifested in 
several ways, including in its particular brand of indigeneity. González (2001, 32) found that: 
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Contextualizing Talea poses a formidable task because the village, though relatively 
remote in some respects […] sits squarely in the world of international migration, 
mass communication, and global trade. The economic reliance of most Talean 
households on maize and beans has not impeded their participation in ‘modernity.’ 
 
He continued (2001, 65): 
At first glance it is easy to pass Talea off as a mestizo or even Europeanized town. 
But an examination of the village’s colonial history reveals that Taleans were 
subjected to the same mechanisms of colonial control, tribute extraction, and violence 
as other villages. In short, Talea was in every sense an ‘Indian village.’ 
     It also has more of the superficial trappings of modernity – automobiles, 
televisions – than other Rincon villages. Nevertheless, the material conditions of most 
Taleans are remarkably similar to those of people living in other villages. They farm 
for a living on small parcels of land, generally live in one-, two-, or three-room adobe 
houses, and have a largely autonomous system of self-governance. They also 
continue to speak Zapotec. 
     What is more, if asked, many Taleans describe their village as ‘indigenous’ (with 
an increasing sense of pride, especially among younger people). Rather than 
becoming embroiled in the long-running debate over what is ‘Indian’ and what is 
mestizo, it is perhaps more important to analyze how the categories themselves may 
be transformed. 
4.5   Social property, neoliberalism, and water in today’s Mexico 
According to the Mexican Constitution, “land ownership [propiedad] does not imply 
ownership of the resource of water, whose right of exploitation depends on the granting of a 
concession,” and that “communities which use their own collective irrigation systems are subject 
to the law, in the same way as formally recognized structures are, which implies the necessity of 
having a concession title.” These legal facts, reiterated in the 2004 reform of the national Water 
Law, confirm that “neither an agrarian right nor a property title is a determinant for the 
ownership of, or access to, water” (Kauffer Michel 2006, 222). At the same time, the Water Law 
reform places a new emphasis on the individual’s “right” to water (not to be confused with 
“ownership”), even if that individual is a member of a social property village (see section 7.5). 
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Given these facts, we can better understand how “communal” water management (in the 
sense of local, often village-scale practices) can sometimes more closely aligned with 
“privatization” of natural resources, than the public-oriented water policies of the state. As Kjell 
Enge and Scott Whiteford (1989, 10-11) encountered in their study of the Tehuacan Valley 
(Puebla and Oaxaca states) galería “communal” irrigation systems: 
Despite the state’s expansion in the region in the 1970s and 1980s, particularly 
through efforts to control water distribution and management, local groups have 
historically resisted state control because water is privately owned in the valley. 
These associations were originally established during the 1940s and 1950s, when 
campesinos organized and constructed irrigation systems covering some seventeen 
thousand hectares without state initiative or financial support. In Tehuacan, irrigation 
associations […] continue to be based on voluntary membership and social control 
via peer pressure. Instead of seeking subsidized credit and state aid, campesinos have 
successfully resisted incorporation into state programs. The collectives maintain local 
control over water, which is also used to expand commercial production for local and 
national markets. 
4.5.1   Land tenure in rural Mexico before PROCEDE  
The “indirect rule” of limited village-scale autonomy in indigenous areas and some other 
rural regions was generally convenient for the colonial government, and for the national state 
which succeeded it (Carrera 2011, 178). The state could “extract labor and tribute, but not have 
to bother with daily administration,” as well as for the villagers, who were “allowed retention of 
much of the traditional culture by giving the village a land base and a recognized form of social 
organization” (Dennis 1987, 29). During the late-19th-century Porfiriato era, the state’s 
promotion of modern, pro-commerce, technocratic legal practices,48 such as the 1890 Oaxaca 
state law which “ordered peasant communities to provide written title to the lands they farmed,” 
actually sometimes reinforced this village orientation, by introducing cartographic delimitation 
and by explicitly forbidding common ownership by multi-village coalitions (McNamara 2007, 
138). 
                                                        
48 The 19th-century technocratic systematization of state interventions in land tenure and water management 
was also occurring in countries such as Spain (Swyngedouw 2003b), Argentina (Gautreau and Garavaglia 
2012), and Laos (Goldman 2004). 
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Inspired by the anti-Porfiriato philosophies of sociologist Andrés Molina Enríquez (1909), 
the political architects of the Revolution and its aftermath post-Revolution social property era 
established the state structures which, in fits and starts, transformed these villages into (or 
established new ones as) ejidos and comunidades. In some respects, the state’s role was little 
changed. “In working to resolve land disputes through surveys, boundary-clearing procedures, 
and Presidential Resolutions, the [government] personnel are direct social descendants of the 
corregidores and alcaldes mayores of colonial times” (Dennis 1987, 28). Similarly, in certain 
regions the power structure of local elites remained intact, or was strengthened. “In northern 
Mexico, where the Revolution began, land tenure reform was a side note to regional and local 
battles between largely elite families, though it was big part of the rhetoric” (Perramond 2010, 
51). At the opposite end of the country, in semi-feudal parts of Chiapas, caciques (local leaders, 
sometimes indigenous) found ways to co-opt the new laws to their advantage, leaving many 
landless (Nash 1994, 376; Watts 2004, 285). A contrasting example involving water is that of an 
Otomí indigenous comunidad in Hidalgo state where a spring was discovered in the 1940s. The 
resulting diversified, commercial crop system benefited the local cacique, but it also made 
villagers less subject to his control, while increasing local contact with government agencies 
(Mendoza Mendoza 2003, 69). 
The social property system was patchy temporally as well as spatially. Each Mexican 
president embraced or ignored the advance of social property in his own way, and so “phases of 
populist land redistribution have been countered or subverted by private interests, or reversed, 
during parties that favored single-party ownership” (Perramond 2010, 51). For simplicity’s sake I 
refer to the archival documents I read for this study as authored by the “RAN” (Registro Agrario 
Nacional), because they are stored in that institution today, but in fact many of them were 
originally written by, or addressed to, other institutions. The following list, adapted from Olmedo 
(1999) and Walker (2000), names the federal organization in charge of social property and rural 
land reform: 
CNA (Comisión Nacional Agraria) – 1917-1934 
DA (Departamento Agrario) – 1934-1958 
DAAC (Departamento de Asuntos Agrarios y Colonización) – 1958-1974 
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SRA (Secretaría de la Reforma Agraria) – 1974-1995 (continues in limited capacity 
today) 
Since 1928, the federal organization in charge of collecting related documents and, after 1995, 
making them publicly available has been called the RAN (Registro Agrario Nacional). 
Each of these of these has or had an office in each of Mexico’s state capitals. 
Additionally, each state has or had another organization, the CAM (Comisón Agraria Mixta). 
Each CAM is a board responsible for much of the groundwork of social property development, 
supervised this work from a more local level. Each board included one person appointed by the 
federal organization, one by the state, and one representing campesinos, the last drawn from a 
short list prepared by the State League of Agrarian Communities and Campesino Unions. 
An important initiative during the social property era for indigenous communities 
occurred in 1940, when the RTBC program (Reconocimiento y Titulación de Bienes Comunales, 
or Recognition and Confirmation of Communal Assets) signaled an effort to pay as much 
attention to comunidades as had been paid to ejidos. In many cases, especially in periurban areas, 
the lands thus titled to indigenous villages had hitherto belonged to Catholic missions (Ledesma 
Barragán 2009).  
In 1940, the Oaxacan historian Rosendo Pérez García provided a rare glimpse into de 
facto land tenure practices across an entire region, practices that left only traces in the official 
documents of government archives. He compiled a table (Pérez García 1996a, 274) listing the 
area in hectares of various de facto land tenure classes for 72 villages of the Sierra Norte. While 
some of the terminology has changed – his lotes de propiedad particular are de facto individual 
parcels, while his predios mayores are de facto common use areas – I was able to calculate 
several average figures. Villages fit into two distinct classes, large-area and small-area. The 
average common use area for large villages was 18,878 ha, for small ones 1,594 ha. In contrast, 
the parceled area averages were almost the same for both groups: 259 ha for large villages and 
278 ha for small ones. Pérez García collected this data by talking with the authorities of each 
village.  
Pérez García (1996a, 270-271) asserted that the Sierra Norte tradition of recognizing 
individual parcels within a village was initiated by the Catholic church during the colonial era, in 
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conjunction with the policy of congregación (forced village clustering of formerly dispersed 
settlement): 
The only old [colonial-era] private properties [in the Sierra Norte] were those 
dedicated to cultivation for the promotion of religion. When the need to group 
inhabitants together was imposed, accomplished through congregating judges, to 
indoctrinate them and demand tribute, the best site for a village was chosen; first, the 
temple, Casa Real [government building], doctrinal schools, and future parade ground 
lots were set aside; then, lots were created for families of the ruling classes 
[dirigentes], [then] those connected to the temple, and the rest for the macehuales or 
common people.  
     Thus, we believe, private property was born. The judges of Composición y 
Repartimiento were a decisive factor in creating personal property, because they 
awakened ambitions of those who could pay them a few pesos to deliver them the 
documents of some privileged parcel [lote].  
     This conduct awakened animosity against these authorities and beneficiaries, and 
was one of the reasons some villages rebelled in 1660. 
4.5.2   Land tenure in rural Mexico after PROCEDE 
In my archival research at the Oaxaca RAN office, I came across a 2005 RTBC (official 
recognition of a comunidad) which revealed how some government officials continued to cite the 
social property ideals of the Revolutionary period, even well after the post-1992-reform era had 
commenced. The resolution (RAN 2005h, 461) resolved a dispute between two indigenous 
Chinantec comunidades by quoting the 1917 Ordinary Session of the Constituent Congress: 
The domain rights conceded to the Indians were at one time individual and similar to 
those of the Spanish, but generally they were given to communities and had the form 
of restricted private property. [The kings] respected the diverse forms of de facto 
possession which many Indians maintained. […] It is absolutely necessary that, from 
now on, our laws do not bypass the facts which are evident in reality. 
 
This example shows how, on one hand, PROCEDE was “simplifying, standardizing, and 
homogenizing,” by imposing its state techne on the metis – the “local, embedded, context-
sensitive community-based knowledge – which is inevitably heterogeneous and unruly, hence 
difficult for large organizations (whether public or private) to incorporate and adjucate in their 
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drive to optimize resource production” (Bakker 2010a, 40). On the other hand, this same 
regularización could be portrayed to social property residents as a way to secure the tenure 
regimes they already practiced, both externally (via well-surveyed village borders) and internally 
(by legalizing the widespread, de facto individual parceling long in place). 
The Mexican government cleverly modified its presentation of the PROCEDE program to 
communities, depending on whether the ethos of a region expressed a desire for individualized 
commercial opportunities, or a concern for maintaining village-scale autonomy (Leonard 2003). 
As geographer Eric Perramond (2010, 152) observed, “PROCEDE […] quickly became the 
focus of attention for both critics and proponents of this land counter-reform. […] In states where 
participation lagged early (or continues to), such as Chiapas and Oaxaca, the government used 
the rhetoric of judicial security, stating that titling would keep holders safe from any legal 
contests or questions regarding their land or resources.” 
For their part, ejidos and comunidades have always cleverly modified their proposals to 
the government, an aspect of what one might call “creative engagement.” The following quote by 
anthropologist Nora Haenn (2006, 144) refers specifically to ejidos in the Calakmul forest 
frontier region of Mexico which only had their perimeters surveyed by PROCEDE, but the 
observation is, to some degree, more generally applicable: 
As long as people remain ejidatarios, they retain their constitutional claims on the 
state […] For 70-odd years, ejidatarios have used their position to gain state 
resources, build community with neighbors, and leverage their natural resource base 
in a variety of ways. At the same time, it seems clear from the combination of 
common and private property regimes favored by ejido members that ejidatarios are 
not necessarily committed to a single form of land tenure. Instead [they] strove to 
retain all the privileges of an ejidatario and all the privileges of a private property 
owner. 
 
Another function of PROCEDE was to give social property villages an opportunity to add 
non-member residents to their membership rolls, which “can be seen as the final gasp of land 
distribution. Perhaps these posesionarios will be less likely to sell their parcels, because of 
lingering doubts about their legal rights as well as the fact that many have had to put more effort 
into acquiring these parcels” (Pérez Castañeda 1998, 72). 
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Researchers have noted that PROCEDE has – perhaps thankfully – failed to deliver on its 
promise of a truly standardized land tenure system. In part, this is due to the creative ways 
different villages have engaged with the program (Kelly et al. 2010; Barsimantov et al. 2010; 
Wilshusen 2010). Partly, however, it is simply due to the procedures stipulated by law not 
always being followed on the ground: “The whole process of desamortazación of lands is often 
done without the requirements of making the contract before witnesses, advising the 
comisariado, or submitting the title change with the RAN. This makes the ejido fall again toward 
irregularity” (Pérez Castañeda 1998, 77). 
Whatever its practical goals, the PROCEDE program inserts the state more than ever in 
the practices of the rural communities, contrary to the professed goal of neoliberalism. In this, 
Perramond (2010, 123) recognized parallels with Porfiriato-era government land surveys: 
To decentralize its past duties as the national communal lands manager, the Mexican 
federal government had to re-embed itself in local communities and resurvey and 
remap the same places that were created as communal resources seventy years ago. 
The same process used to create the ejido after the Mexican Revolution is uncannily 
similar to the one now being followed to ‘liberalize’ the ejido sector and its 
ownership. 
4.5.3   Natural resources and social property after PROCEDE  
Soon after 1992, the impact of land tenure reform on the environment was identified as an 
important subject, a theme which community natural resources scholar David Barton Bray (1996, 
215) considered to be inadequately researched:  
As the custodian of some 50 percent of the croplands and up to 80 percent of the 
forests of the country, the ejido sector clearly has vast implications for Mexico’s rural 
environment […] What is not so obvious is what the nature of the impact [of changes 
in laws that regulate land access] might be and how much credit should be given to 
the reforms for any emergent changes in land use. 
     In general, [Mexican geographer] Victor Toledo (1996) is quite correct when he 
notes that the environment is ‘the great absence’ in the debate around the reforms to 
Article 27. The reforms to the land tenure regime were not first and foremost an 
environmental measure, although some of the supporting legislation, notably the new 
forest and water laws, take on a more explicitly environmental tone. 
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I will discuss the 1992 Water Law in the next subsection. As for the land reform and its 
implementation through PROCEDE, it is interesting to note that its principal architect, Arturo 
Warman, thought that the overall environmental impact would be positive, since “the static ejido 
system has degraded the natural resource base” (Barton Bray 1996, 216). Toledo and others 
predicted that the environmental effects would be more negative than positive. A decade and a 
half later, one fruitful inquiry49 would be to what extent PROCEDE surveying, certifying, and 
titling has provided new opportunities for village-scale, locally managed “protected areas.” As 
the late development studies scholar William Thiesenhusen (1995, 172) pointed out, it is difficult 
to generalize about land reform impacts on the environment in Mexico, because local land tenure 
practices vary widely, and because the biophysical environments themselves are so varied. For 
his part, Barton Bray (1996, 218) predicted that “the reform of Article 27, in and of itself, will 
not necessarily have a large impact on the environment of Mexico, but will be mediated by a 
variety of other political, social, and ecological factors” (Barton Bray). 
As an example of the impact of land tenure reform on natural resource, geographer 
Matthew Fry (2011) detailed the decisions farmers in post-1992 Mexico must make if their land 
becomes potentially more valuable for non-renewable extraction of minerals and rock aggregate, 
especially if they are located near expanding cities. In his 2006 book Política Hidroagrícola y 
Cambio Agrario en Tehuantepec, Oaxaca, sociologist Yanga Villagómez identified links 
between land tenure and water in pre- and post-1992 Mexico (Villagómez, Santos Gómez, and 
Zafra 1998, 104), using examples from a drier region in Oaxaca state. In 1962, the federal 
government expropriated 47,000 hectares around a new reservoir for irrigation, and eventually 
apportioned part of the area to local landholders, leaving the rest as a new ejido. State 
interventions produced a weak village culture and strongly individualized reliance on 
government programs, partly due to the high cost and difficulty of maintaining the irrigation 
infrastructure.  
                                                        
49 In 1998 I initiated such a research project, collaborating with then-geographer Gerardo García Gil, in the 
Calakmul forest frontier region of Campeche state. Ejidos were established there between 1973 and 1992, and 
most had PROCEDE survey only their núcleo perimeters, keeping their individual parcels in a de facto state 
(Haenn 2006, 141). I plan to complete this study in the near future. 
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The creation of Irrigation District 19 excluded an important fraction of campesinos 
from participating in the federal development strategy […] Moreover, the scheme of 
types of ownership stratified the campesinos, favoring the property titled landowners, 
mainly commercial crop producers, who were already the beneficiaries of regional 
agricultural development programs.  
4.5.4 Mexican water law and policy since 1992  
The 1992 Water Law that was somewhat modified in 2004 accomplished four major 
changes (Scott and Silva Ochoa 2001; Rap, Wester, and Pérez-Prado 2003; Wester, Hoogesteger, 
and Vincent 2009). First, it decentralized decisionmaking, mainly among rural irrigators. Second, 
it allowed water costs to rise – that is, the state reduced its subsidies of transport infrastructure 
costs, among both irrigators and urban potable water users. Third, it opened up water rights to be 
exchanged in markets. Fourth, it streamlined the already functioning state-controlled concession 
system. In this sub-section I will address criticisms of all four practices,50 which collectively I 
refer to as “CONAGUA,” the popular acronym for the federal water agency. I will conclude the 
chapter with a look at another recent government program related to water: the PESs 
(environmental services payments) administered by CONAFOR (the forestry agency), with 
CONAGUA involvement. 
The decentralization component of the new Water Law primarily affects communities and 
individuals dependent on irrigation for growing crops. Until the 1990s, over half of the irrigated 
land in Mexico fell within large, federally-managed “Irrigation Districts,” which included a mix 
of private, social, and national property, concentrated in the states of Sinaloa, Sonora, 
Tamaulipas, Michoacán, and Baja California. (Although my study area communities mainly 
receive enough rainfall to be unaffected by the CONAGUA decentralization, I discuss one such 
district in the Huasteca Potosina in chapter 7). The rest of the irrigated land consisted of “small 
systems privately managed or organized by user associations” (Whiteford and Bernal 1996, 224), 
many of them village-scale operations called “Irrigation Units.” The effect of the new 
CONAGUA policies was to gradually dismantle the Irrigation Districts, apportioning the 
                                                        
50 A fifth element to the Water Law which has not yet been extensively employed “defines the conditions to 
decree regulated zones, of prohibition or reserve, whether due to risk of aquifer depletion, disasters, or to 
prevent irreversible ecosystem damage” (Gómez 2008, 6). 
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responsibilities among smaller “water use associations” or “modules” (modulos) (Ramos Valdes 
and Lorda Andrade 2004, 70). Meanwhile, regional (sub-national) water policy among 
government bodies at various scales is supposed to be harmonized through new “watershed 
councils” (Vargas 2003, 226).  
In high-rainfall regions of Mexico, CONAGUA-organized village-scale or multi-village-
scale water management associations are less common, and less highly organized, than they are 
in more irrigation-dependent regions. In water-poor areas, however, the shift to water use 
associations theoretically could strengthen the village orientation of social property núcleos, and 
even of village-sized collections of private property owners. Instead, in many cases the change 
has simply removed the state from its responsibilities to assist in infrastructure maintenance and 
administration, while allowing it to nonetheless retain much of its decision-making power, 
including its control over each system’s headwaters. In the Mexicali Valley, this “top-down 
approach to decentralization aggravated many campesinos and heightened distrust,”  illustrating 
“some of the contradictions in the neoliberal policy and continued state control” (Whiteford and 
Bernal 1996, 225). In areas already with small-scale irrigation systems, “ranging from the 
elaborate futures markets in Tehuacan, Puebla51[…] to private pumping networks in Sonora,” the 
systematizing of the state’s role can also represent an intrusion (Ostrom 1992), favoring urban 
water uses while encouraging individualized water management under a false banner of 
community organization (Vargas and Guzmán Ramírez 2008, 43). Scott Whiteford and 
Francisco Bernal (1996, 225-226) explained the complexities of these government interventions: 
[CONAGUA] gives the district concession of water and the permission for the 
utilization of the central canals. […] The módulo is a new unit of organization in 
Mexico, delineated by engineers of the CNA based on natural divisions of canals and 
fields. Once these divisions are made, they are imposed on the campesino population, 
often dividing communities, ejidos and colonias. At the same time, they merge 
segments of the population that traditionally have not worked together, the pequeños 
propietarios [private landowners] and the ejidatarios. 
                                                        
51 In the Tehuacan Valley, just west of the Oaxaca study region, “water in the sugarcane fields is regulated by 
hours. Each parcel has a set amount of hours per month attached to it. Land values are attributed accordingly. 
Water is also divided up into canal groups that share the use of a spring. Each is controlled by an aguador. 
Canals are maintained by ejido (communal) resources but the entrances and gates are considered private and 
the responsibility of the owner” (Andrew Hilburn, University of Kansas PhD candidate, pers. comm., 2011). 
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   Each civil association is to be administered by an elected Consejo Directivo 
[council], which is under the control of a General Assembly of Users […] responsible 
for collection of water payments from the user, administering the system, and paying 
its water bills to the CNA. Tremendous political battles, intimidation, and violence 
have accompanied this realignment because the consejo ultimately controls the 
delivery, timing of delivery, and quantities of water campesinos receive. 
  
The “transfer of authority to user groups is not seen as empowering but as a maneuver by 
the government to continue raising water prices” (Barton Bray 1996, 217). The new Water Law 
encourages replacement of government subsidies with user fees, to spread the costs of water 
transport infrastructure among agricultural irrigators and domestic potable water users. 
(CENCOS 2007).  Spurred on by anti-water-pollution efforts led by environmental journalist 
Iván Restrepo (1995), and acknowledging the ubiquitous use of relatively expensive bottled 
drinking water among all but the rural poor,52 the Mexican government couched these reforms as 
a fairer way for society to pay for cleaner urban water, while actually lowering rural irrigator 
water fees through greater efficiency (Whiteford and Bernal 1996, 229).  
This predicted decline in water prices for rural irrigators has not occurred. In a 
groundwater-dependent agricultural area of Sonora state, Margaret Wilder and Scott Whiteford 
(2006, 347-350) found that ejido irrigators, who often share wells as sub-village groups, now 
have difficulty competing with private farmers with individual wells. They attributed this change 
partly on the government’s decision to prioritize urban over rural water users through the reforms 
to the water laws, and partly on its preference for farmers whose commercial or export products 
take full advantage of post-NAFTA trade. 
I reiterate that the Mexican Constitution, as clarified in the 1992 and 2004  Water Laws 
and the 1993 Norma Oficial Mexicana (regulatory policy), technically requires any water use 
other than manually extracted, natural-flow-conserving, domestically used water to be regulated 
by the state. This occurs through the issuing of a concession, either directly (e.g., to individual 
agricultural users), or indirectly (e.g., to the local authority responsible for a potable supply 
system) (Kauffer Michel 2006, 221). Unlike the other reforms, in theory this represents a 
                                                        
52 “A study released [in 2011] by the Inter-American Development Bank found that Mexicans used about 127 
gallons of bottled water per person a year, more than four times the bottled-water consumption in the United 
States and more than any country surveyed” (Malkin 2012). 
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continuation of previous policies. For example, during my RAN archival research I encountered 
a 1969 document explaining how the Hydraulic Resources Ministry in Mexico City would grant 
“titles of legalization” to individuals, groups, or companies, including groups of comuneros and 
ejidatarios, granting them right to use specific amounts of national water from specific streams 
or rivers (SRH 1969b).   
In practice, however, the post-1992 concession system is newly standardized and 
professionalized. This has provoked scattered instances of friction with local systems, especially 
in indigenous areas already skeptical of state intrusion (see sub-section 4.4.2 above). 
CONAGUA has limited manpower, and tends to strictly enforce concession laws strictly only in 
areas where public health is involved, especially near cities, or when a núcleo or individual asks 
the agency for technical or financial assistance with some water project. 
This presents an interesting comparison with PROCEDE. PROCEDE certification is 
voluntary; it can legally be ignored or rebuffed by a community. A CONAGUA water rights 
concession is not supposed to be voluntary. However, the ways in which the two programs have 
been implemented has actually made PROCEDE more pervasive across space. PROCEDE made 
a strong attempt to work in every social property village, and so its presence is felt nearly 
everywhere, to one degree or another. In contrast, CONAGUA does not try to fully enforce its 
concession system in well-watered, relatively self-sufficient communities like those typical of 
the Huasteca Potosina and the Sierra Norte de Oaxaca. An exception is the potable water systems 
of large towns. In these places, CONAGUA has focused its permit and user fee enforcement 
efforts especially in well-watered areas like the Sierra Norte – not so much to raise money (the 
fees are always deeply discounted), but merely to remind local residents who is legally in charge 
of water, even if this exacerbates conflicts within and between communities (Flores Mondragon 
2007, 46; Tiburcio Sánchez and Perevochtchikova 2012, 156). 
As with any incompletely enforced law, the water concession system’s limitations have 
fortified a defiance of the state among communities already inclined to this attitude. Kauffer 
Michel (2006, 224-225) documented the case of a Tzotzil village in Chiapas state: 
The interviewees expressed little confidence in the authorities, and an awareness of 
the frequent violation of the legal framework by the very same government 
agencies [. . .] This focus is sustained as something resembling engineering, and 
158 
 
  
considers that the law is applicable over the entire Mexican territory, without any 
consideration for  the existing cultural and ethnic diversity. [. . .] It is based on a 
supposed legal equality, but the day-to-day reality is characterized by strong 
socioeconomic inequalities. 
   There is an undeclared government policy to not intervene in indigenous 
communities, to avoid arousing tensions. This only partly explains the absence of 
CNA action; really, the CNA has little ability and willingness to act and fulfill its 
role. 
 
As with many aspects of rural and especially indigenous areas, in water policy the state is 
simultaneously perceived as doing too much and not doing enough (Whiteford and Bernal 1996, 
232).  
Another recently initiated expression of the state’s interest in regulating landowner 
practices at certain water sources is “payment for environmental services” (PES). This takes the 
form of government programs which facilitate the modest transfer of cash from those who 
benefit from specific protection of biodiversity, forests, or water (e.g., companies whose 
products depend on clean water, or the taxpaying public), to individuals and communities who 
supposedly sacrifice some economically beneficial activity that would have harmed the resource 
(Prichard 2012). One link between some PES programs and the 1992 reforms to Mexican Water 
Law is through the new fee structures for some urban potable water systems, and for a few large 
irrigation systems. A percentage of these user fees can be assigned via PES to landowners in the 
source watershed.  
While the direct or indirect economic and public health benefits are often justified with 
regard to water, the potentially harmful land use practices supposedly avoided more often have 
to do with conserving forests. Therefore, the rationalization for a typical PES program rests 
partly on scientific evidence which shows that forest cover does in fact help maintain the quality 
and/or quantity of water (see section 5.4). Relying on findings summarized in Playedra (2002), 
the Mexican government proposed a program called “PSA-H” [Programa de Servicios 
Ambientales Hidrológicos, Hydrological Environmental Services Program], which Alix-García 
and colleagues (2009, 165) describe thus: 
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Although the relationship between forest cover and water flows is highly debated, 
there is clearly a positive effect of forests on water quality, if not always on quantity. 
For this reason, the original PES program proposal focused on the watersheds defined 
as overexploited, as well as on cloud forests,53 which are thought to have a 
particularly strong relationship with water quantity.  
 
PES programs are not a major focus of the present study, because they are not generally 
about protecting specific water sources with specific landowners, but rather about altering certain 
behaviors of many landowners over a large watershed. However, because PES is a part of the 
assemblage among natural resources, the state, and the village in the neoliberal-influenced era, 
here I will briefly review the Mexican PES system which began to be gradually rolled out in 
2003. I draw primarily from two studies: one by Jennifer Alix-García, Alain de Janvry, Elisabeth 
Saloudet, and Jean Manuel Torres (2009), and the other by Kathleen McAfee and Elizabeth 
Shapiro (2010). 
Unfortunately, the groundwater-recharging role of forests cannot address the most 
fundamental national-scale problem in Mexico, because “there is very little overlap of the forests 
with the overexploited aquifers” (Alix-García et al. 2009, 166). Thus, “the water-focus of the 
[PES program] in Mexico can only justify payments to very specific tracts of forest” (Alix-
García et al. 2009, 167). After a two-year pilot program, two changes in policy were made: first, 
the degree of “marginalization” (in essence, poverty) of a community was removed from 
consideration; and second, the program was opened up to watersheds without over-exploitation 
of groundwater. These combined to make many more social property núcleos (some of them 
indigenous) eligible for enrollment. However, only a minority of núcleos fulfills the 
requirements that a town of at least 5,000 inhabitants be “nearby,” and that its forest have at least 
“80 percent tree density,” as observed in satellite imagery. 
                                                        
53 In the high Andes, páramo (alpine shrubby vegetation) is thought to act as a “sponge that stores rainwater 
and then releases it slowly over time” (Balaguer 2009, 29). Because this vegetation type can be found in 
indigenous areas above large cities, it has been a particular focus of PES programs in Colombia and Ecuador. 
In the latter country, “the indigenous perception that water in the páramo reserve [managed by five 
communities] is on the privatization chopping block runs so strong that they have opposed an agreement of 
cooperation” by which PES funds would be transferred from the water company supplying the city of Quito 
and from several water-dependent industries (Diehn 2005). 
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“For the first year of operation, ejidos and comunidades accounted for 47 percent of the 
contracts and for 93 percent of the area contracted” (Alix-García et al. 2009, 172). Nevertheless, 
the tree density requirement seems more geared to private, individual properties than to the de 
facto or de jure common use areas of social property núcleos, because it places a no-tree-cutting 
restriction on the entire “property” (i.e., the entire forested area of a núcleo), even if just a part of 
that forest is exploited for commercial timber or for scattered agriculture (Alix-García et al. 
2009, 170). This policy disregards the complex land uses and de facto land tenures within social 
property village-scale territories.  
In the first year of the pilot program, ejidos and comunidades varied in how they 
distributed the payments within their communities: “18 percent of ejidos distribute directly to 
members, 22 percent invest all of it in conservation-related forest activities, 18 percent allocate 
all of it to non-forestry public goods, and 42 percent do some combination” (Alix-García et al. 
2009, 175). In a 2008 study of eleven PES núcleos in six states, the engagement of residents with 
the program was in many cases found to be sporadic. Most of the communities claimed to have 
intensified their conservation efforts thanks to the program, but “in some instances […] 
community members had trouble locating firebreaks and forest roads they claimed to be 
maintaining.” Alix-García and colleagues (2009, 178) continued: 
One of the most discouraging findings was that in none of the communities visited 
were the objectives and rules of the program clear to the members […] Interestingly, 
the majority of the ejidos were able to identify the cities that benefited from the 
hydrological service provided by the conservation of their forests, but none of them 
realized that the payments they were receiving were meant to be in compensation for 
those services. 
 
Urban water service providers (whether private or “municipal”) which collected the payments 
from users were more engaged with the program than the private or social landowners which 
received them. An exception was the city of Coatapec, Veracruz, which suffered a drought and 
developed its own PES program, without federal intervention, by contracting with landowners 
(private and social) in the coffee-producing forested hills above the city (Alix-García et al. 2009, 
184). 
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McAfee and Shapiro (2010, 3) also found that the government’s PES program, much like 
PROCEDE, represents an attempt to standardize practices which vary widely across the human 
and physical geographies of rural Mexico: 
These ‘environmental service providers’ are likely to have their own formal or 
informal organizations, resource management practices, development priorities, and 
values with regard to nonhuman nature. These practices and values often cannot be 
reduced to the calculations of individual gain that, in neoliberal PES models, are 
expected to determine human behavior. In Mexico, these institutions and norms have 
combined to confound the model of market-based conservation efficiency envisioned 
by the World Bank and other economists who initially designed Mexico’s PES 
programs. These conflicted interactions have transpired at the levels of the federal 
state, nationally and locally organized social movements, and ejido and indigenous 
polities. 
 
These authors attest that the partial failure of this program is part of the same ethos which has 
condemned the impact of NAFTA on rural Mexican culture. Resistance to both policies stems 
from those who “insist that the values of ecosystems derive less from the market prices of their 
services than from their contributions to peasant livelihoods, food production, biodiversity, and 
wider social benefits that cannot be quantified or sold” (McAfee and Shapiro 2010, 2). 
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5.  Results, part 1: Individual  and village-scale orientation toward land 
and water in 33 núcleos, 1923-2007  
My principal goal in examining the 1923-2007 Registro Agrario Nacional (RAN) legal 
documents was to identify and analyze the many ways that social property residents have chosen 
to emphasize either individual or village-scale practices related to land tenure, especially those 
practices which link land tenure to water source “ownership” and management. I had 
hypothesized that the state interventions since the 1992 land reforms would not, in most cases, 
reduce the level of overall village orientation. I processed about 400 anecdotes.54 About 350 of 
these were drawn from approximately 200 document sets stored in the four state agrarian 
archives (two in each state); each set appears in the References section as an entry authored by 
“RAN.” The remaining anecdotes were derived from interviews I conducted in several of the 
núcleos, from my own participatory mapping work in Talea, and from community and individual 
household questionnaires administered during the México Indígena project. Figures 2.1 through 
2.6, on pages 47 to 59, show the locations of the 33 núcleos within the study regions. 
In this context, an “anecdote” is an event, description, situation, or opinion recounted by 
someone – usually an individual villager, a núcleo authority, a government agent, a judge, or a 
neighboring landowner – which provides evidence of a personal, interpersonal, or institutional 
practice. Because the RAN is the state’s locus of social property matters, nearly all these 
practices related to land, and some of these showed how land is related to natural resources such 
as forests or water. 
I interpreted 293 of these 400 anecdotes as indicative of some manifestation of individual 
or village orientation. Many directly attested to this, while others required a more subjective 
reading; I considered these differences during my analysis. 71 related specifically to water 
sources, and 222 were concerned more generally with land tenure (including several concerning 
non-water natural resources such as forests). Most of my content analysis was qualitative, based 
on finding patterns and trends as shown in multiple anecdotes. I also attempted to explore the 
                                                        
54 In addition, I processed about 100 other RAN document sets which contained facts and announcements of 
official government actions, but not “anecdotes” as I use the term. 
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collection of anecdotes quantitatively (section 5.4). Given the limited sample size, especially of 
water-related documents, and the non-systematic criteria by which RAN saved certain 
documents for storage, as well as the partly subjective nature of my content analysis, this 
quantitative assessment must be interpreted with caution. 
If the results had to be summarized in a single phrase, it would be that whatever general 
trends do exist are overshadowed by the inseparably entangled nature of individual and village 
orientation, both today and in the past. Nevertheless, two subtle trends are discernible amid the 
“noise” of núcleo-specific events and practices. The first trend is an increasing focus on the 
spatial location of water sources as either within individual parcels or within common use areas, 
regardless of whether these tenure areas have been surveyed and certified through PROCEDE 
(although PROCEDE parceling may accelerate the process).55 Anecdote 1 (below) is a pre-1992 
example of the de facto tenure’s status as individual or common not mattering, compared to the 
urgency of keeping water access points within the núcleo’s territory.  
Anecdote 1. In Tancuime, letters from the comunidad to the DAAC (the federal 
organization in charge of social property and rural land reform) during the 1966 Acta de 
Deslinde (government survey of the núcleo perimeter) focus on access to streams as 
community right, in this case for cattle. However, the survey map eliminated all but one of 
the major stream access points which had appeared in the núcleo’s original map (plano 
primordial), in favor of two private landowners (RAN 1966a). 
Illustrative anecdotes 2 and 3 demonstrate water source practices after 1992. Anecdote 2 
is from a PROCEDE-parceled núcleo, while anecdote 3 is from a núcleo which did not have 
PROCEDE survey parcels of individuals. Both show the increasing or continued importance of 
water source locations within either “individual tenure” or “common use” areas. This 
development parallels the new legal emphasis in the Water Law (see section 7.5 and chapter 9). 
                                                        
55 I reiterate that the trends discussed in this introduction are neither pervasive nor universal. Many of the 
anecdotes I present in later sections of this chapter run counter to them. 
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Anecdote 2. In Santa Cruz, each parcel owner has their own presita (small reservoir), for 
watering cattle and irrigating sugar cane. Thus, “they don’t borrow water from each other” 
(interview with Lázaro Reyes 2009), as villagers do among, for example, Talea’s coffee 
plantations. 
 
Anecdote 3. In the 1970s, the comunidad of Cuatlamayán installed a tube from a pozo 
(shallow well, in this case at a natural pool) to a water storage tank 200 meters away, and 
another tube from the tank to the school about 1 km further north. Around 2006, the tube 
connecting the tank to the school burst. Efforts to fix the leak were thwarted, however, 
when the de facto owner of the parcel containing the pozo refused to allow its water to be 
used for community purposes, “not even if he were compensated” (interview with 
Hernández Reyes 2009). 
This increasing linkage of water with land, if left unchecked, results in an overall increase 
in individual orientation toward water sources, because many important water sources are 
located within or very near agricultural parcels. However, there is a second trend discernible in 
some communities since 1992: resistance to this increasingly individual orientation. The 
resistance can take any of three forms. Anecdote 4 is an example of the first strategy: “accept the 
land tenure-water source linkage, but resist its individualizing tendency by adjusting the 
PROCEDE parceling template.” The occurrence of this particular adjustment, “civic” parcels for 
community water purposes, may be in some regions as high as 40 percent of PROCEDE-
parceled núcleos (see sub-section 7.4.1). 
Anecdote 4. Huichimal’s civic parcels include three for community water: one pozo and 
two depósitos (storage tanks). Of the 13 civic solares in its two human settlement areas, 
seven are water related: four pozos and three depósitos (RAN 2004b). 
Anecdote 5 presents an example of the second strategy: “accept the PROCEDE parceling 
template, but avoid individual orientation toward water by resisting the land tenure-water source 
linkage.” Talea (section 6.1) also exemplifies this strategy, through the common practice of 
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individuals borrowing water from nearby parcels owned by others. This strategy probably 
depends on strong local culture and leadership for its continued success.   
Anecdote 5. Santa Cruz, despite the overall individual orientation of its water practices, 
does exhibit several village-scale water arrangements. The main water source for the 
potable domestic supply, an improved “clear water” spring, is in a “private” (i.e., 
individual) cattle-ranching parcel (interview with López 2009). 
Anecdote 6 is an example of the third strategy: “reject the PROCEDE parceling template, 
while also resisting the land tenure-water source linkage.” Yagila (section 6.2) epitomizes this 
strategy as well, with its low concordance between users of water sources and their de facto 
landowners. 
Anecdote 6. In Totomoxtla, 23 percent of the springs considered “important” by the 
community are located in the de facto “parceled” area, though this comprises only 5 
percent of the total area. An additional 9 percent of important springs are in a small area of 
permanent agriculture that is locally considered to be “common use.” 
Anecdote 3 represented a so-far unsuccessful attempt to employ a fourth strategy: “reject 
the PROCEDE parceling template, while maintaining a strong land tenure-water source linkage, 
and apply community pressure to persuade individuals to nevertheless act in the community’s 
interest.” This strategy can be applied in PROCEDE-parceled núcleos as well. Tancuime (sub-
section 3.1.2) offers a more successful example of this strategy, by which individual de facto 
parcel owners maintain forest patches around important springs.56  
I begin this chapter with the history of interactions between social property núcleos and 
the Mexican state (section 5.1), before and after the 1992 land tenure reforms. I continue with a 
few examples of land tenure practices, before and after 1992 (section 5.2). This section ends with 
Figures 5.1.1 through 5.1.9 (on pages 195 to 203), maps showing the current spatial distribution 
of de jure land tenure classes in all 33 RAN document study núcleos. I then give examples of 
                                                        
56 However, enforcing or encouraging specific land uses at certain locations is not as robust as assuming full 
village-scale control over such places. 
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practices related to water sources (section 5.3), concluding with a closer look at the post-1992 
strategies I introduced above. Section 5.4 is a brief summary of key findings. 
5.1 Interactions between núcleos and the state, before and after 1992 
Many of the pre-PROCEDE RAN documents I examined represent official actas (legal 
decrees, although the term sometimes means “minutes of a meeting”), or communications and 
preparations leading up to those actas, on the part of the federal government of Mexico. These 
documents show how the creation of social property in Mexico was not a single act, but rather an 
ongoing process of negotiation, neglect, and engagement between the government and the 
residents of each núcleo, with each party expecting to gain greater legitimacy in the eyes of the 
other. While there are many variations, they can be grouped into three types: the Resolución 
Presidencial (Presidential Resolution); the Reconocimiento y Titulación de Bienes Comunales 
(Recognition and Titling of Communal Assets, or “RTBC”); and the Acta de Deslinde 
(Delimitation Decree). A Resolución Presidencial is typically the action which officially creates 
an ejido or comunidad; if for an ejido, it is often associated with a dotación (land grant on a 
former hacienda or national territory). An RTBC is a document which authenticates (or, in some 
cases, initiates) the existence of a comunidad (never an ejido). An Acta de Deslinde results from 
a physical survey which confirms or corrects the official territory belonging to a núcleo – usually 
an ejido, but sometimes a comunidad. 
Among the 33 RAN document study communities, these legal actions took place 
throughout the 20th century, at times and in sequences which vary so much from one núcleo to 
the next as to almost defy any pattern. The pattern of state actions which does emerge runs 
counter to my expectations, in two ways. First, the period of greatest activity overall is probably 
toward the end of the era, in the 1980s.57 Second, the periods of higher activity do not generally 
correspond to the widely recognized periods of intensified government initiative in the social 
property sector: the presidencies of Cárdenas and Ávila Camacho in the last 1930s and early 
1940s, and the presidency of López Mateos from 1958 to 1964 (Meyer, Sherman, and Deeds 
                                                        
57 One RTBC document I encountered was signed by Arturo Warman, later an intellectual architect of the 
Salinas administration’s neoliberal reforms (RAN 1977b). 
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2003, 579 and 626). Instead, for example, recognition and titling of comunidades agrarias 
through the RTBC mechanism seems to have peaked during the mid-1950s under Ruiz Cortines, 
and again in the late 1980s under de la Madrid. 
The “village” as an idealized philosophical construct, enshrined in the legal system and in 
the national consciousness especially after the Mexican Revolution, has been embraced, 
exploited, or ignored by individuals, village leaders, and the state depending on particular 
circumstances of time, place, and motive. The political compromises which emerged from the 
Revolutionary period continue to be echoed in the complexities and ambiguities which pervade 
many of the practices attested in the RAN documents. 
These ambiguities were apparent during the late 19th century, when the state’s use of the 
word “communal” “came (and has come) to obscure more than it revealed about actual land 
tenure and agrarian practice in the countryside” (Craib 2004, 95). Craib continues: 
Such complexities were elided by officials, as were the bundle of rights, rather than 
the notion of ownership, contained within the descriptor ‘communal’. As a result, the 
term ‘communal’ functioned not so much to describe an existing system but to 
describe what did not exist: individual freehold tenure and a system in which land 
circulated freely as a market commodity. It was, at best, a skewed representation of a 
complex and contextual reality that cannot simply be read through the retrospective 
lens of liberal theory. 
 
A general observation is that engagement with state does not appear to correlate highly 
with especially high village orientation. Núcleos with a history of state engagement exhibited 
some kind of mixture of individual and village orientation, and continue to exhibit a mixture – 
albeit often modified – in their work with PROCEDE and afterwards.  Núcleos with less of a 
state-interaction tradition were also mixed in their individual and village-oriented practices 
(although the mix was sometimes different than in other núcleos), and these núcleos also 
maintain hybrid practices in the twenty-first century.  
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5.1.1 How individuals, villages, and the state deployed the hybrid ideals of the Mexican 
Revolution 
Many RAN anecdotes underscore how nearly all villages divided their territories into 
“parceled” and “common use” areas long before the PROCEDE program incorporated these 
tenure zones into the national cadastre. This is hardly a groundbreaking discovery on my part; 
most scholars I know of readily acknowledge this fact. Therefore, the pre-1992 “baseline” for 
village-scale orientation is not a purely communal entity,58 but rather a balanced blend of 
village-scale and individual practices. 
In the RAN documents, pre-1992 individual parcel documents were sometimes described 
in detail, for example, in Lachichina (RAN 1989-90; RAN 1991-92). On other occasions, parcel 
documents were merely mentioned as existing in a núcleo59 – for example, in Yatzona (RAN 
1981, 91) or in Huichimal (RAN 2004b, 66). Many government reports, typically generated as a 
first step toward a new survey-based decree, mentioned the existence of individually worked 
parcels that may have lacked individual formal documentation – e.g., in Lachixila (RAN 1973c). 
In Chimalaco, state-sanctioned individual parcel surveys were begun but never completed (RAN 
1969). 
A 1942 dispute within Lachichina over the boundary of individual terreno (de facto parcel 
in a named paraje or place) mentions several different legal documents confirming individual 
tenure. One of the litigating comuneros presented a disclosure (manifestación) signed by the 
county Rent Collection Authority, as well as documents by other comuneros which sanctioned 
(ampara) and confirmed (reza) that he owned the land up to a certain stream. The other then 
presented his own 1939 deed (escritura), signed by several authorities, which affirmed he was 
                                                        
58 In chapter 8, I briefly discuss “collective” ejidos, where agricultural or natural resource extraction work is 
truly a group enterprise, usually for commercial purposes. Among the 33 RAN study núcleos, only Las Armas 
partially fits this description.  
59 Laura Nader wrote of Talea (1990, 38) that “there is one common theme in regard to property: property 
(houses and land) is individually owned. A piece of property may be inerited jointly by a pair of siblings, but 
this joint ownership is usually temporary […] for joint ownership of property foreshadows conflict. The 
individual-ownership pattern […] does not imply that the use of property is individual. On the contrary, 
individual ownership is accompanied by joint use of property with the nuclear family.”  
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the owner “up to the hill called Lomo Tabe.” The two parties decided to divide the conflict area 
in half (RAN 1985). For Totomoxtla in 1945, at least fifteen “domain title transfers” had been 
recorded in the in Public Property Registry; each represented a “private sale deed” (escritura) 
with a “cadastral value” of 100 pesos (RAN 1945). The individual comuneros “had for decades 
been selling their lands and solares to people from Yolox and Quiotepec for laughable prices 
[…] The Quiotepecans obliged them to work the lands as contractors” (Pérez García 1996b, 
249). A teacher from another village helped them improve their harvests, until they were able to 
buy back 36 of the lost parcels (Pérez García 1996b, 331-3). 
Guelatao, as the birthplace of the beloved 19th-century president Benito Jáurez, is a 
symbolic bastion of indigenous pride which pointedly rejected PROCEDE altogether. It is ironic, 
then, that (like Talea) its small territory was carved from neighboring núcleos well after they had 
been established, and that “it never had communal lands, as proven by the neighboring villages' 
documents; indeed, it couldn't even benefit from colonial-era laws, because of the mix of lots 
belonging to its own inhabitants and those of Ixtlán […] There exists ample individual 
documentation of sales, transfer, and willed inheritance of lands” (RAN 1992). In 1969, the 
Guelatao community participated in a precise survey of individually-“owned” parcels by the 
federal water ministry; the resulting map shows only a variable-width riparian strip as “forested,” 
without a parcel number, implying that this was the sole non-urban “common use area” (SRH 
1969a).  
In La Alicia in 1961, RAN performed a precursor to PROCEDE’s surveying of grandes 
areas – a formal (though unmapped) internal division into common use, parceled, and human 
settlement zones.  According to the Resolución Presidencial, and confirmed by the núcleo’s own 
law (Mandamiento del Ejecutivo Local), 33 of the 57 ejidatarios were given 10-ha parcels in 
well-watered area, while the rest were given 20-ha parcels in the rotative-agriculture area. After 
subtracting the 20-ha urban zone, this left about 1,450 ha in de facto common use (“for use by 
the petitioning village”), which included both “hilly” and “cultivable” lands (RAN 1961). 
In 1992, a comunero who had left the Tepetotutla to live in Oaxaca City asked the 
assembly to readmit him. However, upon leaving the community he had already sold his “house, 
solar, and part of his coffee parcels, as required by federal law” (RAN 1992). In Cuatlamayán in 
170 
 
  
1998, just before PROCEDE’s first meeting with the núcleo, the assembly passed an “acta de 
asignación de parcela,” authorizing a man to divide his parcel among his sons. The document 
contained sketch maps and precise legal delimitations of boundaries60 (Comunidad de 
Cuatlamayán 1998). 
In the Oaxaca RAN office in 2009, I overheard a campesino complain that the rights to the 
parcel he had worked for 20 years were in his brother-in-law’s name. The RAN administrator 
explained to him that, because it was social property, the RAN couldn’t do anything – the 
transfer had to be resolved by the núcleo’s assembly. The most that the Procuraduría Agraria 
(government legal advocate for rural residents) could do is to help him convocate the assembly. 
These examples show how the state often has expected villages to realize the social 
property ideals of Zapata and Cárdenas to an unrealistic degree. Other items show that the state 
nevertheless expects village authorities to execute any internal boundary paperwork with the 
same precision, formality, and thoroughness with which it carries out its own cadastral work. 
Even though – or perhaps because – Yagila did not have its individual parcels or solares 
surveyed by PROCEDE, Article 22 of its “boilerplate” community statute (see subsection 5.2.1, 
below) states that the núcleo authorities’ responsibilities include “issuing documents 
(constancias) of possession of solares or parcels, and internal credentials of comuneros, to those 
who fulfill its statute and by authorization of the assembly.” An entire section, section 2 (RAN 
2001b), details practices concerning these de facto parcels (tierras parceladas de hecho) – 
although, my based on my fieldwork experiences, few of these requirements are fulfilled during 
a typical parcel assignment or change in ownership:  
Article 75 – The existence and assigning of de facto parcels in the community of San 
Juan Yagila is granted to those comuneros in possession, use, and enjoyment of their 
parcel, as is the ceding of rights to it in favor of their family members and 
avecindados, as stipulated in article 101 of the Agrarian Law, whichever his or her 
preference be. 
                                                        
60 Similarly, in a núcleo in the Central Valley of Oaxaca, “within the village, of course, private lands are 
recognized and sold between community members. Private plots are legally recognized if a deed of sale is 
registered in Etla [the county seat] and the necessary taxes paid each year. In such a case the plots are 
registered as private lands within the communal holdings of the village. Because it requires paying taxes each 
year in Etla, few people declare private title to their bottomland” (Dennis 1987, 41). This appears to be an 
example of full privatization recognized by the municipio but not by the pre-PROCEDE federal government. 
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Article 76 – Each comunero is obliged to delimit his parcels by drawing up 
(levantando) Actas de Conformidad with his neighbors, and should put up parcel 
boundary markers. 
Article 77 – Each comunero will accredit the right over a parcel with the Certificate 
of Agrarian Rights, or by the Constancia de Posesión issued by the comisariado with 
full authorization of the assembly; it should contain basic data about the comunero 
and about the parcel (measurements, neighboring properties, and name in Zapotec of 
the paraje (place) where it is located). 
 
From time to time in all periods, the state has used the communal ideals of the Mexican 
Revolution to justify denying, or threatening to deny, social property status to a village it found 
to be too individual oriented, although the criteria for “too individual” varies among times and 
places.  
An absence of individual parcels in a núcleo was occasionally noted in correspondence 
with the state. In 1937, the residents of Tazáquil claimed that they “have always worked their 
lands in communal form, without any of them being recognized as an individual owner of any 
parcel (lote), except for the pequeños propietarios noted on the map” (RAN 1937, 67). However, 
the ejido may not have been entirely truthful. The letter accompanied a request to the 
government for a 44-hectare extension of their territory, so it is not surprising that it speaks to the 
ideal of communal peasantry which suffused the Cárdenas administration.  
Documents from nine núcleos attest to uncertainty, at one time or another, about whether 
a village should be considered a social property núcleo at all. The extent of this “status 
unresolved” category after the 1992 land tenure reforms is shown Figure 7.1 (page 300) and 
Figure 7.2 (page 305). In Yatzona, for example, a 1981 government inquiry found that the 
community was unsuitable for an RTBC because “it lacks property, possession, and dominion of 
the claimed lands; and furthermore, it does not maintain a communal state of exploitation of the 
lands, neither de facto nor de jure” (RAN 1981, 93). However, since the same government 
readily admits that only about 7 percent of núcleos engage in true “collective exploitation” 
(INEGI 2008), Yatzona must have been deemed to be exceptionally individual-oriented. This 
does seem to have been the case: the engineer who interviewed the comunidad authorities and 26 
campesinos attested that “they stated they had no interest in following through on the RTBC 
dossier, since most of them use [usufructan] their land in the form of individual property, as they 
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had written in an acta of November 16, 1980, signed by them and certified by the presidente 
municipal” (RAN 1981, 91). Because it was failed to achieve legal social property status, 
Yatzona has not become a candidate for PROCEDE surveying and certification. To the extent 
that PROCEDE work generally hastens the demise of village-scale practices, it is ironic that 
today Yatzona may be maintaining more of its residual village orientation than some of its 
PROCEDE-surveyed neighbors, precisely because it was found to be not village-oriented enough 
thirty years ago. 
Talea requested an RTBC when it received its titles for communal lands in 1958 (RAN 
1984b); the RTBC was not issued until 1984. The document was soon thereafter declared 
invalid, after government technicians discovered that Talea was “failing to work its land 
communally.” The village did finally receive the equivalent of a permanent RTBC 1994, 
apparently because by then it had shown the government where its common use (forest) zone 
was located (RAN 1997d). In this case, in order to prove its worthiness as a social property 
núcleo, it had to expressly segregate its communally and individually worked areas.  
In 1990, RAN investigated “ejido parcel usufruct” as it was practiced in La Alicia, to 
clarify the individual agrarian rights of those assigned to care for land meant to benefit the ejido 
directly. Two days later, the community deprived four ejidatarios of their rights, for having 
instead “personally cultivated their granted units for more than two years” (RAN 1990). 
Even the PROCEDE program has sometimes been perceived as a state interference in 
village affairs which hinders the free transfer of parcels among individuals. In Talea during a 
PRM meeting, a comunero declared that “no one explained to us what PROCEDE implied. It's 
like the government became owners – they can take it away whenever they want to, though 
they're unlikely to do so. Now it's more complicated since PROCEDE, unlike in the urban zone 
[i.e., Villa Talea de Castro, not surveyed by PROCEDE], where you are the owner of your solar, 
and you just need to go to the notary public” (interview with Miranda 2009). This statement is 
surprising and fascinating, for two interrelated reasons. First, it shows that the government’s 
expressed justification for neoliberal reform – to remove government regulation from individual 
actions – is sometimes seen as actually having the opposite effect (examples of this perception in 
Nicaragua are found in Broegaard 2009, 158). Second, it reveals a perception that the state is 
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more of an “owner” of a núcleo’s land once PROCEDE has surveyed individual parcels than 
before. However, we should be cautious about making too much of this statement, for two 
reasons. First, Talea is a PROCEDE-parceled comunidad (not an ejido), and so it is in a sort of 
limbo state, with government-recognized individual parcels, yet without the freedom of legal 
individual parcel transactions to any buyer. Second, the comunero’s sentiment is only possible in 
a country with Mexico’s long history of informal transactions never recorded by the state. 
State-núcleo interactions tend to demonstrate a mixture of individual and village-scale 
orientation. Only rarely does the blend take the form of an outright contradiction. Rather more 
often, the blend results from an ambiguity – a lack of clear and consistently applied policy or 
definition, perhaps sometimes to deliberately avoid having to resolve a politically expedient 
difference between de jure law and de facto practice. Most often, however, the blend is a 
“hybrid” – a practice or policy which is clearly and consistently applied in a certain place and 
time period, and in which the individual and village-oriented components are well understood 
and accepted by the parties involved, although not always practiced or enforced. 
One of the questions PROCEDE functionaries asked prior to a núcleo’s survey was "Does 
community have parceled lands?” In one comunidad, the ambiguity inherent in the question was 
revealed by the answer being given as “yes,” but then changed to “no” after the next question 
("What kind of economic parceling is there?") had been answered (RAN 2006b). A similar 
uncertainty was revealed in 1978, when a schoolteacher in a different núcleo requested that the 
government identify a piece of “communal land” and condemn these “terrenos particulares” 
(individual parcels) and donate them to the school. Nine years later, the núcleo did 
“symbolically” transfer the property to the federal education ministry (RAN 1977-80). 
One example, from Tepetotula, raises the question: does a núcleo consist of its people 
(especially the ejidatarios and comuneros, with mainly inherited membership), or rather its 
territory, regardless of who owns and lives in it? In 1979, the government decided it had to 
perform the work for this núcleo’s Resolución Presidencial a second time (declaring the first 
attempt, from 1975, as invalid), because in the interim it had realized that the villagers who 
occupied the territory during the original 1934 land grant had subsequently left, to be replaced by 
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the current group61 (RAN 1980d). This hints at a strong link between people and their territory 
under Mexico’s social property system, compared to, for example, any incorporated town or city 
in the United States, where the entire replacement of residents would not necessitate a new 
charter or new local laws. It also places a greater responsibility on the residents of a núcleo to 
continue to physically occupy their territory, lest they risk losing their rights as social property 
beneficiaries, as almost happened to the residents of Buenavista in the 1960s (RAN 1968-72).  
Another case concerns a group of villagers who currently occupy the highland Chinantec 
comunidad of Totomoxtla, but who have deep historical ties to the humid lowland tropical/cloud 
forest territory of Chimalaco 25 km away (Pérez García 1996b, 328). The ambiguities which 
such cases present are problematic for any standardized cadastral system.  
The case of Tampate offers a different kind of ambiguity more specific to the problems of 
a social property system. Tampate is composed of a heterogeneous collection of marginalized 
Huasteca hill farmers who had been granted a dotación of 4,063 “worthless” hectares in 1923, 
though they apparently never functioned as an ejido. By 1979, there were 1,906 inhabitants (440 
heads of household), apparently some mix of non-farmers and day laborers or sharecroppers. 
Their request for a grant of fertile lowlands was denied in 1980, although two years later 82 
“campesinos with secure rights” were allowed to move to lands in the Pujal-Coy Irrigation 
District (RAN 1979-82). On the INEGI 1:50,000-scale topographic map, and in air photographs, 
the dispersed settlement pattern of the lower, flatter eastern section of Tampate is evident, with 
scattered farms intermixed with forest and secondary vegetation through the linear ridges and 
incised valleys which cover most of the núcleo’s territory. 
Other anecdotes illustrate how the state retained and reasserted its role in village policies 
whenever it issues one of the major núcleo-defining decrees. A 1940 dotación granted communal 
title to an ejido, but the ejidatarios were obligated to keep their roads in good shape, to “subject 
themselves to what the federal government dictates regarding ejido administration, and 
economic, agricultural, and social administration,” and to “comply with regulations dictated by 
the Agriculture and Development Ministry regarding conservation, restoration, and propagation 
                                                        
61 A related case is that of Huichimal. Here, the government was uncertain whether it had to initiate a new 
Resolución Presidencial after the original núcleo was divided into several separate ejidos (RAN 2003a). 
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of their forests and woodlands” (RAN 1940a, 5). A 1966 map showed that the federal parastatal 
PEMEX was digging an oil or gas well in another núcleo, but the absence of any mention of it in 
the accompanying documents implies that state owes community nothing when it exploits an 
entirely nationalized resource such as petroleum (RAN 1966b). When the state surveyed another 
núcleo in 1973 (to include urban zone exclave), they called the entire ejido “property of the 
nation” (DAAC 1973), a term usually reserved for lands outside of both private and social 
control. 
At the same time, the government usually treated ejidos or comunidades as unitary 
stakeholders when other landowners asked to share their natural resource of water. In 1941, the 
Water Office of the government’s Agrarian Department received applications from different 
private landowners for permission to use specified volumes of water from the El Bañito springs 
(for a swimming area) and the Río Choy (for irrigation). Because these waters passed through the 
ejido of Huichimal, its authorities were contacted by the government for their approval of the 
proposal (RAN 1941, 37-40). This was the only pre-1992 reference to a water rights concession I 
found in the RAN documents. The predecessors of CONAGUA certainly enforced concession 
laws and kept records of them,62 but this seems to have only concerned the RAN when private 
landowners engaged with their social property neighbors.  
5.1.2 Mechanics of the state’s social property land tenure initiatives 
Because it was the state’s vehicle for gradually implementing the ideals of the Mexican 
Revolution, the RTBC surveying and certification of comunidades obviously emphasized the 
village as a territorial unit and legal landowner. To earn an RTBC or similar document, a 
comunidad’s residents were technically required to prove that they had “been possessing the 
lands in communal, peaceful, public character since time immemorial”; pre-existing titles from 
                                                        
62 The Archivo Histórico del Agua (AHA) is an archive and library in Mexico City with approximately 
100,000 dossiers (expedientes), reports, and other materials related to CONAGUA and its precursors, and to 
water in general in Mexico. Some of the materials are available online (http://archivohistoricodelagua. 
info/mx/), including its quarterly publication Boletín del Archivo Histórico del Agua. A worthwhile research 
project may be to build upon the present study by examining any materials in the AHA pertaining to the same 
33 RAN document study nucleos, thereby approaching the land/water nexus from the “water” side rather than 
from the “land” side. 
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the colonial period or later were helpful, but not necessary. The final document typically 
described the perimeter boundary in segment lengths and compass directions (metes and 
bounds), with each point given a number or a boundary marker name (RAN 1977-81). The 
comuneros received “certificates of recognition of community membership,” although in several 
cases some residents were excluded because they had been absent from community for over two 
years (RAN 1983). 
The last Resoluciones Presidenciales were not executed until the PROCEDE program had 
already begun. While the cartographic products from these procedures were as modern in 
appearance as contemporaneous PROCEDE ones, the overall process was different than with 
PROCEDE. The surveying techniques were more old-fashioned (employing a “surveyor’s line” 
rather than total station sites with precise GPS coordinates), few or none of the PROCEDE 
standard procedures or “boilerplate” documents were generated, and fewer options were offered 
for sub-núcleo land tenure classes (RAN 2002a). 
The only recurring complaints I encountered regarding pre-PROCEDE surveying 
initiatives were about tardiness. Many of the archival documents convey an ejido or comunidad’s 
exasperation at the long delays between the government initiating or considering some work and 
its finishing the job. At least 10 of the 33 RAN document study núcleos had to wait over twenty 
years for Resolución Presidencial or RTBC work to be completed, for reasons which included 
the philosophical status uncertainties I discussed in the previous pages (which contributed to 
Buenavista’s fifty year wait), weather delays,  and simple incompetence and neglect. A typical 
example is Las Palmas, which petitioned the Cardenas government to appropriate the finca (large 
private estate) of La Amalia in 1938, but was officially granted ejido status in 1961 (RAN 
1971a). Whatever its political or cultural consequences, the PROCEDE program’s undisputed 
efficiency is all the more impressive when compared with its predecessors.  
Some anecdotes recount how third party intermediaries would involve themselves in the 
affairs between núcleos and the government. The most frequent external presence was of various 
pro-campesino unions which offered assistance to, or at least solidarity with, ejido and 
comunidad authorities as they negotiated with the state.  
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The first example, from 1969, provides an ad hoc preview of PROCEDE.  At the request 
of the Chimalaco ejido assembly, a government engineer was sent from Mexico City to do parcel 
surveys, but the ejidatarios complained that they didn’t trust that particular engineer. The 
Confederación Nacional Campesina helped the ejido file the complaint, thus revealing that their 
loyalty was with ejido assembly decisions, even if this resulted in a rare state-sanctioned survey 
of individual parcels (RAN 1968, 205). In 1989, the same union strayed even further into 
government responsibilities, by commissioning topographers on behalf of the ejido of Huichimal 
to survey boundaries in a piece of land disputed with three other núcleos. Their survey was 
accepted a year later by the government as definitive (RAN 1989a). 
Lachichina was officially considered private land while it awaited its Resolución 
Presidencial, which was finally decreed in 1980. When it became legally social, the de facto and 
de jure ambiguities and contradictions in its tenure system and history were used by village 
authorities as ammunition to wage a personal vendetta against a comunero who was accused of 
spending too much time away from the comunidad. A union, part of Confederación Nacional 
Campesina, helped the village authorities with their case as they sought to deprive a resident of 
his coffee farm (RAN 1989-90). A PROCEDE-era example demonstrates union encouragement 
of resistance to the government program. In Las Palmas, the leftist Campesinos de America 
Unidos supported the decision of a few ejidatarios to skip the meeting when PROCEDE 
individual parcel certificates were delivered (RAN 2005d).  
Another intermediary in a few núcleo-government interactions was the primary school 
teacher, typically a formally educated, leftist-sympathizing urbanite with pretensions of 
organizing campesinos to better their conditions. In the several examples I encountered from 
various time periods, the teacher soon encounters opposition within the núcleo they are 
ostensibly trying to assist. One example is from Talea, where, according to one informant, 
“teachers from all over tried to take away land from the comunidad, for mining” (interview with 
Miranda 2009). 
I examined documents from the entire period of the PROCEDE program (1993 to 2006), 
and from the first two years of the successor FANAR program (January 2007 through January 
2009); in other words, from the first fifteen years of the implementation of neoliberal land tenure 
178 
 
  
reform. Among the 33 study núcleos, the PROCEDE-FANAR program began in 1994 in 
Tazáquil, a small Nahuatl-speaking Huasteca ejido on the Panamerican Highway, and ended in 
2007 in Tiltepec, a Zapotec-speaking comunidad in highland Oaxaca. Four of the 33 núcleos 
were surveyed and certified by PROCEDE very early in the program (1994-1995), all of these in 
the Huasteca. Eight núcleos were surveyed and certified very late in the study period (2005-
2007), half of them in Oaxaca and half in the Huasteca. 
The following anecdotes illustrate uncertainty about whether or not to participate in 
PROCEDE, including about the degree to which it promotes village-scale orientation. Some 
demonstrate assessments of PROCEDE by villagers several years after surveying had occurred. 
These anecdotes, unless cited otherwise, derive from the community questionnaires conducted 
during the México Indígena research project. 
Documents reveal that in Yagila at first expressed a desire for parcel certificates, but later 
decided against the idea (RAN 2001d). In Cuatlamayán, true to its history of initiating semi-
formal parcel surveys (reflective of its dispersed settlement pattern) while proudly retaining 
village-scale autonomy, also at first desired PROCEDE parcel certificates, but later opted instead 
to have only a few civic parcels surveyed (RAN 1997c). Much like Cuatlamayán, the comunidad 
of Zoochila (within the Oaxaca geodata analysis area but not one of the 33 RAN document study 
núcleos) has a “partly de jure, but self-generated, land tenure system – a ‘privatized’ indigenous 
community, yet without an internal PROCEDE survey” (interview with Cruz Piñeda 2008). 
In the comunidad of Tancuime, PROCEDE was initially rebuffed, although not 
unanimously. In 1998, 140 voted in favor of PROCEDE doing some work, while 68 opposed, 
and 44 abstained. “During the assembly, diverse points concerning this program were presented, 
some considering it good to renew the community's and standardize the list of comuneros; others 
felt the PROCEDE program would not benefit them, and would not resolve any problems, and 
could create a situation where comuneros want to sell their parcels or solares to people from 
outside the community, and that this would create internal disorganization.” In the end, all 212 
comuneros voted for PROCEDE to measure the perimeter boundary, but not to survey and 
certify individual parcels (RAN 1998m). In the ejido of La Pila, exactly half of the ejidatarios 
initially were in favor of PROCEDE work (RAN 1997b, 13), but the núcleo eventually chose to 
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have its individual parcels surveyed. In Las Armas, there was some initial reluctance to do 
PROCEDE work, mainly for fear of having to pay new taxes63 (RAN 1993a), but this ejido also 
did finally have parcels surveyed.  
The PROCEDE program gave ejidos and comunidades an opportunity to update their 
membership lists to include newer residents who worked plots and collaborated in village life. 
Some núcleos embraced this opportunity more than others. La Pila admitted 119 new ejidatarios, 
but a document from the meeting in which PROCEDE delivered parcel certificates shows 
uncertainty about how many should share rights to common use area (RAN 1997b, 27). In Talea, 
authorities attested to me that even today there is “no community statute, but we need one, to 
clarify the rights and obligations of comuneros with parcels on the list [produced through 
PROCEDE]; their obligations aren't clear to them” (interview with Pascual García 2009). In 
Tancuime, the assembly of comuneros faced a dilemma: it wanted to add its large population of 
526 residents without de facto agricultural plots to its membership list, but was told (erroneously, 
to my knowledge64) that this would have necessitated allowing PROCEDE to survey and title 
their individual solares in the human settlement areas. To avoid this perceived imposition of land 
privatization, “the general assembly proposed to continue granting this recognition only within 
the community” (RAN 2005a, 31).   
The most common reason I was given for a núcleo deciding to participate in the 
PROCEDE program was to prevent or resolve boundary disputes with neighboring núcleos, 
sometimes expressed as “invasions”; this theme had also been common during the earlier state 
programs such as RTBC. Examples include Talea (Toro Yescas 2009) and Chimalaco. Less 
often, PROCEDE surveying of individual parcels was thought to prevent “fights among parcel 
[owners],” a notion attested in Las Armas. In this sense, PROCEDE participation can be 
considered a product of village orientation, and may in some cases enhance that orientation – 
                                                        
63 In their review of cadastral mapping as it developed in the service of European states, Roger Kain and 
Elizabeth Baigent (1992, 336) affirm that “the collecting of taxes and state revenues from land and resources 
drawn from that land, has been the overwhelming reason” for the growing practice. 
64 Lachixola, in the Oaxaca study region, had PROCEDE survey its individual parcels while avoiding 
surveying of its solares, thus keeping its main population center a “common use area.” Talea achieved much 
the same thing by excluding its main population center, though not its residents, from the núcleo altogether. 
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although, by (theoretically) quelling conflicts between one núcleo and another, it could also 
contribute to the elimination of one important source of village unity. 
In a more individual-oriented vein, the ejidos of Chimalaco and Tazáquil, expressed 
satisfaction with PROCEDE parcel surveying because it provided them with the exact size of 
each parcel, and so taxes could be paid fairly by hectares, rather than equally by each community 
member. Tazáquil was also one of the few communities to mention a commonly stated neoliberal 
justification for individualized agricultural land tenure: that bank loans would be easier to obtain. 
Residents of La Pila in 2007 expressed the opinion that “PROCEDE is beneficial because 
now we can sell parcels and solares, so there aren’t any more people demanding land, because 
now they have rights.” I am not certain what this was meant to convey, but it is possible that, by 
making a formal transfer of parcel rights more feasible than before, PROCEDE may actually 
raise the “barrier to entry” for outsiders to acquire land within the ejido boundaries. In other 
words, by requiring extra effort and paperwork, it is possible (though not at all certain) that some 
who normally would have acquired a parcel informally would decide that it isn’t worth the 
bother. This may actually reinforce the difference between insiders and outsiders, as Concheiro 
Borques and Diego Quintana (1998, 168) observed in varied regions on Mexico where 
“campesinos from the same village sell parcels to each other in order to maintain their 
communities.”  
In Talea, a minority of comuneros was displeased with the eagerness of their núcleo 
authorities to authorize parcel surveying by PROCEDE. According to one older comunero, the 
comisariado during PROCEDE was “inexperienced and foolhardy” by allowing land-based 
actions to take place which only benefitted a few families, and some residents were considering a 
joint effort to undo these actions (interview with Miranda 2009). 
5.1.3 Reactions to other post-1992 state programs related to land use 
Besides property surveys and related actions, some RAN anecdotes and fieldwork 
interviews touched on other state programs and interests concerning natural resources in social 
property territories. One of the earliest documents I read is a surprisingly “eco-friendly” 
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boilerplate local statute enacted in Chimalaco in the 1920s, which includes this passage (RAN 
1928, 5-6): 
“Fifth: The residents [vecinos] of the Rancheria of Chimalaco are obligated, from this 
day onwards, to maintain, conserve, and promote the existing forest vegetation on the 
surface of the land conceded to them, and exploit it common, applying the product of 
said exploitation to the public services of the community, with the understanding that 
this cultivation of woodland be subject to the regulations [ordenaciones] relevant 
within the Forest Law [Ley de Bosques].” 
 
During my fieldwork, some núcleos expressed satisfaction with various recent 
government initiatives. Totomoxtla “has no problems with government programs – a recent one 
is for deer hideouts – because they are often dealt with through NGOs, like the World Wildlife 
Fund” (interview with Pérez 2009). Yagila is “happy with the Payments for Environmental 
Services [PES] programs. The government has fulfilled its promises. CONAFOR [the federal 
forestry agency] helps pay us to bring pine saplings from nurseries in Tlacolula or Ixtlán” 
(interview with Ramos Francisco 2009).  
Talea, on the other hand, was disappointed with the PES program. In 2008, CONAFOR 
tried to convince the comunidad authorities to participate, promising it would pay the community 
to build a nursery for pine trees, and that it would pay 5 pesos for each tree they planted. It 
turned out that the community had to buy the seedlings themselves (at 10 pesos each). The 
community, skeptical of the government’s proposals, chose to do the reforestation tasks 
themselves, such as maintaining aclareos (small clearings to encourage faster growth of fewer 
trees), favoring natural seed banks over a capital and labor-intensive nursery, and emphasizing a 
certain variety of pine which they saw as a more secure investment than the one suggested by the 
government (Toro Yescas 2009; PRM workshop comments). 
Talea’s negative reaction to the PES proposal was exacerbated by the fact that one of the 
principal reasons for the program is to encourage the protection of water quality and abundance. 
While the state assumed Sierra residents would be grateful to receive tangible economic benefits, 
and official recognition, as guardians of the region’s water, Taleans rightly understood that the 
true beneficiaries of the program would be private commercial interests, specifically a large 
brewery and Coca-Cola bottling plant in the downstream city of Tuxtepec. While enlightened 
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economists might applaud the fact that these commercial interests were paying for part of the 
PES program, Taleans felt that this arrangement meant the government was “trying to take over 
[adueñarse] and sell its water to the big companies” (Toro Yescas 2009). 
In Santa Cruz, another water-related assistance program serves as an example of the state 
bypassing the village altogether to assist individual farmers directly, despite the general attitude 
toward water as a community affair. There, the state of Oaxaca loaned machinery to certain 
ejidatarios so they could make irrigation ditches (interview with Lázaro Reyes 2009). 
5.2  Land tenure practices before and after the 1992 reforms 
In this section I explore land tenure practices in the RAN document study núcleos, for any 
insight they might provide into individual and village-scale orientation by themselves as well as 
for any contrast that might be discerned between them and the water-related practices I will 
consider in section 5.3. The principal finding is that land tenure practices tended to express a 
hybrid of individual and village-scale orientation before 1992, and that this hybrid orientation 
has persisted after the PROCEDE program was implemented. While the post-1992 anecdote data 
set is not large, it does appear that some núcleos, perhaps surprisingly, have shown signs of a 
slight increase in village orientation toward land tenure in this period.   
5.2.1 Examples of village-scale and individual orientation 
I begin with a pre-1992 example of hybrid orientation. Many of the núcleos indicated a 
scornful attitude toward individual selling of land or resources, but tended to reserve this scorn 
for occasions when it suited them for other reasons. In Lachixila, a poor Mixe man had arrived in 
1968, and the comunidad allowed him to work a paraje (in this case, a parcel of communal land), 
as long has he fulfilled his duties as a village citizen. However, the man refused to let others 
work the paraje, even in 1983 killing his son-in-law when he tried to work on the parcel. In 
1987, the community accused the man of “trafficking in communal lands.” The accused replied 
that he was no longer the owner, but rather his children were, and that no one from Lachixila was 
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working anywhere near the parcel. In 1989, the community denounced him further, for having 
taken away the “best irrigated lands” to raise cattle and plant maize (RAN 1987-89b). 
I continue with several post-1992 anecdotes which indicate village-scale orientation. Two 
neighboring comunidades, Cuatlamayán and Cuajenco, chose to invert the PROCEDE paradigm 
by keeping their parcels in the legal common use area, while creating only a few individual 
parcels, all of them deeded to the community for civic purposes. It is surely not coincidental that 
both comunidades maintain a mainly dispersed settlement pattern; in Cuatlamayán, “only ten 
percent of residents live in the main population center” (interview with Hernández Reyes 2009). 
In such núcleos, the distinction between “urban house lot” and “agricultural parcel” is largely 
meaningless, although a few public features – school, water tower, cemetery, and community 
building – are clustered at a central location (RAN 1998e). It is possible that the residents of 
these núcleos understood that, because they were comunidades and not ejidos, any parcels they 
did create through PROCEDE would be protected from full privatization, at least under current 
law. Las Palmas did undergo standard PROCEDE parceling, but chose not to survey even the 
perimeter of its hilly 5,000-hectare territorial expansion (ampliación) (RAN 2005d). Thus, in the 
post-1992-reform era it remains with a large portion of its land in the same category as núcleos 
which did not participate in PROCEDE whatsoever.   
In five of the nine Huasteca ejidos and comunidades who participated in México Indígena 
project – Chimalaco, Tazáquil, Las Armas, Santa Cruz, and La Pila – tequio was reported to be 
as active as it had been before the 1992 reforms; indeed, these were the same five núcleos which 
underwent PROCEDE parceling. Residents of El Chuchupe attested that “parcel sales are not 
allowed, even among ejidatarios,” while even the meticulous meetings conducted in five núcleos 
to identify the characteristics of all parcels only found a few parcel sales in La Pila. In the 
Oaxaca comunidad of Teotlaxco, PROCEDE representatives found that “some work outside the 
núcleo for months, but are still considered comuneros, represented by family members” (RAN 
2006b).   
Other anecdotes highlight elements of individual orientation in communities. I begin with 
several from before the PROCEDE initiative. 
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The Mexican government since the Revolution has generally promoted itself as committed 
to the pro-community ideals which emerged, albeit in compromised fashion, during that period. 
Even during the current neoliberalized era, these ideals are often expressed as central to the 
national identity.65 Nevertheless, I was surprised to encounter quite a few anecdotes, from before 
1992 and after, in which the state wanted a núcleo to act more village-oriented than the núcleo 
itself preferred. 
In 1968, Chimalaco ejido authorities asked the federal agrarian agency DAAC to conduct 
the “parceling of our ejido, or indicate to whom we should make this request, so it be done as 
quickly as possible. This parceling was approved by the assembly through a majority of votes, 
and recorded in the book of minutes” (RAN 1968, 201). The DAAC replied that they should 
petition the governor, or else another state agency they specified. The ejido replied by asking 
again for the “parceling of our ejido, since only by parceling will the many problems we have, 
and have not been able to resolve.” The community had formed a committee of five to carefully 
study how to divide up the parcels for each ejidatario (RAN 1968, 205). 
In Tampate in 1972, a comunero complained that others would not let him harvest his own 
coffee trees, and that this was because of the chaotic usufruct system, where “each campesino is 
working any parcel merely according to the possibilities each one has to cultivate them.” He 
mistakenly believed that a Resolución Presidencial, which had not yet been issued, would 
include carefully surveyed individual parceling (RAN 1972b). In Chacatitla in 1977, a comunero 
sold 1 ha of his land to his son for 2,000 pesos, but the SRA (state ministry which includes the 
RAN) informed him that the transaction “had no validity,” that “invariably a parcel cannot be 
divided but must remain registered in the name of the titular comunero,” and the son should take 
the money back from the father, which father was willing to do (RAN 1977a). In 1981, a dispute 
over rights to a water source in Lachichina included one resident trying to charge the others 
100,000 pesos. The others retorted that this was “unjust, seeing how this is no longer private 
property, according to our Resolución Presidencial” – implying that at least some residents 
assumed the comunidad was private property before the Resolución (RAN 1984-86). 
                                                        
65 Since the Institutional Revolutionary Party regained the presidency of Mexico in 2012, it is likely that such 
rhetoric will only increase, at least temporarily. One plank in the party’s platform asserts that “no form of 
property or social organization should be excluded” (PRI 2012). 
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In 1992, just as the Salinas administration was neoliberalizing the Mexican Constitution, 
the government nevertheless expressed concern about individuals profiting from natural 
resources. In Lachichina (not to be confused with Lachixila), one of the local authorities was 
cutting wood and selling it as an individual. The Agriculture and Hydrological Resources 
Ministry (SARH) sent a forest engineer to investigate this “illegal activity,” but the engineer 
found that the wood was mainly just used within the community, to repair houses (RAN 1991-
92). 
PROCEDE-parceled comunidades, more than ejidos, are left with neither the degree of de 
facto freedom they enjoyed before to regulate land tenure, nor the de jure freedom envisioned by 
the architects of neoliberalism. In Talea, this has in a way forced the núcleo to act in a more 
village-oriented fashion than they had before, and more than they would prefer to act. For 
example, some complain that “before, a parcel owner could divide up his parcel and give a piece 
to each of his sons, just by getting a document signed by a judge; but now, he can't, he can only 
give it to one son” (interview with Toro Yescas 2009). In other words, by establishing more state 
regulatory involvement, PROCEDE can actually reintroduce some aspects of the original social 
property system, even if this is seen as a burden by some villagers. Another example is Las 
Armas, which asked for full title for their parcels, but according to the community questionnaire 
administered by the México Indígena team, for some reason the ejido’s request was rejected by 
the government. 
Two Huasteca localities, La Subida (RAN 2003b) and Tampate, barely met the general 
criteria as social property núcleos, but achieved some village-scale political organization as the 
PROCEDE program was winding down. In the case of Tampate, the state government’s 
indigenous affairs coordinator attempted to impose a comunidad-style system on what is, in legal 
terms, a failed attempt at an ejido. A 2011 newspaper article describes the incident as a conflict 
between rival factions within the village, and that violence was only narrowly averted 
(Castellanos 2011). Even in the post-1992-reform era, then, there are Mexican state bureaucrats 
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whose sympathy for perceived indigenous community values clashes with the more individual-
oriented preferences of at least some of the local stakeholders.66 
The type of local law which most closely conforms to the state’s idea of legal robustness 
is the estatuto comunal (ejido or comunidad statute). However, on the eve of the 1992 land 
tenure reforms, only 6 of the 13 núcleos which responded to this question claimed to have such a 
statute in force (RAN 1998g; RAN 1998m, 140; RAN 2001b; RAN 2005f). During the 
PROCEDE process, two of the comunidades with existing community statutes decided to update 
them (Yagila and Cacalotepec), while two others decided to enact them apparently for the first 
time – Santa Bárbara (RAN 1999i, 31) and Totomoxtla (RAN 2000c). This represents an 
example of PROCEDE encouraging, or at least a formalizing, greater village orientation. 
However, these four PROCEDE-era community statutes are clearly “boilerplate,” state-initiated 
texts which hardly vary from one núcleo to the next and rarely deal with the unique problems 
and issues in any particular one.  
I continue with a few post-1992 items that speak to the persistence or increase of some 
individually-oriented practices. Signs of increased individual orientation in some ejidos and 
comunidades include declines in the practice of tequio (in Cuatlamayán and La Pila), and the 
elimination of tequio activities connected to the land or natural resources (in El Chuchupe). 
Another sign of individualization is the decision to not establish any legal common use area 
during the PROCEDE surveying process, as happened in Lachixola (RAN 2002c), or to greatly 
reduce the de facto common use area as occurred in Chimalaco (diminishing its area from 70 ha 
to fewer than 6 ha). 
The selling of parcels may have increased since the 1992 land tenure reforms (see sub-
section 5.2.3, below), but only marginally, and the proportion of buyers from outside the 
communities has yet to make an appreciable impact in the study regions. However, even sales 
between community members were reported during México Indígena workshops to be 
problematic. In Cuatlamayán, these sales “generate conflicts among families.” In Chimalaco, 
“sales have been made without consent of the assembly, nor of the authorities.” In Tazáquil, 
                                                        
66 Other cases of inter-agency conflicts of goals were noted by Zoomers and vander Haar (2000) in their review 
of bureaucratic procedures during recent land tenure reforms in Latin America. 
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“clandestine sales are being made [. . .] by handing over one’s parcel title.” Only the latter two of 
these three núcleos had PROCEDE parcel surveying done, but it does seem plausible that, by 
giving each individual a universally recognized document tied to a specific parcel of land, 
PROCEDE has made it easier for anyone to surrender control of their land, sometimes under 
dubious terms. Of course, easier transfer of individual parcels was the goal of the neoliberal 
project – but the continued practice of doing so under dubious terms was the very antithesis of its 
stated intentions. 
5.2.2 PROCEDE’s standardizing of tenure categories: Problems and adjustments 
The most radical legal change introduced by PROCEDE is the formal surveying and 
certifying of individual parcels. A less obvious but in some cases no less important effect is the 
imposition of conceptually and spatially standardized tenure categories in villages which have 
more complex practices. In a sense, this development parallels the standardized water rights 
template simultaneously initiated through CONAGUA (sub-sections 4.4.2 and 4.5.4).  
PROCEDE-surveyed common use areas are often, hilly areas covered in forest or grazing 
land. They are administered and utilized in some more purely village-oriented manner than other 
areas, but the actual practices vary. In other words, although the distinction between “parceled” 
and “common use” areas is now often more rigidly defined (both conceptually and spatially) than 
before, local variation, hybridity and ambiguity persist.  
Naturally, this de jure/de facto divergence is most apparent in núcleos where the entire 
territory continues to be legally “common use.”67 In El Chuchupe, about 100 ha of the territory 
(about 7 percent of the total area) are cultivated, in individual fields by individual households. 
Some ejidatarios told the México Indígena team that these plots are individual, permanent 
“parcels” – some are demarcated by stones – while others made reference to “cultivated areas” 
worked only temporarily by any family. Air photographs confirm that the mosaic of forest, 
secondary vegetation, and farmland is complex. Because in this case there is almost no 
                                                        
67 That is to say, “prior to the [PROCEDE] counter-reforms, many [nucleos] effectively combined private 
property (in the case of parcels) and common property (in the case of common lands). For these places, 
[PROCEDE] provided an additional foundation for mixed tenures” (Haenn 2006, 141). 
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permanent distinction between common use and parceled areas, the ejido claims that there are no 
special rules about what one is allowed to do in de facto common use areas. 
Some ejidos and comunidades include areas between the zone of permanent parcels and 
the zone of (usually forested) common use. In these areas, which I call “intermediate,” typically 
agriculture is allowed, but on temporary parcels, and with the permission of the núcleo 
authorities.68 In Yagila, PROCEDE parceling was rejected, but the PROCEDE-inspired 
“boilerplate” communal statute was creatively adjusted by the comunidad to reflect the existence 
of intermediate areas: “Article 83: Comuneros may exploit common lands in the hot-land zone as 
long as they are not already being worked by other comuneros; they should advise the 
comisariado” (RAN 2001b). Because it is a rare example of a highly traditional comunidad with 
PROCEDE-surveyed parcels, Lachixola’s de jure parcel map displays this intermediate area 
perfectly: a ring of small, permanent agricultural parcels around the main population center, with 
the rest of the territory divided into larger parcels.69 (Figure 5.4, on page 216, shows the 
intermediate areas in the comunidad of Totomoxtla).  
A relatively dispersed settlement pattern, where many or most permanent homes are in 
scattered agricultural parcels, was observed in at least three of the núcleos in the Huasteca 
(Chacatitla, Cuatlamayán, and Tancuime). None of them chose to have PROCEDE survey 
individual parcels, probably because the program treats solares so differently than parcels; for 
example, by granting solares full title immediately. In Chacatitla, “most live in cabins on the 
terrains they cultivate” (RAN 1964); this may partly explain why the núcleo wasn’t granted an 
Acta de Ejecucion y Deslinde (similar to a  Resolución Presidencial) until 1993, although it held 
a communal title from 1895. In 1984, Cuatlamayán decided to legally create an “urban zone,” 
even though they continued to live mostly in dispersed settlement pattern. In their 1984 articles 
of incorporation, they explained that this was done for the “development of the community, since 
it will permit the easier introduction of potable water, electric energy, and other works of social 
benefit” (Comunidad de Cuatlamayán 1984).  Likewise, in 1976 the ejido assembly of 
Chimalaco asked the RAN to “help them locate an urban area, to electrify our ejido and also to 
                                                        
68 “This type of land use, which combines a nucleus of permanently cultivated land with an outside area only 
sporadically cultivated, has been called an ‘infield-outfield system’ by [Eric] Wolf” (Dennis 1987, 40). 
69 In Fig. 5.1.6 on page 200, the two patterns are not discernible because individual parcels are not shown. 
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introduce drinking water” (RAN 1976b); in this case, the community did largely abandon its 
dispersed pattern, and later did undergo PROCEDE parceling, although a vestige of the old 
pattern is visible in a few clusters of unusually small, solar-sized parcels in parts of the núcleo. 
A PROCEDE agent visiting the comunidad of Zoogochi found that “parceling does not 
exist, so we didn’t bother doing the analysis of whose lands exceeds five percent [of the total 
parceled area]” (RAN 1998i). After having spent several days in Zoogochi for various projects 
(e.g., López Paniagua and Kelly 2002), I am certain that it has an area of permanently-assigned 
parcels around the human settlement area, as well as an “intermediate area” of more temporary 
parcels. Perhaps the PROCEDE agent was confused by the presence of the intermediate area. 
The inability of the PROCEDE template to accommodate land tenure zones which shift 
over time is suggested by Yagila, which did not undergo PROCEDE parceling. In 2009, I 
observed a large area had been cleared of forest since my previous visit six months before. I was 
told that this represented “new requests by individuals to cut forest, in what was communal land, 
to plant milpa [maize] – it all just happens to be in the same area this year; they're not usually so 
concentrated. It also works the other way – sometimes people leave the land, and it reverts to 
being communal” (interview with Ramos Francisco 2009). 
At the scale of cooperation among neighboring ejidos or comunidades, anecdotes were 
extremely rare, a fact which underscores the astonishing degree of village-scale self-
identification which continues to typify rural Mexico. Indeed, both multi-núcleo anecdotes I 
encountered were from the same núcleo, Yagila. In 1967, the comunidad asked the government 
for an RTBC, but that it be done together with the neighboring comunidad of Josaa, an 
arrangement called “mancomunado” (RAN 1965-73). The state did not oblige this request. I am 
aware of one example of cooperation in the Sierra Norte of Oaxaca in which several villages are 
treated as a single núcleo even on official PROCEDE maps: the “pueblos mancomunados” of 
Amatlán, Yavesia, and Lachatao, which border Guelatao and Ixtlán. 
In various ways, many núcleos creatively adjusted the PROCEDE template to more 
closely conform to local land tenure practices. 
In Tancuime, PROCEDE was only asked to survey the ejido perimeter in 2005. Like in 
many other núcleos, the opportunity was taken to update the list of ejidatarios. The official list 
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includes an unusual adjustment to local demands: a separate section for each of the five named 
sub-núcleo zones – four large areas of semi-dispersed settlement and agricultural parcels, plus 
the main population center (RAN 2005a, 7). 
Parcel ownership by groups of village residents occurred in Las Armas, where all ejido 
members created a sociedad to commercially cultivate sugar cane in what PROCEDE called a 
“collective use area”.70 The other clear example of this is Talea, where PROCEDE documents 
affirm that “groups of people” own eleven parcels, one of them a 374-hectare terrain owned 
jointly by three women (RAN 2002e).  
In Cacalotepec, the assembly made the unusual request to correct or add about 25 
indigenous toponyms to their PROCEDE map, mainly at perimeter boundary markers. Some of 
these changes corrected the orthography of Zapotec place names, while others added secondary 
names in Zapotec or Spanish (RAN 2005c). 
5.2.3 The effect of PROCEDE on parcel sales 
After PROCEDE surveys individual parcels in an ejido or comunidad, an important locus 
of interaction among the individual, the village, and the state is the formal registering of any 
subsequent parcel transfers. In Table 5.1, I compare formal and informal transfer rates in five 
PROCEDE-parceled Huasteca núcleos. The formal transfer rates derive from 2006 RAN 
Agrarian Histories (RAN 2005h), while the informal transfer rates were obtained through 
México Indígena participatory fieldwork. The right columns “average annual parcel transfers: 
number of parcels, (as percentage of all parcels)” show that the typical non-death-related parcel 
transfer rate is significant but not strikingly high, less than half a percent of all parcels each year. 
Despite their varied geographies and histories, the rate is surprisingly consistent among the 
núcleos. The left column “percent of parcel transfers formalized” shows that, even after 
PROCEDE parceling, only about half of the transfers are legally registered. Unlike transfers 
                                                        
70 “’Group parcels’ belong to small groups of ejidatarios – small units of production, or infrastructure 
benefiting the ejido but not in the common use area. These made up only 1.7 percent of total area [of the 
nationwide sample of núcleos], mostly in northern states and in Yucatan” (Robles Berlanga 1998, 117). 
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overall, this figure does vary notably among the núcleos, from 30 percent in La Pila to 82 percent 
in Las Armas. 
Table 5.1. Formal and informal transfers in ownership of individual parcels, in five 
PROCEDE-surveyed núcleos in the Huasteca. (*Includes both formal and informal 
transfers). 
núcleo 
 
(years since 
PROCEDE,  
in 2006) 
% of 
parcel 
transfers 
formalized 
average # of 
parcel transfers 
per year  
average parcel transfers 
per year as % of 
all parcels in núcleo  
formal in-formal 
not 
death-
related* 
formal in-formal 
all 
parcels 
not 
death-
related* 
La Pila (9) 30 1.6 3.6 0.8 0.3 2.1 1.0 0.2 
Santa Cruz (11) n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. 1.7 n.d. 
Las Armas (12) 82 1.5 0.3 0.8 1.0 0.2 1.2 0.5 
Tazáquil (12) 48 1.6 1.8 0.5 1.1 1.2 2.3 0.3 
Chimalaco (11) 36 2.6 4.7 1.5 0.6 1.2 1.8 0.4 
AVERAGE 49 1.8 2.6 0.9 0.8 1.2 1.6 0.4 
 
While results from only five núcleos cannot show overall patterns, they do suggest several 
tentative generalizations. First, PROCEDE-parceled núcleos are more likely to allow parcel sales 
(legal or illegal) to outsiders according to their community rules. Second, PROCEDE-parceled 
communities are more likely to allow parcel sales (of various kinds) without the need for 
assembly approval.71 However, there are interesting variations. In communities where (legal or 
illegal) sales to outsiders are allowed, actual sales have sometimes not yet occurred, while in 
those where it is forbidden, even after PROCEDE parceling, it may actually be occurring. This 
exposes a second rift between de jure rules and de facto practices, at the level of the núcleo 
rather than of the state.  
                                                        
71 We should not assume that working with PROCEDE caused these and other effects. PROCEDE 
communities may have been more individual-oriented before, influencing their decision to undergo PROCEDE 
parceling in the first place. 
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In sum, according to this small sample, more sales do occur in PROCEDE-parceled 
núcleos than in others, but not overwhelmingly more. More important, PROCEDE-parceled 
ejidos and comunidades tend to have more lenient rules at the community level, which opens the 
door to a much higher rate of sales than is currently occurring (legally or otherwise); and, sales in 
these núcleos are more likely to run counter to the community rules that do exist. In other words, 
while PROCEDE does allow for the (always rather common) de facto parcel selling to now be 
legalized, it can actually be ineffective, in two ways. First, only about half of sales are legalized, 
even after PROCEDE parceling. Second, it can be associated with (though not necessarily cause) 
greater than average mismatch between community rules and reality – despite the fact that 
community rules in PROCEDE-parceled núcleos are generally already more lenient than in other 
ones. 
5.2.4 Land tenure maps of the RAN document study núcleos after neoliberal reforms 
Figures 5.1.1 through 5.1.9 present a nine-page collage of all 33 RAN document study 
núcleos with continuous and undisputed social property status, plus Yatzona, which legally lost 
this status in 1981. These maps are intended to facilitate comparison of the spatial arrangement 
of their de jure land tenure types after the first 15 years of implementation of the 1992 reforms. 
These núcleo maps are grouped such that the collage progresses in order of degree of PROCEDE 
surveying and certification, starting with núcleos (whether ejidos or comunidades) which had no 
PROCEDE work at all, and ending with ejidos which had PROCEDE survey and certify 
individual parcels, leaving little or no common use area. Lighter patterns represent more village-
oriented land tenure classes, while darker patterns indicate more individually-oriented ones. 
Whenever possible, a single scale is used for all ejidos and/or comunidades on a page, although 
space constraints prevented this in some cases.  
Within each successive level of PROCEDE work, first Huasteca núcleos are shown, 
followed by Oaxaca ones. I reiterate that an ejido with individual PROCEDE parcels (e.g., La 
Pila) is more subject to complete land privatization than a comunidad with individual PROCEDE 
parcels (e.g., Talea). Therefore, individually-parceled ejidos are presented after the comunidades, 
and their parceled areas are shown in a darker color than parceled areas of comunidades.  
193 
 
  
For núcleos which had their interiors divided by PROCEDE into grandes areas (land 
tenure types), these are the zones displayed in the maps. The “special areas” (rights of way for 
relatively large watercourses and for certain kinds of public infrastructure such as highways) are 
also shown,72 as these were also surveyed by PROCEDE though not legally included in any gran 
area.  
For other núcleos, the entire polygon is shown as “common use area.” If its perimeter was 
surveyed by PROCEDE, the common use area was legally declared in PROCEDE documents, 
and the núcleo’s perimeter is shown as a thick black line.73 If no PROCEDE work was done at 
all, the entire núcleo’s status as a common use area is enshrined in a pre-PROCEDE Resolución 
Presidencial, RTBC, or other official document. The perimeters of these núcleos is shown as a 
light dashed line, to emphasize how few of these perimeters were ever surveyed with the 
technical precision and accuracy of PROCEDE. 
Population centers, here defined as INEGI localidades with at least 200 inhabitants, are 
displayed for all núcleos. These are included for two reasons: to distinguish single-village and 
multi-village núcleos, and to show where de jure human settlement areas might be located if the 
non-PROCEDE ones were to undergo this work through FANAR. Several Oaxaca núcleos (e.g., 
Totomoxtla) had PROCEDE survey the perimeter of their human settlement area, without 
surveying or titling individual solares (house lots). Legally, this action is of little or no 
consequence; these “human settlement areas without solares” are as much a de jure “common 
use area” as the rest of their núcleo territories. 
Besides the three principal PROCEDE-defined land tenure types (common use area, area 
of individual parcels, and human settlement area), an additional, more specific land tenure type is 
shown for those núcleos where it exists: the civic parcel. I repeat that a civic parcel is legally a 
parcel like any other within an “area of individual parcels,” but which happens to be owned 
(certified to) the ejido or comunidad as a whole. A parcel can be owned by the núcleo for any of 
several reasons, including some reasons which have nothing to do with intentional civic purpose. 
                                                        
72 Only in Lachixola was a “special area” designated specifically as a “spring.” 
73 Nora Haenn (2006, 145) predicts that residents of perimeter-only PROCEDE-surveyed nucleos “will 
continue to live within communities which are de jure common property and de facto a mix between private 
and common property.”  
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In many cases, a civic purpose is intended – and sometimes, that purpose is the protection of a 
common water source.  
Note that there are two kinds of civic parcels. The first kind are in a núcleo (the examples 
here are Cuatlamayán and Cuajenco) where these are the only individual parcels. In other words, 
the community chose to invert the standard PROCEDE template, by making their de facto public 
lands legal parcels, while leaving their de facto individual parcels as legal “common use areas.” 
The second, more common kind of civic parcels are in a núcleo (e.g., Talea) which did follow 
the standard PROCEDE template, and so its civic parcels comprise just a handful of the many 
parcels, the vast majority of which are owned by individual heads of households. 
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Figure 5.1.1. RAN document study núcleos, map 1 (of 9): De jure land tenure areas in 
2009. (Sources: RAN archival documents, including PROCEDE maps; INEGI 2011).                                               
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Figure 5.1.2. RAN document study núcleos, map 2 (of 9): De jure land tenure areas in 
2009. (Sources: RAN archival documents, including PROCEDE maps; INEGI 2011).                                               
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Figure 5.1.3. RAN document study núcleos, map 3 (of 9): De jure land tenure areas in 
2009. (Sources: RAN archival documents, including PROCEDE maps; INEGI 2011).                                               
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Figure 5.1.4. RAN document study núcleos, map 4 (of 9): De jure land tenure areas in 
2009. (Sources: RAN archival documents, including PROCEDE maps; INEGI 2011).                                               
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Figure 5.1.5. RAN document study núcleos, map 5 (of 9): De jure land tenure areas in 
2009. (Sources: RAN archival documents, including PROCEDE maps; INEGI 2011).                                               
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Figure 5.1.6. RAN document study núcleos, map 6 (of 9): De jure land tenure areas in 
2009. (Sources: RAN archival documents, including PROCEDE maps; INEGI 2011).                                               
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Figure 5.1.7. RAN document study núcleos, map 7 (of 9): De jure land tenure areas in 
2009. (Sources: RAN archival documents, including PROCEDE maps; INEGI 2011).                                               
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Figure 5.1.8. RAN document study núcleos, map 8 (of 9): De jure land tenure areas in 
2009. (Sources: RAN archival documents, including PROCEDE maps; INEGI 2011).                                               
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Figure 5.1.9. RAN document study núcleos, map 9 (of 9): De jure land tenure areas in 
2009. (Sources: RAN archival documents, including PROCEDE maps; INEGI 2011).                                               
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5.3  Water source proprietorship before and after the 1992 reforms 
Only a minor portion of the RAN archival documents mention water issues, but I 
supplemented these anecdotes with maps and data obtained through participatory research 
mapping (PRM) and collaborative mapping in 15 of the study núcleos (the more detailed PRM 
results for three of these are presented in chapter 6). The RAN anecdotes tentatively suggest a 
trajectory slightly different than that found in purely land-related ones. In the case of water, most 
of the pre-1992 anecdotes show strong village-scale orientation, while there are suggestions of a 
more mixed orientation after 1992. 
Figure 5.4 (on page 216) and Table 5.4 (on page 220) show the relationships between 
water sources and de facto land tenure areas in Totomoxtla, a Chinantec indigenous comunidad 
where PROCEDE did not survey individual parcels. The proportion of community-mapped water 
sources in each de facto land tenure zone was compared to the proportion of total land area in 
each zone. The only unexpected figure was the high concentration of water sources in the tenure 
category “parceled – urban lots and permanent agriculture.”74 This introduces a recurring theme 
in this study: water sources which the community consider “important” are likely to be those 
which are located in or near zones where humans require water – human settlement areas and 
certain agricultural areas. In other words, the very definition of a “spring,” in anything but the 
most purely hydrophysical context, is inextricably linked to the human beings who recognize its 
existence and assign it some value. Even relatively “scientific” topographic maps favor springs 
already valued by humans (chapter 7). This observation is consistent with scholarly works that 
                                                        
74 Not all important water features are near human-use landscapes, however. The villagers of Nieves, a 
Chinantec comunidad near Totomoxtla, indicated to me that their most sacred site is a pond in the cloud forest 
at the “saddle point” – the mountain pass furthest from the village center and agricultural area, on the boundary 
with another community. This sacred site is noted by Bartolomé et al. in their ethnographic study of the 
Chinantec: 
   “Though social identification is established with one’s village and on some level with one’s municipio, 
territorial realms shared by distinct villages are collectively made sacred due to interactions with nature…For 
the highlanders, Thunder is a living and powerful being [linguistically, it has an animate-classifying numerical 
article]; people with ‘nahua’ power can change into this entity. They gather at Cerro de las Dos Cabezas, 
Mo’tuhdxii, to plan their defense or to attack communities in the form of thunder. They live in the springs on 
top of the mountains” (Bartolomé et al. 1999, 80). 
205 
 
  
critically examine the human construction of nature (e.g., Oelschlager 1991; Neumann 1998; 
Redford and Sanderson 2000; Peluso and Watts 2001; Demerett 2002). 
5.3.1 Examples of water-related village-scale and individual orientation before 1992 
In Chimalaco in 1930 the ejido authorities wrote a letter to  San Luis Potosí state military 
chief, complaining that when the federal social property agency Comisióthen Nacional Agraria 
(CNA) had left it without access to the Huichihuayán River when the ejido was formed the ejido 
six years previously. They asserted that the Arroyo Seco (“Dry Creek”) bordering the ejido was, 
as its name implied, dry during part of each year, leaving the river, 250 meters away, the only 
source of water for animals and people. The remnant of the Huichihuayán hacienda had been 
allowing ejidatarios to cross its land with cattle to reach the river, but when the ejidatarios 
returned from the military Northern Campaign, the hacienda stopped allowing this, “causing our 
complete ruin.” The ejido requested that the General ask the CNA to intervene on their behalf, to 
change the ejido's boundary as indicated on a pencil sketch map (RAN 1930). The change was 
never made, likely encouraging the ejido to create its highly developed system of communal 
pozos (shallow wells, usually at or near natural springs), reflected seventy years later in the 
PROCEDE “civic” parcels dedicated to these water sources.  
Community interest in water sources was sometimes expressed as a desire to include 
specific ones within núcleo boundaries during state-initiated surveying programs. In 1975, 
Guelatao hired an engineer to assert to the RAN that several boundaries in Resolución 
Presidencial were wrong, including a line segment which “leaves outside the community the 
sources (tomas) for potable water, gravity irrigation, and the spray irrigation system” (RAN 
1975b). 
Any potable water system implies a degree of village-oriented water management, and a 
lack of one suggests at least some individual orientation. Among the nine Huasteca ejidos and 
comunidades studied by the México Indígena team, in only two (El Chuchupe and Tancuime) 
were reported to lack running household water among household questionnaire respondents. 
Other núcleos, such as Chimalaco and Santa Cruz, have mixed systems, where some houses in 
the main population center are connected to a shared system, while others have their own norias 
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(household or backyard wells). Only one of the nine communities, La Lima, reported that a 
significant number of households (30 percent) obtained their household water from a public 
spigot or well, a solution often observed (e.g., in Talea) to be a precursor to a piped shared 
system. 
A few núcleos have developed modest agricultural irrigation systems at the village or sub-
village scale, although the practice is not as widespread or developed as in drier regions of 
Mexico. The irrigation canals shown in Guelatao’s 1969 parcel map (SRH 1969a) have mostly 
fallen into disuse. Chicomezúchil has two irrigated zones of about 30 ha each (RAN 1978b), but 
these are by-products of the water infrastructure built for the defunct textile factory there.75 
Cuatlamayán “is contemplating making a deep well with a pump and tank for the entire 
community” (interview with Hernández Reyes 2009); due to its dispersed settlement pattern, the 
same system would serve for both potable water and irrigation. Talea, like several núcleos, 
includes sub-village groups which in essence privately exploit water sources for irrigation, a 
theme I will return to in Section 6.1. The most highly developed irrigation system among the 
study núcleos is in Las Armas, where water is pumped from the Rio Oxitipa (Coy) to serve a 
143-ha “collective use area” of sugar cane. The system is managed by a sociedad de producción 
rural, an entity which conceptually bridges social property and neoliberal commercialism (see 
chapter 9). These scattered and tentative hints at local water management and rationing traditions 
may become more common and larger in scale, as the climate changes and export agriculture 
expands. 
A 1969 incident from Cuatlamayán illustrates a general theme that land is considered to 
be individually owned and water a public good, though the latter should not jeopardize the 
former. A parcel was being worked by someone lacking comunero rights, so the comunidad 
assembly proposed that the núcleo confiscate it and then trade the parcel with some comunero 
whose parcel would be valuable to the comunidad “for public services, such as electricity or 
potable water” (RAN 1969c). Thus, the núcleo demonstrated its respect for individual parcel 
ownership – it never contemplated simply confiscating the parcel of a comunero in good 
                                                        
75 In the late 19th century, the neighboring comunidad of Ixtepeji “charged annual user fees for drawing water 
from the Grillo River, which the factory used for its hydraulic equipment. These lease agreements received 
much attention by village leaders and eventually became a major source of funding for the town” (McNamara 
2007, 103). 
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standing, even if their parcel contained an important water source – while also showing its 
interest in promoting the development of a common water supply. 
A 1984 event in Lachichina demonstrates both the village-scale orientation of water 
sources (even, in this case, if located on an individual's solar), and the individual nature of much 
water infrastructure. A comunera, Isidora, owned a solar with a “chorro” (spring or natural pool) 
called Bej Cuidi, where many families gathered to wash clothes. A comunero, Felipe, wanted to 
build a water storage tank there, and install plastic tubes from it to his house and several other 
houses. Felipe asked the municipal authorities to help him “invade the terrain,” but they refused, 
because they thought the chorro was too small for all the proposed uses, and because it was in 
the middle of the human settlement area. They accused Felipe of trying to “divide our barrio 
[neighborhood or community] in the manner of a cacique [local potentate],” informing Felipe 
that “no one impedes the use of water because it is a liquid of highest importance for human 
beings.” They suggested he and his friends use water from his solar instead. Simultaneously, the 
assembly passed an acta denying Felipe and his friends permission, and that they should instead 
build their tank next to an existing one, at a different chorro. However, this would still require 
that the tubing to cross Isidora's solar. The group did as instructed, but the municipio authorities 
supported Isidora’s contention that even the tubing was intrusive, and so the authorities 
dismantled both the tank and the tubing, despite the núcleo’s authorization (RAN 1984-86).  A 
1954 document from Tiltepec, in contrast, shows how even individual-oriented water 
infrastructure can belong to the núcleo, if it was installed by outside person to whom land had 
been rented for a specified time  (RAN 1955-1958). 
Several documents attest to the access of specific water sources as a community right. In 
Tancuime, letters from the comunidad to the government focus on access to streams as 
community right (Anecdote 1 in the first pages of this chapter) (RAN 1966a). In 1973, the ejido 
of El Chuchupe successfully petitioned the government to have its main population center 
legalized, though this required condemning parts of several private properties, technically 
placing the núcleo in the category of “New Ejido Population Center.” The government survey 
team was careful to include the village pozo (shallow well, likely an enlargement of a natural 
spring) on their map (Figure 5.2), and to delimit the new boundary so the pozo was included in 
the ejido, albeit just barely (DAAC 1973). 
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Figure 5.2. El Chuchupe: 1973 government map of newly surveyed ejido perimeter and 
neighboring properties (detail). (Source: DAAC 1973). 
 
 
5.3.2 Village-scale strategies regarding water source proprietorship after 1992 
To the degree that the ethos which begat the neoliberal land tenure reforms affect even 
communities which have not undergone PROCEDE parceling, and to whatever extent the 
combination of PROCEDE surveying and the modernization of CONAGUA represent a subtle 
but real change in the state’s approach to the land-water nexus in favor of the individual, any 
post-1992 practice in social property communities which continues or invents a village-scale 
orientation toward water source proprietorship could be considered a “reaction” or “strategy.” I 
will present examples using the same “strategy” categories, and in the same order, as I 
introduced them in the first pages of this chapter. I conclude with apparent examples of “no such 
strategy”; i.e., examples of continuing individual orientation, or moving towards this. 
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The first strategy is to accept PROCEDE parceling, but with village-oriented, water-
related adjustments, most commonly via “civic parcels.” To reiterate, civic parcels are those in a 
PROCEDE-parceled area, not a common use area, whose certified owner is not an individual but 
rather the núcleo itself. Five of Chimalaco’s sixteen civic parcels76 exist entirely for the 
protection of community water sources (see Figure 5.5, on page 222). They contain four 
important springs, while the fifth contains a water storage tank for one of these springs (RAN 
1995c, 39-48; RAN 1995g, 5). Their land area totals only 0.29 ha (RAN 1995f). These civic 
parcel water sources only represent a portion of the important pozos (modified springs or shallow 
wells), however. The ejido chose to include 17 water sources on the community map it produced 
during the México Indígena project, 15 of these with distinct Nahuatl toponyms. The four springs 
chosen for civic parcel status are a mixed bunch, in both physical appearance and use. Two of 
them have large roofs installed to protect them (but so do two of the non-civic-parcel springs). 
One of them served a now-abandoned hamlet, Tiaxalo, during the first half of the 20th century, 
but is now used by only three families, and occasionally by residents of a different núcleo 
(interview with Almendro 2009). Another spring now only used by a few families (for coffee 
processing) after once having served a different abandoned hamlet, however, is not a in a civic 
parcel.  
One of the civic parcel springs is the source for most of the potable water in Chimalaco’s 
main population center, but the source for the rest of the system is on an individual comunero’s 
parcel. This is apparently “not a problem, and the spring and its tank are maintained by tequio” 
(interview with Salazar 2009). Indeed, “water is taken from all the pozos. Even those which have 
no space [civic parcel status] are for everyone. Even the parcel’s owner must respect its 
vegetation” (interview with Almendro 2009). However, there have been problems of shared 
maintenance, as discussed below. 
Chicomezúchil is the only RAN document study community in the Oaxaca region to 
include PROCEDE-surveyed civic parcels specifically for water sources (Talea has civic parcels 
for water storage, not for sources such as wells or springs). Because only five of the 19 Oaxaca 
núcleos had PROCEDE parceling of any kind, the occurrence of civic parcels for water is 
                                                        
76 This total does not include parcels “in conflict” or “unassigned,” which are also certified, at least 
temporarily, to the núcleo. Most of these will likely eventually be assigned or sold to individuals. 
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actually similar in the two study regions, at least based on this small sample.77 Two parcels in 
Chicomezúchil are assigned to the comunidad for water purposes: one is a storage tank, and the 
other a riverbank access place. There are also two solares dedicated to water tanks (RAN 
1999g).  
La Pila has 14 parcels assigned to the ejido, many of them for civic purposes, and of these 
three are for water purposes: two are reservoirs (dammed ponds), and the third is a tank. 
Additionally, there are two water tanks labeled as having their own small “parcels” directly on 
the PROCEDE map, rather than labeled with a number, as all individual parcels are. These are 
actually “infrastructure areas”: rights-of-way not part of any PROCEDE gran area (social 
property tenure class). Like national rivers or highways, which are depicted in the same fashion, 
these are less subject to village-scale control than civic parcels.  
Huichimal’s civic parcels include three for community water: one pozo (Figure 5.3) and 
two tanks (depósitos) (see Anecdote 4 in the first pages of this chapter). Of the 13 civic solares 
in its two human settlement areas, seven are water related: four pozos and three tanks (RAN 
2004b). 
Tazáquil included one pozo parcel among its two civic parcels, although it considers all 
five of the important, named springs within its territory to be “protected.” An incident in 
Tazáquil suggests that local natural resource regulations may reflect village-scale orientation, but 
one which was motivated by a common enemy perceived as a threat to those resources. In 2005, 
the villagers mentioned that “there is no longer any fish, because of pollution from the juice 
factory which was built in 1988. We were told that the factory would benefit the campesinos, but 
no, because the factory buys their oranges at a very low price.” In 2009, the situation worsened 
when the plant’s “water storage tubing was accidentally broken, chemically contaminating the 
water supply of Tazáquil,” prompting the state’s Health Secretary to broadcast by loudspeaker 
warnings to the villagers that they should avoid drinking their water until the problem was 
resolved (Martínez Castro 2009). 
                                                        
77 When I asked the Oaxaca RAN delegate water-related civic parcels were a common practice in the Sierra 
Norte, he replied that “such parcels are not commonly deeded to community there, because natural springs are 
so abundant” (interview with Vásquez Córdova 2009). 
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Figure 5.3. Huichimal: PROCEDE map of parceled area (sheet 2 of 3; detail), including 
part of map legend. (Source: INEGI 2004). 
 
 
Table 5.2 compares the distribution of locally defined “important springs” among three 
locally recognized land tenure types in four núcleos (see Figures 5.4 through 5.7 below for 
maps). The three tenure types are “individually-owned parcels,” “civic parcels,” and “common 
use areas.”  Two of the núcleos, Chimalaco and Talea, had individual parcels surveyed by 
PROCEDE; their tenure areas are precisely delimited and legally defined. The other two 
communities, Tancuime and Cuatlamayán, did not undergo standard PROCEDE surveying of 
individual parcels, so their tenure areas are defined differently. For Tancuime, I approximated 
their location and size by combining information from community and parcel questionnaires, the 
núcleo’s participatory map, and my interpretation of air photographs. For Cuatlamayán, which 
inverted the PROCEDE definitions of de jure tenure areas, the delimitations of the civic parcels 
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are precise, while the approximate size and location of its tiny de facto common use area is 
known from fieldwork. For all núcleos, human settlement areas or population centers, and any 
water sources within them, were excluded from the analysis. The springs are those chosen to be 
included in participatory maps during PRM workshops conducted with México Indígena, and 
geolocated during the project (México Indígena Research Team 2006a, 2006b, and 2006h), or 
through my PRM work in Talea. 
 
Table 5.2. Two núcleos with PROCEDE parcels, and two without them: Percentage of 
important water sources in each of three land tenure categories, compared to surface area 
(as percentage of total) of each tenure category. Figures for Tancuime are approximate (see 
text); all other figures use precise PROCEDE survey data.  
 individually- owned parcels civic parcels 
common use 
areas 
núcleo % of area 
% of 
water 
sources 
% of 
area 
% of 
water 
sources 
% of 
area 
% of 
water 
sources 
Tancuime 91 92 <1 0 9 8 
Cuatlamayán 99 100 1 0 0 0 
AVERAGE - núcleos without 
PROCEDE parcels 95 96 1 0 5 4 
Chimalaco 96 71 4 29 0 0 
Talea 84 80 1 0 15 20 
AVERAGE - núcleos with 
PROCEDE parcels 90 76 3 15 8 10 
 
A clear pattern is that common use areas do not appear to be used as a strategy specifically 
for the protection and access of important water sources. Some ejidos and comunidades  have 
large common use areas, others have small ones or none, but in each case the density of 
important springs within them is about the same as in the núcleo as a whole. Civic parcels, in 
contrast, are used specifically for community water sources, but only in certain communities 
(e.g., Chimalaco). It may be significant that Chimalaco has no common use areas, and therefore 
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was had special motivation to protect its important water sources in other ways. In other words, 
typically a village will assign part of its land (or none of it) to “common use,” for reasons 
unrelated to water. If the resulting territory happens to contain an acceptable portion of the 
núcleo’s important water sources, perhaps at least 20 percent of them, then it has no reason to 
protect more of them via tenure actions such as civic parcels (Talea). If the resulting territory 
does not contain such a portion of water sources, the community has other options. It may make 
up the difference by assigning civic parcels (Chimalaco), or it may attempt to maintain village-
scale control through persuasion and cultural pressure (Cuatlamayán). Tancuime appears to 
follow a mixed strategy: a few water sources are in common use areas, but strong local 
leadership and community culture are probably factors in making up the difference (see below 
for how this is practiced through maintenance of forest patches). 
The second broad strategy “for maintaining village-scale orientation toward water sources 
is to have PROCEDE survey and certify individual parcels, and to rely on local traditions of oral, 
tacit, and occasionally written agreements. Santa Cruz underwent PROCEDE surveying of its 
individual parcels, while maintaining certain village-scale water-related practices (see also 
Anecdote 5, in the first pages of this chapter). The ejido is responsible for maintaining a water 
supply which it exports to four villages to the northeast. The water is pumped from the Río 
Oxitipa/Coy, along a stretch with a 40-meter-wide strip of riparian vegetation, and transported by 
a tube installed with the assistance of the government’s nearly defunct Pujal-Coy Irrigation 
District program (interview with López 2009). 
Talea also underwent PROCEDE parceling, but declared its agricultural and forest area 
(the PROCEDE-parceled núcleo of San Miguel Talea de Castro) to be a separate entity from its 
human settlement area (the unsurveyed “localidad” of Villa Talea de Castro, overseen by the 
county authorities). This highly unusual decision was motivated indirectly by village-scale water 
issues. According to local informants, one reason for the arrangement was to more efficiently 
administer the “hinterland,” in response to a deadly boundary dispute with the neighboring 
núcleo of Tabaa. This conflict was largely waged over a zone of productive springs in the 
disputed area (see Figure 6.1 on page 241). A Talea comunero asserted that “when I was a child, 
there were nine pozos with water up there in the Cerro de Tabaa, but we lost them with the 
problems with Tabaa. Now only three have water, because they’re far from the village 
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[population center] of Tabaa, and they don’t take good care of them” (interview with Velasco 
2009). 
A third strategy pertains to ejidos or comunidades which refuse to undergo PROCEDE 
parceling, and also take actions or maintain practices to encourage village-scale proprietorship of 
some water sources in ways which avoid a strong spatial linkage between the sources and the de 
facto ownership of the land where they are located. This, too, relies on maintaining a local 
culture of respect among individuals and a village-centered ethos. Among the RAN document 
study núcleos, 24 (73 percent) have potable water systems for most or all of the structures in 
their main population centers. Yagila’s system services nearly all the houses in the human 
settlement area. It consists of separate components divided roughly by barrio (neighborhood), 
with each barrio receiving at least some of its water from a different source than the others: “For 
the potable water supply infrastructure, Barrio Shlaa paid for Raazin [a modified spring]; the 
whole village, with help from CONAGUA, paid for Yanich [another modified spring]; and 
Barrio Yajutz paid for Los Sabinos [a third modified spring]. They were paid for by coopera 
[occasional village tax]” (interview with Ramos Francisco 2009). Because only a subset of the 
springs are located in de facto common use areas (see section 7.2), this suggests some measure of 
village-scale practice which avoids the legally unambiguous spatial linkages envisioned by the 
Water Law reform. 
Totomoxtla, a highland Chinantec comunidad in Oaxaca which did not undergo 
PROCEDE parceling, exemplifies the complexity of individual and village-oriented land tenure 
and their relationships to water sources. The analysis presented here is based on the collaborative 
applied research I conducted in 2003-2004 for a small team affiliated with World Wildlife Fund, 
and supplemented by interviews conducted in 2009. Figure 5.4 shows a part of the Totomoxtla 
núcleo territory, with three sets of overlapping data: first, important water sources (springs) 
identified by key informants; second, PROCEDE land tenure zones (in this case, only a legally 
meaningless “human settlement area”); and third, land tenure zones as understood and practiced 
by the community. The PROCEDE-defined zones and the de facto areas bear only a loose 
relationship to each other (RAN 2000d; Kelly 2004). 
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During collaborative fieldwork, the de facto “parceled” area, as defined by the núcleo, 
was located with GPS. This area includes both solares (house lots) in the main population center 
and permanent, individual farms, some with houses on them, in a ring surrounding this core. In 
contrast, the PROCEDE map divides this area into three concentric rings:  
1. The center – a “donut hole” which is technically just part of the PROCEDE 
common use area, not its “human settlement area.” In reality, this is an area of densely 
packed houses and other buildings.  
2. The PROCEDE “human settlement area”: In reality, this is zone of larger solares 
verging into dispersed agricultural parcels with houses on them.  
3. A few places where the community-defined “parceled” area extends beyond this 
PROCEDE “human settlement area.” 
As a further complication, not even the locally defined tenure zones correspond entirely to 
the land use patterns observed on the ground. For example, the community’s de facto “parceled 
area” includes part of the zone of permanent agricultural plots without houses, but not all of this 
zone. The area of permanent agriculture extends 1 km further west, covering part of the rest of 
the núcleo, which both the community and PROCEDE agree is entirely “common use.”  This 
area is increasingly regulated at the village scale; one comunero stated that “before, people 
would cultivate wherever; but every time we get together, we make more restrictions about 
where people can cultivate” (interview with Pérez 2009). 
The community-defined common use area includes three major land use areas: the 
permanent agricultural flatland (and firewood-producing forest patches) surrounding the main 
population center; an “intermediate area” of less permanent, scattered, isolated agricultural 
patches in a mix of mainly secondary vegetation; and two areas with commercial forestry (the 
eastern, uphill one is currently productive, while the western, downhill area is a “restoration 
zone,” recovering from a severe fire). Every comunero benefits from the sale of pinewood 
harvested from the commercial forests, but only a subset of comuneros physically manage it 
Because they are paid an extra share of the profits, the forestry enterprise partly functions like a 
sub-village sociedad.  
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Figure 5.4. Part of núcleo of Totomoxtla, Oaxaca. Land tenure areas according to 
PROCEDE map (de jure), and according to GPS mapping in collaboration with local 
residents (de facto), with important water sources identified through GPS collaborative 
mapping. 
 
 
217 
 
  
A fourth, smaller land use in the common use area consists of “protected areas”: a few 
patches of forest which includes two areas specifically designated to safeguard springs. Before 
these protected areas had been established, the community already encouraged that a landowner 
maintain a small grove of trees around one of these springs (CAPLAC 2004b). Two of these 
protected springs are just above (east) of the population center, in a place called Llano Conejo. 
These springs are connected to two large tanks and three small ones, supplying about half of the 
potable domestic water (interview with Pérez 2009). Other sources of the potable water system 
are along streams arising in the cloud forest/pine-oak forest ecotone (not shown on the map), 
about 1000 vertical meters above the main population center (CAPLAC 2004b).  
 
Table 5.3. Comunidad of Totomoxtla, Oaxaca: Percentage of important water sources in 
each land tenure/land use category, compared to surface area (as percentage of total) of 
each category. The first column (“parceled” and “common use”) represents locally-defined 
tenure zones; the second column is observed land use areas within those zones. 
 
 
 
 % of area 
% of 
important 
water sources 
 
relative density 
of important 
water sources 
parceled house lots and permanent agriculture 5 23 4.6 
common use 
permanent agriculture 6 9 1.5 
commercial forest 43 9 0.2 
scattered temporary 
agriculture, secondary 
vegetation, and forest 
48 27 0.6 
forest for conservation 
of water sources 4 32 8.0 
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A comparison of the density of water sources in each de facto land tenure zone (Table 5.3) 
shows that important water sources are most densely concentrated in the area of solares and 
permanent agricultural parcels, as well as in the small “protected” areas. In its own way, 
Totomoxtla shows a similar pattern to that observed in many núcleos, in both study regions, 
regardless of the PROCEDE survey work done: a portion of community-valued water sources 
(typically, 20 to 40 percent of them) are given some kind of land-tenure-based “protection,” 
while for the rest the village-scale orientation is expressed through established social practices 
such as oral agreements.  
In Totomoxtla, comunidad rules stipulate that “we can't cut our trees near four important 
manantiales, even within the [de facto] parceled area” (interview with Pérez 2009). In 2004, the 
community proposed that “it is an excellent idea to plant fruit trees around the springs where 
today there are maize fields, to promote retention of high water-capacity soils.” However, it 
should be noted that the rules were enacted with some influence from outreach by a 
conservationist NGO; and, part of the perceived benefit was to individual comuneros, 
“landowners who would thus benefit economically (CAPLAC 2004b). 
In several PRM study communities, including Buenavista, Talea, Totomoxtla, and Yagila, 
local informants mentioned the maintenance of forested areas or smaller patches of trees to 
conserve the quality and abundance of water at important springs.78 Whether the springs were 
located in de facto or de jure common use areas or on agricultural parcels worked by individuals, 
this vegetation was seen as a benefit to the community’s water supply. To begin to ascertain how 
often important springs actually have such vegetation in their immediate vicinity, I used the data 
sources cited in the previous sections of this chapter, as well as my own interpretation of air 
photographs, to compile a count of each type of spring in four núcleos with especially high 
numbers of locally-identified important springs. Each of the four represents a different type in 
terms of PROCEDE work: Chimalaco is an ejido with PROCEDE parcels, Cuatlamayán is a 
comunidad which “inverted” the PROCEDE template (the only PROCEDE parcels are civic 
ones), Tancuime is an ejido without PROCEDE parcels, and Talea is a comunidad with them.  
                                                        
78 Santos Augusto (2003) documented comparable attitudes in Quiché Maya villages of Guatemala, while 
Merino (2004, 64) presents an example from Michoacán state, Mexico. 
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In linking forest cover with water protection, villagers, consciously or not, 79 echo a robust 
scientific literature which confirms this link in specific, though sometimes not universally 
accepted, ways. While the benefits of forest cover for water conservation are neither simple nor 
perfectly understood, riparian and other forested areas have been shown to generate continuous 
flow during the dry season through subsoil infiltration, in contrast to the rapid surface transfer of 
water over non-forested land – although this is commonly offset by the increased 
evapotranspiration through trees (Melville 1994, 72; Bishop and Landell-Mills 2002, 19). 
Additionally, forests filter sediments and dissolved pollutants, through both the plant issues and 
the rougher ground (Klapproth and Johnson 2000).  Cloud forests, in particular, play an 
important role in water capture and filtration (Holder 2003).  However, reforested areas may not 
act as good water capturers or filters, when compared to “old-growth forests” or even 
agroforestry patches (Noordwijk, Poulsen, and Ericksen 2004).  
Table 5.2 (page 212) showed the proportion of important water sources in these same four 
núcleos, grouped by land tenure categories. Table 5.4 gives the proportion of these same water 
sources, but now classified by three land use/land cover categories – that is, classes which 
primarily draw from vegetative cover visible in an air photograph, but also take into account land 
use and land tenure facts. The goal of this analysis is to begin to determine whether forest 
patches, including small groups of trees, are being maintained around those water sources chosen 
by a community as important to them, and whether they are within large forested areas (often 
corresponding to de facto or de jure “common use areas”), or in an individual parcels. 
If a water source is in a small cluster of trees within a working agricultural parcel, it may 
suggest a village-level policy being followed by individuals, although it may simply reflect an 
individual farmer’s decision purely for their own benefit. As with any classification which 
                                                        
79 In a study of named springs in a Tzotzil núcleo (Chiapas state), it was found that “a powerful reason to 
maintain a spring is the presence of supernatural beings. It is difficult to discern if this attitude is 
conservationist, or if it emanates from their beliefs; in any case, it has helped them maintain the foliage around 
the springs, since they are sacred places. The maintenance of springs is shared, as well as the responsibility to 
care for their surroundings” (Murillo Licea 2008, 28). The first prominent Western ecologist to sound the 
alarm about the intertwined threats to water, forests, and land tenure in Latin America was William Vogt, in 
1947 (Tucker 2000, 410). 
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Table 5.4. Four núcleos: Percentage of important water sources in each of three land 
use/land cover categories, compared to total area percentage of each category. (Sources: 
PRM fieldwork, PROCEDE maps, and air photographs.)  
 agriculture forest patch in agriculture 
forested area 
owned by núcleo 
núcleo % of area 
% of 
water 
sources 
% of 
area 
% of 
water 
sources 
% of 
area 
% of 
water 
sources 
Tancuime 80 25 13 50 7 25 
Cuatlamayán 85 46 14 54 <1 0 
AVERAGE - núcleos without 
PROCEDE parcels 83 36 14 52 4 13 
Chimalaco 89 20 11 63 <1 17 
Talea 45 0 36 60 17 20 
AVERAGE - núcleos with 
PROCEDE parcels 67 10 24 62 9 19 
 
combines land use and land cover, some simplification was necessary. For example, one of 
Chimalaco’s water sources is in a small civic parcel which nevertheless happens to be entirely 
agricultural (i.e., without trees), but because land cover was prioritized over land tenure for 
borderline cases in this exercise, this water source was scored as “agriculture.” Another 
challenge was how to score water sources in generally tree-shaded coffee plantations (mainly in 
Talea and Chimalaco) and other mixed land covers, but in these cases I was usually able to 
discern groups of mature trees (or their absence) without too much difficulty, aided by my 
fieldwork experiences in each of the communities. 
In Tancuime (and, to a lesser extent, Cuatlamayán), the greatest challenge was in 
distinguishing de facto forested common use areas from large forest patches in de facto 
individual parcels. Fortunately, one of the last fieldwork tasks in the Huasteca by the México 
Indígena team was to convene meetings with key informants in several núcleos, with the goal of 
better understanding the location and management of de facto common use areas. The informants 
in Tancuime attested that their de facto common use area is the “mountainous area which we call 
an ‘ecological reserve’,” which is about 80 percent forested, the rest being naturally unvegetated 
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rocky cliffs and scree slopes. Any forested patches in the flatter area to the east of the mountain 
range, including gallery forests along incised streams, are within the “parceled (cultivable) 
lands.” In Cuatlamayán, the local informants stated that “there has never been a common use 
area in the community, that the entire land [except for the civic parcels] has always had 
individual owners, that is to say has been parceled, but there is an area for ‘forest resources’ 
which is totally parceled.” These strips of forest are mainly along the steep west, south, and east 
boundaries of the núcleo, although many agricultural parcels elsewhere in its territory have 
orchards and other types of intermittent tree cover. 
An interesting finding shown in Table 5.4 is that, despite the wide variation among the 
núcleos in most respects, the preponderance of important waters sources in “forest patches in 
agriculture” is remarkably consistent: between 50 and 63 percent. This is the case even in Talea, 
where the overall area with this land use/land cover type is much higher than in the other three 
communities, due to the prevalence of parcels with shaded coffee or pine-oak woodlots. While 
the sample size is too small to make any firm generalizations, it is possible that social property 
villages typically try to ensure that at least half of their important springs located in agricultural 
parcels retain trees and shrubs in their immediate vicinity. 
Four maps (Figures 5.6, 5.7, 5.8, and 5.9) depict the spatial distribution of the springs in 
the núcleos. Each spring point symbol is colored black if located within a wooded area, however 
small, and white if located in an agricultural field or pasture without nearby vegetation larger 
than shrubs.  
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Figure 5.5. Núcleo of Chimalaco, San Luis Potosí: Locally-identified important springs, with 
surrounding vegetation (as identified in 2011 air photographs), and PROCEDE-surveyed land 
tenure zones.  
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Figure 5.6. Núcleo of Cuatlamayán, San Luis Potosí: Locally-identified important springs, 
with surrounding vegetation (as identified in air photographs), and PROCEDE-surveyed 
land tenure zones. 
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Figure 5.7. Núcleo of Tancuime, San Luis Potosí: Locally-identified important springs, 
with surrounding vegetation (as identified in air photographs), and approximate de facto 
land tenure zones.  
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Figure 5.8. Núcleo of Talea, Oaxaca: Locally-identified important springs, with 
surrounding vegetation (as identified in air photographs), and PROCEDE-surveyed land 
tenure zones.  
 
 
Some post-1992-reform anecdotes reflect a more individual orientation toward water 
sources. In Yagila, “there are restrictions on cutting trees near water sources – it's in a statute 
(acta) – but few respect it” (interview with Ramos Francisco 2009). In Chimalaco, “around the 
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Pochayo pozo, vegetation has been cut down. We should expand the vegetated area” (interview 
with Almendro 2009). 
Chimalaco’s gradual transformation from a dispersed settlement to a concentrated one, 
while encouraging village orientation in some ways, has caused several improved water sources 
to fall into disrepair, including the source of the present-day village supply. “The Ohtlayo pozo 
dries up, so the people there get water from the Taiaxalo pozo. The Chiconamel pozos lack 
maintenance nowadays – the tubes tend to get clogged by crud” (interview with Salazar 2009). 
“The Pochayo pozo is almost dry – it wasn’t built deeply enough. We should increase the area of 
protection around it” (interview with Almendro 2009). 
In their community questionnaire meeting, the ejidatarios of Tazáquil expressed concern 
that their territory was well located to attract outside land buyers, in part because of its abundant 
water: “Neighbors and newcomers (avecindados) like this place, because of the water and its 
easy access from the [Panamerican] highway. The ejidatarios sell parcels, at low prices, due to 
their difficult economic situation.” To learn whether PROCEDE-certified parcels containing 
important water sources are being sold at a different rate than other ones, I used the parcel 
transfer data elicited in the four meetings convened by México Indígena student researchers. An 
“important” water source is defined here as one which as the núcleo chose to include on their 
México Indígena-assisted community map. I considered four tenure categories (Table 5.5): 
“individually owned (not sold since PROCEDE),” “individually owned (sold since PROCEDE),” 
“civic,” and “other” (tenure status uncertain). For each tenure category, left-hand figures state the 
percentage of all parcels in that category, while right-hand figures state the percentage of water 
source-containing parcels in that category. For this analysis, “parcel” refers to a de jure parcel in 
a PROCEDE-defined parceled area. Common use and human settlement areas not considered. 
No distinction is made between “formally sold” and “informally sold,” nor between “civic 
parcels specifically for water purposes” and “other civic parcels,” such as for schools. 
On average, individual (non-civic) parcels with water sources tend to be sold at about the 
same rate as parcels in general. However, this average masks great variation among the 
communities. In Las Armas, the sale of parcels with water sources is substantially less frequent 
than that núcleo’s average sale rate, while in two other communities, Chimalaco and Tazáquil, 
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the sale of water source parcels in substantially more frequent. Chimalaco and Tazáquil (along 
with La Pila) specifically declared certain water source parcels to be civic and thus relatively 
shielded from sale. Perhaps this is no coincidence. Having secured a few places as community 
water protected areas through their PROCEDE survey, these núcleos may feel more free to allow 
market forces to determine the future of those water sources they had chosen not to protect in 
this way. 
 
Table 5.5. PROCEDE-surveyed parcels in five Huasteca núcleos: Percentage of all parcels 
(n=1,390) in each of four tenure categories, compared to percentage of parcels containing 
important water sources (n=58) in these categories. 
 individually-owned parcels 
civic parcels 
(all unsold) other parcels  unsold since PROCEDE 
sold since 
PROCEDE 
núcleo %  of all  
% with 
water 
source 
% of 
all 
% with 
water 
source 
% of 
all 
% with 
water 
source 
% of 
all 
% with 
water 
source 
La Pila 94 82 1 0 2 18 2 0 
Santa Cruz 71 63 22 25 2 13 6 0 
Las Armas 82 80 5 0 1 20 13 0 
Tazáquil 82 80 3 10 1 10 14 0 
Chimalaco 92 66 4 8 4 25 1 0 
AVERAGE 84 74 7 10 2 17 7 0 
 
In 2005 and 2006, the México Indígena research team conducted questionnaires with 
ejidatarios and comuneros in nine Huasteca núcleos, covering topics related both to the 
household and to the characteristics of one or more of the respondent’s individual parcels, about 
half of them surveyed by PROCEDE. The parcels were located by the local investigators using 
GPS, assisted by the parcel owners. I found that 38 of the parcels included within them, or at 
their boundary, a water source (including streams) important enough to be included on a 
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participatory community map. Of the many variables elicited in the questionnaires, I chose nine 
with some potential relevance to water and land tenure. 
 
Table 5.6. Non-random sample of 115 parcel owners (de facto or de jure) in nine núcleos in 
the Huasteca Potosina: Percentage of parcels with various characteristics than contain or do 
not contain community-mapped water sources. (Source: México Indígena Research Team).  
 % of parcels 
with mapped 
water source 
% of parcels 
without 
mapped 
water source 
not an ejidatario or comunero 6 6 
rents out part or all of parcel 17 5 
intends to sell parcel “in next year” 6 2 
products are for market 67 41 
grows fruit 31 29 
grows coffee 9 5 
grows sugar cane 26 16 
has cattle, or grows grass for cattle 17 12 
grows maize 23 22 
 
 
Because of the small sample, only stark differences between water-source parcels and 
other parcels should be considered as possibly significant. The results (Table 5.6) suggest that 
water-source parcels may be more attractive for land renters, are more likely to be made 
available for sale, and more often used for certain market products, especially sugar cane. One 
observation is that products grown on water-source parcels are more often produced for market 
(67 percent) than non-water-source parcel products are (41 percent), even though the differences 
for each specific market product (coffee, cattle, fruit) except sugar cane is negligible. This 
suggests that the presence of a water source indirectly makes a product more marketable, perhaps 
because its year-to-year yield is more assured, than the same product on a parcel lacking a water 
source. In any case, even if the link between market production and water sources is significant, 
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commercial orientation is not necessarily always associated with individualistic attitude (see 
chapter 9). 
Especially strong individual orientations toward water sources were observed in two 
Huasteca núcleos: Santa Cruz, which underwent PROCEDE parceling, and Cuatlamayán, which 
did not. (Even in these núcleos, there is also evidence of sustained village orientation toward 
water.) In Santa Cruz, each parcel owner has his own small irrigation reservoir (Anecdote 2, in 
the first pages of this chapter). This individuality of agricultural water supply stems from 
government assistance programs designed more for private cattle ranchers and cane growers, and 
from the physical situation of Santa Cruz’s parceled area: a gently undulating lowland traversed 
by three major streams and bordered by a fourth, the Rio Oxitipa/Coy. The most conspicuous 
cluster of recently sold parcels is around one of these streams (Bonilla 2007), along the stretch 
that is less than 1.5 km from a paved highway.  
Cuatlamayán is unusual among the study núcleos in that it has a long tradition of linking 
water sources to individual parcels, yet it also practices village orientation toward land (e.g., 
through its “inversion” of the PROCEDE template) and water (e.g., by maintaining a rich density 
of Nahuatl toponyms for its water sources). Due to its hydrological characteristics and dispersed 
settlement pattern, the México Indígena household/parcel questionnaires showed that most 
households get their domestic water from an individual shallow well or improved spring (pozo), 
typically dug about 1 meter in depth. Seventeen of these pozos were deemed important enough to 
be included on the participatory community map, eleven of them with distinct Nahuatl names. 
Three of the pozos have served multiple users. One, near the Tancanhuitz (Tetlakatajko) River 
that borders the comunidad, serves six houses. On a 1969 map produced for the RTBC (RAN 
1969d), it is specified as having “communal title,” although it is not given special treatment in 
the PROCEDE map. A second pozo, also on an individual’s de facto parcel, feeds a tank built in 
1996 on the main civic parcel, and provides water for about nine houses (interview with 
Hernández Reyes 2009).  
The third multi-user pozo, more of a spring-fed pond, is problematic. Its name, Ueyi 
Ameli, refers to a local legend about a snake which snake grew too large for the lake, and then 
emerged from it, carving out the topography of the village territory (interview with Hernández 
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Reyes 2009). In the 1970s, the núcleo installed a tube from this pozo to a water storage tank 200 
meters away, and another tube from the tank to the school about 1 km further north. When the 
PROCEDE survey was conducted, once again the tank was included on a small civic parcel, but 
the water source was left in an individual’s de facto parcel. The lack of a de facto common use 
area (other than a few civic parcels), the fact that house lots in the dispersed settlement are 
equivalent to agricultural parcels, and the fact the legally all the house lots/parcels are on 
common use land, all set the stage for a water-related dispute between individual and village 
interests (Anecdote 3, in the first pages of this chapter). Around 2006, the tube connecting the 
tank to the school burst. The de facto owner of the parcel containing Ueyi Ameli refused to allow 
its water to be used for community purposes (interview with Hernández Reyes 2009). This 
perhaps illustrates the fragility of this “fourth strategy”: maintain traditional links between land 
tenure and water sources, while rejecting PROCEDE parceling, and relying on individual 
persuasion to maintain village-scale water control. We should not draw broad conclusions from 
just this one story, and even this story may still have a happy ending. If we were to find similar 
stories in other similarly situated villages, we might venture to suggest that núcleos with an 
especially robust history of individualized land tenure, but which also wish to maintain deep 
village-scale cultural practices, may be better off undergoing full PROCEDE parceling, but with 
adjustments such as multiple civic parcels or small but numerous common use areas. 
5.4 Summary of results 
Anecdotes from RAN archival documents and from my fieldwork generally show an 
impressive persistence of village-scale practices in indigenous communities, but more regarding 
land tenure and rather less when water sources are involved. Coincidentally or not, this may 
parallel the slow roll out of dominio pleno (full land privatization) nationwide through 
PROCEDE as compared to the somewhat faster modernization of CONAGUA’s water rights 
concession system, although the latter program is still only selectively enforced. Intensive PRM 
results (chapter 6) will provide detailed examples of how these issues are being mediated in 
certain indigenous communities, while the geodata analysis (chapter 7) will suggest a broader 
picture of how great these changes might be, and where they could be most significant.  
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All other things being equal, there does appear to be some movement toward individual 
orientation in some communities, and toward deeper entanglement with the systems of the state. 
To the extent that “indigenous” implies a certain degree of separation from the state – and, less 
consistently, a certain level of village-scale orientation – this gradual movement does indicate a 
mild erosion of “indigeneity.”  However, indigenous communities have always engaged 
creatively with whatever state claims sovereignty over their territories, and they have always 
mediated individual and group interests, as any society must do. Most of Mexico’s indigenous 
villages will probably continue to do both these things well into the future, although those which 
have had their individual parcels surveyed and certified through PROCEDE or FANAR are faced 
with an extra challenge if they wish to maintain the practice of friendly borrowing of water 
between individual parcel owners, and between individuals and the village.     
The indigenous Chinantec comunidad of Totomoxtla (sub-section 5.3.2) demonstrates a 
pattern that is remarkably consistent across many ejidos and comunidades, in both study regions, 
regardless of the PROCEDE survey work done. A portion of community-valued water sources, 
typically about 20 to 40 percent of them, are given some kind of land-tenure-based “protection,” 
while for the rest the village-scale orientation is expressed only through established social 
practices such as oral agreements. 
To illustrate this story as it has developed in specific ejidos and comunidades, I extracted 
only those 13 núcleos for which I had encountered at least five land-tenure-related anecdotes in 
either the pre-1992 or post-1992 periods. Three of these communities had at least five anecdotes 
for both periods. As one might expect, village orientation is perhaps slightly more apparent in 
Oaxaca than in the Huasteca, and more in comunidades than in ejidos, but these correlations, if 
they exist at all, are modest compared to the general impression of continued blending and 
hybridity along the individual-village continuum. I then did the same exercise for water-related 
anecdotes: I extracted only those 9 núcleos for which I had encountered at least three such 
anecdotes in either the pre-1992 or post-1992 periods. Only one of these had at least three 
anecdotes for both periods. The sample is too small to confidently characterize by region or by 
núcleo type, though one may observe that Huasteca núcleos always included more individual-
oriented anecdotes than Oaxaca ones. One general observation, illustrated by the relative stability 
of Chimalaco’s orientation over time and confirmed by the histories of Huichimal and other 
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ejidos and comunidades, is that interest in community water control is a village-scale issue with 
deep historical roots. That is, some núcleos happen to have a long history of effort in managing 
their own water sources in certain ways, while others with similar environmental situations have 
been less interested in this – and that villages more dedicated to community water control will 
usually find a way to at least partly incorporate this ethos into PROCEDE-era practices. 
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6.  Results, part 2: Individual and village-scale land and water practices in 
three núcleos in 2008-2009 
In this chapter I discuss the maps I produced of water-related items and land tenure in the 
three Oaxaca comunidades where I conducted intensive participatory research mapping (PRM) 
fieldwork. In Talea (section 6.1), I was the sole fieldwork supervisor, in 2009. In the other 
núcleos, Tiltepec and Yagila (section 6.2), I worked with the assistance of the México Indígena 
research team in 2007 and 2008. The data for Talea are more detailed and complete than that for 
the other two núcleos. The interpretation of these map, along with the RAN archival documents 
in 33 communities reviewed in chapter 5, as well as the geodata analysis of chapter 7, help to 
identify patterns and trends in the village-scale control of water sources.  
Fieldwork in all three núcleos occurred well after the 1992 land tenure reforms. Talea had 
chosen to have its individual parcels surveyed and certified by PROCEDE, in 2002. The other 
two núcleos only had PROCEDE survey their perimeters: in Tiltepec in 2007, and in Yagila in 
2001. Yagila also had PROCEDE survey its “human settlement area,” although because it did 
not have its individual solares (house lots) surveyed, this is of little or no practical consequence. 
Thus, all of the territory in Tiltepec and Yagila is de jure “common use,” while the territory of 
Talea is partly de jure “common use” and partly de jure “individual parcels.” However, as is the 
case with nearly every núcleo in Mexico, the territories of Tiltepec and Yagila are similarly 
divided into de facto “common use” and “individual” areas. De facto tenure areas sometimes 
have less precise or static spatial boundaries than those defined through PROCEDE surveying. 
They may sometimes be defined conceptually by the community differently than envisioned by 
the architects of PROCEDE. Tiltepec and Yagila serve as imperfect proxies for what núcleos like 
Talea were like before they underwent PROCEDE parceling. 
The maps for all three villages use the same basic symbology for water-related items, and 
for land tenure. Individual tenure areas are depicted in gray, and common use areas in white. In 
Talea, where de facto and de jure categories coincide, the boundaries between individually 
parceled and common use areas are depicted as sharp lines. One map, Figure 6.7 (page 261), also 
shows the boundaries of each individual parcel. In the other comunidades, the de facto 
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individually parceled and common use area boundaries are shown as “fuzzy” lines, to more 
honestly represent three facts: in some places, the villagers do not themselves recognize exact 
boundaries; in some places, even if the villagers do recognize exact boundaries, I was not able to 
ascertain their precise locations, due to time constraints as well as to ethical considerations; and, 
in some cases, these boundaries shift over time, something which can happen to PROCEDE-
surveyed boundaries only after considerable legal effort. 
6.1   Talea: Land tenure and water sources in a PROCEDE-parceled comunidad 
After a look at Talea before the 1992 reforms based on secondary sources, I discuss the 
“natural” water situation as endowed to the village and villagers as the post-reform era began 
(Figure 6.1, on page 241). I then analyze Talea’s water-related items in three separate sets, each 
pertaining to a different scale of users and infrastructure. The first scale (sub-section 6.1.3) is the 
village; the second (6.1.4) is the sub-village group, and the third (6.1.5) is the individual. In each 
case, after I make observations about the water-related items, I consider other practices occurring 
at that scale. I conclude with a summary of the findings, and consider how generalizable they 
might be. 
Before proceeding with the sub-sections, I will mention one case from anthropologist 
Laura Nader’s 1990 book on municipal and village legal procedures in Talea. The case 
exemplifies the complex hybrid individual-village nature of the nexus between land and water. 
Nader (1990, 253) observed how Taleans increasingly recognized the state’s ultimate ownership 
of water: 
Landownership is the basis of power and privilege. Water ownership is conceived of 
as separate from the land, and although water may be perceived locally as belonging 
to the community, federal control over water marks the ascendancy of the central 
government over the community. 
 
A local informant expressed these multiple levels of water ownership to me thus:  “The 
[municipal] water committee is just for the human settlement area – the comisariado [núcleo 
authority] is the ‘owner’ of water for the rest of the community. Sure, all water is federal, but the 
community is the owner” (Toro Yescas 2009). 
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Although water is considered separate from land, either of them can be considered as 
“owned” by individuals. When the land and water exist together in space, this spatial coincidence 
can be relevant, although the details are sometimes disputed, as attested in a case where water 
ran from a group of chorros (translated by Nader as “waterspouts”) to a communal washing area: 
The problem began when Sra. Petra wanted to fix the tank in which the water from a 
chorro was collected.  This she did, ignoring the fact that this chorro was not her 
property, but rather had been deeded to the community in 1914 by a relative of the 
people who live near the chorros. 
       When Sra. Petra tried to fix the chorro, the neighbors objected because Sra. Petra 
considered it her property […] When the job was finished, Sra. Petra wanted to 
charge the neighbors for the job, and they refused to pay…The case could not be 
settled by the síndico [village judge]. It was sent to the alcalde [municipal authority], 
who did manage to settle the conflict, whereby Sra. Petra ceded the job, which had 
been done for the common good of the neighbors, without any restitution…Later this 
agreement was ratified by the decision of a federal land agent. 
       Later, she opened the drainage valve, making it impossible for anyone to do their 
laundry. She claimed to be cleaning the tank.   
       The síndico ‘determined that from this date on and with the purpose of avoiding 
any more friction between the parties, the cleaning of the spring would be taken care 
of by the town.’ Sra. Petra disagreed […] In the plaintiffs’ complaint, it was written 
that ‘it is not known in what way she acquired the domain of her property, 
constructing her house in such a manner that the water jet is under her porch.’ 
(Nader 1990, 258-259)  
6.1.1 Talea before PROCEDE 
In 1964, Laura Nader observed that, in Talea, “a distinction is made between private land 
and communal land: private land is owned by individuals and may be inherited or sold; 
communal land may be used for farming by any citizen who asks permission from the town, and 
this land use may be passed from parents to children but no individual has a right to sell 
communal land” (Nader 1964, 220). In 1990, she wrote that “it is by means of village courts that 
the traditional conceptions of collective rights are upheld or destroyed in disputes between group 
interests and those who adhere to the principle of private ownership. Sometimes […] the 
property owner comes to see that the public good is the more important and accedes” (Nader 
1990, 254). In other conflicts, one party will “frequently mention community interests,” while 
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the other emphasizes individualized “written legal documents” – but Nader saw such cases as 
fundamentally about “personal contest” (Nader 1990, 254). 
At the participatory mapping meeting in 2009, I was told by residents that, twenty years 
before PROCEDE, the villagers of Talea felt compelled to formally apply for status as social 
property comuneros. Before this time, they had considered themselves individual “propietarios” 
living in unincorporated county (municipal) land, even if not fully recognized as such by the 
state. The trigger for this change was the “border war” with the neighboring village of Tabaa. In 
essence, through the mechanism of an RTBC (granted in 1984, with the boundary finalized in 
Tabaa’s favor in 1994), the state offered its services as an enforcer of the village’s rural 
hinterland boundary, in exchange for the village becoming an official comunidad agraria. Some 
saw this as a government intrusion to be endured: “Now we have to ask for permission from the 
núcleo authorities (comisariado) to cut trees and such. It’s a government policy.” 
A very early village-scale action relates to both land and water, and is still common 
knowledge among Taleans five centuries later: “Talea village was originally at a lower elevation, 
around Sudoh, but in 1525 they moved it to its present location, to be closer to the springs – even 
though the legend is that someone saw a tree with lights in it there” (interview with Toro Yescas 
2009). 
As the following anecdote illustrates, in the mid-20th century, communally-used water 
sources were important locations for the practice of actions to mediate village-scale and 
individual interests. Nader recounts (1964, 278):   
At the Los Remedios well, each woman in neighborhood has special slab of stone to 
wash her clothes. One year it was noticed that the water began to dry up. This was 
blamed on the great amount of bickering and fighting that had gone on at this well. 
The men’s Well Association, created to protect and maintain the wells, had a meeting 
and decided to renovate the well. They removed all the stones, previously considered 
private property, and built two dozen cementlike stones for washing. It was stated that 
no one could own or reserve a space for washing. The priest was then asked to bless 
the new well and from then on there was water. 
 
The importance of most specific community water sources declined in importance after 
1959, when the first potable water system was installed, bringing piped water to houses in the 
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main population center from only a few locations. However, Nader did observe that, even though 
this technological change “has enabled each woman to have a wash tub in her home, she still 
prefers to wash at the wells” (Nader 1964, 243). 
In 1964 and 1990, Nader stressed the role of several kinds of sub-village groups in the 
culture of Talea, particularly barrios, associations, and churches. Each of these could have some 
spatial specificity, especially if they owned land in their name. 
In Talea, “barrios” referred to three “nonlocalized groups” that functioned as cooperative 
banks or savings-and-loan associations, collected municipal taxes on its saint’s day, and could 
own land (Nader 1964, 236; Nader 1990, 46). She saw them as another example of a shift from 
individual orientation toward a more community-oriented one. “Associations” were “smaller 
versions of barrios,” without official recognition or tax-collecting duties. “As mainly 
neighboring groupings, they [were] more or less localized,” and dominated by women (Nader 
1964, 238), except for the music-performing organizations, which “often represent the differing 
factions in the villages, in particular the enmity and struggle between progressives and 
conservatives, and between young and old” (Nader 1990, 48). Finally, “like the barrio and civil 
organizations, the various church groupings own property in the form of agricultural land and 
personal religious property” (Nader 1964, 240). Nader (1990, 49) attributed the proliferation of 
non-family sub-village groups to Talea’s unusual history: “People settled in Talea from other 
places over time, for various reasons. These people were self-selected for having the will to leave 
traditional situations.”  
In the late 1990s, just before PROCEDE surveyed Talea, anthropologist Roberto González 
found that the barrios were still in existence, holding de facto land titles “in common,” with 
“land tenure rights passed down from father to child,” but together they represented only four 
percent of the núcleo territory (González 2001, 131). As I will discuss in sub-section 6.1.4, at the 
time of the PROCEDE surveying work in 2002, none of the parcels were assigned to groups, and 
only a few to “co-proprietorships,” each with a handful of owners. González determined that the 
barrio/association system was “partly broken down” because coffee had been planted on some of 
the co-owned parcels, and “coffee may not be planted on barrio land because coffee trees are 
long-term plants and groves would effectively become private property” (González 2001, 134), a 
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case of a change in land use inducing a change in de facto land tenure, soon afterwards given 
legal sanction by PROCEDE. 
Like at the village scale, water management at the sub-village-group scale was more 
tangibly significant before the potable system largely replaced the well system, which depended 
on multiple specific locations which were both water sources and water use points: 
“We find other formal groupings in Talea, as for example the well groups. All the 
men whose wives wash at a particular well have an association whose purpose is to 
maintain the wells and the water supply, and to protect their rights should anyone cut 
off or threaten this supply of water. These positions are alternated yearly and elected 
by the neighborhood group.”   
(Nader 1964, 242)   
In sub-section 6.1.4, I will review how the vestiges of sub-village water control have 
shifted to shared irrigation systems, and to the potable system for the hamlet of Santa Gertrudis. 
Despite the strong village identity and preponderance of social property comunidades, 
“the [Sierra Norte] Zapotec’s concept of property is based on individual ownership” (Nader 
1964, 220; emphasis in original). This individual orientation toward worked parcels of land has 
often been semi-formalized by written records (Gonzalez 2001, 130; see section 5.1 for examples 
in other núcleos). For example, in 1958 a dispute developed between two Talean landowners, 
when one removed some of the other’s coffee plants. Nader wrote (1964, 274): 
Both the plaintiff and the defendant were asked to produce the documents of land 
ownership. From these, the [municipal authority] determined that the defendant had 
been in the wrong, and he ‘ordered that new boundary stones be set [. . .] The two 
signed a convenio [agreement], and the defendant was fined 40 pesos. 
 
Nader was careful, however, to distinguish between “dyadic” contracts between two 
individuals, and the practices which mediate between individual rights and community 
responsibilities (Nader 1990, 6). I discuss this in the context of agreements between parcel 
owners to share a single water source (sub-section 6.1.5). 
Nader (1990, 250-252) cited a legal case which illustrated how water could play a role in 
the “clash between collective interests and individual ownership.” The incident reveals how 
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water itself might be considered a collective good, fundamentally owned by the nation, but that 
the practices associated with water at a particular location could generate conflicts, with an 
individual’s efforts invested in infrastructure as a key component. A group of Taleans 
complained that another one would not allow them to “drink water from a river and spring that is 
on his property”: 
We need the water for washing clothes; our women need it. And Sr. Zenon took away 
the rocks and railing [which they later said they built to protect Zenon’s coffee trees]; 
and we are certain they were there before he bought the land. 
     Zenon was called to the [municipal authority]. He explained that he had put the 
rocks there, and that the others don’t wash there, they just throw junk there and leave 
it disgusting. ‘For my part there is no permission that they occupy my land because I 
pay the tax. Those people are abusing private property. I took away the rocks because 
I am going to plant coffee trees in that place, because it is mine.’ 
     The [authority] said, ‘They need that water for their homes.’ 
     Zenon said, ‘That is true.  If they want to wash, they must take the water to their 
homes and wash there.’ 
     The others said that ‘we don’t have the same manner of thinking that he does’; that 
they had planted banana trees, from which Zenon took the fruit, then killed the 
trees [. . .] ‘Also, with our money we constructed wooden boxes to have water 
wherever it is needed. He went to uncover them on purpose without our knowing 
it…He himself invited us to name a chief of the spring so that he and his aides would 
be aware of whatever was needed. Also, he sold the wood to make the boxes. Also, it 
was an ugly ravine until we did the work to make it a good, level washing place.’ 
     Sr. Zenon said, ‘Why do you want to order my property? Why did you dig without 
my consent? There is the water, which is federal, but there is no permission for you to 
occupy my land without my consent.’ 
 
Nader wondered, “was [Sr. Zenon] refusing access [for washing clothes] as a way to 
defend his individual ownership rights, or was he using his rights to the land as a way to force his 
opponents to work for him? Or both?” (Nader 1990, 253). In any case, the mix of appeals by 
both parties to individual, village, and national ideals and practices is typical. 
González devoted much of his analysis to the practice of coffee cultivation in Talea, 
including the ways in which coffee farming tended to cement spatially specific, individualized 
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practices,80 while also adding a new layer of loose cooperative structures, though only weakly 
identified with the village. He wrote (2001, 195): 
Coffee was introduced in Latin America against the background of older systems of 
farming [. . .] Talea is a case in point, for it is clear that coffee, in spite of its recent 
arrival and its Old World origins, is grown in a way that might be referred to as 
‘traditional’. An exploration of new coffee cooperatives in Oaxaca’s Northern Sierra 
is also part of the story. The cooperatives, institutions structurally rooted in Sierra 
Zapotec, Mixe, and Chinantec communities, promote organic coffee cultivation based 
on local techniques that are ecologically sound. 
 
González identified two other ways in which coffee farming promoted group bonding, at 
two different scales. First, the coffee harvest is considered a “fun family activity,” something I, 
too, was told during my fieldwork. Second, the labor necessary for the harvest often brings 
together Taleans who live there and those who live elsewhere, typically in Oaxaca City or 
Mexico City, although the hiring of entirely non-Talean laborers is even more common 
(González 2001, 212). 
Figure 6.1 shows the availability of water in Talea in 2009, during my participatory 
fieldwork there. It can be compared to Figure 2.7 (page 65), which shows topography and land 
use/land cover. One must keep in mind that any depiction of “nature” involves various levels of 
human construction. Figure 6.1 inevitably reveals what is important to humans, particularly in 
the “areas suitable for shallow wells” (zonas de pozos), which may express as much about the 
locating of human activities for non-hydrological reasons as it does about the water table 
geography. 
The map highlights how altitude is the most important factor in water availability. The 
large contiguous zone of springs envelops the slopes of Cerro Mogote and its continuation along 
the Cerro de Tabaa ridgeline to a place called Yab Duá or Yagbdua, Zapotec for “green spring” 
(INAFED 2007). A second zone of discontinuous concentrations of springs extends below the 
                                                        
80 The coffee parcels are individually owned, but their spatial pattern does imply some degree of community 
orientation: “In the village, coffee cultivation has occurred in a more or less egalitarian manner, on small plots 
distributed among many households, and thuis replicates a pattern that has existed in the Northern Sierra for 
years” (González 2001, 225). 
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Figure 6.1: Núcleo of Talea, Oaxaca, in 2009: Water availability (“natural” endowment). 
(Source: participatory fieldwork). 
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crest of El Arenal almost to the main population center (Villa Talea de Castro). Although the two 
zones are at similar elevations, anthropogenic disturbance may be at least partly responsible for 
the more fragmented distribution of the El Arenal springs. Regional geo-climatic factors also 
play a role, especially in the lack of springs, and near absence of perennial streams, on the Atrás 
de la Cumbre (“behind the summit”) slope descending to the Río Cajonos. 
The high hydrological value of the Cerro de Tabaa ridgeline is evident. As I have 
mentioned before, “most of this thin strip of forest was lost in a 1991 land conflict” with the 
neighboring núcleo of Tabaa (González 2001, 41). Now, the comunidad boundary follows a 
break in the slope, rather than the ridgeline. This leaves Tabaa with a flat area containing several 
coffee farms. This area’s value to Tabaa is probably even greater than its value to Talea, because 
the rest of Tabaa’s territory faces the Río Cajonos, with the same drier conditions found in Atrás 
de la Cumbre. 
During my fieldwork, I came to realize that springs themselves are regarded as important 
places, but that many of the actual “tomas” – water uptakes for human use – are made along the 
segments of rivers just below these springs, where the water is approximately as reliably 
abundant and clean as it is at the springs themselves. With the assistance of my PRM 
collaborators in Talea, I have included these segments in the map. 
In her 1964 book on Talea, Laura Nader included a detailed map of the human settlement 
area and its immediate surroundings “circa 1960,” an area about 2.5 km west-to-east by 2 km 
north-to-south (Nader 1964, 206). After the houses, the most prominent features on the map are 
water sources: 15 pozos (wells for houses, now all disused except two or three at the edge of the 
main population center), and five chorros (“waterspouts, springs”). Her map has few features in 
common with my modern geographic layers, as the road network has changed greatly in fifty 
years. Nevertheless, I was able to georeference the map with enough accuracy to determine that 
only one of her five chorros corresponds to a spring specifically identified during my fieldwork: 
the Lachi Lagunah spring, visible in Figure 6.1 below the word “Villa.” 
Another of Nader’s 1960 springs, Los Tres Chorros, was the primary water source for the 
commercial heart of the main population center, and the reason the village was located there in 
1525 (González 2001, 39). It is now a paved-over, pumped well half a block from the market 
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square. While it is still used to supplement the water systems of the buildings surrounding it, it 
was not included in my study, as it is not in any way connected to the núcleo territory (which, to 
reiterate, excludes the urbanized “Villa Talea de Castro”). The third of Nader’s springs is in the 
“area of numerous springs” shown in Figure 6.1 south of Chia.  
The last two of her springs were not encountered during my fieldwork. One of these is 
well outside the urban area, on the coffee-grove-covered slope south of the main population 
center. Since this is at the edge of an “area suitable for shallow wells,” it is possible that the 
once-natural spring later had to be excavated to reach a locally subsiding water table. 
6.1.2  The map of all water-related items, with observations about land tenure 
Figure 6.2 displays the location of nearly all the water sources, water transport conduits, 
and water storage facilities I located during my fieldwork. Water use facilities or locations are 
shown if they are also water sources (e.g., most shallow wells), or if they are used by sub-village 
groups, but for clarity, points of individual water use are omitted. The three scales of 
infrastructure and users (village, sub-village group, and individual) are not identified in this map, 
but can be inferred by the spatial patterns of conduits.  
A notable difference between the water availability map (Figure 6.1) and the water use 
and infrastructure map (Figure 6.2) occurs at Yag Brubh, an area on the slope of Cerro Mogote. 
The upper part of this zone has abundant water, yet it is not an especially important area for 
human water use, a fact confirmed to me during the PRM workshop. There is a small 
PROCEDE-certified common use area here (the white space at the southern tip of the núcleo), 
but most of the zone is individually parceled and partly planted in coffee, though it is heavily 
forested. It is poorly located to provide potable water for either of the human settlement areas 
(the main population center, and the hamlet of Santa Gertrudis), and probably too remote and 
steep-sloped to be suitable for the water-intensive coffee production, cattle ranching, or irrigated 
agriculture found elsewhere in the núcleo.  
The hamlet of Santa Gertrudis, home the 10 percent of Taleans not living in the main 
population center. The 17 solares (house lots) of Santa Gertrudis were surveyed by PROCEDE,  
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Figure 6.2: Núcleo of Talea, Oaxaca, in 2009: Water-related items and land tenure (entire 
núcleo). Tenure types shown are de jure “individual” and “not individual.”  (Sources: INEGI 
2002b and participatory fieldwork). 
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but its “area of influence” has no formal boundary surrounding it. As one local informant told 
me, “its parcels are pretty well mixed up with Talea villager parcels” (interview with Méndez 
2009). Santa Gertrudis convenes its own assembly (asamblea de agencia), practices its own 
occasional tequio, and is responsible for its potable water supply. Technically, the hamlet is a 
sub-village group. 
At some time in the past century, Taleans began to extend the main human settlement area 
northward, to an area called Barrio (or Colonia) Vírgen de los Pobres, “founded as a ‘gift’ from 
the municipio to a group of landless folks, in exchange for cargo [unpaid community 
administrative work]” (Toro Yescas 2009; González 2001, 38). After the initial PROCEDE 
survey in 2002, but before the documents had been finalized, the núcleo chose to extend the 
“localidad Villa Talea de Castro” boundaries to include this neighborhood, thus reducing the size 
of the comunidad by 19 hectares. 
Talea’s assembly directed PROCEDE to survey six common use areas. The primary one is 
the forested, well-watered zone above the main population center, up to the summit of El Arenal. 
About half this area was farmed in maize until 1978, when the village assembly prohibited 
further deforestation “to prevent forest fires,” though “a few people had deeds [escrituras] 
written up, and they supposedly retain rights to their lands” (interview with Pascual García 
2009); hence, some of the forest is today composed of noticeably secondary vegetation. The 
current local definition of “communal terrain,” according to my participatory collaborators, does 
not include all of this de jure common use area: there are two places within it still considered as 
including “individual parcels” (parcelas particulares), around which loose cattle roam. Other 
permissible uses include the gathering of firewood (although this is controlled by the núcleo, in 
order to allow pine trees to thrive), and, in a few places, the cutting of pines for lumber. 
Taleans chose to designate five smaller places as additional common use areas. Between 
Chia and Seguh (Figure 6.3, on page 251) are two zones where “agriculture has been prohibited 
since the time of PROCEDE, to avoid forest fires, but you can plant maize here or cut wood for 
personal use, with permission of the comisariado” (interview with Pascual García 2009). On the 
steep, secondary-vegetated slopes of the lower stretch of the Río Santa Gertrudis, here called the 
Río del Rosario and the Río de Lacal, are two other common use areas, in zones which were 
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impacted by mining and limestone quarrying. The last area is the small zone on the slope of 
Cerro Mogote. 
Talea assigned four PROCEDE-surveyed individual parcels as “civic,” i.e., “in favor of 
the community” (see sub-section 5.3.2). By far the largest of these is the 12-hectare parcel 
containing the Secondary School, founded in 1977 in the pine woods near the main highway, two 
kilometers beyond the west edge of the population center. The other three parcels are very small, 
totaling 0.02 hectares, and contain water storage tanks. One of these tanks is part of the main 
potable water system, and was included in my fieldwork, while the others have smaller tanks, 
serving just three and six peri-urban house parcels, respectively. 
My final village-scale land tenure observation concerns the “special areas,” terrains within 
the núcleo of Talea surveyed by PROCEDE but not included in any of the grandes areas 
(parceled, common use, or human settlement areas). In Talea, there are two types of special 
areas: public roads, and “rivers or streams” (ríos o arroyos). The latter type is discreetly visible 
on the maps in this chapter as narrow, sinuous white lines of varying width. Only two rivers or 
streams were deemed wide enough by the PROCEDE surveyors to be given this designation: all 
of the Río Santa Gertrudis (also called the Río del Rosario in one stretch), and part of the Yegu 
Yuxhina (called a “nameless stream” on the PROCEDE map). A 5-meter streambed width 
appears to be the approximate minimum for this legal designation.  
These rivers and streams, like the public roads,81 are locations where the PROCEDE 
surveyors felt it was necessary to allow the public the right of access, and not just the members 
of the núcleo. If they had not done so, any rights of way later desired for the public good,  such 
as a new public road or electrical utility line, would have to be created either by expropriation 
(thus removing the terrain from the núcleo), or by entering into a contract with the ejido or 
comunidad (if in a common use area) or the parcel owner (if on a certified parcel) for “subjection 
[servidumbre] of passage, rent, and bailment [comodato],” or by waiting until the parcels in 
question had entered a state of dominio pleno (full title), at which point they could be purchased 
outright (CFE 2001, 5). The PROCEDE surveying protocol includes provisions for all types of 
                                                        
81 In the maps in this chapter, some of the public road and stream rights of way are too narrow to be visible. 
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right of way on its maps and documents; for example, every parcel certificate includes an area 
total for the contract class of right of way, though the figure is nearly always zero (Kelly Salinas 
1995, 229).  
Only two of the water-related items I mapped are located within a “special area” in Talea, 
neither of them water sources. In the  maps and tables, I treat these areas as functionally 
equivalent to the common use areas. Nevertheless, one should keep in mind that these areas are 
not legally deeded to the núcleo, as the civic parcels are, nor are the deeded to all the comuneros 
or ejidatarios at the moment of PROCEDE, as the common use areas are. Instead, they are the 
first examples of what will gradually become a more common occurrence: land which lies within 
a núcleo’s boundaries, but does not in any way belong to it. It is simply within the núcleo’s 
jurisdictional administrative area. This represents the first clear break in the long-standing unique 
situation of Mexico’s ejidos and comunidades as both a land-owning entities and the lowest-
level jurisdictional unit. As PROCEDE-surveyed individual parcels gradually enter into full title, 
the land-owning role of núcleos will diminish.82 
I will now review the land tenure geography of sub-village groups. The principal 
observation is that the 20th-century system of landowning barrios and associations, already in 
decline by the 1990s, has not survived into the post-1992-reform era. Taleans could have taken 
the step of formalizing any of these groups as a commercial sociedad agraria, as did the 
ejidatarios of Las Armas in the Huasteca Potosina, and their land would have been certified as 
“collective use” property. Alternatively, any of these groups could have had their PROCEDE-
surveyed parcels certified to multiple owners, known as “co-proprietors.” There are eleven such 
parcels; they are shown as grey areas with black stippling in Figure 5.1.6 (page 200). Several of 
these probably represent the remnants of old associations, but none have more than five 
PROCEDE-certified owners. One of these, owned by three women, is by far the largest 
                                                        
82 However, the núcleo’s jurisdictional role will not increase in turn, but rather diminish as well. The perimeter 
boundary will fade in importance, as newly privatized parcels fall under the direct jurisdiction of municipios, 
like properties in unincorporated county areas in the United States. Even common use areas will simply be 
parcels with co-propietors, whose owners happen to be the list of ejidatarios or comuneros at moment of 
PROCEDE certification. In nucleos where the process reaches its logical end, the only property that will be 
owned by the núcleo will be any civic parcels it might have had the foresight to assign thus during PROCEDE 
– although, since the núcleo may not function as a viable entity by that point, I assume that civic parcel 
ownership would be transferred to a larger government entity: the muncipio, the state, or the nation. 
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individual parcel in Talea: 374 hectares of scrubby secondary vegetation (abandoned farms) in 
the relatively dry and distant slope known as Atrás de la Cumbre (RAN 2002d). During my 
fieldwork in 2009, the road from Santa Gertrudis through the coffee farms toward Zudoh was 
rebuilt after storms had washed it out, and it was also extended to the ridgeline (“La Cumbre”) 
between Cerro de Tabaa and El Picacho (Figure 6.5). I was told that the road construction was a 
group project by owners of parcels on both sides of the ridgeline, in order to make their farms 
more accessible and therefore profitable. For the co-owned parcel holders, the road would allow 
them to re-initiate farming to renters or sharecroppers. Current sub-village-scale associations 
(sub-section 6.1.4) are composed of owners of individual parcels who join together for a specific 
purpose, such as shared irrigation infrastructure, without owning any land as a group. 
I reiterate that the hamlet of Santa Gertrudis is legally a sub-village group. I have not yet 
resolved the question of whether, as a group, it is the legal owner of any land. The house 
lots/kitchen gardens (solares) of the hamlet’s residents are located in two legally distinct land 
tenure areas. 15 houses are on PROCEDE-titled solares within the human settlement area; this is 
the thin strip labeled “de jure human settlement” in Figure 6.5. Another approximately 20 
houses, however, lie within a single PROCEDE-certified parcel (i.e., in the supposedly 
agricultural “parceled area”); this is the parcel which appears in Figure 6.7 (page 261) containing 
the trout hatchery and Nizban Pool. The PROCEDE documents are either incomplete or 
contradictory regarding the status of this parcel, as well as for an adjacent, uphill, mainly 
forested parcel. It is not included in the list of Talea’s eleven parcels with co-proprietors, nor is it 
one of the three tiny (water-related) “civic” parcels (RAN 2002d), but neither is it included on 
the list of parcels assigned to individual comuneros (RAN 2002b). Due to this ambiguity, I 
excluded the water items in this area in calculations for the tables in this chapter. 
The land tenure geography of individual parcels presents other complexities. When 
PROCEDE convened its first full meeting with the community in June 2002, the 1994 RTBC list 
of 648 comuneros was reduced to 468, 100 of whom had died in the intervening eight years 
while 78 were absent from the meeting and so their rights were suspended for six months. Only 
one comunero was added at this meeting (RAN 2002e). During the PROCEDE activities which 
followed, 525 non-landowning villagers (avecindados) were added (RAN 2002d). This is an 
unusually high number, and reflects Talea’s history as relatively welcoming of newcomers, many 
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of them engaged in non-agricultural work. Of this final list of 993 comuneros (RAN 2002e), 704 
were certified owners of the 1,637 parcels. The average of 2.3 parcels per owner obscures the 
fact that comuneros have a single parcel, while a few have as many as eleven or twelve. 
Parcel boundaries are rarely formally demarcated. Typically, they are marked by subtle 
vegetation changes which both neighboring owners are aware of. The word lugar (place) is used 
for a named area without definite boundaries, usually containing around ten parcels; in some 
Zapotec núcleos, the equivalent term is paraje. The toponyms for these places appear on the 
participatory community map, and a few of them are also on the maps in this chapter.  
Permanent structures are found on two types of parcels: “peri-urban” parcels, and 
ranchos. Peri-urban parcels are smaller-than-average parcels located in three places just beyond 
the boundaries of Villa Talea de Castro; another group of six is visible in the Santa Gertrudis 
hamlet, in Figure 6.7. These are places where a human settlement area has expanded beyond its 
former boundaries. The other type of structure built on parcels, the rancho, is much more 
common. These are buildings used for storing maize, processing coffee beans, or other farm 
activities; many once included sugar cane presses, but these are now uncommon (interview with 
Méndez 2009). There are over five hundred ranchos, distributed throughout the núcleo. Many 
are built so robustly, and with the same aesthetic attention paid to the human settlement houses, 
that the cartographers who created the INEGI 1:50,000-scale topographic map marked them with 
the symbol usually reserved for permanent domiciles. These structures represent a significant 
investment, attesting to the enduring link between a parcel and its owner (and the owner’s heirs), 
but are locally recognized as not being “houses” because the “lack electricity” (interview with 
Pascual García 2009). 
There are a few areas, such as Seguh (Figure 6.5, on page 257), which contain 
PROCEDE-certified individual parcels, but where farming is generally no longer practiced. Such 
parcels are typically abundant in “ocote” pine trees (Pinus ayacahuite or P. montezumae). After 
obtaining permission from the núcleo authority, owners of these parcels sometimes contract a 
local resident who owns a chainsaw to cut a few trees for timber, for themselves or for a few 
friends and neighbors (interview with Toro Yescas 2009). 
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6.1.3   Village-scale water-related items in Talea 
Village-scale water items (Figure 6.3) fall into two categories. Most sources, conduits, and 
storage facilities are part of the potable water system which serves the houses and businesses of 
the Villa Talea de Castro population center.83 The second category consists of a few water 
sources where water is still used in situ by the community. I will discuss this second, smaller 
category first.  
The “Manantial Lachi Lagunah” (Figure 6.4) is a productive spring in a well-shaded 
neighborhood near the edge of the settlement zone. Next to the natural spring, behind a retaining 
wall, is a large, partly-roofed cement tank with an open upper surface for storing its water. This 
is used to provide water to a few coffee-producing ranchos nearby, and by several dozen 
households for washing clothes, as well as for emergency provision of water to the potable 
system. On orders from the municipal authorities (not núcleo authorities, as it is outside the 
boundaries of the comunidad), the surrounding vegetation is “protected” (interview with Ribero 
2009). In 2009, to supplement or replace the existing wastewater pipe at the western extreme of 
the main population center, construction was initiated (with CONAGUA’s assistance) on a 
wastewater pipe which will collect effluent near this spring, and treat it at a plant about 1 km 
downslope, along the Guiax Pquíz stream. 
One other village-used water item unrelated to the potable system is shown in Figure 6.3: 
a small rock weir which forms a swimming hole, along the Yegu Yagbduah Xil stream, where 
the road to Yatoni exits the Talea núcleo’s territory. I included this item to represent the 
approximately dozen simple modifications of streams, scattered across the núcleo near important 
roads and paths, which are used occasionally by anyone for washing, bathing, or drinking. 
The potable water system for the main population center is maintained by CONSAP, a 
water committee with its own small office separate from the municipio administration. Each 
household pays it 50 pesos per year. The committee is in charge of making sure the storage tanks 
are kept clean, and its members take turns guarding the water sources and tanks against 
                                                        
83 Due to Talea’s unusual “donut” legal configuration, this is technically an example of water transport which 
crosses núcleo boundaries. Because the domestic users of the “donut hole” are the same people as the 
landowners of the “donut,” this fact is unimportant, although it conceivably could cause problems in the future. 
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Figure 6.3: Núcleo of Talea, Oaxaca, in 2009 – Village-scale infrastructure/users: Water-
related items and land tenure areas (map shows part of Talea núcleo territory).  Tenure 
types shown are de jure “individual” and “not individual.” Sample is almost 100 percent of 
village-scale items in Talea. (Sources: INEGI 2002b and participatory fieldwork). 
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Figure 6.4. Manantial Lachi Lagunah, a spring, water tank, and public basin at the outskirts 
of the main population center of Talea, Oaxaca. It is one of the few remaining locations of 
for in situ community water use, and the only water source serving both agricultural parcels 
and, in emergencies, the domestic potable water system. (Photograph by the author in 
2009). 
 
 
infractions such as dumping garbage. They periodically check the tanks to make sure they don’t 
completely empty; if they do, a local plumber is called to fix the airlock which this causes 
(interview with Pérez Cruz 2009). Before the 1970s, tequio (obligatory communal work) was a 
more active village-scale practice, and one of its tasks was “to recondition the public water 
supply and drainage system” (Nader 1964, 242).  
There are four locations currently functioning as potable water sources feeding into the 
system. Each consists of a stream uptake 150 to 400 meters downstream from the spring where a 
permanent stream arises. Typically, these uptakes were constructed as small concrete tanks 
through which the stream passes, surrounded by wire mesh as a filter. In two of the locations, a 
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small dam had been built to form a pond (interview with Pérez Cruz 2009). A fifth uptake, built 
in 1991, fell into disuse in 2008 when its stream became dry for most of the year. 
Two of the uptakes are well within the large, forested common use area.84 One uptake, 
along Arroyo Xagníchih at a permanent spring, is surrounded by barbed wire, to keep cows 
away. While it is within the common use area, an individual’s parcel is located only 50 meters 
away and uphill from the uptake. I was told that this parcel was planted in maize until 1986, 
when it was “taken from the owner and given to the community, in exchange for another parcel, 
to prevent agro-chemicals from contaminating the water.” However, the 2002 PROCEDE 
documents show it as still certified to an individual – an unusual discrepancy between de jure 
and de facto land tenure in Talea. 
The fourth productive uptake for the main population center’s supply is located well 
within a PROCEDE-certified individual’s parcel, near the source of the Yegu Xhuag stream. A 
second uptake, serving the secondary school nearby, adjoins it. The land here is well forested, 
including some cloud forest species. I was told that not even the parcel owner is allowed to cut 
down trees near the water uptake, although this dictum is not always followed: another comunera 
attested that “several springs around edge of settlement area have dried up because they lacked 
maintenance – vegetation was cut down” (interview with Méndez 2009). One local leader told 
me that the village-scale power over any local landowner in potable water supply matters was 
linked to the fact that the state grants the concession to the community as a whole: “It’s no 
problem if some [potable supply] springs are within parcels, but CONAGUA gives concessions 
to the ayuntamiento [municipio authority]. The people with parcels know they can’t refuse 
[negar]” (interview with Pérez Cruz 2009). 
The conduits which bring water from these sources to the storage tanks near the main 
population center include metal pipe (in some segments buried, in others suspended on brick 
columns), or PVC tubing for segments installed since 1987 (Archivo Histórico del Agua 1970). 
                                                        
84 Also within the common use area is a “lake once considered sacred – a place where you give thanks to the 
rain” (interview with Pascual García 2009). My local collaborators brought me near the site, but not precisely 
to it. 
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Three tanks at the edge of the main population center store the potable supply. One is 
located on a small “civic” parcel, and another is well within the “donut hole” of Villa Talea de 
Castro. The third tank, located just within Villa Talea, is Chorro Vírgen de los Pobres. This is the 
most interesting and aesthetically pleasing water-related site in Talea. It began as a natural spring 
above the main settlement area. When the Vírgen de los Pobres neighborhood was developed for 
new residents sometime in the 20th century, a beautifully constructed rock, concrete, adobe, and 
wooden structure was built to channel the spring’s water into a roofed, hard-floor, open-walled 
tub to facilitate their water needs, both in situ (e.g., washing clothes) and as a source for hand-
carried domestic water. Even after the population center’s potable system was installed in 1959, 
the structure has continued to be used for water activities, probably in part due to its social 
function as a gathering place. In the 1980s, the spring had become unproductive. At about the 
same time, the Río Frío section of the potable supply system was constructed, including a storage 
tank built as an extension of the Vírgen de los Pobres structure, thus fortuitously maintaining the 
site’s role as an active village water feature. 
In 2006 schoolteachers working in Talea and neighboring villages initiated a proposal to 
revive mining in the núcleo, after a Canadian mining company had explored the possibility in 
2003. In an expression of village-scale water orientation, this idea was opposed by the 
comunidad assembly, mainly due to fears of water pollution and of the village springs drying up 
if the water table lowered (interview with Miranda 2009). 
Other observations related to village-scale orientation are not directly related to water, but 
reflect Taleans’ continuing ambiguous attitude toward technology, and toward the state, in the 
post-1992-reform era. González (2001, 60-61) found that “many Taleanos expressed a 
fascination with ‘modern’ devices and technologies,” and cited the example of a local 
“technological hero” who had “designed a wooden water mill for extracting the juice from 
sugarcane.” Yet, “by [. . .] 1997, I had detected a certain disenchantment on the part of at least 
some villagers with the effects of these changes on everyday life.” However, González “took 
these observations with a grain of salt – particularly since those critiquing technology were often 
the same people who most aggressively sought it.” 
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The same ambiguity is directed toward government programs. González mentions 
complaints about a national anticholera campaign’s chlorination of local drinking water (2001, 
61), and that “even today various officials from the government and NGOs arrive with plans to 
improve coffee but are politely ignored by many campesinos” (2001, 221). I observed 
disappointment with the recent CONAFOR-initiated Payment for Environmental Services 
program (PES) (see sub-section 5.1.3). 
These attitudes can be considered signs of enduring village culture. I encountered other 
examples of this. The municipio recently considered restricting the sale of goods from Oaxaca 
City, to help Talea’s tradition Monday market, which features local products, to regain its former 
prominence. A new colonia (neighborhood) is being built near the old airstrip at the edge of the 
main settlement area. Although it is partly on an individual’s parcel, the núcleo is apparently 
paying for the construction, and will recoup the investment by selling the homes, though it will 
not sell the land. 
On the other hand, the village tradition of tequio continues to decline. It is now mainly 
restricted to non-professional tasks like clearing brush; semi-skilled work such as road repair 
contracted to experts (interview with Méndez 2009). One comunero lamented to me that 
“someday no one will do their tequio.” Interestingly, the government has tried to prolong the 
tradition of tequio, through a program of “temporary employment” in which they pay the núcleo 
to pay residents for part of their tequio work – but surely the introduction of money removes 
much of its village solidarity function.  
Finally, there is the introduction of the Internet to Talea. In 2009, Internet was still 
essentially a “community” activity: only a few, slow connections were available, in a “café” an 
in a small library. This situation is unlikely to last long, however, as more individualized 
connections become available. On the other hand, the Internet does afford opportunities to 
express village-scale pride, as a beautifully produced 2007 YouTube slide show demonstrates 
(http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UEW5W7r8f9I, accessed April 29, 2009). 
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6.1.4 Sub-village-group water-related items in Talea 
Water sources and infrastructure items tied to sub-village-scale groups fall into two 
categories: the potable domestic water supply for the hamlet of Santa Gertrudis (Figure 6.5), and 
the approximately half-dozen groups of residents which exploit specific water sources in shared 
irrigation schemes (Figure 6.6). 
The potable supply for Santa Gertrudis (Figure 6.5) derives from two natural springs 
along perennial streams which have been modified into constructed water uptakes. Both uptakes 
are located on PROCEDE-certified individual parcels, and required an oral agreement between 
the agencia assembly of the hamlet and the parcel owners. One of the uptakes, near Lachi Rah 
Guih, is on the parcel of a woman who died in 2004, and had been “directed by the comisariado 
(núcleo authority) to give permission for its community use” (interview with Miranda 2009). Its 
location was chosen because it is about 150 meters upstream from the outlet of the existing 
wastewater pipe for the main population center, although I was told that “until they finish 
building the new treatment plant, the water from this uptake isn’t as clean as it should be.” The 
second uptake, south of the hamlet near the Yag Brubh stream, is on a parcel owned by an 
individual coffee farmer, who gave permission to the hamlet to build the infrastructure in 1998, 
including a metal pipe. 
One of the two main holding tanks for Santa Gertrudis’ potable water is in the solar 
(house lot) certified to the hamlet’s assembly hall (grandly labeled “palacio municipal” on the 
PROCEDE map). Besides being distributed to homes, its water is accessible via a small public 
tap, beside a beautiful old stone bridge. The other tank, near the Chapel of the Virgin, is in the 
forested parcel of uncertain tenure status, mentioned in sub-section 6.1.2. A third (auxiliary) tank 
is in the right of way (“special area”) polygon of Río Santa Gertrudis. 
Clarke described irrigation in the Central Valley of Oaxaca (Figure 2.5, on page 56), a 
drier region than Talea’s but flatter and more accessible to markets, as characterized by a “large 
number of small-scale and independent systems” (Clarke 2000, 96). Because the area has few 
large perennial streams to feed it, the valley’s main river, the Río Atoyac/Salado, is not suitable 
for a valley-scale irrigation project, and so irrigation infrastructure is more typically at the scale 
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Figure 6.5: Núcleo of Talea, Oaxaca, in 2009 – Sub-village-group-scale infrastructure/ users, 
map 1 (potable water system for hamlet of Santa Gertrudis): Water-related items and land 
tenure areas (map shows part of Talea núcleo territory).  Tenure types shown are de jure 
“individual” and “not individual.” Together with map 2 (Figure 6.5), sample is about 60 
percent of sub-village-group-scale items in Talea. (Sources: INEGI 2002b and participatory 
fieldwork). 
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of one to three villages. In Talea, the abundance of perennial water sources has resulted in a 
pattern of a few irrigation schemes (Figure 6.6) that are even smaller and more “independent” 
than those of the Central Valley. Because rainfall in Talea is, in most years, sufficient to 
maintain the principal crops (maize for subsistence, and coffee for market – though many coffee 
farmers do need additional water for coffee processing), these few irrigation groups exist mainly 
to cultivate crops which require more water than these crops do, such as roses (grown in a 
greenhouse), or to ensure more than one crop per year. 
For their water sources, these sub-village irrigation groups usually draw from the tomas 
(stream uptakes) at or near natural springs. Occasionally, these groups draw instead from pozos – 
shallow, simple “wells” which expose subsurface water, usually without pumps.85 
The longest PVC tube in the upper map in Figure 6.6, about 2 km in length, was installed 
in 1993-1994 by a sociedad of about eight owners of parcels above the stretch of the Santa 
Gertrudis river known as “Río del Rosario.” The water is drawn from a stream uptake in a parcel 
owned by an individual not associated with the group. Before distribution to individual parcels, 
the water is stored in a sturdy tank at a prominent bend in the road to Santa Gertrudis. The 
second sociedad whose infrastructure appears in this map was organized in 1999, also with 
participation by the leader of the first group. Its toma, upstream from the first, has a similar 
storage tank, and also serves about eight landowners, some of whom cultivate maguey for 
distilled mezcal. 
The lower-left map within Figure 6.6 shows the more modest infrastructure shared by another 
sociedad. This is the group that is extending the road to “La Cumbre,” partly to revive maize and 
coffee agriculture in the area called “Atrás de la Cumbre” (unfortunately, I was told that the 
road’s construction probably caused a nearby pozo to “dry up”). Farming in this terrain had 
                                                        
85 These pozos resemble those described at the Preclassic-Classic Maya city of Dzibilchaltún: “Numerous 
‘wells’ or small cenotes usually measuring less than a meter in diameter were found near ruin groups. The 
proximity of these to Pre-Hispanic architecture indicates that the Maya either dug or at least enlarged them. 
Masonry, often consisting of carefully dressed limestone blocks, is sometimes found at the mouth of these 
wells. The water table is 2 to 3 m below the surface” (Kurjack 1979, 6). 
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Figure 6.6: Núcleo of Talea, Oaxaca, in 2009 – Sub-village-group-scale infrastructure/ 
users, maps 2, 3, and 4 (various “sociedades”: three for irrigating agricultural fields, one for 
irrigating a greenhouse): Water-related items and land tenure type (maps show parts of 
Talea núcleo territory). (Sources: INEGI 2002b and participatory fieldwork.) 
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been “abandoned due to introduction of chemical fertilizers (which doubles [maize] yield, so 
there is need to cultivate distant fields), and to outmigration” (González 2001, 41). The primary 
source for these farms is a spring in the Cerro de Tabaa area, most of which lies outside the 
present-day boundaries of the núcleo. 
The lower-right map shows the water supply for a modern greenhouse, constructed by a 
group of Taleans on a PROCEDE-certified individual parcel. The roses are cultivated using a 
sophisticated drip irrigation system whose source of water is an uptake on a perennial stream at 
the edge of the same parcel. 
6.1.5 Individual-scale water-related items in Talea 
The map of individual-user water sources and infrastructure (Figure 6.7) includes most of 
the items in this category which I geolocated in the field. Several other individual-scale items 
beyond the boundaries of this map are visible in Figure 6.2 (on page 244). Figure 6.7 also 
displays the boundaries of individual PROCEDE-certified parcels. Most of the individual water 
items relate to the processing of coffee beans, some to the watering of cattle, and two have 
unique purposes.  
During the participatory mapping meeting, I was told that only coffee beans on parcels 
relatively distant from the main population center require processing on site in “ranchos;” closer 
ones do their processing in town. Therefore, the greatest concentration of water-dependent coffee 
processing locations (Figure 6.8) is on the far slope, southeast of Santa Gertrudis.86 Water is 
needed to wash the beans after they have been depulped, dried, and allowed to ferment for two or 
three days. González (2001, 206-207) observed that:   
Water is also a consideration when selecting a site. Cultivating coffee too far from a 
spring or waterhole is a bad idea, for relatively large quantities of water are necessary 
for ‘washing’ the coffee after its skin and pulp have been removed. The alternative is 
to ship the entire fruit back to the village [i.e., main population center] for depulping. 
 
                                                        
86 In the Huasteca village of Chimalaco, all coffee cultivation occurs relatively close to the main village and 
highway. Thus, “the cafetales don't have ranchos – that is, they don't process beans in the parcels – so, they 
don't need much water” (interview with Salazar 2009). 
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Figure 6.7: Núcleo of Talea, Oaxaca, in 2009 – Individual-scale infrastructure/users: Water-
related items and land tenure type (map shows part of Talea núcleo territory).  De jure 
individual parcel boundaries are shown. Sample is about 25 percent of individual-scale 
items in Talea. (Sources: INEGI 2002b and participatory fieldwork). 
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He continued (2001, 215-216): 
The beans are transferred to a specially-made perforated tin (sometimes as large as a 
bathtub), and a water hose is dropped into the tank. A stirring paddle is used to loosen 
the remaining bits of pulp and other ‘trash’ from the coffee beans. The effluence 
drains away through the perforations, the beans are transferred gourdful by gourdful 
to a smaller ‘tin’ (a plastic tub with holes burned into the bottom of it with a heated 
nail), and then the process is repeated, using the arm and the hand instead of the 
stirring paddle. 
 
Figure 6.8. Individual water use point on a parcel in Talea. The water is transported from a 
neighboring parcel, with that parcel owner’s permission, via a flexible tube. The tray at 
right is used to wash coffee beans. (Photograph by the author in 2009). 
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Water must be transported from the source to the rancho structure, whether it is on the 
same individual’s parcel or on a neighbor’s. In the context of northern Mexico cattle ranching, 
Perramond calls these short-distance water transports “pseudo-irrigation strategies” (Perramond 
2010, 67). I will review the transport of water from one parcel to another in sub-section 6.1.6.  
The water uptakes are usually simple affairs. Often, a wooden, bamboo, or PVC length of 
half-tube focuses the streamwater, which also makes the site more useful for any thirsty person 
who walks by. A minority of uptakes are more elaborate constructions. A few have brick-and-
cement, zinc-roofed storage tanks, built and maintained by the parcel’s owner, even if he loans 
water to neighbors. Some uptakes are located at natural springs, springs modified with simple 
stone linings, or shallow “wells” (i.e., pozos, almost indistinguishable from modified springs); 
these often have metal screens covering the uptake point, to avoid clogging by leaf litter. At a 
hardware store in Talea in 2009, half-inch-diameter light-duty plastic hose cost 220 pesos (about 
twenty dollars) for 100 meters, while reinforced plastic hose cost 250 pesos. A join cost 3 pesos, 
and a 1½-inch T-connector cost 15 pesos. 
Because they can be located with even more spatial flexibility than coffee ranchos, cattle 
waterers are usually placed directly at a water source; only in a few cases is the water transported 
a short distance by hose. In at least one case, a natural spring on an individual parcel was 
deepened and improved by the now-deceased owner. His widow “doesn’t mind if anyone uses it, 
usually for animals which pass by,” i.e., for ganado suelto (cattle temporarily allowed to roam 
free from parcel to parcel, or within the common use area) (interview with Toro Yescas, 2009). 
As with most of the tomas used primarily by individuals, this attitude of “anyone can use the 
water” makes it difficult to definitively assign these water uptake points as having “individual” 
users. For the purposes of this study, these water sources are considered as “individual,” because 
that is their primary function, and because there is no shared responsibility for infrastructure 
maintenance. However, this permissive attitude toward fellow villagers must be kept in mind 
throughout the interpretation of the data.  
The two individual, water-intensive use points with unique purposes are located at the 
edge of the Santa Gertrudis hamlet. There, a vigorous and prosperous Talean entrepreneur, 
developer of an impressive hotel in the main population center, in 2009 was building a trout 
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hatchery and a recreational pool (balneario). Pisciculture has been promoted as a means of 
greater nutritional self-sufficiency in many núcleos in the highlands of Oaxaca, and in a few 
places it has generated thriving commercial enterprises or restaurants. In the case of Talea, I was 
informed that the trout farm was expected to only generate modest profits, but that it also served 
as a way for its owner to “give back” to his hometown, such as by being an important source of 
food during Holy Week, when many Talean expatriates come to visit. The water for one of the 
projects comes from an uptake within the right of way of the Río Santa Gertrudis, while the other 
gets its water from an uptake along a stream at the boundary of two private parcels. Both 
conduits are five-inch-diameter PVC tubes. 
6.1.6 Talea: Analysis and summary 
The tables in this sub-section summarize the relationships in Talea among the users of 
water (represented by points where water is extracted, stored, or used), and the ownership of the 
land (in Talea, both de fact and de jure) where those points are located. Water-related locations 
with multiple functions (e.g., “spring” and “storage tank”) are counted, in these tables, once for 
each function. For the table entries which differentiate between water “sources” and other water-
related items, “sources” refer to stream uptakes, natural springs, and pozos (modified springs or 
shallow wells). Water sources which were unproductive (“dried up”) in 2009 are not counted, 
nor are the three items in the hamlet of Santa Gertrudis whose precise land tenure status I could 
not determine. 
Table 6.1 gives the breakdown of water-related items on individual and community tenure 
areas among the three categories of user: individual users, sub-village groups, and the village as 
a whole. (“Users” almost always refers to whoever built, maintains, and benefits from the water-
related infrastructure). Table 6.2 shows the same information, but considered from the opposite 
viewpoint: the breakdown of water-related items, for each of the three user types, among the two 
land tenure categories. 
These tables show that the concordance between individual-user water items and 
individually-owned land is high, as is the concordance between community-user water items and 
community-owned land. The most noticeable mismatch is the 16 percent of water items on 
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community territory which are for individual use (Table 6.1), but this is still a small percentage, 
especially considering that it represents only five percent of the individual-use water items 
overall (Table 6.2). 
 
TABLE 6.1: All water-related items in Talea (n=87): For each de jure land tenure category 
(individual or communal), percentage of items in each infrastructure/use category. 
 
water item infrastructure/use 
% individual % sub-village group % village 
individual land tenure 82 16 1 
community land tenure 16 11 74 
 
 
TABLE 6.2: All water-related items in Talea (n=87): For each infrastructure/use category 
(individual, sub-village group, or village), percentage of items in each de jure land tenure 
category. 
 % individual land tenure 
% community 
land tenure 
(% not in 
núcleo) 
water 
item 
infra- 
structure/ 
use 
individual 95 5 0 
sub-village group 79 14 7 
village 7 93 0 
 
 
The more interesting results concern the sub-village groups. From Table 6.2, we see that 
water-related items used by these groups are almost six times more likely to be located on 
individually owned land rather than on community land. This reflects the culture of Talea well: 
people form associations with specific purposes, but maintain clear individual ownership of 
agricultural parcels.  
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In Tables 6.3 and 6.4, I consider only the water sources, not other items such as storage 
tanks. This distinction is potentially important because water sources are generally more 
permanently tied to specific locations – and, therefore, to specific land tenure regimes – than 
other elements of water infrastructure. (Among the various kinds of water sources, springs are  
 
TABLE 6.3: Water sources in Talea (n=42): For each de jure land tenure category 
(individual or communal), percentage of items in each infrastructure/use category. 
 
water item infrastructure/use 
% individual % sub-village group % village 
individual land tenure 76* 21** 3 
community land tenure 43 0 57 
 
 
TABLE 6.4: Water sources in Talea (n=42): For each infrastructure/use category 
(individual, sub-village group, or village), percentage of items in each de jure land tenure 
category. 
 % individual land tenure 
% community 
land tenure 
(% not in 
núcleo) 
water 
item 
infra- 
structure/ 
use 
individual 90* 10 0 
sub-village group 88** 0 12 
village 20 80 0 
*38 percent of the water sources in this category provide water to an individual other than 
the water source landowner. 
**71 percent of the water sources in this category provide water to a group to which the 
water source landowner does not belong.  
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the most tied to specific locations, and wells are the least, with stream uptakes in between, 
although even wells depend spatially availability of groundwater). 
When we include only sources, the concordances are rather weaker than before. This is 
not surprising, since, again, sources are relatively immobile; for example, it is easier to relocate a 
tank to a location with more precisely compatible land tenure, than it is to relocate a spring. The 
most notable mismatch is that only 57 percent of water sources on community land are used by 
the village as a whole (Table 6.3, while 43 percent of the community-tenure sources are used by 
individuals. However, this figure should be interpreted with caution: there were only seven 
community-tenure water sources included in the study, and so the “43 percent” of these used by 
individuals represents only three items: a spring 100 meters within the main common use area; 
the Lachi Lagunah spring, less than 20 meters within the main population center; and an uptake 
in the Río Santa Gertrudis right of way. 
When only water sources are considered, the relationship between individual land tenure 
and sub-village water user groups is even stronger than before. All the water sources for these 
sociedades (and for Santa Gertrudis’ potable supply) are located on individual parcels, except for 
one which is not in the núcleo at all. 38 percent of the geolocated water sources on individual 
parcels have some of their water transported to other parcels with different owners (Table 6.4). 
At the participatory mapping workshop, I was told that the overall percentage is actually higher 
than this: “60 to 70 percent of us ask for water from our parcel neighbors.” Similarly, for 71 
percent of the water sources which supply sub-village groups, the source landowner is not a 
member of the group. 
For Table 6.5, I subdivided the community tenure areas into five sub-types, each subject 
to somewhat different legal strictures: 1. PROCEDE-certified common use areas; 2. the “donut 
hole” of Villa Talea de Castro, which is de jure common use by default; 3. parcels certified by 
PROCEDE to the núcleo for civic purposes; 4. solares in Santa Gertrudis certified by PROCEDE 
to the núcleo for civic purposes; and 5. “special areas” surveyed by PROCEDE as public rights 
of way. 
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TABLE 6.5: Talea, water-related items in different categories of “community land tenure” 
(n=19): Number of items in each infrastructure/use category. First number in a cell is total 
items; number in parentheses is water sources only. 
 water item infrastructure/use 
 individual sub-village group village 
common use area 1 (1) - 7 (3) 
localidad of Villa 
Talea de Castro 1 (1) - 6 (1) 
civic parcel - - 1 (0) 
civic solar - 1 (0) - 
special area (river) 1 (1) 1 (0) - 
 
 
A general observation is that all five community tenure sub-types include useful water 
items. A specific one is that Talea’s unusual “donut” arrangement, which kept its main 
population center from being surveyed by PROCEDE, is the reason that six of the items (one of 
them a water source) are in a de jure common use tenure area. (If FANAR were eventually 
invited to survey and title the population center’s solares, Taleans would still have the option of 
designating these water items as civic ones.) 
I reiterate that the water sources geolocated by me and my Talean colleagues reflect 
human water use at least as much as they do “natural” water abundance. Clearly, the large, 
forested, PROCEDE-certified common use area is important for protecting most of the sources 
for the main population center’s potable water system. However, the maps and tables in this 
section suggest that the array of water sources within individual parcels is at least as important, 
probably more so. Most of these water sources are used by individuals, often a different 
individual than the source’s parcel owner. The definition of “useful water source,” in other 
words, usually includes the idea that it be “in or very near a working farm.” 
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It is perhaps surprising that none of the village-use items are located within the public 
watercourse rights of way (“special areas”), but the reason for this is straightforward: the few 
stream or river segments wide enough to be surveyed as rights of way are located at or near the 
bottom of the valley within the núcleo’s territory. Water within them, despite its abundance, is at 
too low an elevation to be useful for most activities, since nearly all water transport in Talea 
depends on gravity. Furthermore, water here is probably relatively unclean, being downstream 
from nearly all agricultural runoff (including cattle ranching) and point pollution sources within 
the núcleo. 
The impression which arises from this web of land tenure and water practices is that of a 
community which expresses its cohesion, its village orientation, in several ways. One way is by 
maintaining a system of friendly permission, usually oral, to transfer water from one’s individual 
parcel to another individual’s parcel, or to an installation used by a sub-village group, or to the 
village as a whole. Nevertheless, the land tenure practice of distinct agricultural parcels owned 
by individual households persists. This particular blend of individual and community orientation 
– as well as skepticism toward the state, and cultural separation from, yet commercial ties to, the 
larger national system – recalls the practices of, for example, Amish communities in the United 
States (Kraybill 1989, 12; Robinson 1997). 
I conclude this section with a few thoughts about bottled water. Despite their enviable 
blend of commercial savvy, village-scale pride, and plentiful, clean water, to date no Taleans to 
my knowledge have attempted to market locally bottled water. Perhaps their caution stems from 
observing the checkered recent history of bottled water ventures in the region. Small, simple 
commercial bottled water plants have been established in several villages in the Sierra Norte, 
whose water may become increasingly valued as droughts more frequently impact the Sierra Sur 
and deforestation continues to desiccate the Mixteca region. One example is in my Oaxaca 
geodata analysis area: the “Shoo Ra” cooperative bottling venture, in the comunidad of Yavesía, 
about halfway between Tlacolula and Ixtlán (Figure 2.4, on page 53). The project is run by a 
subset of comuneros (villagers), some of them living in the United States, with start-up funding 
from their remittances as well as a government grant. The water taken from a spring, purified, 
bottled, and transported to stores in Ixtlán, Oaxaca city, and a few other locations (Ayuntamiento 
de Santa María Yavesí 2008, 65). 
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However, the Yavesía effort has faced two problems typical of such ventures: First, to 
recoup start-up expenses, the water must be sold at too high a price to compete successfully with 
large companies, which get their water from wells in the densely populated Central Valley 
(Flores Mandragon 2007, 47). Talea, located yet further from the Central Valley, would fare 
even worse. Second, the venture has generated conflict87 among the “mancomunados” (partially 
unified) villages, of which Yavesía is one, over whether forests should be conserved for water, or 
sustainably exploited for commercial wood (Flores Mandragon 2007, 48). 
6.2   Tiltepec and Yagila: Land tenure and water sources in comunidades without 
PROCEDE parcels 
In this section I discuss the relationships between land and water in two other Zapotec 
núcleos of Oaxaca state: Tiltepec and Yagila. Both are located 20 to 25 km northwest of Talea 
(see Figures 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6, on pages 53 to 59), though the distance by vehicular road, much of 
it unpaved, is at least 70 km.   
The maps in this section are similar to the ones in the previous section for Talea, but 
without separate maps for each scales of users and infrastructure (village, sub-village group, or 
individual). The three scales can be inferred from the pattern of water transport conduits attached 
to some water source points, and they are differentiated in the tables. Because the features I 
geolocated in the field are spatially clustered, I have included additional larger-scale maps which 
display most of the features more legibly.  
One difference between the maps in this section and the maps of Talea is that these maps 
depict de facto land tenure boundaries, not de jure ones, because neither Tiltepec nor Yagila had 
its internal areas of individual parcels (nor the parcels themselves) surveyed by PROCEDE. The 
boundaries between individual and common tenure areas are shown as fuzzy lines. This 
                                                        
87 The conflict presents an interesting comparison to one in Shapleigh, Maine, United States, where local 
environmentalist opposition to the multinational corporation Nestlé’s attempt to expand its wells for Poland 
Spring brand bottled water led to a new town ordinance banning “large-scale water extraction on town-owned 
land, state-owned land or privately owned land” (Todd 2009). 
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fuzziness mainly reflects the fact that I did not have enough fieldwork time to precisely and 
participatorily locate every vertex of every tenure zone. In some places, the fuzziness also 
signifies that the boundary is truly indefinite and indistinct in the minds of local residents.  It also 
serves the additional purpose of removing any possibility that precisely located personal 
information could be extracted from these maps, as per the requests made by both communities. 
Another difference between these maps and those for Talea is that, among water sources, 
“springs” feature more prominently in these comunidades, rather than “stream uptakes” 
downstream from springs. This is partly due to my having spent more time doing fieldwork in 
Talea, but it may also reflect an actual difference within the communities. It is possible that the 
greater emphasis of coffee production in Talea, and thus the greater number of “ranchos” which 
need water to process beans, has led Taleans to more often utilize nearby streams rather than 
more distant springs.  
There are three sub-sections devoted to each of the two comunidades. The first is a brief 
introduction to the núcleo and its land tenure areas, and includes a map of the GPS points taken. 
In sub-section which follows, I present and describe the maps of water items and de facto land 
tenure areas. In the third sub-section, I interpret the tables generated by the data. Local 
informants are cited by name only if they were interviewed by me specifically for the present 
study.  
6.2.1 Tiltepec: Introduction and land tenure areas 
Legally, the comunidad of Tiltepec includes the entire territory depicted in Figure 6.10. 
However, approximately 35 percent of the area is controlled by the functionally separate village 
of La Luz (see Figure 6.9, on page 273), called an “annex” in the FANAR documents. Because 
the residents of La Luz did not participate in the fieldwork for this study, their de facto territory 
is not included in the analysis. 
Even after subtracting La Luz, the núcleo of Tiltepec covers almost twice the land area of 
Talea, but with less than one third its population. It is also more isolated than Talea: the only 
road to Tiltepec is still unpaved, and is entirely impassable after landslides during some rainy 
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seasons. Due to both its lower population density and its lesser commercial orientation than 
Talea, Tiltepec has a greater proportion of its land area covered in continuous-canopy, more-or-
less “natural” forest. The altitudinal and precipitation ranges are comparable to Talea’s (Figure 
2.4, on page 53). As can be appreciated in Figure 2.5, Tiltepec does contain more extensive 
cloud forests than Talea (because of its location closer to the Gulf Coastal Plain), as well as more 
tropical rain forest (because of its somewhat lower average altitude than Talea’s).  
Among the RAN document study núcleos, Tiltepec shares with Tepetotula (Figure 2.5, on 
page 56) the distinction of probably having the greatest abundance of perennial, clean water 
sources. Even more than in Talea, only those water sources with at least some direct use to the 
village or to any of its residents were included in the participatory GPS fieldwork. Many other 
unnamed and unmapped springs are certainly located at or near the heads of the numerous 
streams which abound in the núcleo territory.  
This abundance of forest and water was recently given some degree of recognition when 
the villagers declared two large parts of their territory to be “natural protected areas,” 
specifically, in part, for the conservation of “water resources.” However, it is not known how 
much of the comunidad assembly actively participated in this declaration; the boundaries of the 
reserves are approximate;88 and the special land use or other behavior rules (locally written and 
codified, or otherwise) are apparently vague (for example, there are several agricultural 
“ranchos” within one of the reserves). These “reserves” were probably inspired by interaction 
between the comunidad authorities and the Mexican federal agencies of CONAGUA, 
CONAFOR, and perhaps SEMARNAT, although the zones are not part of any government’s 
ANP (natural protected areas) system, at least not yet.89 
                                                        
88 According to the notes taken during the making of the sketch maps showing these reserves, the most 
precidely identified and agreed-upon boundary point is a prominent waterfall which marks the western 
boundary of the “biodiversity reserve.” 
89 In their physical attributes and their water-protection emphasis, the zones resemble the five village-scale 
reserves established at similar mixed cloud/tropical humid forest forest patches of the Las Balsas watershed, in 
northern Costa Rica. Coordinated by an NGO called the Nectandra Institute, these reserves were located where 
specific important springs serve potable water systems (known in Costa Rica as Asociaciones Administradoras 
de Acueductos Comunales, or “ASADAs”) for specific villages downslope. The springs and villages are linked 
by tubes, each between 1 and 8 km long. Unlike in Tiltepec, the land around each ASADA spring is owned by 
private individuals (Gentes 2010, 6). Parts of these parcels immediately surrounding the springs were 
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Figure 6.9. Tiltepec: De facto land tenure areas (approximate), including proposed village-
scale natural protected areas, and locations of GPS points taken during fieldwork.  
 
 
The “individual” and “community” tenure areas shown in Figures 6.7, 6.8, 6.9, and 6.10, 
while sometimes approximate in their location, are considered “real” by Tiltepec’s residents. In 
1981, two comuneros resolved a parcel boundary dispute by placing rocks along boundary (RAN 
1981-86, 377). In the field in 2007 and 2008, while taking each GPS point (Figure 6.9), the local 
investigator was asked the nature of the tenure at that location, and on every occasion the reply 
was an unequivocal “dueño” (owner) or “comunal.” The individual parcels range from about 0.4 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
purchased by the village from the private landowner, assisted by an “eco-loan” from the NGO. Each loan was 
then gradually repaid by community members, by doing reforestation work and other conservation activities; 
thus, the land purchase was essentially donor-driven, albeit with significant direct involvement by village 
beneficiaries (Herrera Rodríguez 2010). 
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to about 3 hectares each, and are used mainly to grow maize, raise cattle, or cultivate coffee, with 
secondary uses including sugar cane, fruit trees, and minimal timber exploitation. 
Somewhat in the manner of the núcleo of Totomoxtla (see sub-section 5.3.2), another 
comunidad whose tenure areas have not been simplified by conforming to the PROCEDE mold, 
the zones of land use patterns in Tiltepec are loosely organized into concentric rings around the 
main population center. Interestingly, while the spatial patterns of human activity change 
markedly along this continuum, neither land tenure nor land use changes much. In other words, 
except for deep forest areas (which are communal by default), a similar mix of common use and 
individual activity areas exists close to the population center and far from it. Most comuneros 
own several parcels, typically four or five, usually “scattered among different elevational zones” 
(Brady 2008). 
Closest to the population center is an area of more or less continuous parcels, although 
most of the parcels contain forest patches, fruit orchards, or coffee shade canopy trees. Not all 
parcel boundaries are physically marked; some simply have “known” locations. Common use 
parcels in this zone are usually designated thus due to some specific occurrence, such as an area 
which has poor soil (used for firewood and timber), or two others which were adjacent to the old 
population center half a kilometer north of the current site and have retained their common use 
status (used for maize and other plantings, with assembly permission).    
Around this is a zone where true forest cover predominates, interspersed with some coffee 
plantations, cattle ranches, and maize. This zone is the source of most firewood, mostly 
secondary vegetation on owned parcels, cut by the owner to make a new clearing and gathered 
with his permission by other comuneros (Brady 2008). Once an individual invests significant 
effort in a parcel – for example, by maintaining permanent pasture cover for cattle – he is 
recognized as the permanent owner, and rights to it are transmitted by inheritance but cannot be 
sold. At the outer edges of this zone are several bean plantations which are collectively operated 
and, in two cases, communally “owned.” 
 Beyond this, human activity is concentrated along four large paths which penetrate far 
into the surrounding forest. Here, most parcels are “ranchos.” As in Talea, a rancho is a small, 
permanent structure where products grown on the surrounding parcel are processed and/or stored 
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(usually sugar cane, but sometimes coffee or maize). Usually, one rancho serves two or three 
nearby parcels, often owned by close relatives. Individual parcels are acquired in this zone 
simply by a comunero clearing and planting an unused area; the núcleo assembly need not even 
be consulted, unless there is a dispute. 
6.2.2 Water items in Tiltepec 
Tiltepec is unusual among núcleos in that its territory neatly occupies an entire watershed, 
that of the 9-km-long stream known most commonly as Yegu Yula’an.90 This stream flows into 
the Río Cajonos, which marks the eastern boundary of the núcleo. The other boundaries follow 
the high rim-shaped ridgeline. Not surprisingly, uncertainties have historically arisen at both 
places where a boundary segment must be chosen to connect the ridgeline to the Río Cajonos. 
Due to the high-rainfall climate, about 40 permanent streams feed the Yegu Yula’an in 
parallel courses (only a few of these are shown in Figure 6.10). Participatory mapping work 
during the México Indígena project revealed a remarkable toponym density of streams and 
stream segments; even in areas seldomly visited, streams have Zapotec names known to many 
residents. Figures 6.10, 6.11, and 6.12 show the location of some water sources deemed 
important by the community. 
For the population center’s domestic potable water supply, there is neither a single large 
system (as in Talea), nor a pair of “barrio-scale” larger systems complemented by smaller ones 
(as in Yagila, described below). Instead, all houses are supplied by small, shared potable water 
sources. These are groups of about five houses which share the use of a spring or stream uptake, 
typically about 500 m away. Some groups use a shared tube, while others share a source but use 
individual hoses. In Figure 6.11, conduits for just one of these smaller systems are shown as an 
example, one fed by a spring called Rui Gaa. In Tiltepec, two of the small shared systems are 
distinct from the others by the presence of a shared storage tank, making them almost “barrio-
scale” systems. Classification of potable water systems is imprecise, because in rural Mexican 
                                                        
90 During my fieldwork I came to realize that the Zapotec word “yegu” glosses as “stream,” but only rarely 
refes to the entirety of a single watercourse. More precisely, it is a “place dominated by part of a watercourse.” 
Thus, a stream may have several names, one for each stretch; and, conversely, a group of small tributaries may 
share the same name. 
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Figure 6.10. Water items and approximate de facto tenure areas in Tiltepec, Oaxaca – entire 
núcleo. (Sources: RAN 2008 and participatory fieldwork). 
 
 
population  centers there is a continuum of practices for domestic water, ranging from individual, 
single hose from an unshared nearby source, up to a village-operated system where everyone is 
served by a network originating from the same few, more distant sources. For the present 
analysis, I consider these sources to be used by “sub-village groups,” because several comuneros 
usually (though not always) share the maintenance of infrastructure. For example, as observed by 
Scott Brady (2008), at one spring: 
 The responsibility for maintaining the manguera [hose] east of [a comunero’s] house 
was the responsibility (tequio) of two members of his neighborhood. Thus the 
neighborhood’s management appears to extend beyond the zona urbana [population 
center] limit to the manantial [spring] that provides it with water. Most of the barrios 
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extend to the zona urbana limits. So, maybe the manantiales and mangueras that 
provide water to the individual barrios function as peri-urban regions of water 
management. 
 
Compared to Talea, there is little formalized sub-village-group irrigation for the 
cultivation of commercial products. In Tiltepec, only one water source was identified with a sub-
village user group beyond the small potable domestic supply systems: a spring used to water a 
beanfield cultivated commonly by a group of comuneros.  
Figure 6.12 shows two examples of water conduits (in this case, 1.25-inch-diameter 
general service rubber hoses) used to irrigate individual parcels far from the population center. 
As in Talea, there are many instances of water taken from a stream or spring in one parcel and 
someone else’s parcel. In Tiltepec water is sometimes transported to an individual parcel over a 
surprisingly long distance, such as the 1.5-km hose shown in Figure 6.12 which services a coffee 
farm. In this case, the water source is on de facto common use land. Similarly, the 500-m-long 
hose shown near the upper-left corner of Figure 27 is fed by a stream uptake in a communal 
forest patch close to the human settlement area. This conduit serves two individual parcels (a 
coffee farm and a cattle ranch), and its installation costs were shared by the two owners. 
Three springs were identified within the “protected area for (partly) water conservation.” 
All three are used “communally,” although only one of them is used for an active, village-wide 
purpose – occasional irrigation for a shared beanfield nearby.  The other two springs are 
“communal” simply because they are not used by any specific individual, but they are near paths 
where many comuneros pass (one is on the route to the village of Josaa, the other on the route to 
the eastern ranchos). They occasionally provide refreshment for any individual, and the 
occasional beast of burden.  If a full-scale potable water system were installed someday for the 
village, one or more of these springs would likely serve as its sources.  
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Figure 6.11. Water items and approximate de facto tenure areas in Tiltepec, Oaxaca – detail 
of main population center and nearby agricultural and forest areas. (Source: participatory 
fieldwork). 
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Figure 6.12. Water items and approximate de facto tenure areas in Tiltepec, Oaxaca – detail 
of a sample agricultural and forest area. (Source: participatory fieldwork). 
 
 
6.2.3 Tiltepec: Analysis and summary 
Tables 6.6 and 6.7 show the relationships among water source users (village, sub-village 
group, or individual) and the de facto land tenure where the sources are located. They can be 
compared to Tables 6.3 and 6.4 for Talea, on page 266. One should bear in mind that, on some 
conceptual level, all water sources are “communal,” independent of who actually uses them, or 
whether they are located on an individual parcel or a common use tenure area. For example, a 
280 
 
  
comunero explained that “the Ruu Gaa spring91 is communal in terms of who has rights to the 
water, but it is in a parcel with an owner. No one fights over water, although in the driest part of 
the dry season, it is distributed with more care.” Today this spring is used neither by the village 
as a whole, nor exclusively by the owner of the parcel around it, but rather by several individual 
houses in the human settlement.  
However, on another conceptual level, specific water rights are indeed “real.” This is 
revealed when a complaint or conflict arises, which occasionally does occur, as documented in 
my RAN archival research and Laura Nader’s work in Talea. In well-watered regions, only 
rarely do conflicts arise because too much of the water itself is depleted by an individual. When 
intra-village water-related arguments do occur, they usually concern some infrastructure which 
into which an individual has invested effort and capital. For this reason, in Tiltepec, Yagila, and 
Talea, local informants sometimes explicitly clarified to me that  a particular water source was 
available for use by “anyone that wants to,” even though some individual had installed 
infrastructure there and was its principal user. Four of the Tiltepec individual-use water items (31 
percent of the total) were so described; of these four, three were located on individual-tenure 
parcels.  
Two of the “village use” items are springs in the main population center, used mainly for 
domestic potable water. Like the Tres Chorros spring in Talea, they are a vestige of the time 
when all domestic water was hand-carried from a spring or pumped well in the heart of the 
population center. Like the Lachi Lagunah spring in Talea, they serve multiple purposes today, 
including as a social clothes-washing spot. Both of these springs are in ambiguous tenure areas. 
They are close enough to houses that, were FANAR to survey Tiltepec’s solares, they would 
probably be included in individual solares; thus, I considered the land around them to have de 
facto individual tenure status.92  
                                                        
91 This spring has special significance because water was once carried from it, by hand, to the old village site. 
Scott Brady observed that the camino real (principal footpath) connecting the spring to the old village 
“functioned in the manner that the mangueras [tubes] function presently” (Brady 2008). 
92 Direct evidence for the individual orientation toward house lots in Tiltepec comes from a dispute in the 
1980s, documented by complaints and legal replies filed in the RAN archives. One comunero accused another 
of letting his animals invade his territory, and also disputed the bounary line between their solares. The 
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TABLE 6.6: All water-related items geolocated in Tiltepec (n=23; all except 1 are water 
sources): For each de facto land tenure category (individual or community), percentage of 
items in each infrastructure/use category. 
 
water item infrastructure/use 
% individual % sub-village group % village 
individual land tenure 65 18 18 
community land tenure 33 17 50 
 
 
TABLE 6.7: All water-related items geolocated in Tiltepec (n=23; all except 1 are water 
sources): For each infrastructure/use category (individual, sub-village group, or village), 
percentage of items in each de jure land tenure category. 
 % individual land tenure 
% community 
land tenure 
water 
item 
infra- 
structure/ 
use 
individual 85* 15 
sub-village group 75 25 
village 50 50 
*46 percent of the water sources in this category provide water to an individual other 
than the water source landowner. 
 
A comparison of Table 6.3 with Table 6.6 suggests that the congruence between land 
tenure and water users is broadly similar in Tiltepec and Talea, although slightly lower in 
Tiltepec: 18 percent of its village-use water sources are on de facto individual property, while 
only 3 percent of Talea’s village-use water sources are on de jure individual property. When the 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
accused replied, about the solar, “I consider it my property, since I've worked it for ten years; and [my accuser] 
as well as all the other citizens know perfectly well where the boundaries lie” (RAN 1981-86, 376). 
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same data is considered instead by distributing each use category among the tenure categories 
(Tables 6.4 and 6.7), the difference in congruence between Talea and Tiltepec is somewhat more 
apparent. In Talea, the congruence is still high. In Tiltepec it is rather lower, because water 
sources used by the village are distributed more evenly between individual and common tenure 
areas. 
6.2.4 Yagila: Introduction and land tenure areas 
Like Tiltepec, Yagila chose not to have PROCEDE survey and certify its individual 
parcels. However, in certain respects Yagila resembles Talea more than it does Tiltepec. Yagila 
(location shown in Figure 2.4, on page 53) is closer in size to Talea, in both area and population, 
than Tiltepec, and therefore its proportion of intense human activity areas to other areas 
resembles that of Talea. Additionally, its ecological situation somewhat more closely mirrors that 
of Talea, particularly in its preponderance of pine-dominated forest. Yagila’s degree of isolation 
from paved highways and lowland or central valley cities is similar to Tiltepec’s, although the 
2009 completion of the unpaved ring road through the entire Rincón de Ixtlán has brought it a bit 
more within the national ambit, and it has a deeper tradition than Tiltepec of emigration to, and 
remittances from, emigrant destinations such as the United States. 
The map of individual and communal de facto land tenure in Yagila (Figure 6.13) was 
developed from two sources: a map of parajes (named places) created by a comunero, assisted 
by other ones, during the México Indígena project; and, GPS points taken during PRM 
fieldwork, during which my México Indígena colleagues and I were informed of the land tenure 
status of each point by a local investigator. Each paraje was assigned communal, individual, or 
mixed status in a participatory meeting; in Figure 6.13, I refer to this data source as a “partial 
community consensus.”   
As in Tiltepec, the common use and individual tenure areas are often spatially well 
defined. On several occasions, while walking on a trail, a local informant indicated the precise 
boundary between the tenure types. Several community/individual tenure boundaries, including a 
200 m line between Yeaj Beej and Yaba springs (Figure 6.15), are marked by row of a particular 
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species of planted tree: Heliocarpus appendiculatus (in the Malvaceae family, formerly 
Tiliaceae), known locally as “majagua” in Spanish and “yupusustu” in Yagila Zapotec.93 
 
Figure 6.13. Yagila: De facto land tenure areas (approximate), including areas defined 
during participatory mapping meetings, and locations of GPS points taken during 
fieldwork.  
 
 
In Yagila, the concentric rings of land tenure are more homogeneous than in Tiltepec. 
That is, in Yagila, there and few individually held lands in the outer areas (except, as in Tiltepec, 
                                                        
93 The tree is also known in general Sierra Norte Zapotec as “yaga schquídi,” and is also sometimes called 
“tzompantli,” a word borrowed from Nahuatl (Bolaños Méndez and González 2008, 39). 
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near the main paths).94 As in Tiltepec, however, the specific mix of land uses does not change 
much as one moves further from the population center: shaded coffee and maize dominate, with 
sugar cane and cattle ranching common as well, and some planted fruit trees. 
A notable difference with Tiltepec is Yagila’s deeper involvement in commercial forestry, 
mainly in communal tenure areas, which include pine reforestation and 
CONAGUA/CONAFOR-inspired forest “reserves.” According to one informant, “the difference 
between ‘communal’ and ‘reserve’ lands is that any comunero, with the comisariado’s 
permission, temporarily establish a milpa (maize field) in the communal land, whereas a reserve 
is known to be a bad place for agriculture, either because of its poor soil or because it is so far 
from the [population center]” (interview with Ramos Francisco 2009). The “temporary 
individual maize fields in common land” are concentrated just south of the main road connecting 
Yagila to Tiltepec and Ixtlán (in the western half of the comunidad). The rotation time for 
secondary vegetation can be more than 15 years.  
In a 1-km-wide strip north of the road, the land in this western half of the comunidad is 
individually owned. The difference was made very clear to me when I returned briefly to Yagila 
in 2009 after a six month absence, and found the hills north of the road had been clear cut  for 
“private [i.e., individual] agriculture” (interview with Ramos Francisco 2009). Reserve land is 
concentrated along the upper slope of the ridgeline marking the núcleo’s southern boundary. One 
informant attested that some reserve areas have individual owners, yet they are not authorized to 
cultivate there, only to extract commercial wood. The same comunero claimed that water 
conservation was one motivation for maintaining these rather small forest reserves. Indeed, the 
reserves are located near, but not exactly at, the two springs and water uptakes which feed the 
large-scale potable water supply.  
De facto common use parcels include two belonging to schools. In one case, the former 
individual owner was compensated with a similarly-sized piece of land.  
                                                        
94 Yagila has a long tradition of precisely-defined individual properties among its residents. In an 1801 
“proclamation of gifts of real property” transcribed by the México Indígena team, a Yagilan itemized three 
houses (plus a foundation), two solares, and eleven “tierras” (one of these in Zoogochi, a nearby village). Of 
these, one house, the foundation, one solar, and five of the tierras had been sold to him; he included the name 
of each seller and the cost. Most of the “tierras” were identified by the name of their paraje, though word 
“paraje” was not used (de la Cruz 1801). 
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Article 76 in Section 2 of the boilerplate (i.e., government-template-based) comunidad 
statute states that “each comunero is obliged to delimit his parcels by drawing up [levantando] 
Actas de Conformidad with his neighbors” (RAN 2001b). However, a local informant asserted 
that “to acquire a terrain, whether it is purchase or inherited, the agreement [trato] is just by 
word; but, if one desires, one can request a stamped document from the comisariado, in which 
the rights of the acquired lands are granted – but only if the person wishes to do it this way.” 
This suggests that the statute is not well integrated into the actual practice of the community. 
6.2.5 Water items in Yagila 
Yagila’s hydro-topographic situation has commonalities with both Tiltepec’s and Talea’s. 
Like Tiltepec, its territory essentially covers a complete and self-contained watershed, that of the 
Yegu Yulawi stream, which after exiting the núcleo joins the Río Juquila near its junction with 
the Río Cajonos. Somewhat as in Talea, there are several long ridges which divide the territory 
into long, nearly parallel valleys, and the entire comunidad can only be seen from a few of the 
highest points. Water sources are generally plentiful (Figure 6.14), including a rich concentration 
of springs within 1 km of the human settlement area.  
About 60 percent of the homes in the population center receive potable water from either 
of two installations, built with the assistance of CONAGUA funding and engineers and similar to 
Talea’s system. The infrastructure includes 1.1-km-long pipes which begin at two permanent 
springs improved with collection tanks, labeled Xhebeyu’u and Xhubëshidzu in Figure 6.15. The 
pipes carry water to two storage tanks at the edge of the settlement area, a metal one built in the 
late 1980s,95 the other a PVC tube built in the late 1990s. For these storage tanks, a written acta  
(contract) formalized the community’s acquisition of its small footprint of land from the 
individual parcel owner96 (interview with Ramos Francisco 2009). Together these two systems 
                                                        
95 A 1979 document in the RAN archives describes Yagila as having “no public services, but it is just starting 
to install a potable water network. There is no irrigation” (RAN 1979a, 133). 
96 In the PROCEDE-parceled Huasteca ejido of Santa Cruz, a similar arrangement is in effect. There, a “clear 
water” spring in an individual ejidatario’s parcel has been used by the community since 1993, when they 
installed a tube connecting it to the human settlement area. Unlike in Yagila, this was done without any formal 
written agreement (interview with López 2009). 
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serve all the homes in one of the three “barrios” (neighborhoods in the population center), as 
well as a few homes in a second barrio. 
A third relatively large system, but smaller than the two just described, carries water 500 
m from a spring just inside the settlement area and distributes it to most of the homes in a second 
barrio (that is, about 25 percent of all the houses). It has no holding tank as this would “cause 
 
Figure 6.14. Water items and approximate de facto tenure areas in Yagila, Oaxaca – entire 
núcleo. (Sources: INEGI 2001b and participatory fieldwork). 
 
 
too much pressure.” Like the two largest systems in Tiltepec, this system is only slightly larger 
than a typical sub-village-use “small shared potable water source.” All three systems are 
maintained by barrio-scale committees and owned by the community. A third tank at a spring 
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called Los Sabinos once served as a bathing place and to collect water for some houses, but was 
abandoned when the spring “dried up about ten years ago – no one is sure why, but no one really 
noticed or cared, since there is so much water around” (interview with Ramos Francisco 2009). 
The remaining approximately 15 percent of the houses are served by typical small shared 
potable water sources, with each house linked by an individual hose to a nearby spring or stream 
uptake. One of these springs now nearly fails to produce any water. As in other núcleos, the 
introduction of potable water systems (even if incompletely) has led to the partial abandonment 
of water access locations within the settlement area. At least one pool along a stream is still 
sometimes used for washing and bathing. Beyond the settlement area, there is one notable water 
access point which is used by the entire community: a poza (natural pool along a stream), used 
for swimming especially during Holy Week, when extended family members living elsewhere 
visit Yagila. At a place called Ra’azin are two other water items with multiple users: a cement-
lined spring in a communal pasture which provides water to a dormitory for secondary-school 
students, and a tank for edible fish under construction as a school project. 
The group of springs at Yeaj Beej is near the boundary between an individual parcel used 
for cattle ranching and a common pasture. Trees are maintained around the springs, which are 
used mainly for watering cattle; there are no conduits issuing from them.  
North of the population center, several springs are scattered among the many individually-
owned parcels dominated by coffee groves. As in parts of Talea and Tiltepec, coffee is washed in 
ranchos, in many cases supplied by a neighboring parcel owner’s water source. At Yëjëto, a 
spring is used for watering animals (“abrevedero”), and a PVC tube provides water access for 
humans. Not far from this is another tank for raising trout. Not currently in use, the tank was 
built by the community in an individual’s parcel, and was maintained by a sub-village group. 
At Shubëa, a seasonally productive spring along the main path “has no owner,” though it 
is on an individual’s parcel. The hollowed trunk of a tree called “yarec” (species unknown to 
me) directs water for use by passersby. Local residents informed me that these natural streams of 
water, lightly modified to facilitate human access, are known here as chorros in Spanish, and 
bëdua in Zapotec. 
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Figure 6.15. Water items and approximate de facto tenure areas in Yagila, Oaxaca – detail 
of main population center and nearby agricultural and forest areas. (Sources: INEGI 2001b 
and participatory fieldwork). 
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As in Tiltepec, many water sources are scattered throughout the higher, more forested 
lands furthest from the population center, but these are only used rarely by humans, notably to 
water cattle (interview with Ramos Francisco 2009). 
The boilerplate comunidad statute (RAN 2001b) includes several references to the village-
scale and individual use of natural resources, including of water. Three of the six rotating 
authority positions, those of the Consejo de Vigilancia (security council), must “permanently 
keep watch over the rational use of natural resources, principally water, stones, gravel, sand, and 
fruits produced to benefit the community, avoiding their destruction or loss,” along with five 
other duties. Indeed, all comuneros are required to “permanently keep watch over the resources 
of the community, and inform the assembly or the authorities of any irregularities or violations 
observed” (Section 3). Section 4 gives further details about natural resources: 
Article 54 – The community of San Juan Yagila is the unique and owner of all 
resources located within its territory, such as: stones, sand, fertilizer, ornamental and 
medicinal plants, as well as wild animals. 
Article 55 – Economic resources obtained through improvement/use 
(aprovechamiento) of natural resources will be applied to social service works 
previously agreed upon by the assembly. 
Article 57 – The springs and natural founts (ojos de agua) included within the 
communal lands will be for common use. 
Article 61 – Any comunero wishing to use a natural resource such as sand, stone, 
gravel, or wood must ask for permission from the Comisariado and inform the 
assembly. 
 
Article 57 is especially germane to the present study. When this phrase appears in the 
statutes for núcleos who have PROCEDE-surveyed parcels but also some common use areas, its 
meaning is relatively clear: water sources in de facto individual-use plots, but within the de jure 
common use area, can be used freely by any ejidatario or comunero. However, when the phrase 
appears in núcleos such as Yagila whose entire territory is de jure “common use,” its meaning is 
ambiguous. It might refer to the entire territory, or it might refer to de facto (i.e., village-defined) 
“communal lands.” The mere existence of this ambiguity implies that the boilerplate text was 
prepared with a “standard” PROCEDE núcleo in mind, i.e., one with legally defined parceled 
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areas and common use areas – despite the inclusion of Section 2 (quoted in the previous sub-
section above), which is clearly designed only for núcleos without PROCEDE-surveyed parcels. 
Another article (RAN 2001b) again reveals that the text was composed with a certain 
prototype in mind, in this case that of a rainfall-poor ejido or comunidad with widespread 
irrigation necessitating a community “irrigation unit” to apportion the right to scarce water.  
None of this applies to Yagila: 
“Article 90 – The use and exploitation of communal waters will be governed by the 
Reglamento de Operación, Mantenamiento, y Conservación de Unidades de Riego for 
rural development; its functioning will be coordinated by the Directiva de la 
Asociación of the users of the irrigation unit for rural development, composed of a 
President, Secretary, Treasurer, and two voting members [. . .] ” 
6.2.6 Yagila: Analysis and summary 
Tables 6.8 and 6.9, like the previous tables for Talea and Tiltepec, describe the 
relationships among Yagila’s water source users and the land tenure (in this case, de facto) where 
the sources are located. 
According to interview notes collected by México Indígena student researcher Estrella 
García, the “permission between parcel owners to use a common water source [yacimiento de 
agua] is a form of reciprocity we call guelaguetza.”97 This practice is approximately as common 
in Yagila as it is in Talea and Tiltepec. 
True to Article 57 of its comunidad statute, the rate of individual use of water sources in 
or originating from common use tenure areas is markedly lower in Yagila (11 percent) than in 
Tiltepec (33 percent) or Talea (43 percent). Conversely, the community use of individual-tenure 
water sources is higher in Yagila (50 percent) than in either Tiltepec (18 percent) or Talea (3 
percent). Even after taking into account possible differences in data collection priorities among 
the local investigators, this observation likely represents a real finding. 
                                                        
97 While more popularly associated with large annual gatherings for exchange among ethnolingustic groups, 
the multiscale nature of the term guelaguetza in Oaxacan indigenous culture was noted by anthropologist 
Jefferey Cohen (1999, 87). 
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40 percent of the “village use” items overall are for potable domestic water, but only one of them 
(14 percent) is definitely in a communal tenure area. The rest of the “village use” water points 
are mainly for cattle watering, where there is often little distinction between them and water 
sources which are in fact used by one or two individuals, but anyone can use them. 
 
TABLE 6.8: All water-related items geolocated in Yagila (n=30; all except 6 are water sources): 
For each de facto land tenure category (individual or community), percentage of items in each 
infrastructure/use category. 
 
water item infrastructure/use 
% individual % sub-village group % village 
individual land tenure 43 7 50 
community land tenure 11 11 78 
 
 
 
TABLE 6.9: All water-related items geolocated in Yagila (n=30; all except 6 are water sources): 
For each infrastructure/use category (individual, sub-village group, or village), percentage of 
items in each de jure land tenure category. 
 % individual land tenure 
% community 
land tenure 
water 
item 
infra- 
structure/ 
use 
individual 90* 10 
sub-village group 60 40 
village 60 40 
 
*30 percent of the water sources in this category provide water to an individual other than 
the water source landowner. 
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Overall, congruence between land tenure and water users in Yagila is rather lower than in 
either Tiltepec or Talea. The most notable difference is with Talea, where 76 percent of the 
individual-tenure water items mapped were used by individuals, compared to 43 percent of 
Yagila’s. While this figure does probably reflect a difference in the fieldwork methods, it does 
underscore the importance of tacit, oral, and written agreements among Yagilans.  
To my knowledge, Yagila (like Tiltepec) has almost no sub-village groups sharing 
irrigation, something which is relatively common in Talea. 
In some ways, Yagila represents an intermediate step between Tiltepec and Talea in the 
formalizing of rights to land and natural resources. For example, Yagila posseses a boilerplate 
comunidad statute and a PROCEDE-surveyed human settlement area, albeit without titled 
solares. Yagila is also between Tiltepec and Talea in its level of formal ties to government 
agencies: it has, for example, agreements with CONAFOR for forest reserves, and with 
CONAGUA for assistance with its potable water system. 
Disputes in Yagila could potentially arise if the “mismatches” between land tenure and 
water source use, currently managed through intricate and locally understood practices, are 
exacerbated through their further formalization within the simplified, standardized, 
neoliberalized legal code. It would likely take many generations of out-migration and indigenous 
cultural decline before these local practices and oral agreements were so completely forgotten 
that the neoliberal dream of reduced conflict through a state-standardized, individual-oriented 
framework were to have any possibility of arising.  
6.3  Summary of results 
Based on detailed data from three Sierra Norte de Oaxaca comunidades, the congruence or 
mismatch between users of water items (e.g., springs, stream uptakes, or storage tanks) and the 
land tenure class (village-scale or individual) of their locations is at most only weakly related to 
whether the tenure classes have been formalized through PROCEDE. In PROCEDE-parceled 
Talea, the concordance between individual-user water items and individually-owned land is high, 
as is the concordance between community-user water items and community-owned land. In non-
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PROCEDE-parceled Tiltepec, congruence is also generally high. In non-PROCEDE-parceled 
Yagila, however, congruence is lower. There, about half of the village-used water sources are on 
de facto individual parcels. 
In Talea, sub-village-scale groups, usually organized for commercial production, use 
water mainly drawn from individual parcels, and the water source parcel owner is rarely a 
member of the group. One of these groups is functionally equivalent to a population center 
potable water system: the hamlet of Santa Gertrudis. 
In all three villages, the most widespread practice which depends on oral “dyadic” 
agreements rooted in cohesive village culture is that of an individual parcel owner borrowing 
water from a neighboring parcel on a long-term basis. The practice is about as common in 
PROCEDE-parceled Talea (38 percent of the individual use/individual tenure water items) as it 
is in the non-PROCEDE-parceled comunidades (46 percent in Tiltepec, 30 percent in Yagila). In 
Yagila, similar agreements or tacit understandings are also important for community use of water 
sources on individual parcels. 
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7.  Results, part 3: Geodata analysis of major springs and land tenure       
in 2009 
The basic question I try to answer in this analysis is: “Are springs98 more often found in 
common use areas than one would expect?”  I address this general problem through four specific 
questions: 
1. Are springs more commonly located in social property, as compared with private 
property? The findings mainly concern the “natural endowment” of water resources. 
2. Within the social property universe,99 are springs more densely located in de jure 
common use areas, as compared with de jure (i.e., PROCEDE-certified) individually parceled 
areas? Note that there are two kinds of “de jure common use areas”: those specifically designated 
by PROCEDE as common use areas within núcleos which also contain individually certified 
parcels, and those which comprise entire núcleos where PROCEDE surveyed only the 
perimeters. The findings may help describe the current legal situation, but provide only partial 
insight into the nature of village and individual practices in communities.  
3. Within the more limited universe of PROCEDE-parceled núcleos, are springs more 
densely located in common use areas, as compared with parceled areas? These findings more 
directly address the hypothesis of this study, which is that communities are maintaining village-
scale control of water sources. Unfortunately, the universe of núcleos with both PROCEDE 
parcels and significant PROCEDE common use areas is not very large, even though they 
exemplify the conceptual template for the PROCEDE program (Figure 1.1 on page 14). Because 
the INEGI springs dataset is also not especially large, one must be cautious in interpreting the 
results of this part of the analysis.   
                                                        
98 The geodata analysis includes just one type of hydrological feature, the “spring”, excluding water source 
points such “tomas” (stream uptakes) and deep wells (an uncommon feature within the study regions). See 
sub-section 1.1.7 (page 26) regarding the importance of springs, symbolically as well as for public health. 
99 To reiteraite, I use the phrase “social property” to mean “all núcleos agrarios,” notwithstanding the several 
ways in which social property could be considered a tenuous concept anywhere in post-1992 Mexico (see sub-
section 1.1.4). 
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4. Is there any evidence that, at the moment of PROCEDE certification, ejidos and 
comunidades tend to actively incorporate important springs into their newly surveyed common 
use areas?  That is, do they expand their existing de facto common use areas to include springs 
that otherwise would fall within their newly surveyed individual-parcel areas? Or do they simply 
tend to codify into a legal cadastre the existing spatial configuration of “parceled” and “common 
use,” without regard to how the legal definition of “individual parcels” might someday interfere 
with the customary village-scale access to natural resources located on them? This issue can only 
be addressed by including de facto (i.e., non-PROCEDE-surveyed) parceled and common use 
areas in the analysis. Because such information can only be obtained through participatory 
fieldwork, the available data set is quite small. Nevertheless, I tentatively consider the matter at 
the end of sub-section 7.4.2, drawing from findings for the comunidades of Tiltepec and Yagila. 
When choosing which springs to include in their 1:50,000-scale maps, INEGI does not 
simply consider physical size or water output; they also take into account human use and value, 
partly as a consequence of their use of air photography. This human-defined value bias exists in 
the PRM data as well. However, this is mostly unproblematic. It is simply a reflection of the 
social construction of nature, a theme which runs through the cultural ecology scholarly tradition 
which underlies this study, and which is part of any work addressing the very human concept of 
land tenure.100 The most interesting findings I discuss in this chapter are those which underscore 
how the spatial coincidence of “important” water sources and areas of intense human activity is 
better described not as a “bias,” but rather as an inescapable fact. This fact highlights how local 
cultural practices as at least as important as legalistic tenure mechanisms for community resource 
management.    
I executed the analysis using the INEGI-mapped springs for each of the two geodata 
analysis areas separately as well as for both areas as a whole. This was done to illuminate 
possibly relevant differences between the regions. Besides being home to different indigenous 
groups, and having rather distinct relationships with the state during various periods in history 
                                                        
100 One potential problem with this bias is that some places currently lack intense human activity, but do 
contain natural resources such as large springs, and these resources may someday be exploited for commercial 
purposes or for long-distance water transport to cities. One approach to materially acknowledging the value of 
some of these “hidden” resource locations is through Payment for Environmental Services programs (see sub-
section 4.5.4). 
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(up to and including different rates of lukewarm response to PROCEDE), my Oaxaca geodata 
analysis area happens to be dominated by the Sierras, while about half of my Huasteca area 
happens to be in the Gulf Coastal Plain. I emphasize that any differences in tenure and water 
analysis results between the two regions are not necessarily a product of the different indigenous 
groups and histories of the two regions. If I had extended the Oaxaca geodata analysis area 
further into the Coastal Plain, or if I had extended the Huasteca area further into the Sierra, 
certain regional contrasts in my results may have been reduced or eliminated. 
In this chapter I begin by discussing the land tenure results without reference to water, 
first for the Sierra Norte de Oaxaca study area (section 7.1) and then for the Huasteca Potosina 
study area (7.2). In each section I begin with observations on the land tenure patterns shown in 
the maps (Figure 7.1 on page 300 and Figure 7.2 on page 305), followed by comments about a 
few specific villages. After this, I offer observations on the spatial patterns of the INEGI-mapped 
springs. I continue (7.4) with the main focus of the geodata analysis: an attempt to address the 
relationships between water sources and land tenure. After presenting the key results tables, I 
augment the findings with finer-scale participatory research mapping (PRM) data from 14 
núcleos. I then add the variable of indigenous language speakers to the analysis. I conclude by 
analyzing the pattern of 2009 CONAGUA water rights concessions within the Oaxaca study 
region (section 7.5). The results are summarized in section 7.6. 
7.1   Land tenure in the Sierra Norte de Oaxaca 
The total area of the Oaxaca geodata analysis area, which includes part of the state of 
Veracruz, is 6,939 sq km. The population is 170,894, of whom about 116,000, or 68 percent, are 
indigenous language speakers. The average population density is 25 persons per sq km.  
There are about 153 núcleos mainly or entirely within the area, including approximately 7 
with unresolved legal status (see discussion below), as well as around 5 private property villages 
(i.e., INEGI-defined localidades with at least 100 residents). 
The average population of the núcleos and private property villages is 1,081, while the 
average area (after subtracting known terrenos nacionales from the total area) is 43 sq km. The 
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average population of the 19 núcleos subjected to RAN archival research and (in six cases) 
participatory mapping is 663, while their average area is 38 sq km. As a representative sample of 
the entire Oaxaca geodata analysis area, the RAN document/PRM study núcleos are satisfactory 
in terms of area, but are significantly smaller in their populations than the regional average. 
Before analyzing the Sierra Norte de Oaxaca land tenure map (sub-section 7.1.2), I 
discuss a land tenure category I had not anticipated:  “de facto núcleos with unresolved legal 
status.”  
7.1.1 De facto núcleos with unresolved legal status as social property 
As I began to exhaust the available sources to build a land tenure coverage (see section 
4.4), the presence of “leftover” areas, especially in Oaxaca, led to my awareness of the existence 
of de facto ejidos and (more commonly) comunidades which have not even been given a chance 
to accept or reject PROCEDE, because their legal status as social property was never resolved by 
legal authorities. Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana anthropologist Ana Paula de Teresa 
Ochoa (1999, 5) found that there were five municipios (counties) in the Chinantec-dominated 
highlands (the northeastern quarter of my Oaxaca geodata analysis area) which contained such 
villages: “Even if the RAN does not recognize núcleos agrarios within [these five municipios], 
because they don’t have [legal] agrarian actions filed [instaurada], they can be considered as 
such because they possess their own territories, shared with several annexes.” De Teresa asserts 
that such places are especially vulnerable to conflicts with private property owners, and may 
eventually find themselves declared private properties. This would be ironic, since they would 
likely be among the very last núcleos to choose domino pleno (full privatization). 
To locate and estimate the territories of these núcleos as best I could, I relied first on de 
Teresa’s 1999 article. For areas of Oaxaca outside the Chinantla, the next source I consulted was 
the official publication of the resolution among SRA, INEGI, RAN, and Procuraduría Agraria 
which began to bring the PROCEDE process to a close in Oaxaca state (SRA 2006). This 
document contains two helpful appendices: a list of núcleos which have rejected PROCEDE 
(along with whether their status as a comunidad or ejido, their area, and their “maximum 
advance” in or towards PROCEDE work), and a list of “núcleos agrarios con imposibilidad 
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legal.” The latter list is of villages which are recognized by someone in the government as 
núcleos, but with severe legal problems or insufficiencies. I assigned places in the first list to the 
category “núcleos without PROCEDE survey.” Places in the second list were assigned to this 
category as well, unless their surface area was listed as “zero,” in which case I places them in the 
“de facto núcleo, status unresolved” category, because their lack of any kind of officially 
recognized survey implies that their claims to núcleo status are not likely to be resolved soon. 
Finally, for any villages101 still left over, in the Huasteca as well as in Oaxaca, I performed an 
Internet search for any documents or news items from which I could at least make an educated 
guess about its tenure situation. These steps left me only with a few small areas of truly unknown 
tenure status (Figure 7.1) which had to be excluded from the quantitative analysis. 
7.1.2 Land tenure in the Oaxaca study area: General observations 
To ascertain how representative is the sample of 19 RAN document study núcleos, I 
calculated the percentage of each broad tenure category within the geodata analysis area. 
Because they are an artifact of the arbitrary study area boundaries, these surface area percentages 
have no deeper significance than this. I did not include areas of unknown tenure in the 
calculations. The results (Table 7.1) show that the archival study sample does represent the  
Table 7.1: Percentages of the Oaxaca geodata analysis area in each general land tenure 
category, compared to the RAN document study and PRM núcleos in the same area. 
 
Mostly 
common use 
(all types) 
Mostly 
PROCEDE-
certified parcels 
De facto social, 
status as núcleo 
unresolved 
Private Federal 
Entire Sierra Norte 
de Oaxaca study 
area 
81 10 6 2 1 
Sample of 19 núcleos 84 14 0 2 0 
 
                                                        
101 For this task, I researched all INEGI census localidades with at least 100 residents. 
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overall area remarkably well.102 (Note that, while I never intended the RAN document sample to 
include private property, the legal judgment which declared Yatzona to be “private” resulted in 
its inclusion anyway. Interestingly, Yatzona contains an INEGI-mapped spring). 
The geodata analysis results maps for the Oaxaca study area (Figure 7.1) and the Huasteca 
study area (Figure 7.2, on page 305) show the INEGI-mapped springs and land tenure classes. 
The maps show as many of the land tenure classes used for the quantitative analysis as possible, 
given the legibility limitations of the map scale. In this map we can see how social property 
extends well into the coastal plain, even beyond the lowland Chinantec-speaking zone, although 
it is probable that much of the white space around the Oaxaca-Veracruz state border is private 
property (Clarke 2000, 246). The Chinantecs living on the coastal plain inhabit ejidos, most of 
them parceled by PROCEDE, rather than comunidades. This reflects the 20th century origins of 
most of these villages, as development spurred by the Papaloapan Commission attracted some 
highland Chinantecs to move downslope. A 1960s investigation found that “the instability of 
community relations under the impact of such outside forces presented complexities not 
encountered in the study of villages of the Sierras” (Luebke 1968, 37). 
The overall pattern of land tenure shows some truth to the stereotype which equates the 
“Sierras” with “resistance to PROCEDE,” and the “plains” (and Central Valley) with “full 
acceptance of PROCEDE parceling, plus private lands,” regardless of indigeneity. However, I 
found numerous departures from this generalization, as well as more subtle patterns within it. 
Two bands of “de facto, unresolved” núcleos, interspersed with a few PROCEDE-
parceled núcleos, extend from the coastal plain well into the Sierras. One is the valley of the Río 
Usila, at northeast extreme of Chinantec speakers. This valley is known for its high rainfall and 
patches of well-conserved humid tropical forest (Figure 2.5, on page 56). Its apparently tenuous 
legal expression of village orientation may be related to its being one of the main catchment 
areas for the Papaloapan Basin project’s Miguel de la Madrid Reservoir. After decades of 
                                                        
102 While different sources give somewhat different figures, the surface area totals for the entire state of 
Oaxaca is about 74 percent social property (about 62 percent of this in comunidades and 38 percent in ejidos) 
and 26 percent private (Clarke 2000, 246; Álvarez 2003, 367).  
300 
 
  
Figure 7.1. Oaxaca geodata analysis area: Land tenure in 2011, and springs included on 
INEGI 1:50,000-scale maps. White areas are of unknown tenure status, and are not 
included in analysis. (Sources include INEGI 2011). 
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elevated interaction with the state, some village identity may truly have been lost, but this has 
likely been reinforced by the state’s special incentive to downplay whatever village identity still 
exists in this area of particular “national interest.” 
The second corridor of tenure uncertainty and scattered full acceptance of PROCEDE is 
near the southeast extreme of Chinantec speakers. This zone follows the boundary between the 
Colorado and Cajonos watersheds (Figure 2.4, on page 53), including the núcleo of Lachixola, 
and up to the lightly populated highlands where the Chinantec, Zapotec, and Mixe language 
areas meet (Figure 2.6, on page 59). I currently have no specific explanation for this region’s 
tenure orientation, except to observe that this corridor has a history of an unusually vigorous 
blending of individual-oriented commercial agriculture (mainly mango in the lowlands, and 
cattle ranching further up) with indigenous culture. Talea is not far from this corridor, and shares 
some of its traits. I consider this matter further (sub-section 7.2.1) with the case of Lalana, the de 
facto núcleo which borders Lachixola to its northeast. This corridor, essentially a mestizo-
indigenous interaction zone, should be considered for future research. The Huasteca núcleos 
investigated by the México Indígena project are located within a similar corridor, in terms of 
physiography, ethnicity, and land tenure patterns.103   
Within the Sierra zone of “resistance to PROCEDE,” there is noteworthy clustering of the 
two principal strategies. Núcleos which only had PROCEDE (or FANAR) survey their 
perimeters are concentrated in a zone extending from the highland Chinantec-speaking villages 
around Quiotepec to the ethnically Zapotec (though not necessarily Zapotec-speaking) villages 
between Ixtlán and the Central Valley. The núcleos which did not do any PROCEDE work at all 
are concentrated in the Zapotec-language-dominant highlands from the Cajonos valley to the 
                                                        
103 If this zone were located in a country or region without such a long history of uninterrupted, relatively 
dense human occupation, this band might be termed a “colonization front” (Herlihy 2003, 315). In the present 
study areas, it is a front of “colonization” only in a less literal sense of the word: a line of expanding 
commercial agriculture, especially cattle ranching. In the context of Oaxaca, Colin Clarke refers to the band 
between about 400 and 1700 meters in elevation – most of the Sierra Norte’s northern slope – as “tierra 
templada” [temperate land]. Neither as hot as the coastal plain below it, nor as cold as the highest mountains 
above it, Clarke characterizes it as a “contested zone, with histories of land conflict between estates and small 
farmers. Communal land is literally above these conflicts, occurring in the tierra fría” [cold land] (Clarke 
2000, 245).  
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“mancomunados” villages southeast of Ixtlán.104 Based on my field experiences, I suspect this 
clustering of strategies may in part be due to the influence of regional rural development/political 
NGOs such as UNOSJO (Unión de Organizaciones de la Sierra Juárez de Oaxaca). These groups 
appear to be gradually replacing the role of núcleo-specific “maestros,” non-indigenous primary 
and secondary school teachers whose leftist organizing (not always welcome in the communities) 
was cited from several historical documents in chapter 5. 
7.1.3 Notable examples encountered while constructing the Oaxaca land tenure coverage 
Lalana is the de facto núcleo “con imposibilidad legal” (SRA 2006) just northeast of the 
PROCEDE-parceled comunidad of Lachixola (location of Lachixola shown on Figure 7.1, in 
page 300). The white space just bordering Lalana to its northeast is the land in and around the 
village of Zaragoza, which one agroecologist asserts is private property (Delgado García 2007). 
While I show these three places as belonging to different tenure categories, in a deeper sense 
they are all part of the same phenomenon: villages that are, culturally and to a degree legally, “in 
between” social and private property. Anecdotal images and descriptions I found in Internet 
conversations, as well as air photographs, suggest that these places engage in many village-
oriented practices such as barrio-specific fiestas and perhaps cargos (rotating village leadership 
posts) or the occasional tequio, but that they also emphasize private, individual property 
ownership, much of it on land devoted to cattle ranching. Lalana’s private property orientation is 
also attested in a government report (SRA 2006). In the Huasteca Potosina, the same sort of mix 
is found in some núcleos also located at the edge of the coastal plain. For example, the lowland 
parcels which comprise almost half of the ejido of La Pila are not easily distinguishable in air 
photographs from neighboring privately owned ranches.  
In Lalana and villages around it, there appear to be cases where the state is expressing its 
own internally conflicting attitudes toward the concept of social property in the post-1992 era. 
The Lachixola PROCEDE map (INEGI 2002a) describes Lalana as “terrenos comunales” (i.e., 
as social property), suggesting that the RAN equates it with other well-established núcleos that 
                                                        
104 About 20 km beyond the geodata analysis area to the northwest, there is another noteable cluster of non-
PROCEDE nucleos inhabited by indigenous Mazatecs. 
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have rejected PROCEDE on their own initiative, while the reality on the ground seems to be 
oriented closer to individual, essentially private parcels.  
The case of Comaltepec illustrates a different sort of miscommunication among the 
branches of the Mexican government. This low-population-density comunidad had its perimeter 
surveyed by FANAR in 2008. The 18,366-ha, nearly 40-km-long polygon snakes all the way 
from a ridgeline just above the town of Valle Nacional, past the núcleo of Cuasimulco, almost to 
the Río Grande near the comunidad of Quiotepec. While this polygon does not overlap with any 
of the ejidos or comunidades already surveyed by PROCEDE, it does spill far out of the 
Comaltepec municipio to include portions of three other municipios, as they are defined by the 
INEGI “marco geoestadístico” shapefile as well as within the PHINA database (RAN 2009-12). 
(I should note that these two government sources also sometimes contradict each other.) I am not 
aware of any conflicts which have specifically arisen from Mexico’s apparent tolerance of a 
mismatch between its núcleo and municipio boundaries, but there have been serious clashes 
caused in part by discrepancies between both of these boundary types and state boundaries, e.g. 
between the states of Yucatán and Quintana Roo (Sánchez 2011) and, more violently, in the 
Chimalapas region between Oaxaca and Chiapas (Matías 2012). 
7.2   Land tenure in the Huasteca Potosina 
The total area of the Huasteca geodata analysis area, excluding the city of Ciudad Valles, 
is 3,523 sq km. The population is 420,594, of whom about 195,000, or 46 percent, are 
indigenous language speakers. The average population density is 119 persons per sq km.  
There are about 316 núcleos mainly or entirely within the area, including approximately 3 
with unresolved legal status, as well as around 15 private property villages (i.e., INEGI-defined 
localidades with at least 100 residents). 
The average population of the núcleos and private property villages is 1,271, while the 
average area (after subtracting known terrenos nacionales from the total area) is 10 sq km. The 
average population of the fifteen núcleos subjected to archival and (in nine cases) participatory 
research is 1,095, while their average area is 15 sq km. As a representative sample of the entire 
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Huasteca geodata analysis area, the RAN document/PRM study núcleos are satisfactory in their 
populations, but are somewhat larger in terms of area than the regional average. 
7.2.1 Land tenure in the Huasteca study area: General observations 
The RAN document/PRM study núcleos (Table 7.2) overrepresent common use land and 
territories with unresolved status as ejidos or comunidades, and underrepresent parceled areas, 
when compared to the whole geodata analysis area. This holds true even after discounting private 
and federal lands, which I never intended to subject to archival and participatory research. This 
disparity is less severe when the sample is considered as a collection of núcleos rather than as a 
dispersed sum of areas, because the ones with significant common use areas tend to be larger 
than others. 
 
Table 7.2: Percentage of the Huasteca geodata analysis area in each general land tenure 
category, compared to subset of núcleos subjected to detailed study. Values in parentheses 
exclude private and federal lands.  
 Mostly common use (all types) 
Mostly 
PROCEDE-
certified parcels 
De facto social, 
status as núcleo 
unresolved 
Private Federal 
Entire Huasteca 
Potosina study area 26 (37) 38 (56) 5 (7) 28 3 
Sample of 15 
núcleos 67 14 19 0 0 
 
The geodata analysis results map for the Huasteca study area (Figure 7.2) shows the 
distribution of INEGI-mapped springs within land tenure classes. About half of the study area is 
in the Gulf Coastal Plain (including the large lowland valleys near the town of Tambaca), in 
contrast to the Oaxaca study area, where only a small portion is in the Coastal Plain. 
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Figure 7.2. Huasteca geodata analysis area: Land tenure in 2011, and springs included on 
INEGI 1:50,000-scale maps. White areas are of unknown tenure status, and are not 
included in analysis. (Sources include INEGI 2011). 
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In general, the land tenure pattern in the Huasteca study area shows variation and 
heterogeneity, at several scales, to a much greater degree than the pattern observed in Oaxaca. As 
in Oaxaca, social property dominates, even far into the coastal plain. There are, however, three 
large areas dominated by non-social property:  
1. The private property zone, mainly sugar cane farms and cattle pastures, on the plain 
near Ciudad Valles. 
2. The federal zone remnants of the World Bank-funded Pujal-Coy Irrigation District and, 
continuing to the west, an area of upland private properties between El Chuchupe and Tampate. 
3. A large area of mainly private properties in the lowlands surrounding a stretch of the 
Río Moctezuma, but extending toward the low sandstone hills east of Chimalaco, where these 
private parcels border PROCEDE-parceled comunidades. A finger of private property continues 
westward along the highway up to Xilitla, a town surrounded by a small area of privately owned 
coffee plantations.  
The first of these zones is mainly mestizo (Figure 2.3, on page 51). The second zone 
contains mainly Teenek speakers, in both the irrigation district and the upland private property 
area. The Pujal-Coy irrigation project (see section 3.4) was a federal scheme to pump water from 
the Río Tampaón for use by small-scale commercial farmers (Whiteford et al. 1998, 385). Ejidos 
in the project area were formed in the usual way, mainly by state expropriation of large private 
farms. More of the ejido settlers came from distant regions than is typically the case. As “few 
ejidatarios [could] afford to irrigate because of rising water and labor costs,” de facto individual 
parcel ownership and management became common (Whiteford et al. 1998, 386). 
The private property uplands west of the irrigation district include part of a long, rounded 
limestone ridge which extends from beyond the northern boundary of the study area southward 
to Santa Cruz (Figure 2.1, on page 47). This 5-km-wide ridge, called Sierra La Pila or Sierra Las 
Anonas by INEGI, and T’sum T’sum T’zon or Sierra Papatla by Teenek residents of La Pila, is 
remarkable because almost every land tenure category is represented in one segment or another. 
Besides these private parcels, the ridge includes “PROCEDE-surveyed common use areas within 
ejidos with PROCEDE parcels” (e.g., La Pila); “de facto common use areas in núcleos with only 
their perimeters surveyed by PROCEDE” (e.g., La Lima); and “núcleos without PROCEDE 
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work” (e.g., El Chuchupe). A slightly more rugged ridge which begins just to its south even 
includes parts of a “de facto núcleo with unresolved legal status” (Tampate). Despite this 
hodgepodge of land tenure categories, the entire ridge appears essentially uniform in air 
photographs: scattered milpas (many of them rotative “slash and burn” plots), and few small 
permanent ranches, as well as, perhaps, a few plantations of illicit substances, all within a matrix 
of medium-canopy humid tropical forest on rather poor soils. Only the eastern edge has deeper 
soils, permitting a mix of crops and fruit orchards known in Teenek as te’lom (Alcorn 1983). 
The third zone of mainly private property contains many Nahuatl speakers, especially in a 
corridor between the towns of Tanquian and Tampacan, but it is also inhabited by many mestizos 
concentrated near the Río Moctezuma. The slightly hillier part of this zone east of Chimalaco 
contains a mix of indigenous and non-indigenous language speakers. 
In contrast to Oaxaca, the Huasteca Potosina geodata analysis area lacks a very large area 
of non-compliance with the standard PROCEDE template. In the Huasteca, the corridor of non-
PROCEDE-parceled núcleos stretching southward from Tampate suggests that, as in Oaxaca, the 
higher Sierras are a zone of PROCEDE resistance. However, the indigenous Pame-speaking zone 
which includes the northwest part of the Huasteca study area is also mountainous, yet nearly all 
the núcleos here are ejidos with PROCEDE parcels, interspersed with some private properties 
which are larger than the scattered pequeñas propiedades of the Sierra in Oaxaca. A closer look 
at the part of the Pame region included within the geodata analysis area reveals that this zone is 
not nearly as topographically rugged as the high Sierras further south. As Figure 2.1 (page 47) 
suggests, this is actually a karstic area of flat, low-elevation, deep-soil dolines, planted mainly in 
sugar cane, surrounded by low-population-density wooded hills with a few farms, ranches, and 
hamlets. Census data reveals that the villages in the fertile dolines are mainly mestizo, while the 
settlements in the hills are more purely Pame. Both settlement types are in PROCEDE-parceled 
ejidos which sometimes border private properties. I will discuss the example of Tanlacu in 
subsection 7.2.2 below. The situation is similar to that in the Oaxaca ejidos of Las Palmas and La 
Alicia (Figure 7.1, on page 300). In both cases, the presence of indigenous ejidos (not 
comunidades) suggests a history of relatively recent indigenous settlement – or, more likely, re-
settlement. As in Oaxaca, physiography is a somewhat better predictor of land tenure regimes 
than indigeneity. 
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In Oaxaca, comunidades (not ejidos) with PROCEDE-certified individual parcels are rare, 
Talea being one. In the Huasteca, I was surprised to find that this is a much more common 
occurrence. There are two major clusters of PROCEDE-parceled comunidades. The larger 
cluster comprises most of the land area of the Nahua-dominated low sandstone hills, known to 
some as the Sierra de Tancanhuitz, which form a 25-km half circle extending southeast from the 
town of that name. Only the southern half of this cluster consists of comunidades like Talea, with 
many individual parcels. The northern half mainly contains comunidades which, like 
Cuatlamayán, innovatively declared their de facto parceled areas to be de jure “common use,” 
letting PROCEDE survey only a few, civic parcels. (The distinction between the two tenure 
strategies is not visible in Figure 7.2). The settlement pattern of all núcleos in these hills is the 
same: dispersed houses with permanent occupation on small plots, with some large trees on most 
plots and wooded strips at steeper slopes, but no large forested areas.   
The second, smaller cluster does contain “conventional” parceled comunidades similar to 
Talea. It is located in a Nahuatl-speaking area with low hills (visible in Figure 2.1, on page 47, as 
the boundary between the Moctezuma and Tempoal watersheds), around the town of Tampacan. 
In summary, the pattern of land tenure categories in the Huasteca Potosina conforms to 
what might be expected for such a location. The Teenek region is essentially the extreme 
northern end of a long, discontinuous strip of indigenous settlements clustered around the first 
mountain range inland from Atlantic coastal plain. The strip continues southward through 
northern Oaxaca and Chiapas, into the Ixil and Kanjobal territories of Guatemala (where this 
“first mountain range” is now far inland, due to the presence of the Yucatán Peninsula), to the 
Tol (Jicaque) of Honduras (living just inland from the narrow coastal plain), then the Tawahka, 
Pech, Miskito, and others in Honduras and Nicaragua (where the coastal plain widens again –
even more than in Yucatán, this time occupied mainly by indigenous peoples all the way to the 
Caribbean coast), and on through the Bribri-Cabécar of Costa Rica and the Ngöbe of Panama 
(where the coastal plain again narrows and disappears), and even into the Sierra de Santa Marta, 
Colombia, home of the Kogi and Arhuaco. These cultures have many differences, but they share 
certain physiographic characteristics (including high rainfall, and – where the topographic 
conditions allow it – cloud forest), as well as a generalized history of being “pushed back” by 
non-indigenous groups, to varying degrees, from the plains and into the mountains (or, as 
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sometimes in Moskitia, from the mountains into the plains), and of finding accommodation with 
the state (e.g., in legal land tenure practices) in areas more exploitable for commercial agriculture 
(usually the plains), while confronting the state more vigorously in less exploitable areas (usually 
the mountains, although again in Moskitia this pattern is sometimes reversed). 
7.2.2 Notable examples encountered while constructing the land tenure coverage 
I will discuss three interesting examples from the Huasteca geodata analysis area. The first 
two share a common theme: land tenure decisions in places where separate indigenous and 
mestizo settlements nonetheless consider themselves, in some ways, to form a single 
“community.” 
The large-area núcleo of Tanlacu, part of which lies outside the geodata analysis area, 
covers much of the mixed Pame-mestizo, karstic hill-and-valley zone described above. Its human 
settlement areas, parceled areas, and common use areas were surveyed in two stages: part of the 
ejido by PROCEDE in 2005 and the rest by FANAR in 2010. In its final form, it has ten 
settlement areas (four of them with over 100 residents each), three large parceled areas (together 
comprising about 40 percent of the territory), and the rest in common use.105 One of the large 
parceled areas is the largest fertile-soil, flat valley, which also contains the largest village (called 
“Tanlacut” in INEGI maps) and six other settlements, all of them mainly mestizo. The other large 
parceled area within the study area is a rugged, mountainous zone with scrubby secondary 
vegetation, extending up to 3 km from the canyon of the Río Santa María; it is anchored at its 
ends by two Pame-dominant settlements. There is an additional Pame hamlet surveyed as a 
human settlement area deep within the common use area. 
Tanlacu offers an example of indigenous and mestizo villages acting, in legal terms, as a 
single núcleo. The second example, Matlapa, has a similar condition, but here the local residents 
have instead chosen to be considered as two separate núcleos, with different responses to 
PROCEDE. The two communities which share the name “Matlapa” could not be more explicit in 
their distinguishing characteristic: the official name of one is “Matlapa Indígena,” while the other 
                                                        
105 There is an INEGI-mapped spring just within the common use area, about 1 km from the main population 
center, for whose potable water system it likely serves as the source.  
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is officially “Matlapa Mestizos.” Matlapa Indígena is a 2-polygon ejido with 3,400 residents (60 
percent of whom speak Nahuatl), and did not do any PROCEDE work; its location appears in 
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 (pages 47 and 49). Matlapa Mestizos (also called “Colonia Escalanar”) is an 
ejido with 405 residents (none of whom speak Nahuatl), and had PROCEDE survey its 
individual parcels (SEDESOL 2011). However, Matlapa Mestizos also contains a 4.5-ha 
PROCEDE-surveyed common use area which was clearly located there, at least in part, 
specifically to legally protect the common use status of the INEGI-mapped water source within it 
– a rare instance where the data sets used in this analysis allow us to directly observe this 
practice. 
The last example is the one instance when my uncertainty about which land tenure 
category to assign to an INEGI-mapped spring led me to discover a potential direct conflict 
between private property owners and non-indigenous-language residents (or, alternatively, an 
error in the ASERCA shapefile of private properties). The place is called La Cuchilla, in the 
mountainous part of the municipio of Aquismón, near the confluence of the Río Gallinas and the 
Río Santa María. The 400 “poor” inhabitants evidently consider themselves a “comunidad” 
(Plano Informativo 2011), yet part of their territory is apparently in private hands, while the rest 
lacks official núcleo status. 
7.3   Major springs in both geodata analysis areas 
When considering the pattern of springs INEGI included in its 1:50,000 maps, I will refer 
to the watersheds shown in Figure 2.1 and 2.4, in chapter 2. In this section, “springs” refers to 
this INEGI dataset (see sub-section 4.4.2 for an analysis of the limitations and characteristics of 
this dataset, particularly its apparent bias toward human use). At the end of this subsection, I will 
briefly consider the few additional springs which appear in other INEGI hydrology shapefiles. 
The Sierra Norte de Oaxaca geodata analysis area (Figure 7.1, on page 300) mainly 
comprises parts of four watersheds. Despite its high rainfall, the relatively small Valle Nacional 
watershed contains only a few springs, perhaps (given the data’s human-use bias) because its 
slopes are thickly forested and thinly settled. The Verde watershed – i.e., the Central Valley – 
also contains few springs, probably due to its drier climate; its inhabitants are increasingly 
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dependent on groundwater.106 The two major watersheds within the study area, the Grande and 
the Cajonos, each contain many springs, although there are none in the lower (northern) half of 
the Cajonos watershed. 
In the Grande watershed, an important group of well-spaced springs is located within the 
2000-to-2500-m-elevation band in long stretches on both slopes above the upper Río Grande. 
Many of the springs are located just above population centers; this is surely in part because some 
of those villages were founded at their locations due to their proximity to water sources. One 
cluster of springs within this group is found in the pine-oak forests of the upper (southern) 
portion of the núcleo territory of Ixtepeji, halfway between Oaxaca City and Ixtlán. These 
springs are located between the hamlet of El Punto (on the main highway crossing the Sierra 
Norte) and Cerro San Felipe, a peak conspicuously visible from Oaxaca City. Another cluster 
lies within the Chinantla Alta area, centered on the comunidad of Temextitlán, near Quiotepec. A 
smaller concentration of springs in the Grande watershed is found between 500 and 1000 m 
elevation, in and around the tropical forests above the Río Usila. This is the only significant 
cluster of springs at such a low altitude, and their existence was likely a factor in the Papaloapan 
Commission’s planning of the Miguel de la Madrid Reservoir. 
In the Cajonos watershed, there is a remarkable concentration of springs above and 
between the settlements of Villa Alta and Yaa, a Zapotec-speaking núcleo 9 km to the south. 
These springs are between 10 and 15 km southeast of Talea, and lie just below the crest of a 
ridgeline which continues into the Mixe-dominant territory outside the study area. There are 
probably other important concentrations of INEGI-mapped springs south of the study area along 
the rim of the uppermost segment of the Río Cajonos Valley. When I drove through this area 
after completing my Talea fieldwork, I encountered one telling example: a spring in a forested 
upper zone of the territory of San Pedro Cajonos, a Zapotec community whose location appears 
in Figures 2.4 and 2.5, on pages 53 and 56. The spring has water conduits extending from it, and 
                                                        
106 “The history of water use in the Central Valleys is one of increasing abstraction [i.e., extraction] at the outer 
edge of the drainage network leading to a decrease in water availability downstream in the Atoyac [River] 
itself. More and more water has been taken from the perennial tributaries at their points of entry into the valley. 
Water has been used upstream of Oaxaca City in the Etla Valley by increasing the use of the high water-table 
zone and extending and modernizing canal systems. Abstraction has been multiplied many times over by the 
increasing number of wells with mechanical pumps, to the point that groundwater reserves are threatened” 
(Clarke 2000, 94). 
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is enclosed by a fence and locked gate, encased in a beautiful stone structure adorned with 
religious symbols. It is marked with a hand-painted road sign which reads: 
LET’S TAKE CARE OF THE FOREST AND THE WATER. Prohibited: Washing 
vehicles or polluting stream water, hunting wild animals, dumping trash in the forest, 
and removing [saqueo] wood, pine seedlings, fertilizer, hay, moss, etc. Respectfully, 
Comisariado de Bienes Comunales and Consejo de Vigilancia, San Pedro Cajonos, 
Oaxaca. 
 
The Huasteca Potosina geodata analysis area (Figure 7.2, on page 305), unlike the Oaxaca 
one, is located far from the true headwaters of major rivers. The Río Santa María/Tampoán 
originates near the borders of western San Luis Potosí state and Guanajuato state, while the Río 
Moctezuma’s upper tributaries arise deep within Hidalgo and Querétero states, and even within 
the limits of Mexico City, where in 1607 a canal was built to it to drain Lake Texcoco (Wolf 
1959, 6). Due to its karst geomorphology, many streams “disappear” in the hills of the Sierra 
Madre Oriental and re-emerge as major springs within the study area. 
All but two of the INEGI-mapped springs in the Huasteca study area are located near the 
base of these limestone hills. Some are found where a ridge meets the Gulf Coastal Plain (e.g., 
the line of springs from Tampate to southwest of Tazáquil), while others are within the Sierras, 
along the margins of flat, deep-soil doline valleys (e.g., a cluster southeast of Tambaca, near the 
northwest corner of the study area). In both situations, such places are often where more 
community-oriented property in the hills borders more individually-oriented property in the 
valleys and plains. In some cases, this is expressed as “social property” (of any type) bordering 
“private property,” while in other cases it is expressed within a social property núcleo as a 
“common use area” bordering a “parceled area” (whether de facto, or converted to de jure status 
by PROCEDE surveying). 
The most extraordinary cluster of springs in the Huasteca study area is about 8 km 
southeast of the town of Xilitla. These springs are on the steep slopes of a sharp ridge which 
reaches 1000 meters in elevation, generating tremendous orographic rainfall. The cluster lies 
between the populous Nahuatl-speaking villages of Itzacapa (1,300 inhabitants) and Ahuehueyo 
(1,200 inhabitants). The latter is one of four villages, plus several smaller settlements, which 
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make up the ejido of El Cristiano y sus Anexos.107 All six INEGI-mapped springs within this 
núcleo are within the PROCEDE-surveyed parceled area. However, close inspection at the GAIA 
coverage reveals that three of these springs are probably actually in “common use” areas, 
broadly speaking: one is 30 meters (within the INEGI tolerance of error) from a tiny parcel 
whose size and shape is similar to known civic parcels in other ejidos and comunidades; another 
is at the edge of a stream right of way, not in any parcel despite its being in the “parceled area”; 
and the third spring is in what appears to be a small water body right of way, next to a civic 
parcel which may contain its water storage tank. The protocol of the geodata analysis demanded 
that I avoid speculation, and assign all three of these springs to the “PROCEDE-parceled” land 
tenure category. 
In Figure 7.2, several springs are depicted within the general region of the Gulf Coastal 
Plain, but in fact all but two are located along the edges of sandstone hills (either the Sierra de 
Tancanhuitz, or the smaller hills around Tampacán). Even the spring along the Río Oxitipa/Coy 
(visible within the word “Teenek”) is at the edge of an isolated small hill, the same hill which 
comprises the forested common use area of the ejido of Las Armas. This spring is shown on the 
INEGI topographic maps as feeding an impressive system of water conduits, including an 11-km 
pipe which delivers water to at least four ejidos. Only two springs, near the Río Moctezuma, are 
deep within the true alluvial-soil plain. 
Adding the augmented INEGI water source shapefiles (INEGI 2009) to both geodata 
analysis areas did not appear to change the overall patterns observed when using the topographic 
“springs” coverage alone. A few new localized clusters did emerge, however, which may merit 
further investigation in the future. The augmented INEGI springs for the Oaxaca study area are 
visible in Figure 7.6 (page 337) as the smallest empty circles. The only new group is a line of 
five springs stretching southward from Valle Nacional for 30 km. These are all within 500 
meters of the trans-Sierra highway, along the spine of a forested ridge that is almost entirely 
uninhabited, on land belonging to Comaltepec, a núcleo whose perimeter was only recently 
surveyed. Pending further research, it seems probable that these springs were opportunistically 
                                                        
107 Whatever the sociopolitical consequences of PROCEDE, this ejido is a spectacular testament to the sheer 
work accomplished by the program. The GAIA online GIS portal (INEGI 2011) shows it to be divided into 
thousands of small parcels of many shapes. 
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included by government personnel for their convenient locations along a main highway, although 
it should be noted that this segment of highway does pass through well-conserved cloud forest, 
and several tributaries of the Valle Nacional river system originate here. 
Adding the additional INEGI springs layer (INEGI 2009) to the Huasteca study area 
produced a sprinkling of new springs (not shown on any map in this study). There are two 
modest clusters: a group of five spread over the Sierra de Tancanhuitz (some on private property, 
others within “inverted” civic-parcels-only núcleos), and another group of six dispersed across 
the Gulf Coastal Plain’s PROCEDE-parceled ejidos. All are listed as for “domestic” or 
“domestic and cattle ranching” uses. One of the springs in the augmented data set is within the 
México Indígena participatory mapping ejido of La Pila. It appears to be one of the “pozos” 
included by the community in their map, near the largest human settlement area, along a multi-
núcleo potable water pipeline.  
7.4   Relationships between major springs and land tenure 
In each of the subsections which follow, I begin by considering the geodata analysis areas 
in their entirety, and continue by focusing on progressively smaller subsets within these areas 
(e.g., “PROCEDE-parceled núcleos”).  
To reiterate, there are four main questions. Are springs more commonly located in social 
property, as compared with private property? Within the social property universe, are springs 
more densely located in de jure common use areas, as compared with de jure (i.e., PROCEDE-
certified) individually parceled areas? Within the universe of PROCEDE-parceled núcleos within 
social property (i.e., excluding perimeter-only ones) are springs more densely located in common 
use areas, as compared with parceled areas? Is there any evidence that, at the moment of 
PROCEDE certification, núcleos tend to actively incorporate important springs into their newly 
surveyed (but generally de facto pre-existing) common use areas? 
Neither the study-area-wide land tenure data, nor most of the participatory data, captures 
the distinction between purely de facto “common use” and individually “parceled” areas; that is, 
these tenure areas within núcleos that only had their perimeters surveyed by PROCEDE, or 
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which avoided PROCEDE work altogether. Thus, the geodata analysis results focus on legal 
land tenure classes, not the actual land tenure practices I analyzed, for example, in Tiltepec and 
Yagila (section 6.2). I will briefly consider de facto land tenure at the end of subsection 7.4.2, but 
these results must be considered tentative, due both to the small sample size and to the spatially 
inexact nature of the de facto land tenure coverage. 
The numbers in the tables in this section refer to the “number of observed springs, 
compared to number of expected springs, after normalizing as if every sample size were 100.” 
For example, in Table 7.7, the figure for “human settlement areas” is “+9.6.” This means that, 
given an even distribution, one would only expect 1.2 springs – i.e., about one or two of them – 
to be found in this tenure category. Instead, 12 springs were found in this tenure category, a 
“surplus” of 10.8. Because there are 112 total springs in this sample, this quantity normalizes to 
9.6. In each table, in tracing any path through the cells from top to bottom, the values sum to 
zero (after accounting for minor rounding errors).  
The overall average density of INEGI-mapped springs is considerably higher in Huasteca 
geodata analysis (about 1 spring for every 8,300 ha) than in the Oaxaca one (about 1 spring for 
every 13,900 ha).108 Because of this, the results for any tenure category with very different 
relative proportions in the two study regions will appear odd. For example, the result for “only 
núcleo perimeter surveyed” is mildly positive when considering each study region separately 
(Tables 7.5 and 7.4), but strongly negative when considering both study regions together (Tables 
7.3 and 7.7).  
As a separate, minor exercise, I investigated the existence of government-recognized 
“natural protected areas” within the two study areas, including state parks, national parks, and 
biosphere reserves. Although the de jure land use restrictions within such areas vary widely, and 
the de facto land use practices vary more widely still, it was important to tentatively explore how 
these entities relate to land tenure and to important water sources. This is a fruitful theme for 
future research. 
                                                        
108 The higher density of springs in the Huasteca study area is partly due to the greater preponderance of karst 
geomorphology, but mainly is due to the greater population density and concentration of villages. This 
underscores the idea that “human use” was a key criterion for a spring’s inclusion in the INEGI data set. 
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There are three state or federal protected areas within my geodata analysis areas.109 The 
two protected areas in the Huasteca Potosina area (Figure 7.2 on page 305) are: 
1. Sótano de las Golondrinas Natural Monument, a 280-ha polygon which includes a 
famously deep and wide sinkhole. In my land tenure coverage, it is within the orbit of Tamapatz, 
a “de facto social property, status as núcleo unresolved” community (probably mainly terreno 
nacional) that is principally mestizo, at least linguistically. 
2. La Hoya de las Huahuas Natural Monument, a 400-ha polygon which contains one of 
the INEGI-mapped springs. In my land tenure coverage, it is in the non-PROCEDE Teenek-
speaking núcleo of Tampaxal; effectively, then, it is common use social property.  
The one protected area partly within the Sierra Norte de Oaxaca study area (Figure 7.1 on 
page 300) is Benito Juárez National Park, decreed in 1937. One INEGI-mapped spring lies just 
outside its borders. The portion of this 2,600-ha park within the study area is in the higher-
elevation section of San Andrés Huayapam, a mainly non-indigenous-language núcleo which had 
only its perimeter surveyed by PROCEDE, and so is all de jure common use. 
While using the PHINA núcleo tenure history online database, I noticed that one other 
Oaxaca study area núcleo had had some of its territory expropriated by SEMARNAT, the federal 
agency which directs protected area management and enforcement. This partially Chinantec-
speaking ejido, Caracol Estrella, is located where the Río Usila enters the Papalopan 
Commission’s Miguel de la Madrid Reservoir. 
7.4.1 Results using INEGI “springs” dataset 
The grouped subsets of tenure categories (e.g., “social property,” or “PROCEDE-surveyed 
núcleos”) appear in the three tables which show all tenure categories (7.3, 7.5, and 7.4), and the 
most important subsets are also presented in separate tables (7.7 and 7.8). There are two reasons 
for this. First, the all-inclusive tenure area category totals used for tables 7.3, 7.5, and 7.4 
necessarily distort the relative values within grouped subsets. Second, direct comparison with the  
                                                        
109 Additionally, the huge Sierra Gorda Biosphere Reserve borders the Huasteca geodata analysis area. It 
covers over one third of Querétaro state (de la Maza Elvira et al. 1998, 87). 
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Table 7.3. Oaxaca and Huasteca geodata analysis areas combined: Observed number of 
INEGI-mapped springs in each tenure category, as difference from expected value; 
normalized to n=100 (n=123; total area is 10,208 sq km). More specific categories are 
grouped into more general categories adjacent to them (see page 89). 
social 
property 
+7.6 
de facto social property,  
status as núcleo unresolved  +3.8 
núcleos without PROCEDE survey  -6.6 
PROCEDE- 
surveyed 
núcleos 
+10.4 
only núcleo 
perimeter surveyed  -5.9  
common 
use areas 
-7.9 
common use areas  
in comunidades  -0.2 
common use areas  
in ejidos  -1.8 
human settlement areas  +8.8  
parceled 
areas 
+9.5 
parceled areas in 
comunidades  +1.1 
parceled areas  
in ejidos  +8.4  
non-social property  -7.6 
 
PRM data would otherwise be difficult, because the PRM is drawn only from social property 
areas. 
After  normalizing to n=100, 7.2 more springs were found on social property than 
expected (Table 7.3), when combining both study areas. This suggests that important water 
sources are disproportionately located on social property, lending some support to general theme 
expressed by Toledo (1996) and other scholars regarding potentially high ecological impact of 
PROCEDE. I reiterate that this is probably mainly due to a third factor which likely correlates 
positively with both variables: mountainous, rugged regions tend to be associated with important 
springs as well as with social property, much of which is found in relatively less accessible 
locations, often with poorer than average soils. However, springs in limestone-dominant 
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Table 7.4. Sierra Norte de Oaxaca geodata analysis area: Observed number of INEGI-
mapped springs in each tenure category, as difference from expected value; normalized to 
n=100 (n=50; total area is 6,939 sq km). 
social 
property 
+7.2 
 
de facto social property, 
status as núcleo unresolved +6.5 
núcleos without PROCEDE survey  +0.7 
PROCEDE- 
surveyed 
núcleos 
+0.1 
 
only núcleo 
perimeter surveyed  +7.4 
common 
use areas 
+2.7 
 
common use areas 
in comunidades  -0.3 
common use areas 
in ejidos  -4.4 
human settlement areas  +1.5 
parceled 
areas 
-4.1 
 
parceled areas in 
comunidades  -1.0 
parceled areas 
in ejidos  -3.1 
non-social property  -7.1 
 
 
 
geological regions are disproportionately located near where these mountainous areas adjoin 
valleys, and therefore there is some tendency for them to be found near private (or at least 
PROCEDE-parceled) property, even if they are within social property. 
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Table 7.5. Huasteca Potosina geodata analysis area: Observed number of INEGI-mapped 
springs in each tenure category, as difference from expected value; normalized to n=100 
(n=73; total area is 3,268 sq km). 
social 
property 
+18.3 
 
de facto social property,  
status as núcleo unresolved  +2.6   
núcleos without PROCEDE survey  +0.7   
PROCEDE- 
surveyed 
núcleos 
+15.0 
 
only núcleo 
perimeter surveyed  +1.0   
common 
use areas 
-0.2 
 
common use areas  
in comunidades  -1.4   
common use areas  
in ejidos  +0.2  
human settlement areas  +13.3 
parceled 
areas 
+1.9 
 
parceled areas in 
comunidades  +0.8   
parceled areas  
in ejidos  +1.1   
non-social property  -18.4   
 
 
Table 7.6 isolates the portion of the Huasteca study area in non-social property, to show 
the observed differences between private property and zonas federales. I did not include the 
Oaxaca study area, because its non-social portion is relatively small, and the distribution of 
specific non-social categories in Oaxaca is less certain. This table expresses the relationships 
with INEGI-mapped springs as percentages rather than as normalized numbers of springs, 
because the sample size is so small. The results suggest that, within non-social property 
categories, the observed distribution of springs is about what would be expected if the 
distribution were even.   
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Table 7.6. Non-social tenure portion of Huasteca Potosina geodata analysis area: Observed 
percentage of INEGI-mapped springs in each tenure category, as difference from expected 
value (n=10; total area is 1,021 sq km). 
 % of 
land area 
% of major 
springs 
private property 83 
90  
(70 definitely, 
20 probably) 
federal zones 
(mostly “leftover” areas in irrigation 
districts; smaller subcategories include large 
rivers and highways, and parastatal lands) 
16 10 
other (including unknown) 1 0 
 
 
Within the social property “universe” (Table 7.7), substantially fewer springs than 
expected were observed in three of the four types of de jure common use areas: PROCEDE-
surveyed common use areas in ejidos (-2.4), núcleos with only their perimeters surveyed by 
PROCEDE (-9.4), and those where PROCEDE did no work (-9.9). In contrast, both PROCEDE-
surveyed parceled areas in ejidos (+7.8) and PROCEDE-surveyed human settlement areas (+9.6) 
contained substantially more springs than expected.  
The relative paucity of springs in PROCEDE-certified common use areas was probably 
due to the bias in the data set toward the kinds of individually-oriented human uses which are 
generally in non-forested areas, a bias reinforced by the fact that some villages were founded at 
their present locations precisely because of the presence of springs. Indeed, the bias toward 
including springs in or near population centers is even stronger than this table suggests; many of 
the springs assigned to parceled areas were actually very close to the outer boundaries of human 
settlements. This sampling bias is instructive in how it reminds us that human values pervade 
human geography (particularly when it involves land tenure), but it does run the risk of failing to 
adequately include springs that are important to people but located under forest canopies, such as 
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those near the stream uptakes for Talea’s potable water system, or the springs of the Cerro de 
Tabaa over which Talea has suffered violent skirmishes with a neighboring núcleo. 
Table 7.7 does show that, despite this likely bias in the data, important springs in 
comunidades (as opposed to ejidos) are located in common use areas as often as would be 
expected were they distributed evenly. We may speculate that this over-representation (given the 
bias) of springs in common use areas reflects some instances of comunidades actively favoring 
keeping their important springs in common use areas. However, we must be cautious in making 
any such assumptions, because the figures are based on a rather small sample. Furthermore, that 
sample is skewed by the fact that most of the technically PROCEDE-parceled comunidades in 
the study areas do not follow the standard PROCEDE template exemplified by Talea, but rather 
they follow the “inverted” innovation, typified by Cuatlamayán, of “legally common use 
 
Table 7.7. Social property portions of the Oaxaca and Huasteca geodata analysis areas 
combined: Observed number of INEGI-mapped springs in each tenure category, as 
difference from expected value; normalized to n=100 (n=112; total area is 8,524 sq km). 
de facto social property, 
status as núcleo unresolved  +3.7 
núcleos without PROCEDE survey  -9.9 
PROCEDE- 
surveyed 
núcleos 
+6.1 
only núcleo 
perimeter surveyed  -9.4 
common 
use areas 
-12.2 
common use areas 
in comunidades  -0.4 
common use areas 
in ejidos  -2.4 
human settlement areas  +9.6 
parceled 
areas 
+8.7 
parceled areas in 
comunidades  +0.9 
parceled areas 
in ejidos  +7.8 
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area with individual farms, plus a few legally individual, but ‘civic,’ parcels.” If indeed there is 
some tendency for special effort to be made in PROCEDE-parceled comunidades (but not in 
ejidos) to keep major springs in common use areas, this might be considered ironic, because 
under current law individual PROCEDE parcels in comunidades are actually protected from full 
privatization, unlike PROCEDE parcels in ejidos. 
In Table 7.7, we see that fewer springs found than expected in núcleos without a 
PROCEDE survey. This figure is based on a small sample size, but we might speculate that such 
núcleos tend to have a history of limited interaction with the state, and that this tradition is based 
partly in their tendency to be located in places with relatively less physical access to the urban, 
“modern” parts of Mexico. Such places tend to correlate positively with large forested areas, 
which would reinforce the bias stemming from the INEGI methodology.    
In contrast, more springs were found than expected in territories with “unresolved status” 
as social property núcleos. This may simply be a chance artifact of the data set, as Tampate and 
Tamapatz are huge Teenek-speaking territories in the Huasteca study area which happen to be de 
facto, uncertain-status núcleos that contain many INEGI-mapped springs. However, the result 
may not be entirely accidental. The uncertain-status Chinantec-speaking núcleos of the Usila 
valley in the Oaxaca study area, documented by de Teresa (1999), also contain an unusual 
concentration of INEGI-mapped springs. There may be a tendency for the state to “drag its feet” 
when it comes to legally acknowledging the village-oriented social property status of places rich 
in the kinds of natural resources (e.g., water) which are seen as belonging to the nation as a 
whole. A less charitable theory would be that this foot dragging has less to do with avoidance of 
ceding power from the nation to the village, and is more about maintaining such places in a 
condition more conducive to rapid individualized, privatized commercial development. 
Table 7.8 focuses on just the land tenure categories within núcleos that contain individual 
parcels surveyed and certified by PROCEDE. Absent a more complete and verified coverage of 
purely de facto land tenure distinctions, this dataset gives us the best chance, if we can overcome 
the human-activity-oriented bias in the data, of identifying possible evidence of important 
springs being specifically “protected” by keeping them in common use areas.   
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Table 7.8. Núcleos with PROCEDE-surveyed parcels in the Oaxaca and Huasteca geodata 
analysis areas combined: Observed number of INEGI-mapped springs in each tenure 
category, as difference from expected value; normalized to n=100 (n=35; total area is 2,152 
sq km). Human settlement areas are not included. All springs are located in the Huasteca 
study area. 
PROCEDE- 
surveyed 
núcleos 
with parcels 
 common use areas  
in comunidades  -2.2 common 
use areas 
-13.8 common use areas  
in ejidos  -11.6 
parceled 
areas 
+13.7 
parceled areas in 
comunidades  +1.0 
parceled areas  
in ejidos  +12.7  
 
 
The results show that, in núcleos with PROCEDE parcels, especially in ejidos, springs are 
found less frequently than expected in de jure common use areas. It is difficult to remove the 
human-use-oriented bias here, but in any case there is no evidence from this data set of special 
efforts being made to include springs in PROCEDE-surveyed common use areas. Indeed, many 
PROCEDE-parceled núcleos have no de jure common use areas at all. 
I reiterate the caveat that the data set for this sample is small. Of the 35 INEGI-mapped 
springs in PROCEDE-parceled núcleos, only four springs are in common use areas. These 
springs are not clustered, so it is unlikely that they represent a localized practice (as, for example, 
the “inverted” PROCEDE template seen in Cuatlamayán does represent). I have discussed two of 
these instances, the ejidos of Tanlacu and Matlapa Mestizos (subsection 7.2.2). The other two 
occurrences of INEGI-mapped springs in PROCEDE-surveyed common use areas are also in the 
Huasteca study area. Atlamaxatl is an ejido with 900 Nahuatl-speaking inhabitants. One third of 
its territory was parceled by PROCEDE with the left kept in common use, including the spring 
visible 7 km northwest of Tamazunchale in Figure 7.2 (page 305). The final instance is in the 
Nahua comunidad of Coaxinquila. However, this núcleo is one of those which, like nearby 
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Cuatlamayán, “inverted” the PROCEDE template, so its INEGI-mapped spring is probably 
within an area that is, in practice, individually parceled. 
We must keep in mind that this analysis does not capture PROCEDE-surveyed “civic 
parcels,” effectively common use parcels within individually parceled areas. If we are correct in 
our interpretation that springs are not, in general, a major consideration when a núcleo creates its 
common use area through PROCEDE, civic parcels (and civic solares) are all the more 
important for keeping water sources in de jure community control.110 
With the verified data that I did acquire, we can begin to estimate the incidence of water 
source civic parcels in two ways: 
1. 12 of the 33 RAN document study núcleos had individual parcels surveyed by 
PROCEDE. Of these twelve, five (42 percent) have at least one civic parcel dedicated to a water 
source. (Here, I am using “water source” to include items such as La Pila’s check dam pond and 
Chicomezúchil’s stream access point, but not storage tanks).  
2. Five of the fifteen PRM núcleos had individual parcels surveyed by PROCEDE. Of the 
42 important springs mapped through PRM within their de jure parceled areas, eight (19 percent)  
are located in civic parcels. 
The first figure suggests that an impressively large minority of PROCEDE-parceled 
núcleos have at least one civic parcel dedicated to water sources. The second number suggests, 
however, that the majority of springs deemed important to communities are located on parcels 
assigned to individuals. Furthermore, we should not consider civic parcels, as they are currently 
configured within the legal system, as necessarily always representing an ideal solution to the 
problem of village-oriented water features within otherwise individually-parceled areas. José 
Ledezma Barragán, head of the RAN office in San Luis Potosí, mentioned to me the example of 
El Platanito y sus Anexos, an ejido 10 km beyond the northern boundary of the Huasteca study 
area. The núcleo had its 990-ha parceled area, and 220-ha common use area, surveyed by 
                                                        
110 I have described the case of El Cristiano y sus Anexos (section 7.3), a PROCEDE-parceled núcleo with four 
INEGI-mapped springs in its parceled area (in fact, it has no PROCEDE-certified common use areas). I 
pointed out how, using the GAIA online coverage alone, one could almost determine that two of these springs 
are located in civic parcels, but without inspecting the PROCEDE documents by visiting the state RAN office, 
it is impossible to be sure of this. 
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PROCEDE in 1995. The parceled area includes many parcels along the banks of the Río Valles, 
at the point where the river emerges from the whitewater cascades called the Micos Falls. 
Tourism opportunities are being exploited both by individual ejido members and by the ejido as 
a whole. One parcel is dedicated to the ejido as a “civic parcel,” but its exact purpose is not 
specified in the PROCEDE documents, something which Ledezma asserted might cause 
problems within the ejido in the future (interview with Ledezma Barragán 2009). 
7.4.2 Results using México Indígena and CAPLAC “springs” datasets 
The results in this subsection include springs declared through PRM to be important by 
villagers themselves, rather than the government agency INEGI.  
Table 7.9. Fourteen núcleos in the Huasteca and Oaxaca analysis areas: Observed number 
of PRM-derived springs in each tenure category, as difference from expected value; 
normalized to n=100 (n=138; total area is 266 sq km). Human settlement areas are not 
included. 
de facto social property,  
status as núcleo unresolved  N.A. 
núcleos without PROCEDE survey  -11.8 
PROCEDE- 
surveyed 
núcleos 
+11.8 
only núcleo 
perimeter surveyed  -14.7  
common 
use areas 
-18.1 
common use areas  
in comunidades  N.A. 
common use areas  
in ejidos  -3.4 
human settlement areas  +10.0  
parceled 
areas 
+19.9 
parceled areas in 
comunidades  N.A. 
parceled areas  
in ejidos  +19.9  
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Table 7.10. Five núcleos with PROCEDE-surveyed parcels in the Huasteca: Observed 
number of PRM-derived springs in each tenure category, as difference from expected 
value; normalized to n=100 (n=45; total area is 43 sq km).  
 
PROCEDE- 
surveyed 
núcleos 
with parcels 
 common use areas  
in comunidades  N.A. common 
use areas 
-28.2 common use areas  
in ejidos  -28.2 
parceled 
areas 
+28.2 
parceled areas in 
comunidades  N.A. 
parceled areas  
in ejidos  +28.2  
 
 
To facilitate comparisons, I employed the same methods and table formats for this dataset 
as I did for the INEGI one. For example, civic parcels are subsumed within the land tenure class 
“parceled areas.” The data presented in this subsection derives from 14 núcleos. Although it was 
a PRM community, I did not include Talea in this analysis, because the fieldwork there was more 
specifically focused on water and therefore its data may not be directly comparable to the others. 
Despite the differences in the datasets, the PRM results are remarkably similar to those 
from the INEGI data. The tables which include all social property categories, Table 7.7 and 
Table 7.9, are especially close. “Núcleos with PROCEDE-surveyed parceled areas” have more 
mapped springs than would be expected were the springs evenly distributed, while both 
“PROCEDE-perimeter-only” núcleos and “non-PROCEDE” núcleos have fewer springs than 
expected. We may be tempted to posit that there is something about the presence of water 
sources which relates, either directly or through a common third variable, to a community’s 
decision to have PROCEDE survey its parcels. One possibility would be that water-rich villages 
are more likely to have experienced commercially-oriented agriculture, and that this experience 
sets the stage for more individually-oriented land tenure decisions, or that it predisposes a village 
to cooperation with state-driven initiatives. 
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We must also consider the possibility that the PRM data has the same bias as the INEGI 
data in favor of springs located within areas of intense human use: agricultural parcels and 
population centers. This could cause the “PROCEDE-parceled núcleos” springs density to be 
high, simply because the núcleos with PROCEDE parcels tend to have smaller than average 
areas, but average populations. These ejidos and comunidades thus have smaller areas which are 
distant from intense human activities; i.e., smaller areas where fewer springs tend to be included 
in participatory maps, because they are less intensively present in the cognitive maps of village 
residents. (There are, of course, many exceptions to this general observation. Many núcleos 
include on their participatory maps a few springs far from intense human activities where certain 
sacred rituals take place, or are remembered to have taken place in the past). 
A comparison of the tables which focus on the more restricted “universe” of PROCEDE-
parceled núcleos, Tables 6.6 and 6.8, reinforces this interpretation. The high incidence of 
important springs within the parceled areas of these communities is even more apparent when 
using the participatory data set. While there are some springs in forested areas, unmapped by 
INEGI but deemed important to the community and included in their common use areas, their 
number is overwhelmed by the many important springs within parceled areas, to an even greater 
degree than shown in the INEGI data. 
This observation is further reinforced when we focus the “universe” of two núcleos whose 
de facto land tenure zones we know best: Yagila and Tiltepec (Table 7.11). In this table, for 
which population centers are excluded, we see that there were about 40 more important springs 
than “expected” (after normalizing) within the agricultural parcels.111  
The participatory research mapping process ensured that only springs deemed important to 
the community as a whole, or at least to a large subset of residents, would be included in the 
maps. As I described in detail when discussing Yagila, Tiltepec, and Talea (chapter 6), most or 
of these springs are considered as belonging to the community, at least in the sense that their 
water is accessible to anyone who wants to use it. The fact that only 19 percent of them are 
located within civic parcels may be a cause for alarm, if the act of individual parcel certification 
                                                        
111 When the de facto human settlement areas are included, the values for this dataset (n=37) become: 
Common use areas: -54.1; Parceled areas: +20.3; Human settlement areas: +34.1. 
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by PROCEDE often represents a step toward individuals limiting access by others to their 
parcels. To the extent that this is so, PROCEDE parceling would be part of a more general 
disintegration of village-oriented culture as we know it. 
 
Table 7.11. Two núcleos without PROCEDE parcels in Oaxaca: Observed number of PRM-
derived springs in each tenure category, as difference from expected value; normalized to 
n=100 (n=24; total area is 86 sq km). Human settlement areas are not included. 
only núcleo 
perimeter 
surveyed 
de facto common use areas 
-40.4 
de facto parceled areas 
+40.4 
 
 
The most obvious cases of PROCEDE accelerating the loss of village-oriented practices 
occur when a de facto common use area (including any springs within it) is divided into 
individual parcels at the time of PROCEDE surveying. I was involved in participatory mapping 
work in six núcleos which had PROCEDE survey their individual parcels, excluding 
Cuatlamayán’s “inverted” scheme. Of these six, only one, Chimalaco, provided clear evidence of 
having significantly reduced its de facto common use area through PROCEDE. However, the 
regional and national figures may be much higher than suggested by this small sample. Mexican 
geographer Gerardo Hernández Cendejas (2008) completed fieldwork and geodata analysis in six 
ejidos within the Huasteca, and discovered that three of them had divided most or all of their 
forested common use areas during PROCEDE work. In Figure 7.2 (page 305), these núcleos 
occupy the ring of ejido land surrounding the private property area in the corner of the study area 
to the northwest of Tanquián. 
The evidence in this and previous chapters suggests that the challenge facing many 
communities is not that the surface area of their common use zones diminishes through 
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PROCEDE, but rather that the village-oriented practices within the parceled areas might change 
more quickly than they would have otherwise, once the state has given its legal imprimatur to the 
individual parcels. 
7.4.3 Indigeneity, land tenure, and water sources 
As a final exercise within the same geodata analysis areas, I introduced a third variable, 
“indigeneity,” and compared it first to land tenure, and then to INEGI-mapped springs. The land 
tenure results (Figures 7.3, 7.4, and 7.5) are expressed as proportions of surface areas, while the 
springs results (Tables 7.12, 7.13, and 7.14), for which I used same analytical approach as the 
rest of the geodata analysis, are expressed as expected and observed percentages. 
For the indigeneity values, I used the same coverages (indigenous, mixed, non-indigenous, 
and no population) developed for the study area maps in chapter 2 (see section 4.5 for methods), 
and added the small portion of Veracruz state that is within the Oaxaca study area but omitted 
from the depictions of indigeneity in those maps. Like the rest of the geodata analysis in this 
study, I considered only surface areas, not populations. I reiterate that, in this context, “no 
population” does not imply “unoccupied,” nor “unused by any local resident,” nor “not owned by 
any person or núcleo,” but simply means “far from a population center or permanent homes.”112  
Because the indigeneity polygons represent imprecise regions, I restricted the land tenure 
classes to four broad categories: 1. zonas federales (see section 3.4); 2. private property; 3. social 
property that is mostly de jure individual parcels (i.e., ejidos or comunidades with PROCEDE 
parcels but which lack large common use areas); and 4. social property that is mostly de  jure 
common use (i.e., ejidos or comunidades with a few PROCEDE parcels and large common use 
areas, or with just perimeters surveyed by PROCEDE, or not surveyed by PROCEDE at all). 
Excluded for the analysis were the categories “de facto núcleos, unresolved status,” “urban,” and 
“unknown.” 
                                                        
112 For a population-based analysis of indigenous and land tenure in the Huasteca Potosina, see Kelly et al. 
2010. 
330 
 
  
Figure 7.3: Oaxaca geodata analysis area: Proportional distribution of land tenure 
categories (by area) within indigenous language class areas.   
 
 
Figure 7.4: Huasteca geodata analysis area: Proportional distribution of land tenure 
categories (by area) within indigenous language class areas.   
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Figure 7.5: Both geodata analysis areas combined: Proportional distribution of land tenure 
categories (by area) within indigenous language class areas. 
 
 
The most obvious and unsurprising observation is that areas dominated by indigenous 
language speakers correspond to the highest proportions of social properties that are mainly in de 
jure common use. However, the proportion of common use social property is not overwhelmingly 
greater than that found in non-indigenous language areas. Mestizo areas tend to have only 
slightly more individually-PROCEDE-parceled social property than indigenous areas; “keeping 
social property in de jure common use” is not a major strategy for maintaining a distinct 
indigenous identity, but simply one tool among many (see Kelly et al. 2010 and Liffman 2011). 
The main difference is with private property, of which there is little in indigenous-language-
speaking areas. 
In both the Oaxaca and Huasteca study areas, the zonas federales are dominated by 
mixed-language settlements. This is likely due mainly to these areas generally having been 
resettled since about 1950 with residents from other villages, regions, and even other states, often 
in connection with government-initiated irrigation projects. 
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indigenous mixed non-indigenous no population
pr
op
or
tio
n 
of
 a
re
a 
language of inhabitants 
zona federal 
private 
social, mostly            
parceled 
social, mostly            
common use 
land tenure 
332 
 
  
partly a function of the arbitrary boundaries of the study areas. A more valid observation is that, 
within Oaxaca, the highest proportion of PROCEDE-parceled social property is not within the 
non-indigenous areas, but rather within the mixed-language areas. Even this result may be 
somewhat misleading: much of the “non-indigenous” zone within the Sierra Norte de Oaxaca is 
in fact “indigenous” in several important ways except in terms of language. A principal region of 
“non-Zapotec-speaking Zapotecs” is an area extending southward from the town of Ixtlán almost 
to the city of Oaxaca (Figure 2.6 on page 59).  
The “no population” areas are predominantly in common use social property, the great 
majority within the Oaxaca study area. The Huasteca study area includes only a few, relatively 
small uninhabited zones, such as the area around a rugged stretch of the Río Santa María, visible 
in Figure 2.3 on page 51. This area is divided among private properties and parceled ejidos, with 
a few scattered, non-indigenous “ranchos” (isolated farmsteads) toward the mixed-language 
núcleo of Tanlacu to its west (see subsection 7.2.2). 
The quantitative analysis of density of water sources in the indigenous-language, mixed, 
non-indigenous-language, and no population portions of the study areas (Tables 7.12, 7.13, and 
7.14) is a modest exercise within the theme of much larger efforts to document the place-based 
links between indigenous peoples and natural resources such as forests and water in the tropical 
Americas (e.g., National Geographic Society 1992; National Geographic Society and Center for 
the Support of Native Lands 2003).   
 
Table 7.12. Sierra Norte de Oaxaca geodata analysis area: Observed distribution of springs 
in INEGI 1:50,000-scale maps within indigenous language class areas, compared to 
expected distribution.  
 expected % of springs 
observed % 
of springs 
indigenous 47 63 
mixed 14 14 
non-indigenous 11 12 
no population 28 12 
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Table 7.13. Huasteca Potosina geodata analysis area: Observed distribution of springs in 
INEGI 1:50,000-scale maps within indigenous language class areas, compared to expected 
distribution.  
 expected % of springs 
observed % 
of springs 
indigenous 52 55 
mixed 15 15 
non-indigenous 33 30 
no population 4 0 
 
Table 7.14. Oaxaca and Huasteca analysis areas combined: Observed distribution of springs 
in INEGI 1:50,000-scale maps within indigenous language class areas, compared to 
expected distribution.  
 expected % of springs 
observed % 
of springs 
indigenous 48 58 
mixed 14 15 
non-indigenous 19 23 
no population 20 5 
 
The results show that the pattern of INEGI-mapped springs conforms to the pattern 
expected were they evenly distributed across space, for most language categories. There are two 
exceptions. First, in the Oaxaca study area, areas inhabited by indigenous language speakers 
have a substantially denser concentration of springs. Second, in both study areas, “no 
population” areas contain fewer springs than expected. While the second result is probably due 
to the human-activity bias in the springs data set, the first result, the overrepresentation of 
important springs among indigenous residents in Oaxaca (but only negligibly in the Huasteca) 
may reinforce the contention of some scholars (e.g., Toledo 1996) that indigenous peoples of 
Mexico are blessed with a disproportionate share of some of the country’s natural resources. 
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At least in the case of water in the two regions of the present study, it is clear that this 
finding is not because of some inherent indigenous capacity to maintain the existence of 
important springs, but rather because of physiography. For historical reasons related to patterns 
of commercially viable lowland and valley agriculture, and to the reach of the state and of 
mestizo culture through communication and transportation links, indigenous language speakers 
tend to persist in the more mountainous parts of both study regions (though there are numerous 
exceptions to this pattern). For geological reasons, the higher, less accessible parts of the Sierra 
Norte de Oaxaca are where most of the regionally important springs are located, many of them 
near where tributary streams of major rivers first begin to form. In the more broadly karstic 
Huasteca Potosina, in contrast, most of the regionally important springs are located closer to the 
Sierra’s boundary with the Gulf Coastal Plain; these springs are actually points of re-emergence 
for rivers whose high-altitude tributary streams lie much further inland.  
The following section introduces a data set that presents a more direct glimpse into the 
nexus of water and communities as envisioned by the state: CONAGUA water rights 
concessions. 
7.5 CONAGUA’s presence in the study areas 
The 1992 Water Law required that the federal government, through CONAGUA, 
standardize the previously existing water rights concession systems into a single nationwide 
registry, the Registro Público de Derechos de Agua (REPDA), bringing together private and 
social properties into a seamless whole. CONAGUA created an internal GIS system called 
SIGA, drawing from their database called GEOAGUA, to model Mexico’s hydrological and 
human geographies. From this they devised two schemes: rules about how much water would be 
concessioned for each certificate granted, and a schedule of fees for the concessions.  
The rules about per capita volume of water use allowed by each concession are based on 
regionally averaged levels of supply (precipitation and aquifers) and demand (especially, the 
higher demand in places with more intense evapotranspiration). Both study regions are in the 
lowest of four categories (less than 700 cu m per person per year – the highest category being 
over 2100 cu m), but the highest category region begins only a few km north of the Huasteca 
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geodata analysis area (CONAGUA 2010a). Few of the highest-concession-category areas 
contain large indigenous territories; the two notable ones are the Otomí region of Hidalgo state 
(centered on town of Ixmiquilpan), and the Maya region of Yucatán state (centered on town of 
Sucila). 
The concession fee system, intended to promote water conservation and defray some of 
the costs of infrastructure, creates a pay scale which is uniform within each region and for each 
type of use. In general, costs are higher where less water is available, including urban demand 
(i.e., Mexico City is in the highest-cost region, while the drier northern states are in medium-
high-cost areas). Farmers do not pay anything until they exceed certain volumes of use; when 
they do, they pay 13 centavos (about 1 US cent) per cu m, in any zone. Potable water system 
users pay between 4 and 36 centavos, depending on the zone, and their fees are doubled if they 
use above 300 liters per person, per day. The Oaxaca geodata analysis area is in the lowest-cost 
category, and the Huasteca one is divided between this and the second-lowest-cost category 
(CONAGUA 2010b).  
While CONAGUA maintains the centralized digital database of concessions, various 
state-level agencies and other federal ones are involved in assisting rural communities develop 
their water infrastructure, especially village-scale potable systems for population centers. One is 
the Comisión Estatal de Agua (CEA) of Oaxaca state, which “is more about serving water to 
cities, and occasional programs to help campesinos build wells and the like” (interview with 
Bernal Flores 2009). “CONAGUA does help with potable water programs, but usually indirectly, 
via state-level water agencies” (interview with Yáñez Morales 2009). In indigenous areas, here 
defined as areas where at least 40 percent of inhabitants speak an indigenous language, state-
level indigenous agencies typically contribute 20 percent of the cost toward some potable water 
systems, through a program called PIBAI (“Basic Infrastructure Program Attending to 
Indigenous Peoples), with CDI (the national indigenous agency) contributing the rest (interview 
with Cruz Piñeda 2008). CONAGUA is primarily interested in the point of water uptake, 
typically a water capture tank a long a stream, while the distribution of water to houses in a 
population center is more of a local issue (interview with Bernal Flores 2009). 
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If they were to follow the letter of the law, a núcleo or municipio wishing to dig a well for 
a potable water system would have to apply for a concession and file and environmental impact 
form with the environmental affairs agency SEMARNAT, explaining how residual waters 
(sewage and graywater) would be dealt with (interview with Díaz Jiménez 2009). In the 
CONAGUA office in Xalapa, a poster advises visitors that even many water users who pay no 
rights fees, a category which includes most small-scale farmers, must nonetheless obtain a 
concession: 
 If you use water from a river, lake, manual well [noria], or motorized well [pozo]:  1. 
Review the cover sheet of your Concession Title. If it expires between 2007 and 
2009, apply for an extension ahead of time. 2. Go to CONAGUA with the number of 
your title, or a copy; and, if you pay water rights, with proof of its payment. 
 
The Federal Rights Law specifies additional requirements, such as that “rural settlements of 
population up to 2,500 must install water meters [dispositivos de medición] at both the entrance 
and exit of their potable water systems” (CONAGUA 2008c, 18).  
However, the strict letter of the law is only partially respected, especially in well-watered 
areas where the financial and technical assistance of government agencies is not as commonly 
sought. “It’s usually the municipios, or councils [patronatos] and other associations, which ask 
for concessions” (interview with Yáñez Morales 2009). Within the Sierra Norte de Oaxaca study 
region (Figure 7.6), concessions are usually for village-scale groups or larger, as well as a for 
few sub-village groups.  Concessions for villages in the plains tend to be for groundwater, while 
those for villages in the mountains, where more of the land is social property, tend to be for 
surface water. Despite the imperfect conformity to the laws, CONAGUA in 2006 considered the 
titling process nationally to be “97 percent completed” (CONAGUA 2008a, quoted in Scott, 
Dall‘erba, and Díaz Caravantes 2010, 2). Apparently, CONAGUA is generally satisfied with the 
current level of concession law compliance. Perhaps it assumes that strict enforcement is 
unnecessary in well-watered areas, where conflicts over water rights are probably less frequent 
and threats to regional or national water availability are not (yet) a major issue. 
The map of CONAGUA-issued active water rights concessions in the Oaxaca study area 
in 2009 (Figure 7.6) displays two sets of data not used for the main geodata analysis I presented 
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Figure 7.6. Water concessions in the Oaxaca geodata analysis area (CONAGUA 2009). Map also 
shows INEGI-mapped water sources (INEGI 2000; INEGI 2009) and indigenous language areas.  
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earlier in this chapter. The prominent dark symbols show the distribution of rural concession 
holders (the large town of Ayotzintepec is excluded). The light gray circles show the pattern of 
non-concessioned water sources, drawn from two INEGI coverages: the same 1:50,000-scale 
topographic “springs” data used in the geodata analysis (see Figure 7.1, on page 300), and a 
separate 1:250,000-scale hydrological data set.  
Although a more quantitative analysis must await future investigation,113 here I will offer 
a few observations on the pattern of water concession titles shown in Figure 7.6. There were 329 
certificates listed for the five “sub-watersheds” (Figure 7.6 does not include the entire area of all 
five). All but nine, or 97 percent, were granted for “urban public” potable water systems, with 
social property villages and/or municipios (and, occasionally, sub-village groups) the apparent 
title holders in most cases. Titles were granted to village-scale groups even when its legal status 
as a núcleo is unresolved; this occurred for several springs and stream uptakes near the Río 
Usila. 61 percent of the certificates are for groundwater (wells, all but one of them hand-drawn 
“norias”), the rest for surface water (springs and stream uptakes). All nine certificates granted for 
a use other than a potable public system were for surface-drawn water; there are seven for 
agriculture (including one in Talea), one for fish farming, and one (again, in Talea) for domestic 
use. All the surface water sources except four are in mountainous terrain, while all the wells are 
in the coastal plains. 
Among surface water sources, “stream uptakes” are clustered in three areas: around the 
town-sized comunidades of Ixtlán and Villa Alta, near the Río Usila, and along a section of the 
edge of the plains near the Veracruz border. Elsewhere, “springs” are the dominant surface water 
source. However, the distinction between these categories is not always as clear-cut as the 
concession data suggests. All four of the certificates granted to Talea or Taleans are for 
“springs,” but from my fieldwork I know that at least one of these refers to water drawn from a 
toma (uptake) several hundred meters downstream from a spring. 
The spatial distribution of concessions essentially shows that each núcleo obtained one for 
the potable water supply system serving its main human settlement area, including some cases 
                                                        
113 The concession tables I received have about thirty complete attribute fields, but the “title” (i.e., grantee) 
column was empty. The “RFC” (Registro Federal de Contribuyentes) field of grantee tax identification codes 
had been filled in, and could be used during future research. 
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(e.g., Tiltepec) where the system is limited to serving only a portion of the population center 
homes. Of the 19 RAN document study communities, 11 have one or more potable supply 
concessions. Of these 11 núcleos, Las Palmas (a partly Chinantec-speaking ejido on the edge of 
the coastal plain, with PROCEDE-surveyed parcels as well as two large common use areas) 
received the most certificates, for 40 wells.  
Two of the places with the greatest variety of types of concessions are Ixtlán (which has 
11 certificates listed) and Talea (which has four). While these are typical Sierra Norte 
communities in terms of indigenous identity and village-scale pride, both are also known for 
their histories of higher-than-average degree of engagement with the state and with commercial 
enterprises, albeit on their “own terms.” The Talea concessions for a principal source supplying 
the main potable system (the Río Frío uptake, with by far the largest water volume of the four); 
for a source supplying houses in the hamlet of Santa Gertrudis, technically a sub-village group; 
for a “domestic” use originating at the Arroyo Chia, which may be the “Río del Rosario” eight-
member agricultural sociedad I described in section 6.1; and for an “agricultural” use originating 
at a spring called Yuguxubuel, which may be the second sociedad I mentioned in that section. 
Perhaps the most interesting pattern displayed in Figure 7.6 is where water rights 
certificates have not been issued, despite the presence of sizable villages. The areas with a 
notable absence of concessions include: 
1. The highly Chinantec núcleos of Arroyo Palomo and Palantla, about 10 km northwest 
of Valle Nacional. Arroyo Palomo did not undergo any PROCEDE work. 
2. 11 villages between Ixtlán and Quiotepec, on both slopes of the Río Grande Valley. 
These núcleos, which include Analco and Macuiltianguis, are typical of the Sierra Norte in that 
PROCEDE surveyed only their perimeter boundaries.  
3. Several núcleos in the Río Cajonos valley south and southeast of Talea, including 
Solaga and Yaa. This Zapotec-speaking zone bordering the Mixe language area is shown on 
INEGI topographic maps to be rich in springs.  
Future research may reveal some trait common to these and other apparently concession-lacking 
areas. I am aware that the second area of these three is a zone of high out-migration; a typical 
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near-empty street scene there is of elderly residents and young children walking amidst parked 
late-model cars and impressive basketball courts. Perhaps the same remittance dollars also fund 
potable water systems, allowing local authorities to eschew CONAGUA funds and, in doing so, 
avoid applying for CONAGUA water concession certificates. 
To return to the main theme of the present study, the links between land and water are 
complex and sometimes ambiguous, even in a legal and regulatory system as well documented 
and streamlined as the 1992 Water Law. Within social properties, the RAN before 1992 included 
a land tenure category “Accesión de Agua” (water concession), used primarily when a state, 
federal, or municipal agency wished to build water infrastructure on ejido or comunidad land. 
After 1992, this was replaced by the “infrastructure” public rights-of-way (visible as white strips 
in some of the núcleos in Figures 5.1.1 to 5.1.9, on pages 195 to 203). Except for “a few 
territorially-defined water concessions for groups of ejidatarios – sociedades or coderechosos” 
(interview with Ledezma Barragán 2009), all water rights concessions are now defined just as 
volumes of water originating from some point, without direct reference to the land around them. 
However, there is still potential for tension between the individual and his or her núcleo 
over water sources, and PROCEDE parcel certification may exacerbate this tension, or at least it 
may influence how the tension develops or is resolved. Water which flows as a stream through 
an individual parcel, or emerges as a spring within the parcel, or falls as rain on the parcel, is 
often used by the parcel’s owner, but the findings I presented in chapters 5 and 6 showed that 
others often desire to have access to this water. I was told by the CONAGUA user services chief 
in Oaxaca (interview with Bernal Flores 2009) that: 
Sometimes the village wants to use water which arises in someone’s parcel. Before 
PROCEDE, it was more common for the núcleo authority [comisariado] to just make 
an agreement with the individual, but now, sometimes they will formalize it by 
registering with us a ‘usufruct concession.’ To have the rights in the first place, the 
individual must produce documents that show that the water they had been using was 
just useful for their own parcel – to avoid hoarding [acapamiento]. 
    Legally, all water users beyond what one uses on one’s own parcel originating 
from that parcel – e.g., any group of ranchos which gets its water from another’s 
parcel – should apply for and be granted concessions for use of national waters. In 
practice, though, few do; instead, they rely on usos y costumbres. This applies equally 
to villages which had PROCEDE certify individual parcels, and those that didn’t. 
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    As populations grow, this may cause problems in a few villages which are located 
near large towns or cities. 
 
The 1992 Water Law included a new section, Article 55 to address these possible tensions 
(CONAGUA 2008b, 76), but its approach is to favor the individual over the village. The goal is 
apparently to prevent bullying or corruption by a núcleo’s authorities or its assembly against any 
individual members: 
When an ejido or comunidad has parceled itself, the ejidatarios or comuneros may 
exploit or use the water necessary to irrigate their respective parcels. 
    In no case may the assembly or the ejido authorities use, stipulate, or determine the 
exploitation or use of waters destined to parcels without the express consent of the 
ejidatarios who hold title114 to those parcels, except if it regards waters indispensable 
for domestic needs of the human settlement. 
 
The earlier 1972 Water Law did not refer to ejidos or comunidades, while its 1986 reform 
did so only to clarify that the government may decide what volume of water each ejido and 
comunidad has rights to as a whole (SIAPS 2010, 184). In contrast, the 120-page 1992 Water 
Law devotes two entire pages to ejidos and comunidades, but about three-quarters of this text 
concerns individual protections, not village-scale concerns. Besides the article quoted above, the 
law specifies how, when one or more parcels are passed to dominio pleno (full title), the núcleo 
must inform CONAGUA of its now-reduced land area, so its collective water rights concession 
may be reduced accordingly. Another article clarifies that an individual ejidatario or comunero 
can transfer their water rights when they transfer the title of their parcel, e.g. to another 
ejidatario. 
To accompany the Water Law, an 80-page book of rules was passed in 1994, detailing 
what must take place to build and maintain the comprehensive and uniform concession system. 
Again, the only rules I could find that are specific to ejidos and comunidades refer to individual 
parcel matters, such as what happens to water rights when a parcel passes to dominio pleno 
(CONAGUA 2008b, 161). 
                                                        
114 I assume the phrase “hold title to” in this context does not refer to literal “titles” (dominio pleno), but to 
PROCEDE parcel certificates and any locally issued non-PROCEDE de facto parcel documents. 
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When México Indígena student researchers Gerardo López Roque and Jacinto Jiménez 
asked the comuneros of Cuatlamayán about water, they were told that “four years ago, some 
people from the municipio came to them and told them that everyone who had pozos [shallow 
wells, often modified natural springs] in their [de facto] parcel had to register them, since any 
water from more than 80 cm deep is national water, and so they’d have to pay a tax” – i.e., that 
they would have to apply for individual concessions for agricultural use of groundwater, in 
addition to any potable-use water concession whose costs are shared across the entire núcleo. In 
the Oaxaca CONAGUA office, I overheard two indigenous men being told that, even if they just 
wanted to dig a shallow well in a parcel for individual use, they would need a permission form 
(i.e., concession application), including a sketch, description of materials, and itemized expenses 
(interview with Díaz Jiménez 2009). 
This top-down legal focus on individual ejidatarios and comuneros conforms to the 
neoliberal mindset that also produced the PROCEDE initiative, but it runs counter to the intent of 
the Agrarian Law’s Articles 27 and 267, which even after the 1992 reforms state that “populated 
núcleos which de facto or de jure maintain their communal state will be empowered to enjoy in 
common the lands, forests, and waters which belong to them or which have been returned to 
them” (quoted in RAN 1981, 91). Perhaps the contradiction is resolved by focusing on the phrase 
“maintain their communal state” (“guardan el estado communal”). This phrase is ambiguous 
enough to give the government the option to exercise the “no true Scotsman fallacy,” whereby 
the definition of “communal state” can be molded to suit any specific situation. Who is to say 
whether a village is village-oriented enough to satisfy this condition? 
7.5  Summary of Results 
The density of INEGI-mapped springs is greater on social property than on non-social 
property. Among social property categories (núcleos with only their perimeters surveyed by 
PROCEDE, non-PROCEDE ones, etc.), the results were mixed, and probably reflect the fact that 
núcleos without PROCEDE-surveyed individual parcels tend to have large areas, and therefore 
more land far from areas of intense human activity, and thus lower overall density of springs 
highly valued by local residents and other people. When the more detailed PRM data is analyzed, 
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an even greater “bias” toward springs in human activity areas was found. However, many 
communities, especially indigenous ones, also place high value on one or two “sacred” springs 
deep within their common use forested areas; examples of this include specific small natural 
lakes in Talea (page 253) and Nieves (page 204), and springs at caves in Tancuime and Santa 
Cruz. De facto or de jure “common use areas” were not found to be a method specifically 
employed to keep water sources in community control, but sources such as these “sacred” sites 
tend to be located in areas that are designated as “common use” for other reasons.   
The higher density of community-valued springs in individual parceled areas was found 
both in núcleos where PROCEDE has surveyed the parceled areas and common use areas areas, 
and in those where PROCEDE has not done this work. Exact figures for PROCEDE-certified 
water source “civic” parcels are not known for the geodata analysis areas, but several lines of 
evidence suggest that this practice is employed in perhaps as much as 40 percent of PROCEDE-
parceled núcleos. However, in these ejidos and comunidades only a minority of important 
springs are kept in de jure community control by this method. To the degree that PROCEDE 
parceling encourages an increase in individual orientation toward land and (to a lesser extent) 
toward water sources, the assigning of civic parcels represents one method to counter this trend, 
but even where this method is employed, whatever village-scale orientation toward water sources 
persists will do so more because of cultural practices and local leadership than by any purely 
legal mechanism.  
Some relationship was found between indigeneity (defined here by language) and density 
of INEGI-mapped springs, but only in the Oaxaca study area. Areas with high densities of 
springs have specific geophysical characteristics. In the Oaxaca study region headwaters of large 
rivers tend to be located high in the mountains, while in the Huasteca study region springs are 
concentrated where large rivers re-emerge near the base of karstic ridges. This physical 
geography also has a strong influence on land tenure patterns: in both study regions, social 
property – especially, núcleos without PROCEDE-certified parcels – tend to be located in the 
mountains, while non-social property and some núcleos with PROCEDE-certified parcels are 
more common in the plains. These factors combine so that INEGI-mapped springs happen to be 
mainly located deep within social property areas in Oaxaca, but near the ragged boundary 
between social and non-social property in the Huasteca. Because “social property” – especially, 
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núcleos without PROCEDE-certified parcels – is moderately correlated with “indigeneity,” it is 
not surprising that a weak relationship between indigeneity and springs would be found in 
Oaxaca, and no relationship at all in the Huasteca.  
At this time, the CONAGUA system of water rights concessions has limited impact in the 
Oaxaca study region. If anything, it may occasionally help to strengthen village orientation, as 
almost all the current concessions are for village-scale potable water supply installations. 
However, this is merely due to the low level of enforcement of regulations in the study area. 
Technically speaking, individual parcel-to-parcel and sub-village-group water users should apply 
for concessions, but because the study area rarely suffers water shortages, there is little incentive 
for CONAGUA, villages, or individuals to apportion water through the concession process. The 
groundwork for intra-village conflicts, or at least for erosion of village-scale practices, has been 
laid by 1992 and 2004 changes to the Water Law that emphasize “protecting” individual 
ejidatarios and comuneros from corrupt abusers of village-scale power, although I did not 
recognize many examples of such “caciquismo” in my participatory fieldwork experiences 
(although see Yetman 2000, 216 for references to evidence of corruption in some ejidos). 
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7. Conclusion 
My hypothesis was that indigenous, water-rich communities in Mexico are maintaining 
the same degree of village-scale control of water sources that they practiced before the neoliberal 
land tenure reforms of the 1990s. Documents in the National Agrarian Registry (RAN) and 
information collected through participatory research mapping (PRM) demonstrate an impressive 
persistence of village-scale practices in most communities during the first fifteen years of 
implementation of the reforms. In some villages there are recent indications of tension regarding 
an individual’s right to water from sources within his or her agricultural parcel, but in most cases 
these tensions continue to be avoided through local practices of tacit, oral, and occasionally 
written agreements. These generalizations apply equally to núcleos agrarios (village-scale units 
with social property tenure regimes) which have had their individual parcels surveyed and 
certified through the PROCEDE program or its successor FANAR and to those which have not 
had this work done. For those núcleos that wish to maintain a certain degree of village-scale 
orientation toward land and natural resources, PROCEDE parceling offers both opportunities and 
challenges. The opportunities for adjusting the state’s standard template tend to be embraced in 
villages with strong local leadership and a history of creative engagement with the state. The 
challenges arise from the gradual evolution toward individual orientation which PROCEDE 
parceling may often accentuate, especially in conjunction with subtle changes to the national 
Water Law which tilt toward a tighter linkage between water sources and land ownership. 
Because locally-defined “important” springs are nearly always within or close to areas of 
intense human activity – areas which are usually individually parceled, by law or in fact – these 
subtle legal changes are magnified. Few of these springs are located within de facto common use 
areas. In communities where PROCEDE has certified individual parcels, this pattern generally 
holds true. The most important exception to this is the scattered occurrence of “civic” parcels – 
individual parcels (not conventional common use areas) assigned to the núcleo, rather than to 
any one ejidatario or comunero. A minority of civic parcels were established to keep certain 
water sources fully in the hands of the community. They typically protect about 20 percent of the 
“important” water sources. It is interesting that communities that lack water-related civic parcels, 
either because they did not undergo PROCEDE parceling or because they did so but without 
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implementing this adjustment, tend to maintain village-scale control over about the same 20 
percent of their important water sources using other means, e.g. by agreeing in the ejido or 
comunidad assembly that particular water sources are “protected.” The short-term effect of 
PROCEDE parceling is neither to trigger village-scale practices nor to suppress them, but rather 
to influence the precise form those practices take.  
However, this cautious optimism must be tempered by two caveats, one spatial and the 
other temporal. The spatial caveat is that these findings only apply more or less directly to the 
seven areas (besides the two study areas) shown as stippled overlapping light or dark gray in 
Figure 1.7 on page 39. The five smaller areas are the central (Nahuatl-speaking) Huasteca region 
along the border of Veracruz and Hidalgo states; the Nahuatl-speaking portion of the Sierra de 
las Tuxtlas in southern Veracruz; the Mixe-speaking region southeast of the Oaxaca study area; 
and an area of Amuzgo, Triqui, and Mixtec speakers along the border of Oaxaca and Guerrero 
states. The two larger regions are the entire highland area of northern Chiapas state, inhabited by 
speakers of several languages in the Mayan family; and the large but sparsely settled Yucatec 
Maya-speaking central portion of Quintana Roo state and southwestern Yucatán state. The 
temporal caveat is that, even within these areas, only some villages will be able to maintain a 
high degree of village-scale practices toward land and natural resources. In other villages, the 
next generation of residents will cease to carry out customary, orally transmitted practices of 
village orientation in the face of the legal individualization of property. 
A quantitative analysis of larger regions, the Sierra Norte de Oaxaca and the Huasteca 
Potosina, combined springs included in government-produced topographic maps with land tenure 
information based on a government GIS web portal and supplemented by other sources. One 
finding was that the geophysical situation of the Huasteca Potosina favors the clustering of large 
springs near the spatially complex boundary between areas that favor individual-oriented land 
tenure and areas that favor village-oriented land tenure, while the situation of the Sierra Norte de 
Oaxaca favors clustering of springs deep within village-oriented land tenure areas. As much as 
any cultural or historical differences between the two regions, this fact makes concerns about 
village-scale control of water a more urgent matter in the Huasteca Potosina. 
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8. Discussion 
8.1.1 The village ethos 
This study fundamentally concerns the ethos of the village-scale territorial unit: an 
individual’s tendency – never absolute or exclusive, merely a tendency – to interact with others 
in such ways that the interests of a group of people of between about 50 and 4000 individuals are 
kept in mind, a group which identifies itself strongly with a particular place or territory.115 There 
are many sorts of interactions among individual villagers, and between villagers (collectively or 
individually) and external entities. These include commercial interactions, cultural exchanges, 
and bodily movements (e.g., migration). The external entity that I focus on in this study is the 
state, which can take forms that include federal programs, enforced laws, and state-level or 
county-level initiatives. Because they identify themselves with ancestral communities which 
predated the formation of the state in particular places, indigenous communities have a special 
relationship of contrasts with, and accommodations to, these state-driven initiatives. Klaus 
Deininger and his World Bank colleagues (2001) claimed that any difference in response to 
PROCEDE between indigenous and mestizo (non-indigenous) núcleos has little to do with 
indigeneity per se, but rather is rooted in other variables which happen to imperfectly correlate 
with indigeneity such as relative physical isolation. This may be true: activist scholar Ana de Ita 
(2006, 158) makes the point that mestizo ejidatarios also have a special relationship with the 
land, because their ancestors “fought for it” during and after the Mexican Revolution. In any 
case, “pure indigeneity” is always a problematic concept, and applies especially poorly to 
Mexico. Because my study only includes non-indigenous villages in the large-area geodata 
analysis, not in the intensive archival and participatory communities, I cannot offer new evidence 
on this subject without additional research. I can merely suggest that there are probably some 
                                                        
115 Biologist-mathematician Martin Nowak (2006, 1560-1562) has used computer models of natural selection 
to explore the advantages and conditions of cooperative practices. He found that “real populations are not well-
mixed. Spatial structures or social networks imply that some individuals interact more often than others. 
[When we run an evolutionary graph theory model], cooperators can prevail by forming network clusters, 
where they help each other. The resulting ‘network reciprocity’ is a generalization of ‘spatial reciprocity’.” 
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differences between practices which reflect mestizo attachments to territory with a time depth of 
decades and indigenous ones based on attachments that span centuries or millennia.116  
Village-scale orientation persists and evolves through villagers engaging with state 
initiatives while retaining some ambiguity and skepticism towards them. 117  In the Zapotec 
comunidad of Talea, residents recently signed up for a Payment for Environmental Services 
(PES) initiative, but later rejected it in disappointment. Both their initial enthusiasm and their 
eventual dismissal express attitudes documented in the same community by Roberto González 
over ten years ago, and by Laura Nader over forty years ago. In 1996, Scott Whiteford and 
Francisco Bernal (1996, 227) interviewed and rural residents in three regions in Mexico, 
revealing a similar mix of engagement and suspicion: 
In all three regions there was a high degree of skepticism about NAFTA (90 percent 
opposed), Article 27 [i.e., PROCEDE] (44 percent opposed), and the new water law 
(51 percent opposed). At the same time, the majority of campesinos felt that they did 
not know enough about any of the three programs. The distrust of the government 
emerged as the dominant reason the change was opposed, not necessarily the 
                                                        
116 Some scholars emphasize that some Mexican indigenous groups, to one degree or another, actively and 
consciously maintain conceptual ethnic territories larger than the núcleo, despite the state’s longtime 
discouraging of such regional attachments. Alicia Barabas (2004, 108) asserts that “the progressive 
implantation of Western notions of territoriality [. . .] for example by making maps of village lands and 
marking their boundaries, changed the indigenous ways of thinking about territory. [. . .] A grave consequence 
of the long and complex process of fragmenting and diminishing ethnoterritories is that indigenous people lost 
their memory of them and gradually encapsulated the notions of a people and and ethnoterritory in terms of 
núcleos agrarios.” Nevertheless, there are some persistent practices, mainly related to sacred natural places 
such as springs or mountains or to other pilgrimage destinations, which might serve as a starting point for more 
formally recognized larger territories (Barabas 2004, 113-114). Paul Liffman (2000, 2) offers an even more 
optimistic view that, at least in the case of the Huichols and other indigenous groups in the ‘Gran Nayar’ 
region of western Mexico, “everyday people who have been carrying out territorially extensive ritual practices 
far beyond the limits of their comunidades and ejidos for centuries are now tying those practices into political 
demands as well.” 
117 The village-scale community is free to make decisions about participation with academic research projects, 
as well as with state or NGO programs. In December 2008, the núcleo assemblies of Tiltepec and Yagila 
elected to suspend their participation in the México Indígena participatory research mapping (PRM) effort, just 
as the nearby núcleo of Yagavila had chosen to do several months before. In each case, I and my academic 
colleagues immediately removed any community maps from public accessibility, and destroyed any personal 
records or geospatial data not available through open sources. I celebrate each community’s decision as a 
glorious example of village-scale orientation. While one might contend that some of the deeper fears expressed 
by certain comuneros at the time of these suspensions were factually unfounded, I prefer to rejoice in the 
declaration of indigenous territoriality and culture which is represented both by any village’s participation in a 
PRM project, and by any village’s resolution to denounce it. 
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programs themselves. In fact, both Article 27 and the new water law were supported 
in principle, meaning people were willing to accept privatization and participatory 
management. 
 
In any village, most practices concerning land tenure and natural resources blend the 
interests of the village and the individual.118 Furthermore, some residents in any village are 
inevitably more individual-oriented than their neighbors. One might posit that the degree of 
engagement with the state is largely predicated on the sociopolitical character of any particular 
núcleo, which is shaped by at least three interrelated factors: its physical connectedness to cities; 
whether, like Talea, it has a historical raison d’être which encouraged a local attitude of ready 
admittance of outsiders; and the vigor and outlook of local leaders.119 Broadly speaking, both the 
Huasteca Potosina and the Sierra Norte de Oaxaca have historical precedents of hostile attitudes 
toward interlopers. Both were the site of famous indigenous defeats of Spanish conquistadors. In 
the Huasteca in 1518, Alonso Álvarez de Pineda was killed, with many of his men, by Aztecs 
who were ancestors of the region’s Nahuas (Morison 1974, 517). In 1522, Gonzalo de Sandoval 
was repulsed by Zapotecs at Tiltepec, who killed one third of his 200 soldiers (Chance 1989, 38). 
8.1.2 “Collectivist” núcleos: a clarification 
Since the inception of the social property era, the Mexican government has recognized 
that rural practices tend to lie along a continuum between individual and village orientation. In 
its occasional nationwide Ejido Censuses (which include all núcleos), agricultural-livestock-
forestry activities are counted as being either “collective” (“realizada en forma colectiva”) or 
“non-collective” in nature (INEGI 2001a, INEGI 2008). It is important to understand that 
“collective” only refers to a specific form of village-scale orientation: work that is performed by 
most or all village households formally organized for a single commercial purpose (Singelmann 
1978, 57). It does not directly signify anything particular about land tenure practices, except that 
any collectivist núcleo necessarily include some land dedicated to the common commercial 
                                                        
118 The trout hatchery and recreational pool recently built by a Talean entrepreneur is a good example of a 
water-related individual initiative which was conceived with village-scale benefits in mind. 
119 For a dicussion of nuanced engagements with the modern state at multiple scales, see Li (2005). 
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purpose. The establishment of collectivist ejidos (almost never comunidades agrarias) was 
especially strong during the Cárdenas administration in the late 1930s (Singelmann 1978, 38). 
The two Ejido Censuses for which this data is readily available were conducted in 2001 and 
2007. They show that, in general, about five percent of the agriculture and livestock ranching is 
collective, and 50 percent of the commercial forestry, but because agriculture and livestock 
ranching is much more common than commercial forestry, overall about 7 percent of núcleos 
have collective production of some sort (INEGI 2001a, INEGI 2008). 
It is not coincidental that of my 33 RAN document study núcleos, the same ejido, Las 
Armas, includes the most clearly collectivist agricultural scheme (an irrigated sugar cane zone 
administered by a rural corporation owned equally by all ejidatarios) is also among the most 
market-oriented of the villages, and that it enthusiastically participated in PROCEDE. Las Armas 
is also the one núcleo of the 33 to definitely contain a sociedad de producción rural – a “rural 
production society” – that is, a government-recognized collectivist corporation consisting of all 
or some ejidatarios or comuneros for selling an agricultural product.  
Between 2001 and 2007, collective agriculture increased in both relative and absolute 
terms: a relative increase from 4.4 percent to 5.9 percent of all núcleos which practice 
agriculture, and a surprising 40 percent increase in absolute terms, from 1,236 to 1,734 núcleos 
overall.120 Despite their superficially “socialist” appearance, collectivist ejidos tend to be more 
capitalist, and less self-sustainable, than others because they are so much more dedicated to 
commercial agriculture rather than subsistence121 (Stavenhagen 1975, 163). In some indigenous 
areas, such as parts of Guatemala, the practice of subsistence farming is an important part of 
identifying oneself, and being identified by others, as “indigenous” (Brent Metz, University of 
Kansas anthropologist, pers. comm., 2012). Nevertheless, Las Armas is proudly indigenous, and 
atypically has significant numbers of both Nahua and Teenek residents.  
                                                        
120 The differences between absolute and relative figures arise from the fact that the total number of social 
property núcleos actually jumped from 30,305 in 2001 to 31,514 in 2007, presumably due mainly to the legal 
resolution of villages with uncertain status. 
121 When Chinantec villages were to be flooded by the Papaloapan Commission reservoirs (Barabas and 
Bartolomé 1973), the government chose the “collective ejido” as the format for the resettlements, even though 
most of the villagers thought this was not a workable scheme. “As one campesino said, ‘the collective idea 
came from the government; we’re used to working individually, because in collective work, the little that we 
earn must be shared among everyone” (de Teresa 2000, 97). 
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8.1.3 Legal changes and challenges in post-1992 Mexico  
Rather than introducing an entirely new spatiality to a núcleo, PROCEDE surveying and 
certification tends to merely add a new level of state imprimatur over existing de facto intra-
village tenure patterns. However, there are at least five important ways in which this sometimes 
is not the case. First, PROCEDE surveying fixes in space what was, in some instances, a 
positionally malleable tenure boundary. Second, PROCEDE surveying reduces the variety of 
actual tenure categories to a simplified system; for example, the “intermediate areas” (e.g., in the 
Chinantec comunidad of Totomoxtla) are one potential “casualty” of PROCEDE. Third, 
PROCEDE surveys are absurdly precise, with boundary vertex coordinates stated in millimeters. 
This produces, in some cases, sharper boundary lines than are appropriate to local tenure 
practices. Fourth, surprisingly often, the RAN defines a “núcleo” contrary to the real village 
identities, and this is reconfirmed through PROCEDE certification. Two of the communities 
investigated in this study (Cuatlamayán and Tiltepec) legally share their territory with another 
village that they have nothing to do with in daily life. Talea, too, is almost an example of this, 
because the hamlet of Santa Gertrudis within its territory takes care of most of its own affairs. 
Fifth, existing village-scale control over a spatially-defined núcleo territory is obviously directly 
affected when one or more individual parcels are removed from its territory through conversion 
to dominio pleno.122 However, dominio pleno is still rare in most indigenous areas. 
Practices which blend the individual and the village have always existed in social property 
communities, and they still persist and evolve. However, CONAGUA’s nationally standardized 
rights concession system does, in theory, contribute to the village’s loss of control over water 
sources within its boundaries. Article 55 of the 1992/2004 Water Law clarifies that the individual 
parcel owner has first rights to water; and, any village-scale infrastructure should be filed with 
the state’s registry, and subject to a nationally standardized fee schedule. The village is 
compelled to cede power to both the individual and the state, which emphasizes the ties between 
                                                        
122 Eric Perramond (2010, 78-80) found that “many private ranches are creations of former ejido members who 
now own their ranch outright. [. . .] Because the ‘process’ of becoming private has remained elusive in the 
social science literature, it has reinforced the binary of ‘private’ or ‘communal’ in land-tenure 
discussions. [. . .] Are they part of ejido, or not? Yes and no. Some maintain ties, and some other community 
members don’t mind this. [. . .] Typically, however, the transition from communal to private involves a gentle 
phasing out of communal role-playing.”  
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water sources and land only in the context of an individual’s rights – and only as long as that 
individual is prepared to receive the state’s blessing through a registered concession (Kauffer 
Michel 2006, 222). 
Political scientist Michelle Diggles’ doctoral dissertation comparing responses to 
PROCEDE in two indigenous ejidos in Yucatán state describes one evolving nexus between 
individualized land tenure and water sources. Beginning around 1970, the ejido of Maní 
gradually engaged with a state initative to encourage well irrigation for citrus plantations. The 
irrigated portions of the núcleo territory became de facto individual parcels, while the non-
irrigated areas remained as de facto common use areas planted in rotative milpa (maize complex) 
and secondary forest. The community accepted PROCEDE parceling for its irrigated area, and 
kept the milpa zone as de jure common use (Diggles 2008, 104). PROCEDE parceling had the 
effect of encouraging parcel sales within the ejido, including among non-ejidatarios, but 
indigenous self-identity was maintained mainly through practices within the common use area 
(Diggles 2008, 1). 
In general, an interesting and probably unintended consequence of the division of 
PROCEDE-surveyed núcleos into legally distinct individual parcels is the greater degree of state 
regulation on waters. Many streams and ponds now cross multiple properties which before were 
contained within a single property, the ejido or comunidad. The Mexican Constitution stipulates 
that “[. . .] water bodies or courses completely contained within a single parcel are considered an 
integral part of the property” (Cámara de Diputados 2004, 15). This provides one example 
among many that neoliberal-inspired initiatives are usually promoted as reducing the role of the 
state, but in fact they tend to increase it. 
We must avoid overstating the degree to which individualization of water rights can ever 
be compared or linked to the privatization of land ownership. Karen Bakker, paraphrasing Noel 
Castree, has stated that geographers are “unable to generate convincing explanations of the 
neoliberalization of nature as a historically and geographically differentiated, yet global (or at 
least translocal) phenomenon.” For example, some primary commodities – specifically, water – 
have been subject to a more “restricted” neoliberalization than certain others (Bakker 2010b, 
721). A few components of the1992 and 2004 reforms to Mexico’s Water Law do bring a subtle 
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new emphasis to the linkage of land ownership and water rights, but there are three facts which 
would impede and ultimately limit this shift, even if it were not resisted in some social property 
communities. First, land ownership is never entirely “individual” or “private” (see sub-section 
1.1.1). Even the most neoliberalized system recognizes the many kinds of group interests tied to 
any property, and to its natural resources. Second, the state has a compelling interest in keeping 
water fundamentally available as a public utility. This is reflected in the Mexican Constitution, in 
the standardizing of the CONAGUA water rights concession system, and perhaps in the state’s 
the deliberate failure to bestow social property núcleo status on villages in the Miguel de la 
Madrid Reservoir watershed (see subsection 7.4.1). Finally, the fluid or vaporous nature of water 
as a physical substance limits the ways in which it can be linked to particular properties or 
territories.  
8.1.4 “Successful” villages and water in the study regions 
It has been said that the successful management of natural resources by village-scale 
groups depends only partly on legal decrees. More fundamentally, it is an issue of social capital 
(Madrid et al. 2009, 186), which should include organizational experience, shared general 
values, and clearly delimited resource boundaries (Merino 2004, 47). These scholars would 
contend that there is nothing inherently “anti-village” about PROCEDE, but they would concede 
that it is part of a larger, longer-term process of village disintegration or, occasionally, re-
integration in a new form. Neoliberal land tenure reform represents yet another challenge facing 
all rural societies as they come into increasing contact with the state, with the global economy, 
with the urban centers of cultural, financial, and political power, and with each other.  
The varied resistance to, and modifications of, PROCEDE can be seen as another step in 
the centuries-long process of forging a Mexican identity that fuses the “indigenous” with the 
“Western.” Some have credited the initial efforts in this enterprise from the Western point of 
view to the Jesuits, who until their expulsion in 1767 worked more than anyone else other than 
the indigenous themselves to make the “Mexican territory [. . .] a shared legacy” (Alfaro 2011, 
84). Nora Haenn (2006, 142) described neoliberal-era creative engagement of social property 
residents as “the re-appropriation of PROCEDE at the state, regional, and local levels” (Haenn). 
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In Talea, the invention of “customary” practices that embrace the commercial sector without 
abandoning the local is nothing new: “Talea’s coffee tradition is a case of cultural creativity” 
(González 2001, 226).  
Regarding water, this creative engagement with the state and with the commercial sector 
will be put to the test in certain places more acutely than in others. Within regions where 
abundant rainfall has made the development of an explicit local rights apportionment system 
unnecessary, a small subset of villages may nevertheless have new demands placed on their 
water. The two types of external water users most likely to affect a few of the villages in the 
Huasteca Potosina or the Sierra Norte de Oaxaca are growing cities and water-intensive 
commercial export crops; water-intensive rural industries may also appear in a few places. 
Among the RAN document study núcleos, the ones most likely to serve as sources for medium-
scale water transport to cities are Huichimal, La Lima, and La Subida (Figure 7.2 on page 305), 
which are 10 to 20 km from the city of Ciudad Valles. The ejido or comunidad most likely to be 
called upon to provide water for large-scale commercial irrigation may be Lachixola (Figure 7.1 
on page 300), which is located near an increasingly important area for export-quality mangos. 
However, such communities will be the exception rather than the rule: long-distance water 
transport is expensive and rare. In any case, as the example of Axocopa demonstrates (subsection 
1.2.2), the pressure of an outside entity placing demands on a valuable resource can sometimes 
improve village orientation. In the longer term, climate change may also play a role.123   
8.1.5 Final thoughts: Indigenous individuals in indigenous villages 
It is not necessary to introduce “indigeneity” into the story of evolving practices and 
natural resources in social property Mexico, but it is a contributing factor to the degree and forms 
of resistance to erosion of village-oriented rights and obligations. Indigenous culture is positively 
                                                        
123Anecdotally, one preliminary indicator of climate change in my study areas may be the several “dried-up” 
springs scattered across several of the núcleos. For example, a local informant in Cuatlamayán told México 
Indígena student researchers that “before, the wells and springs usually had water all year round, the 
Tancanhuitz Arroyo was clean, and enough water ran so that various folks fished, and it rained a lot; the 
planting and the harvest is all over the place these days, and sometimes it fails altogether.” Preliminary data 
colleceted by entomologist Hans Clebsch (pers. comm., 2007) on wasps in the Río Sayulapam valley (Fig. 2.4 
on page 53) suggests the possibility of altitudinal habitat shifts in the Sierra Norte due to climate change. 
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correlated with both outright refusal to convert individual parcels from de facto to de jure status, 
and with less easily quantifiable preservation of village-oriented practices even where 
PROCEDE parceling has occurred. To an extent, the 1992 reforms already accommodated the 
distinctive culture of some indigenous areas, by not allowing newly surveyed comunidad parcels 
to be fully privatized (dominio pleno). (I remind the reader that nearly all comunidades are 
“indigenous” by most definitions of the word, while at most half of Mexico’s ejidos are in some 
sense “indigenous.”) Indeed, for some members of some comunidades such as Talea, PROCEDE 
represents an example of the state prohibiting certain individual ownership and commercial 
opportunities they desire. In other words, even under Salinas and afterwards, much of the 
Mexican bureaucracy has maintained an interest in preserving some elements of the Revolution-
era land reforms, or at least the appearance of preserving them. While the era of progressive land 
redistribution is obviously long over, the PRI’s recent (2012) return to national power may 
engender a further prolonging of some of those ideals, at least in rhetoric if not in action.  
Precisely because Mexico does not officially designate or recognize individuals or 
territories as “indigenous,” indigeneity is a pervasive, creative, active undercurrent rather than a 
static, segregated category. In the words of Mary Louise Pratt (2007, 403): 
The idea of generativity perhaps takes one small step past jaded pragmatism. It 
conceives of indigeneity not as a configuration or a state, but as a force that enables, 
that makes things happen. This generativity, I would suggest, lies not only in what 
indigeneity actually makes happen in a given instance, but also in the unrealized 
possibilities that it creates in every situation, and that remains as potentialities that 
can be activated in the future. One imagines indigeneity, then, as an unfolding in 
space-time that generates realized and unrealized possibilities. 
 
Cultural ecologists must always be careful to refrain from passing judgment on 
demonstrations of individual agency. Any one villager is free to decide, from moment to 
moment, what action is best for them, and how to best utilize the structures of family, village, 
state, and world. In Talea, Laura Nader (1990, 260) observed that “state and village law often 
disagree over what is more important – the public good or the individual. Individuals [. . .] have a 
keen understanding of which jurisdiction is more favorable to their plight or where their situation 
is more negotiable.” With the increasingly robust connectivity pathways afforded by the Internet 
356 
 
  
and by cyclical emigration, the world beyond the state is an ever-increasing panoply of further 
options for individual engagement, what David Slater calls “globalization from below” (Slater 
2004, 219; see also Warf 2012, 279).  
While connectivity and opportunity should be celebrated, Peter Singelmann (1978), 
inspired by Ferdinand Tönnies (1957), reminded us that something is lost when a village and its 
residents forge deeper ties with national and international political and market structures. 
According to Singlemann, the village loses autonomy and self-dependence, and with it a 
predictable, steady existence, subject to neither boom nor bust. Debatably, this loss is a price 
worth paying: first, because global connectivity can help make a wider range of lifeways 
available to certain individuals, e.g., women and landless “pobladores”; and second, because 
many indigenous individuals are able to maintain a deep tie to specific territories and village-
scale groups while they simultaneously engage in more “modern,” less place-bound practices. 
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—. 1945. Títulos Traslativos de Dominio. In Expediente [Dossier] 801-TC: Comunidad de Santa 
María Totomoxtla. Archivo Histórico, Oaxaca, Mexico. 
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RAN. 1949a. Dotación Definitiva para el Poblado de Chimalaco (map). In Expediente [Dossier] 
42-340: Ejido de Chimalaco (Documentación Jurídica). Archivo General Agrario, San Luis 
Potosí, Mexico.  
—. 1949b. Resolución Presidencial. In Expediente [Dossier] 42-1138: Ejido de La Lima 
(Documentación Jurídica). Archivo General Agrario, San Luis Potosí, Mexico.  
—. 1953. Confirmación de Derechos sobre Bienes Comunales. In Expediente [Dossier] 
276.1/259: Comunidad de Santa Cruz Tepetotutla. Archivo Histórico, Oaxaca, Mexico. 
—. 1955-58. Documents related to rights of renters. In Expediente [Dossier] 276.1/612: 
Comunidad de San Miguel Tiltepec. Archivo Histórico, Oaxaca, Mexico. 
—. 1957a. Request for Reconocimiento y Titulación de Bienes Comunales. In Expediente 
[Dossier] 20/C-206/I/286: Comunidad de San Miguel Talea de Castro (Carpeta Básica). 
Archivo General Agrario, Oaxaca, Mexico. 
—. 1957b. Solicitud de Restitución de Terrenos Comunales. In Expediente [Dossier] 23-1121: 
Comunidad de Cuatlamayán. Archivo Histórico, San Luis Potosí, Mexico. 
—. 1961. Resolución Presidencial de 12 Julio 1961. In Expediente [Dossier] 457/001/84: Ejido 
de La Alicia (Carpeta Básica). Archivo General Agrario, Oaxaca, Mexico. 
—. 1964. Reconocimiento y Titulación de Bienes Comunales. In Expediente [Dossier] 2399: 
Comunidad de Chacatitla. Archivo Histórico, San Luis Potosí, Mexico. 
—. 1965-73. Documents related to requests for Reconocimiento y Titulación de Bienes 
Comunales. In Expediente [Dossier] 585-TC: Comunidad de San Juan Yagila. Archivo 
Histórico, Oaxaca, Mexico. 
—. 1966a. Letters to Delegado de Asuntos Agrarios y Colonización regarding new topographic 
survey. In Expediente [Dossier] 2316: Comunidad de Tancuime. Archivo Histórico, San Luis 
Potosí, Mexico. 
—. 1966b. Plano para Resolución Presidencial (map). In Expediente [Dossier] 23-2203: 
Comunidad de Cuatlamayán. Archivo Histórico, San Luis Potosí, Mexico. 
—. 1967. Delegado de Asuntos Agrarios y Colonización en el Estado to Jefe de Asuntos 
Agrarios y Colonización, May 17, 1967 (letter). In Expediente [Dossier] 276.1/259: 
Comunidad de Santa Cruz Tepetotutla. Archivo Histórico, Oaxaca, Mexico. 
—. 1968. Letters between Delegado de Asuntos Agrarios y Colonización and ejido authorities 
regarding surveying of individual parcels. In Expediente [Dossier] 23/495: Ejido de 
Chimalaco. Archivo Histórico, San Luis Potosí, Mexico. 
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RAN. 1968-69. Documents related to census of comuneros for Reconocimiento y Titulación de 
Bienes Comunales. In Expediente [Dossier] 276.1/612: Comunidad de San Miguel Tiltepec. 
Archivo Histórico, Oaxaca, Mexico. 
—. 1968-72. Documents related to Tribunal Expediente C-137(I)/1972. In Expediente [Dossier] 
276.1/672: Comunidad de San Martin Buenavista. Archivo Histórico, Oaxaca, Mexico. 
—. 1969. Certificado del Título. In Expediente [Dossier] 668-TC: Comunidad de Asunción 
Lachixila (Carpeta Básica). Archivo General Agrario, Oaxaca, Mexico. 
—. 1969a. Documents related to status of settlers in Cerro Machín. In Expediente [Dossier] 
276.1/612: Comunidad de San Miguel Tiltepec. Archivo Histórico, Oaxaca, Mexico. 
—. 1969b. Informe de los Trabajos Ejecutados para El Reconocimiento y Titulación de los 
Bienes Comunales. In Expediente [Dossier] 276.1/259: Comunidad de Santa Cruz 
Tepetotutla. Archivo Histórico, Oaxaca, Mexico. 
—. 1969c. Letter from communal authorities to SRA San Luis Potosí concerning unauthorized 
occupation of communal lands. In Expediente [Dossier] 23-2303: Comunidad de 
Cuatlamayán. Archivo Histórico, San Luis Potosí, Mexico. 
—. 1969d. Reconocimento y Titulación de Bienes Comunes (map). In Expediente [Dossier] 42-
57: Comunidad de Cuatlamayán (Documentación Jurídica, Vol. 1). Archivo General Agrario, 
San Luis Potosí, Mexico. 
—. 1970a. Letter of July 6, 1970 from ejido authorities concerning a minority faction’s 
resistance to parcel surveying. In Expediente [Dossier] 23/495: Ejido de Chimalaco. Archivo 
Histórico, San Luis Potosí, Mexico. 
—. 1970b. Letters from communal authorities to DAAC Oaxaca concerning land use. In 
Expediente [Dossier]: Comunidad de San Miguel Talea de Castro). Archivo Histórico, 
Oaxaca, Mexico. 
—. 1971a. Acta de Dotación. In Expediente [Dossier] OAX/E-635/01/122: Ejido de San Antonio 
Las Palmas (Carpeta Básica). Archivo General Agrario, Oaxaca, Mexico. 
—. 1971b. José María Pérez Hernández to DAAC Oaxaca, October 16, 1971 (letter). In 
Expediente [Dossier] 668-TC: Comunidad de Asunción Lachixila (Carpeta Básica). Archivo 
General Agrario, Oaxaca, Mexico. 
—. 1972a. Denuncia. In Expediente [Dossier] 276.1/259: Comunidad de Santa Cruz Tepetotutla. 
Archivo Histórico, Oaxaca, Mexico. 
—. 1972b. Gilbert García Osorio to DAAC Oaxaca (letter). In Expediente [Dossier] 276.1/259: 
Comunidad de Santa Cruz Tepetotutla. Archivo Histórico, Oaxaca, Mexico. 
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RAN. 1972c. Resolución Presidencial y Confirmación de Bienes Comunales. In Expediente 
[Dossier] 749-TC: Comunidad de San Pablo Guelatao. Archivo Histórico, Oaxaca, Mexico. 
—. 1973a. Acta de asamblea concerning abandoned parcel. In Expediente [Dossier] 23/205: 
Ejido de Tazáquil. Archivo Histórico, San Luis Potosí, Mexico. 
—. 1973b. Congregeción Chachalaca to DAAC Oaxaca, November 20, 1973 (letter). In 
Expediente [Dossier] 668-TC: Comunidad de Asunción Lachixila (Carpeta Básica). Archivo 
General Agrario, Oaxaca, Mexico. 
—. 1973c. Informe del Delgado de Asuntos Agrarias. In Expediente [Dossier] 668-TC: 
Comunidad de Asunción Lachixila (Carpeta Básica). Archivo General Agrario, Oaxaca, 
Mexico. 
—. 1973d. Raúl Martínez Martínez to DAAC Oaxaca (letter). In Expediente [Dossier] 749-TC: 
Comunidad de San Pablo Guelatao. Archivo Histórico, Oaxaca, Mexico. 
—. 1973e. Resolución Presidencial de Posesión Definitiva. In Expediente [Dossier] OAX/E-
635/01/122: Ejido de San Antonio Las Palmas (Carpeta Básica). Archivo General Agrario, 
Oaxaca, Mexico. 
—. 1973f. Santa Cruz (map). In Expediente [Dossier] 42-219: Ejido de Santa Cruz. Archivo 
General Agrario, San Luis Potosí, Mexico. 
—. 1973g. Trabajos Técnicos Informativos Pendientes de Ejecución, por el Instituto Nacional 
Indigenista. In Expediente [Dossier] 749-TC: Comunidad de San Pablo Guelatao. Archivo 
Histórico, Oaxaca, Mexico. 
—. 1973-74. Requests for Reconocimiento y Titulación de Bienes Comunales. In Expediente 
[Dossier] 801-TC: Comunidad de Santa María Totomoxtla. Archivo Histórico, Oaxaca, 
Mexico. 
—. 1973-75. Documents related to dispute over a communal parcel. In Expediente [Dossier] 23-
2203: Comunidad de Cuatlamayán. Archivo Histórico, San Luis Potosí, Mexico. 
—. 1975a. Letter from Comisariado de Bienes Comunales to SRA San Luís Potosí regarding 
Acta de Asamblea. In Expediente [Dossier] 2399: Comunidad de Chacatitla. Archivo 
Histórico, San Luis Potosí, Mexico 
—. 1975b. Wilfredo Orozco Ramírez to SRA Oaxaca (letter). In Expediente [Dossier] 749-TC: 
Comunidad de San Pablo Guelatao. Archivo Histórico, Oaxaca, Mexico. 
—. 1976a. Letter of April 18, 1976 from ejido authorities concerning location of urban area. In 
Expediente [Dossier] 23/495: Ejido de Chimalaco. Archivo Histórico, San Luis Potosí, 
Mexico. 
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RAN. 1976b. Request for boundary survey by communal authorities to SRA Oaxaca. In 
Expediente [Dossier]: Comunidad de San Miguel Talea de Castro). Archivo Histórico, 
Oaxaca, Mexico. 
—. 1976-79. Documents related to Silvicola Magdalena (Fábricas de Papel Tuxtepec). In 
Expediente [Dossier] 276.1/672: Comunidad de San Martin Buenavista. Archivo Histórico, 
Oaxaca, Mexico. 
—. 1977a. Letter from SRA San Luís Potosí to Presidente del Comisariado de Bienes 
Comunales. In Expediente [Dossier] 2399: Comunidad de Chacatitla. Archivo Histórico, San 
Luis Potosí, Mexico. 
—. 1977b. Reconocimiento y Titulación de Bienes Comunales. In Expediente [Dossier] 20/C-
064/I/01: Comunidad de San Miguel Reagui (Carpeta Básica). Archivo General Agrario, 
Oaxaca, Mexico. 
—. 1977c. Report by Juan Toledo Cruz Ramos regarding smallholders within community 
boundaries. In Expediente [Dossier] 276.1/672: Comunidad de San Martin Buenavista. 
Archivo Histórico, Oaxaca, Mexico. 
—. 1977-79. Reconocimiento y Titulación de Bienes Comunales and related documents. 
Expediente [Dossier] 276.1/612: Comunidad de San Miguel Tiltepec. Archivo Histórico, 
Oaxaca, Mexico. Archivo Histórico, Oaxaca, Mexico. 
—. 1977-80. Reconocimiento y Titulación de Bienes Comunales and related documents. In 
Expediente [Dossier] 909-TC: Comunidad de Santa María Lachichina. Archivo Histórico, 
Oaxaca, Mexico. 
—. 1978a. Carlos Fernández Flores (Confederacíon Nacional Campesina) to SRA Oaxaca, 
February 20, 1978 (letter). In Expediente [Dossier] 276.1/259: Comunidad de Santa Cruz 
Tepetotutla. Archivo Histórico, Oaxaca, Mexico. 
—. 1978b. Ejido del Pueblo de San Juan Chicomezúchil (map). In Expediente [Dossier] 20/C-
003/I/01: Ejido de San Juan Chicomezúchil (Carpeta Básica). Archivo General Agrario, 
Oaxaca, Mexico. 
—. 1978c. Report of Brigada de Topógrafos para Deslindes de Comunidades. In Expediente 
[Dossier] 276.1/672: Comunidad de San Martin Buenavista. Archivo Histórico, Oaxaca, 
Mexico. 
—. 1979a. Acta de Deslinde. In Expediente [Dossier] OAX/E-635/01/122: Ejido de San Antonio 
Las Palmas (Carpeta Básica). Archivo General Agrario, Oaxaca, Mexico. 
—. 1979b. Informe [Report] for Resolución Presidencial. In Expediente [Dossier] 585-TC: 
Comunidad de San Juan Yagila. Archivo Histórico, Oaxaca, Mexico. 
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RAN. 1979-82. Documents related to request for Amplicíon de Ejido. In Expediente [Dossier] 
25/3448: Poblado de Tampate y Eureka. Archivo Histórico, San Luis Potosí, Mexico. 
—. 1979-83. Acta de Agencia Municipal and other documents related to dispute with Fenelón 
property owners. In Expediente [Dossier] 668-TC: Comunidad de Asunción Lachixila 
(Carpeta Básica). Archivo General Agrario, Oaxaca, Mexico. 
—. 1980a. Acta de Ejecución del Mandamiento Gubernamental del Ejido Provisional de Nuevo 
Rosario Temextitlán. In Expediente [Dossier] 937-TC: Comunidad de Santiago Cuasimulco. 
Archivo Histórico, Oaxaca, Mexico. 
—. 1980b. Documentación Técnica Relativa a los Trabajos de Ejecución de la Resolución 
Presidencial sobre Reconocimiento y Titulación de Bienas Comunales. In Expediente 
[Dossier] 276.1/612: Comunidad de San Miguel Tiltepec. Archivo Histórico, Oaxaca, 
Mexico. 
—. 1980c. Documents related to claim by campesino group to be a social property community. 
In Expediente [Dossier] 319: Comunidad de Cuayo Piaxtla. Archivo Histórico, San Luis 
Potosí, Mexico 
—. 1980d. Ejecución de Deslinde de la Resolución Presidencial and related documents, 
including Plano (map), scale 1:40,000. In Expediente [Dossier] 276.1/259: Comunidad de 
Santa Cruz Tepetotutla. Archivo Histórico, Oaxaca, Mexico. 
—. 1980e. Minutes from community assembly meetings. In Expediente [Dossier] 801-TC: 
Comunidad de Santa María Totomoxtla. Archivo Histórico, Oaxaca, Mexico. 
—. 1981. Documents related to Acuerdo sobre Reconocimiento y Titulación de Bienes 
Comunales. In Expediente [Dossier] 898-TC: Poblado de San Juan Yatzona. Archivo 
Histórico, Oaxaca, Mexico. 
—. 1981-86. Documents related to intra-community disputes. In Expediente [Dossier] 
276.1/612: Comunidad de San Miguel Tiltepec. Archivo Histórico, Oaxaca, Mexico. 
—. 1981-90. Documents related to Reconocimiento y Titulación de Bienes Comunales. In 
Expediente [Dossier] 937-TC: Comunidad de Santiago Cuasimulco. Archivo Histórico, 
Oaxaca, Mexico. 
—. C. Alberto Rasgado Salinas to SRA Oaxaca, and replies from Alfredo Pérez Velazco and 
Genaro Montaño Montaño (letters). In Expediente [Dossier] 276.1/612: Comunidad de San 
Miguel Tiltepec. Archivo Histórico, Oaxaca, Mexico. 
—. 1983. Certificados de Reconocimiento de Miembros de la Comunidad. In Expediente 
[Dossier] 23-1121: Comunidad de Cuatlamayán. Archivo Histórico, San Luis Potosí, 
Mexico. 
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RAN. 1983-86. Documents related to Resolución Presidencial. In Expediente [Dossier] 585-TC: 
Comunidad de San Juan Yagila. Archivo Histórico, Oaxaca, Mexico. 
—. 1984a. Manifestación and Escritura. In Expediente [Dossier] 909-TC: Comunidad de Santa 
María Lachichina. Archivo Histórico, Oaxaca, Mexico. 
—. 1984b. Reconocimiento y Titulación de Bienes Comunales. In Expediente [Dossier]: 
Comunidad de San Miguel Talea de Castro). Archivo Histórico, Oaxaca, Mexico. 
—. 1984-86. Acta de Asamblea and related documents. In Expediente [Dossier] 909-TC: 
Comunidad de Santa María Lachichina. Archivo Histórico, Oaxaca, Mexico 
—. 1985. Prisciliano Morales Domínguez to SRA Oaxaca (letter). In Expediente [Dossier] 749-
TC: Comunidad de San Pablo Guelatao. Archivo Histórico, Oaxaca, Mexico. 
—. 1986a. Acta de Transferencia de Derechos. In Expediente [Dossier] 909-TC: Comunidad de 
Santa María Lachichina. Archivo Histórico, Oaxaca, Mexico. 
—. 1986b. Actas de Posesión de Solares. In Expediente [Dossier] 909-TC: Comunidad de Santa 
María Lachichina. Archivo Histórico, Oaxaca, Mexico. 
—. 1987-89a. Documents related to dispute with Mónico Flores Osorio. In Expediente [Dossier] 
668-TC: Comunidad de Asunción Lachixila (Carpeta Básica). Archivo General Agrario, 
Oaxaca, Mexico. 
—. 1987-89b. Documents related to dispute with Rogelio Jiménez. In Expediente [Dossier] 668-
TC: Comunidad de Asunción Lachixila (Carpeta Básica). Archivo General Agrario, Oaxaca, 
Mexico. 
—. 1989a. Acta de Aceptación para Realizar la Verificación de Linderos. In Expediente 
[Dossier] 23/1296: Ejido de San Antonio Huichimal. Archivo Histórico, San Luis Potosí, 
Mexico 
—. 1989b. Documents related to disputed land at Rancho Elote/Mii-Laa. In Expediente 
[Dossier] 276.1/672: Comunidad de San Martin Buenavista. Archivo Histórico, Oaxaca, 
Mexico. 
—. 1989c. Reconocimiento y Titulación de Bienes Comunales Complementaria. In Expediente 
[Dossier] 20/C-003/I/01: Ejido de San Juan Chicomezúchil (Carpeta Básica). Archivo 
General Agrario, Oaxaca, Mexico. 
—. 1990. Acta de Investigación de Campo Practicada con Motivo de la Investigación General de 
Usufructo Parcelario Ejidal. In Expediente [Dossier] 457/001/84: Ejido de La Alicia (Carpeta 
Básica). Archivo General Agrario, Oaxaca, Mexico. 
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RAN. 1990-95. Reconocimiento y Titulación de Bienes Comunales and related documents. In 
Expediente [Dossier] 668-TC: Comunidad de Asunción Lachixila (Carpeta Básica). Archivo 
General Agrario, Oaxaca, Mexico. 
—. 1990-96. Documents related to intervillage boundary conflicts. In Expediente [Dossier] 585-
TC: Comunidad de San Juan Yagila. Archivo Histórico, Oaxaca, Mexico. 
—. 1991. Request by community assembly to establish school parcel. In Expediente [Dossier] 
801-TC: Comunidad de Santa María Totomoxtla. Archivo Histórico, Oaxaca, Mexico. 
—. 1991-92. Quejas y Denuncias. In Expediente [Dossier] 668-TC: Comunidad de Asunción 
Lachixila (Carpeta Básica). Archivo General Agrario, Oaxaca, Mexico. 
—. 1992. Pedro González Martínez to SRA Oaxaca (petition). In Expediente [Dossier] 
276.1/259: Comunidad de Santa Cruz Tepetotutla. Archivo Histórico, Oaxaca, Mexico. 
—. 1992-98. Documents related to Sentencia Sobre La Resolución Presidencial de 1991. In 
Expediente [Dossier] 937-TC: Comunidad de Santiago Cuasimulco. Archivo Histórico, 
Oaxaca, Mexico. 
—. 1993a. Acta de la Primera Reunión de PROCEDE. In Expediente [Dossier] 42-128: Ejido de 
Las Armas (Documentación Jurídica). Archivo General Agrario, San Luis Potosí, Mexico. 
—. 1993b. Primera Convocatoria. In Expediente [Dossier] 42-340: Ejido de Chimalaco 
(Documentación Jurídica). Archivo General Agrario, San Luis Potosí, Mexico.  
—. 1993c. Primera Convocatoria. In Expediente [Dossier] 42-269: Ejido de Tanchanaco. 
Archivo General Agrario, San Luis Potosí, Mexico.  
—. 1993d. Plano de la Comunidad for Acta de Ejecución y Deslinde (map). In Expediente 
[Dossier] 2399: Comunidad de Chacatitla. Archivo Histórico, San Luis Potosí, Mexico. 
—. 1994a. Primera Convocatoria. In Expediente [Dossier] 42-128: Ejido de Las Armas 
(Documentación Jurídica). Archivo General Agrario, San Luis Potosí, Mexico.  
—. 1994b. Reconocimiento y Titulación de Bienes Comunales. In Expediente [Dossier] 20/C-
206/I/286: Comunidad de San Miguel Talea de Castro (Carpeta Básica). Archivo General 
Agrario, Oaxaca, Mexico. 
—. 1995a. Álvaro González (World Wildlife Fund) to RAN Oaxaca (letter). In Expediente 
[Dossier] 276.1/612: Comunidad de San Miguel Tiltepec. Archivo Histórico, Oaxaca, 
Mexico. 
—. 1995b. Documents delivered to community upon completion of PROCEDE. In Expediente 
[Dossier] 42-219: Ejido de Santa Cruz. Archivo General Agrario, San Luis Potosí, Mexico. 
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RAN. 1995c. Documents delivered to community upon completion of PROCEDE, including 
Acta de Aceptación de Nuevos Ejidatarios, Posesionarios, y Avecindados and Delimitación y 
Destino de las Tierras Ejidales y Asignación de Derechos sobre las Mismas. In Expediente 
[Dossier] 42-340: Ejido de Chimalaco (Documentación Jurídica). Archivo General Agrario, 
San Luis Potosí, Mexico.  
—. 1995d. Documents related to case of Luis Martell Espinoza. In Expediente [Dossier] 2399: 
Comunidad de Chacatitla. Archivo Histórico, San Luis Potosí, Mexico. 
—. 1995e. Folio Auxiliar Parcelarios. In Expediente [Dossier] 42-340: Ejido de Chimalaco 
(Documentación Jurídica). Archivo General Agrario, San Luis Potosí, Mexico.   
—. 1995f. Relación de Ejidatarios, Posesionarios, y Avecindados Que Reciben Documentos. In 
Expediente [Dossier] 42-340: Ejido de Chimalaco (Documentación Jurídica). Archivo 
General Agrario, San Luis Potosí, Mexico. 
—. 1995g. Resumen de Información de Planos. In Expediente [Dossier] 42-340: Ejido de 
Chimalaco (Documentación Jurídica). Archivo General Agrario, San Luis Potosí, Mexico. 
—. 1996. Ficha Resúmen de Viabilidad y Dificultad. In Expediente [Dossier] 20/C-003/I/01: 
Ejido de San Juan Chicomezúchil (Carpeta Básica). Archivo General Agrario, Oaxaca, 
Mexico. 
—. 1997a. Acta de Ejecución de la Resolución Presidencial de 15 Agosto 1984. In Expediente 
[Dossier] 20/C-064/I/01: Comunidad de San Miguel Reagui (Carpeta Básica). Archivo 
General Agrario, Oaxaca, Mexico. 
—. 1997b. Asamblea de Información de PROCEDE. In Expediente [Dossier] 42-709: Ejido de 
La Pila. Archivo General Agrario, San Luis Potosí, Mexico. 
—. 1997c. Ficha Resúmen de Viabilidad y Dificultad por Comunidad. In Expediente [Dossier] 
42-57: Comunidad de Cuatlamayán (Documentación Jurídica, Vol. 1). Archivo General 
Agrario, San Luis Potosí, Mexico. 
—. 1997d. Plano Definitivo for Reconocimiento y Titulación de Bienes Comunales (map). In 
Expediente [Dossier] 20/C-206/I/286: Comunidad de San Miguel Talea de Castro (Carpeta 
Básica). Archivo General Agrario, Oaxaca, Mexico. 
—. 1997e. Resúmen de Viabilidad y Dificultad. In Expediente [Dossier] 42-81: Comunidad de 
Santa Bárbara (Documentación Jurídica). Archivo General Agrario, San Luis Potosí, 
Mexico. 
—. 1998a. Acta Convenio de Núcleo con Propietario Particular. In Expediente [Dossier] 42-57: 
Comunidad de Cuatlamayán (Documentación Jurídica, Vol. 2). Archivo General Agrario, San 
Luis Potosí, Mexico 
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RAN. 1998b. Acta de Asamblea. In Expediente [Dossier] 20/C-064/I/01: Comunidad de San 
Miguel Reagui (Carpeta Básica). Archivo General Agrario, Oaxaca, Mexico. 
—. 1998c. Asamblea de Delimitación, Destino, y Asignación de Tierras Ejidales, Resúmen 
General del Registrador, and Resúmen de Información. In Expediente [Dossier] 42-709: Ejido 
de La Pila. Archivo General Agrario, San Luis Potosí, Mexico. 
—. 1998d. Constancia de Exhibición de Gráficos and Folio Agrario de Tierras Matriz. In 
Expediente [Dossier] 20/C-036/I/01: Comunidad de Santa María Zoogochi (Carpeta Básica). 
Archivo General Agrario, Oaxaca, Mexico.  
—. 1998e. Documents delivered to community upon completion of PROCEDE, including Actas-
Convenios de Identificación, Rectificación, y Conformidad de Linderos. In Expediente 
[Dossier] 42-14: Comunidad de Cuajenco. Archivo General Agrario, San Luis Potosí, 
Mexico. 
—. 1998f. Documents delivered to community upon completion of PROCEDE, including 
Asignación de Parcelas, Resúmen de Información de Planos, and Realización de la Asamblea 
de Delimitación, Destino, y Asignación de Tierras. In Expediente [Dossier] 457/001/84: Ejido 
de La Alicia (Carpeta Básica). Archivo General Agrario, Oaxaca, Mexico. 
—. 1998g. Ficha Resúmen de Viabilidad y Dificultad. In Expediente [Dossier] 20/C-064/I/01: 
Comunidad de San Miguel Reagui (Carpeta Básica). Archivo General Agrario, Oaxaca, 
Mexico. 
—. 1998h. Ficha Resúmen de Viabilidad y Dificultad. In Expediente [Dossier] 20/C-036/I/01: 
Comunidad de Santa María Zoogochi (Carpeta Básica). Archivo General Agrario, Oaxaca, 
Mexico. 
—. 1998i. Opinión Técnica. In Expediente [Dossier] 20/C-036/I/01: Comunidad de Santa María 
Zoogochi (Carpeta Básica). Archivo General Agrario, Oaxaca, Mexico. 
—. 1998j. Primera Convocatoria [1]. In Expediente [Dossier] 42-57: Comunidad de 
Cuatlamayán (Documentación Jurídica, Vol. 1). Archivo General Agrario, San Luis Potosí, 
Mexico. 
—. 1998k. Primera Convocatoria and related documents. In Expediente [Dossier] 42-14: 
Comunidad de Cuajenco. Archivo General Agrario, San Luis Potosí, Mexico. 
—. 1998l. Resúmen de Viabilidad y Dificultad. In Expediente [Dossier] 42-14: Comunidad de 
Cuajenco. Archivo General Agrario, San Luis Potosí, Mexico. 
—. 1998m. Sistema de Control de Calidad Documental del Expediente Ejidal. In Expediente 
[Dossier] 42-190: Comunidad [sic] de Tancuime (Documentación Jurídica, Vol. 1). Archivo 
General Agrario, San Luis Potosí, Mexico. 
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RAN. 1999a. Acta de Delimitación, Destino, y Asignación de Tierras. In Expediente [Dossier] 
42-57: Comunidad de Cuatlamayán (Documentación Jurídica, Vol. 2). Archivo General 
Agrario, San Luis Potosí, Mexico. 
—. 1999b. Director General de Procedimientos Agrarios, SRA Oaxaca, to Autoridades de 
Tepetotutla, February 12, 1999 (letter). In Expediente [Dossier] 276.1/259: Comunidad de 
Santa Cruz Tepetotutla. Archivo Histórico, Oaxaca, Mexico. 
—. 1999c. Documents issued during PROCEDE process, including Acta de Asamblea de 
Regularización del Padrón de Comuneros and Convocatoria para la Asamblea de 
Delimitación, Destino, y Asignación de Tierras (ADDAT). In Expediente [Dossier] 42-57: 
Comunidad de Cuatlamayán (Documentación Jurídica, Vol. 1). Archivo General Agrario, San 
Luis Potosí, Mexico. 
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